Shaftesbury's Re-imagining of the Passions

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Abstract:

The Third Earl of Shaftesbury is generally viewed as the key philosopher in eighteenth-century England to reiterate the classical idea that man's virtue lay in recognizing the interconnectedness of all beings through his use of reason. In the face of a growing acceptance of self-interest as natural to man in the eighteenth century, Shaftesbury, through his writings, has been understood to have countered the view of man as naturally selfish by arguing that man through his reason can comprehend how all beings are organically linked, and desire the good of all. In this article, I focus on how Shaftesbury addressed a more particular problem – the idea of public good was now being seen as too abstract and remote to evoke the instinctive benevolence and virtue in man. In his time, the passions were increasingly understood as the prime mover or motivation for man's benevolent actions, and reason was not adequate enough to move men in desiring public good, especially the welfare of people outside their own familiar circle. This article shows how Shaftesbury reworks the older idea of virtue based on reason, into a virtue that is interwoven with the passions, in order to answer the problem of how people can be motivated to desire public good. Shaftesbury refurbishes a notion of virtue based on reason, and seeks to make it coterminous with a natural affection towards the idea of public good.

Keywords: Shaftesbury, virtue, eighteenth-century moral philosophy, passions, public good

1. Introduction

In the seventeenth century in England, an important question about the passions in relation to virtue was raised by many writers and there was a debate as to whether the passions could lead to self-interested or benevolent actions. An opposition between reason and passion was beginning to be challenged.[1] The passions, or affections as they were often called in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, were usually understood as feelings or desires not easily controlled by reason, and had most often been viewed with suspicion as not amenable to good reason and virtuous actions.

Passions were often seen as leading man to selfishness and the seeking of private interests at the expense of others. In the seventeenth century, this view was exemplified by the early modern English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. In his key treatise *Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme and Power*

of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil (1651) written during the civil war in England, he suggested that power was the central dynamic in human relations, and popularised the idea of man as naturally selfish and competitive. His view was developed in a more cynical and perhaps playful way in the early eighteenth century by the Anglo-Dutch philosopher, Bernard Mandeville. He dismissed the possibility of a disinterested or selfless virtue, in his two-volume work *The Fable of The Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits*[2] (1714) whose subtitle summed up his argument, which was that private self-interests were beneficial to society. He argued that individuals seeking their own profit would ultimately be a benefit to society. Mandeville condemned all claims of altruistic virtue as hypocritical and argued that those who were supposedly virtuous were driven by hidden, self-regarding motives. These writings of Hobbes and Mandeville accommodated expediency and the pursuit of power into their account of morality. There was an increasing visibility of such claims, and a steadily growing view in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century that saw man in a state of nature as naturally selfish, where his seemingly good actions were seen as motivated by self-interest, as Mandeville had suggested, and his inclination to his private self-interest, as Hobbes had argued, were inimical to public good.

The notion of many individuals with multiple interests as potentially frictional produced new challenges to imagining sociability. One response to imagine a new sense of sociability was to bring a renewed idea of virtue in eighteenth-century moral philosophy, which can be seen in the writings of the philosopher and writer, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, primarily in his treatise *An Inquiry Concerning Virtue* (1699) and *Sensus Communis: An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour* (1709). The former piece was revised as *An Inquiry Concerning Virtue, or Merit* along with new material and all his writings were published in an anthology titled *Characteristics of Men, Manner, Opinions, Times* in 1711 consisting of three volumes. His work, especially *An Inquiry,* served as a counter-force to the troubling but influential account of self-interest and the normative position it had come to occupy in the eighteenth century.

A view of man as driven by base passions was countered in the same period with efforts to see the natural goodness in man who was viewed as inextricably concerned with the well-being of others or at least was made uneasy by their distress. Hence there were two competing views of man – as a naturally selfish and deceptive being pursuing his advantages, profit and power, and the view that with a self-conscious effort at virtue and his natural benevolence, man achieved his best happiness in a just and harmonious society.

One question that moral philosophy in the eighteenth century like Shaftesbury's addressed was how the idea of private interest, if it had no regard for the welfare of others, detracted from public good.[3] Even an action purported to be good, could be undermined by base motives. Any selfish motivation behind supposedly benevolent actions was a dubious form of virtue. An instance of such an exhortation can be observed in *Sensus Communis* (1709), where Shaftesbury uses the term *Sensus Communis,* to mean the sense we have of the common interests of all men or we may call it man's natural sociability, that Shaftesbury believed in.[4] He suggested that human virtue was rooted

in a natural human sociability. Importantly for him, there must be an unsolicited and natural propensity towards virtue to make it a true virtue — "If the love of doing good be not of itself a good and right inclination, I know not how there can possibly be such a thing as goodness or virtue" (Shaftesbury *Sensus*, 46). Shaftesbury bemoans how "men have not been contented to show the natural advantages of honesty and virtue" but have made virtue into "so mercenary a thing," and "have talked so much of its rewards that one can hardly tell what there is in it, after all, which can be worth rewarding" (Shaftesbury *Sensus*, 46). Virtue was not tied to religion for him and he observes that for Christians, only voluntary virtues like "private friendship and zeal for the public and our country" that do not earn rewards in the afterlife, may therefore have the quality of disinterestedness and virtue (Shaftesbury *Sensus*, 46).

Shaftesbury's main philosophical work, *An Inquiry Concerning Virtue, or Merit* (1711), has been read as a renewal of a classical account of society viewed as an organic whole and this view invoked an equation between the virtuous and happy way of life.[5] Shaftesbury tried to negotiate the growing view of seeing man as inclined to self-interest produced largely by the influence of Thomas Hobbes. The debate on the selfish passions in man was co-produced alongside a vigorous discussion on the natural compassion in man for many moral sense philosophers like Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury's account of virtue involves the passions as playing a role, social passions which are powerful in making man benevolent.

In this essay, I show how Shaftesbury transforms the practice of virtue into a dynamic quality. He examines the passions in relation to virtue to show that individuals could desire the collective good through their passions. Virtue for Shaftesbury is imbued with passion, as the natural passions were beginning to be conceived in the period as a source of man's compelling inclination to sympathy and benevolence towards others. There was a shift to how the passions as an inevitable part of man were to be negotiated.

2. The self-reflexive self

With Shaftesbury's writings, eighteenth-century moral philosophy took a modern turn in its question about virtue in a society of increasingly "disembedded" individuals, as Charles Taylor as termed it.[6] In his magisterial history of the self in Western thought, Charles Taylor in *Sources of the Self*, offers a broad argument on how a self-reflexive self comes to its "full form" in Locke and other Enlightenment thinkers (Taylor *Sources of the Self,* 160).[7] A greater sense of individuation permeated the idea of the self in the eighteenth century which had come to indicate a self-reflexive individual as the object of his own reflective consciousness, a subject of his own feelings, and viewed by his own cognition.[8] A society of individuals had to be re-imagined as they were no longer organically linked in social relations.

The sense of selfhood was now imbued with an idea of a reflexive consciousness. This idea had been most prominently elaborated on by John Locke in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1689). As we know, Locke's notion of consciousness is one that is always "of" or "about" something,

the preposition dividing the subject from the object, even if the two are one and the same person. Consciousness in man is to register what knowledge he receives. Locke describes consciousness as noting or attending to what is outside us or in our minds which produces knowledge — consciousness is "our Observation employ'd either about external, sensible objects; or about the internal operation of our Minds, perceived or reflected on by ourselves" that produces knowledge (Locke, Book II, chap. I.2 p. 104)[9]. "Observation" entails a noticing, and Locke's word "employ'd" suggests an effort that is purposeful. For Locke, even in the most immediate and passive receiving of impressions, a consciousness of taking in ideas is present. Consciousness creates a mediation that is implicit in all selfhood. The imagining of one's own mind resulted in the understanding of the self as available in a virtual register. Shaftesbury views a self-reflexive human subjectivity as creating a peculiar alienation within man, and also between man and society. This detracted from man's capacity to naturally desire the good of all, a problem he seeks to resolve with a recuperation of the passions in the interest of sociability.

This kind of individuation where the self was mediated and therefore in a way, virtual rather than immediately experienced, meant that solidarity or a connection with other individuals in society had to be imagined in new ways. Virtual subjects would not cohere into a spontaneously felt society, as an individual subject did not immediately connect to a collective. This modern sense of subjectivity led to the notion that people may not feel naturally inclined towards the good of a larger collective outside of one's familiars, a concern I will show below in my reading of Shaftesbury. A connectedness between people had to be based now on a new imagined fellowship in a public sphere, as Jürgen Habermas calls it, one that was not perceived as an organic society but an imagined or virtual collective.[10] Michael McKeon explains Jürgen Habermas's idea of the virtuality of the public sphere as a "discursive realm of imagined collectivity where people 'come together' in a sense far different from their traditional assembly in the agora, the public square, the meeting hall, or the like" (McKeon, 276). As McKeon notes, "the virtualization of the public sphere" needed "a re-conceptualization of the faculty of the imagination as capable… of a remarkably powerful and productive sort of human solidarity" (276). In other words, the representation of social bonds now had to be produced through a simulated connection between an individual and others. To this end, the philosophy of Shaftesbury in his treatise *An Inquiry Concerning Virtue, or Merit* (1711), and later the Scottish philosopher Frances Hutcheson in *An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* (1725), sought to sketch a continuum between the vividness of passions that may be felt in particular encounters between individuals, and the more abstract idea of a public or society.

3. Self-interest and Public interest as One

Shaftesbury invigorated the debate on "common sense or the love of mankind" as essentially constituting the sociability of man (*Sensus*, 57).[11] He deplored the narrow Hobbesian view that man suppresses natural affection "turning every passion towards private advantage, a narrow self-end" (*Sensus*, 56). The terms "society" and "public" in the eighteenth century (where "public" was often

used as an adjective like public interest, public good, public spiritedness) were often drawn together by writers, for instance, like Shaftesbury who says that "a public spirit can come only from a social feeling or sense of partnership with human kind [...] There is no real love of virtue without the knowledge of public good" (*Sensus*, 50). The social and public are aligned here just as public good and virtue are aligned too.[12]

The notion of a public good was not new, and according to J. A. W Gunn, it was re-conceived from an earlier version of a common good.[13] The traditional view of the common good was that private interests must bow before the common good, whereas the newer individualist discourse pitted private interests as a counter to state or monarchical interest. Hence the gradual replacement of "common good" with "public interest" or "public good" can be observed. It was towards this public good that Shaftesbury argues for a consciousness of an organic universe. Virtue for him lay in actively perceiving the interconnectedness of all beings.

In order to establish what virtue may comprise, early in the *Inquiry* Shaftesbury distinguishes between "goodness" which for him means an affection for others available in all species, and "virtue" which for him is a reflection on goodness, a capacity exclusive to humans. Shaftesbury defines goodness as what is fit or appropriate in "every living creature" (plant, animal or man) in relation to its essence and in consonance with the harmony of "a system or whole" to which the thing belongs. Therefore, nothing can be good or bad unto itself only. He then rebuts the idea of man as disincorporated from society, by using a series of linked metaphors from nature that stress an organic view of the universe – where beings relate to each other as the limbs and organs relate to the body, just as leaves and branches of trees to each other and to one root. In such a system, an anomalous part in a network affects the whole, just as one "pernicious man" is "justly styled an ill man" as he ill-fits in with others and with his own real nature which is connected to others (Shaftesbury *Inquiry*, 169). The metaphors of part-whole that are likened to creature-species and man-society allow for parts to exist as units but not independently of each other or of the whole.

For Shaftesbury, persons do not just aggregate into a society, but must come together as they affect each other. Virtue, or 'merit' by which he means a self-conscious sense of virtue, is predicated on man recognizing the web-like nature of the universe and his embedded position in it. The joining of parts to make a whole is extended infinitely whereby each constituted whole is a part of a larger system. In human terms, this means that a society is not just a conglomeration of people in a whole system but also a firmly-tied group of units gesturing towards something beyond itself. People are not just a part of society, but as he puts it, society is part of a "globe or earth," which is further a part of another system like a "galaxy" (Shaftesbury *Inquiry,*169). His positioning of a whole into a part of something larger, serves to tighten its constituent units so that they lose their discrete identities and forge a whole, thus fitting into a larger organic whole. By establishing the interrelated parts of systems, which exist because of the harmony amongst each other, Shaftesbury can claim that virtue must consist in the recognition of that which benefits the system to which a creature belongs.

Since society is shown as an organic whole and the individual as inextricably tied to others,

Shaftesbury points out that no self-interest which is inimical to the good of all can really be a good even to the individual. Even an injury to any part, he argues, hurts the whole, and conversely a good for the system will benefit the individual:

> Now if, by the natural constitution of any rational creature, the same irregularities of appetite which make him ill to others, make him ill also to himself, and if the same regularity of affections, which causes him to be good in one sense causes him to be good also in the other, then is that goodness by which he is thus useful to others a real good and advantage to himself. And thus, virtue and interest may be found at last to agree. (Shaftesbury *Inquiry*, 167)

In this passage "appetite" and "affections" are viewed as "irregular" and "regular" respectively. He suggests that appetite is a desire for a personal gratification without any rectitude, and it makes the individual and the system he is part of ill. Shaftesbury emphasizes that true interest cannot be just self-interest, and therefore cannot be opposed to public interest but in fact public interest and our self-interest "agree" or concur. The phrase "regularity of affections" suggests a conformity or symmetry of affections within a system that results in harmony so that "at last" or eventually, interest and virtue coincide. In such a framework, self-interest in the way Shaftesbury conceives of it, cannot be conceived apart from the interest of others. Therefore, the equation of virtue with interest is not to accommodate a private self-interest that is not compatible with the good of others, but to dismiss as illogical the idea of a discrete self-interest. For Shaftesbury, therefore, that which "the subject considered as private good, is not really such but imaginary," an impossibility because good cannot but be of all (Shaftesbury *Inquiry*, 170). The spectre of people placing their private good above society's good, haunts Shaftesbury even as he points out its cosmic harm. So, he firmly dismisses the idea of a private benefit, which is not in tune with the public, as "imaginary" or illogical.

Once Shaftesbury has shown the private and public as overlapping and the welfare of both as congruent, he pursues the logic of this argument so that a reader must acknowledge this congruence and must reflect on his own actions. Though goodness is natural and universal to all creatures, it is the possibility of conscious virtue or merit that differentiates men from other creatures. Selfishness must then be recognized not only as an immoral choice but as an irrational one: "Everyone discerns and owns a public interest, and is conscious of what affects his fellowship or community. When we say, therefore, of a creature that 'he has wholly lost the sense of right and wrong', we suppose that, being able to discern the good and ill of his species, he has at the same time no concern for either" (Shaftesbury *Inquiry*, 177-78). Shaftesbury stresses that those who pursue their self-interest to the exclusion of the interests of "their species," can "discern" what constitutes the public good, but nevertheless are showing a deliberate lack of concern for it. The conflation of being "conscious" and having "concern" is a significant move that tries to bind together affections or the passions, and consciousness. Shaftesbury seeks to show that an ideal and happy person in desiring public good, is making both a conscious move and following a natural social instinct.

Shaftesbury looks to the passions, not as other philosophers who viewed the passions as

leading man to error or mis-judgment, but as a basis for natural human benevolence and a concern for others, a moral sense quite like other human senses, and akin to taste. To explain the immediacy or instinctive nature of virtue, he compares this moral instinct or sense to man's aesthetic responses to art and music. The ability to sense what is harmonious for the order we live in, is for Shaftesbury akin to our aesthetic capacity to admire harmony and beauty. Shaftesbury stresses on our 'mind's sensor 'in detecting an ill action, just as we might detect an off-key note in music or an incongruity in a painting:

> The mind, which is spectator or auditor of other minds, cannot be without its eye and ear so as to discern proportion, distinguish sound, and scan each sentiment or thought which comes before it. It can let nothing escape its censure. It feels the soft and harsh, the agreeable and disagreeable in the affections, and finds a foul and fair, a harmonious and a dissonant, as really and truly here as in any musical numbers or in the outward forms or representations of sensible things. (Shaftesbury *Inquiry*, 172-73)

Shaftesbury sees our mind as a sensory organ responding to impressions, and the mind's perceiving and judging the behaviour and actions of others is just like the eyes and ears perceive and judge objects. He likens our mind's looking and listening to the thoughts and feelings of others, to our aesthetic responses to beauty that we feel "in the affections." We can detect through our affections a discordant note in those minds that are out of tune or in discord with the rest of society. The idea of a moral sense that Frances Hutcheson would later view as a mode in his writings, Shaftesbury here delineates as a capacity in man to be esteemed and valued.[14]

Thus virtue, in Shaftesbury's definition, holds together a sensory perception of an idea and a conscious knowledge of it. Shaftesbury's emphasis on consciousness of the mind echoes many ideas from John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1689). But Shaftesbury deploys sensation and reflection as a mutual process. The conceptual overlap between sensation and reflection is intensified in Shaftesbury's application of it to virtue.[15] Shaftesbury argues that with man's natural moral affections, an affection is developed for affections, that is to say, affections like kindness are objects too and virtue lies in an affection for itself.

Shaftesbury divides the self as having a natural goodness, then he has a self-consciousness of goodness that can be called virtue, and then man develops an affection for virtue itself. In a Lockean move, where the thoughts and feelings in the mind are themselves objects, Shaftesbury says:

> In a creature capable of forming general notions of things, not only the outward beings which offer themselves to the sense are the objects of the affection, but the very actions themselves, and the affections of pity, kindness, gratitude, and their contraries, being brought into the mind by reflection, become objects. So that, by means of this reflected sense, there arises another kind of affection towards those very affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the subject of a new liking or dislike. (Shaftesbury *Inquiry*, 172)

The relation between the sensation of goodness, and the reflection on virtue, becomes reflexive. In the above passage, affections like kindness are objects too and virtue lies in an affection for itself. Sensation relates particular experiences like receiving kindness, and reflection allows for an affection for the general quality of kindness. In suggesting a subsequent affection for virtue, the sequence becomes dialectical where goodness being an instinctive affection for the species, and virtue being a conceptual understanding of the organic nature of the species, the individual develops an affection for the concept of virtue, just as self-conscious virtue partakes of intuitive goodness. This two-way model allows for a back and forth between the experience of goodness, and an understanding of its necessity and value.

4. Role of the Passions in Virtue

It is important to see how Shaftesbury brings the natural passions in man to play a role complementary with a self-conscious goodness. In reading his treatise, we can perceive how Shaftesbury brings together a conscious commitment to public good in line with an instinct for benevolence in man. The passions were now increasingly accommodated into becoming a significant source of virtue in man.[16] The reliance on instinct in the formation of social bonds that Shaftesbury argues for reveals sympathy or the 'affections 'as the underlying bond between individuals, and when this sympathy is expanded across a spectrum, it could create bonds within a larger community. A desire for what he calls "universal good" was theorized along with the representation of relations between individuals as an affectively powerful one.

The problem identified by Shaftesbury and other moral sense philosophers like Frances Hutcheson in his *An Inquiry Concerning the Original of Our Ideas of Virtue or Moral Good* (1725), David Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739-40) and Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) was not just of self-interest but of the abstract nature of public good that precluded in man a naturally-felt inclination towards it. Personal relations or even relations between particular strangers could evoke benevolence in man, but his lack of "affection" for a remote collective was a challenge since the source of inclination for an imaginative connect with an impersonal collective was unclear. Shaftesbury explains the problem lying in the difference between an immediate experience and reflecting on an abstract idea, and between the felt perception of a "community" and the imagination of a "body politic":

> Universal good, or the interest of the world in general, is a kind of remote philosophical object. [...] In less [smaller] parties, men may be intimately conversant and acquainted with one another. They can there better taste society and enjoy the common good and interest of a more contracted public. They view the whole compass and extent of their community, and see and know particularly whom they serve and to what end they associate and conspire. [...] [Their concern] can never find exercise for itself in so remote a sphere as that of the body politic at large. [...] The close sympathy and conspiring virtue is apt to lose itself for want of direction in so wide a field. (Shaftesbury *Sensus Communis*, 52)

The ability in men to visually embrace a smaller "contracted public" allows a familiarity that gives them a purpose and drive towards a common good. But the abstract idea of a public did not evoke man's social passions.

Shaftesbury thus attempts to define sociability through personal affective bonds, and link it to a desire for the welfare of an impersonal and virtual public. He termed "sociableness" or "associating spirits" (Shaftesbury *Sensus*, 53) as a natural desire in men to associate or feel connected with others. Shaftesbury elaborates on this desire by using various terms like "herding," "fellowship," and "affection" that he says leads man from love for his narrow circle of "kindred and clan" to a wider collective like a "country," and finally to "universal good" (Shaftesbury *Sensus*, 51). In other words, sociability includes man's personal and intimate ties with his familiar circle, as well as his relation to an impersonal society. For Shaftesbury, it is this widening spiral of the social passions emanating from man and progressing outward and through which "a public is recognized" (Shaftesbury *Sensus*, 51).

5. Conclusion

What becomes visible in my reading of Shaftesbury is that although instinct comes to be associated with the private sphere of an individual, and consciousness with his relationship to the public, this split between reason and passion is not strictly dichotomous in the eighteenth century. Even the most abstract reflections on the common good can be inflected with the passions since they provide momentum for activity whether of the mind or body.

Shaftesbury's treatise evoked a new idea of a self-reflexive sociability, one that is highly self-conscious and yet instinctive, anticipating future models of a sociability based on a moral sense. This model of linking the particularity of goodness and the generality of public spiritedness allows for an embedding of a desire for public good within what Shaftesbury believed was the natural goodness of man.

Endnotes:

1. See a comprehensive account of this shift in Susan James, "The passions and the good life" in *The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. Donald Rutherford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 210.
2. Bernard Mandeville had initially published a poem on this theme titled "The Grumbling Hive" in 1705, which he then included in a full commentary on virtue and vice in his work *The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits* (1714), both published anonymously.
3. For example, Frances Hutcheson, a moral philosopher of the eighteenth century, and admirer of Shaftesbury uses "public" most often as an oppositional term to any kind of selfish gain, for example, "publick spirit" against "selfish," "publick good" versus "self-interest" (99) and "publick Good" versus "private Advantage" in his treatise *An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, in Two Treatises*, edited by Wolfgang Leidhold (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004 (104).
4. *Sensus Communis* in *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* ed. Lawrence E. Klein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). This text is referred to as *Sensus* in my article, and page numbers are given parenthetically to this edition. As is the common practice in scholarship on the third Earl of Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper), he is referred to as Shaftesbury in my article.

5. See Isabel Rivers, who reads Shaftesbury's career as demonstrating "the classical tension between otium [retirement] and negotium [service], between on the one hand, private retirement, self-examination, and individual virtue, and on the other, public service, love of one's country, and the good of the whole... For Shaftesbury true self-knowledge is not possible without wide commerce with the world, private virtue without commitment to public good" in *Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in England, 1660-1780*, Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 96.
6. I take this term 'disembedded' from Charles Taylor, who terms the eighteenth century as the end of what he calls the "Great Disembedding" (Taylor *Modern Social Imaginaries,* 77) which he explains as the process by which people are unmoored from a social matrix and society is "reconceived as made up of individuals" in the eighteenth century (Taylor *Modern Social Imaginaries*, 78).
7. See Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989).
8. Charles Taylor, in his book *Sources of the Self,* distinguishes between being able to think about the self, and what he calls a "radically reflexive stance that emerges through the adoption of the first-person standpoint" (*Sources* 130). In his history of the self, Taylor grants the origins of "radical reflexivity" to Augustine, who sees it as a way to God, that "brings to the fore a kind of presence to oneself which is inseparable from being the agent of experience" (131) and that "this reflexivity is central to our moral understanding" (139). In Taylor's trajectory, Locke pushes this reflexivity further where a person is not just a self but always an awareness of a self. Taylor remarks on how this "completely third-person" perspective creates a human being from which "the last vestiges of subjectivity seem to have been expelled" (175-176).
9. John Locke's treatise *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).
10. For this account of the public sphere, see Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989) where a "bourgeoise public sphere" is "the sphere of private people come together as a public (27). He says how the word "public" started to be used in Great Britain instead of "world" or "mankind" (26).
11. Shaftesbury's term 'common sense' is explained as the common interest of mankind in *Sensus Communis, An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour* (1709), his playful piece on the importance of genuinely free conversation in producing virtue.
12. In *Sensus Communis*, Shaftesbury melds common sense with common good – "[Some commentators] make this common sense of the poet, by a Greek derivation, to signify sense of public weal and of the common interest, love of the community or society, natural affection, humanity, obligingness, or that sort of civility which rises from a just sense of the common rights of mankind, and the natural equality there is among those of the same species" (48).
13. Gunn explains that the term 'common good' held too many traditional moral associations so either the term public interest or public good were used, the former often in a political context. He reminds us that the term 'public interest' became common from the seventeenth century beginning with the civil war, "gradually replacing the 'common good' of scholastic philosophy and the '*salus populi*' favoured by Roman law" (Gunn, ix). Moral philosophy exerts pressure to renew a desire for this refurbished public good.
14. Ernest Tuveson, in his article "The origins of 'moral sense'", says that the term "moral sense," later seen as a school by many, is used just once by Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury's broader argument is that "the mind's case in respect of that natural affection and anticipating fancy, which makes the sense of right and wrong" is independent from religious beliefs and atheism (Shaftesbury *Inquiry*, 179-80).
15. Despite Shaftesbury's reliance on Locke's empiricism, his ethical beliefs seem distinct from Locke's in the sense that Shaftesbury asserts an internal space for moral affections in man while Locke views

morality as arising from empirical experiences and has a somewhat utilitarian outlook. Shaftesbury in his letters was open in his criticism of Locke, who had been his tutor. For a discussion on this relation, see Jason Aronson about Shaftesbury on Locke ("Critical Note: Shaftesbury on Locke"). Locke's morality is tied to his epistemology where he tries to prove that knowledge is particular and we are not born with any general maxims. Lawrence Klein argues that Shaftesbury may agree with Locke's politics but not with his atomistic view of humans – "Shaftesbury sympathized with Locke's political beliefs but not his attempt to ground them on the consequences of a supposed natural state prior to society. A humanity prior to society was simply inconceivable if one insisted on natural human sociability" (Klein, xxviii).

16. Ann Van Sant, for instance, draws our attention to "the general shift of the foundation of moral life from reason and judgment to the affection," as the passions were cited as the source for "an intensely felt humanity or philanthropy" (Van Sant, 5).

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