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

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The Nature of the Dispute between Philo and Cleanthes in David Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*

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Abstract:

In my paper, I examine the source of the disagreement between Philo and Cleanthes in David Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, beginning in Part 2, in regard to the analogical Argument from Design - the argument which purports to prove, through the principle 'like effects prove like causes', that the similarities between the design of the world and the design of machines, in terms of means to ends relations and a coherence of parts, countenance the conclusion that the cause of the design of the world resembles the cause of the design of machines. I show that Cleanthes and Philo have different interpretations regarding the proper application of the principle 'like effects prove like causes', the central principle employed in Cleanthes' argument. Hume achieves a reconciliation between the disputants in Part 12, which he holds that it is reasonable to accept, although the reconciliation is held to take place, not as we might expect, between Cleanthes and Philo (the principal speakers in this work), but between the theist and the atheist, and (in a footnote in Part 12) between the dogmatists and the sceptics. I explain this change; and show that in Part 12, as in the earlier Parts of the *Dialogues*, Philo remains consistent with his claim to Demea in Part 2, that he argues with Cleanthes "in his own way".

Keywords: argument, design, analogy, reasoning, theist, atheist, dogmatist, sceptic

The first edition of David Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*[1] was published posthumously by Hume's nephew in 1779 (Hume died in 1776). Hume never speaks in his own person in this work, except in one footnote in Part 12, which I will reference later in my paper. A view that is prevalent in the literature on the *Dialogues* is well-expressed by Keith E. Yandell, who writes: "It is also Hume's view that there is no evidence for any religious belief. Hence, he holds that no one is ever reasonable in accepting a religious belief" (Yandell 1990, 3). My paper will establish that this view is mistaken. I show that in Part 12 of the *Dialogues*, Hume argues that there is one proposition about God that it is reasonable to accept. To reach this point in the dialogue, we must examine the arguments which are put forth in earlier Parts of this work, all of which assist in establishing that this one proposition about God is reasonable.

Although the *Dialogues* involves five characters, my paper centers on only two – Philo and Cleanthes. It is Cleanthes who puts forth the Argument from Design in Part 2, and Philo who criticizes this Argument in Parts 2 through 8, and who then attempts a reconciliation of the opposing sides in Part 12, culminating in the one proposition about God which it is reasonable to accept.

I begin by quoting Cleanthes' version of the Argument from Design:

> Look round the world: Contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions, to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other… The curious adapting of means to ends relations, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since therefore the effects resemble each other we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man; though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work, which he has executed. By this argument *a posteriori*, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind and intelligence. (Cleanthes' version of the Argument from Design, D.109)

In Part 2 of Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, Cleanthes defends the analogical Argument from Design - the argument which purports to prove, through the principle 'like effects prove like causes', that the similarities between the design of the world and the design of machines, in terms of means to ends relations and a coherence of parts, countenance the conclusion that the cause of the design of the world resembles the cause of the design of machines. Given that the cause of the design of machines is intelligence, he argues that the designer of the world is an intelligent being, who resembles our minds, "though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work, which he has executed" (D.109).

Philo undertakes a series of criticisms of the Design Argument in Part 2, all centering on (what he regards as) the proper use of the principle 'like effects prove like causes'. He maintains that the proper use of this principle requires that we observe an object of one type constantly conjoined with an object of another type, whereupon when observing a new instance of either type of object, we can infer, by analogy, the existence of the second type of object. The resemblances between the types of objects previously observed and the objects under consideration must be sufficiently specific to enable us to classify the objects under consideration as objects of those types respectively. Philo insists that the design of the world does not bear an adequate resemblance to any type of machine to enable us to classify the world as a machine of a particular type. Accordingly, he maintains that the principle 'like effects prove like causes' cannot be applied to the case under consideration, namely, the design of the world and an intelligent cause of design.

I will now provide greater detail to the dispute between Philo and Cleanthes, including the reason why the debate moves (without fanfare or explanation) from Cleanthes and Philo (in Parts 2-8) to the views in Part 12 of the theist and atheist (D. 174-176), and in a footnote in Part 12 (D.177) to the views of the dogmatists and sceptics. I will also show how Hume effects the reconciliation between the disputants.

Cleanthes does not think that has to prove the machine - like character of the world, given that these two features – means to ends relations and a coherence of parts - are present throughout the design of machines and the world. Cleanthes and Philo have a fundamental disagreement about the proper use of the principle, 'like effects prove like causes'. For Philo, this principle requires that we observe an object of one type constantly conjoined with an object of another type. The focus for Philo is the *specific* resemblance(s) that objects bear to each other. In Part 2, Cleanthes takes a different approach to the proper use of the principle 'like effects prove like causes', while acknowledging that the world does not bear a specific resemblance to any type of machine. Following Philo's claim that the universe does not bear a specific resemblance to any kind of object in the world (D.110), Cleanthes responds:

> It would surely be very ill received, replied Cleanthes; and I should be deservedly blamed and detested, did I allow, that the proofs of a Deity amounted to no more than a guess or conjecture. But is the whole adjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a resemblance? The economy of final causes? The order, proportion, and arrangement of every part? (D.110)

In this passage, Cleanthes focuses on the presence of means to ends relations and a coherence of parts throughout the design of the world and machines (in this passage, a house). Cleanthes regards these resemblances as sufficient to apply the principle, 'like effects prove like causes', to the design of the world and the design of machines. It must be emphasized that Philo's objection about the reasoning in the Argument from Design, that we are dealing with objects – God and the world - that are "single, individual, without parallel, or specific resemblance" (D. 115) would not move Cleanthes because, as we now understand, Cleanthes does not hold to Philo's view that to apply the principle 'like effects prove like causes', we must find objects of one *specific* type constantly conjoined with objects of another *specific* type. So, while Cleanthes agrees that the design of the world cannot be classified as a machine of a certain type (the world does not resemble a house or a ship, etc.), he does hold that the presence of means to end relations and a coherence of parts throughout the design of the world and the design of machines does enable us to classify the world as a machine. The observed conjunction, therefore, involves machines and intelligence as their cause. Cleanthes focuses exclusively on the features of design in machines and the world, rather than on the issue of classification. Cleanthes also holds that the dissimilarities between the design of the world and machines do not weaken the argument.

In Parts 6 through 8 of the *Dialogues*, Philo attacks Cleanthes' claim that the design of the world resembles the design of machines, by arguing that means to ends relations and a coherence of parts are also the essential features of the design of animals and vegetables (Parts 6 and 7), and of design where there may be no designing *principle* (Part 8). As a result, whether the universe is compared to an animal or organized body, or held to arise from no organizing principle (through a blind unguided force, Part 8), the essential features of design are identical to the essential features of the design of machines, namely, means to ends relations and a coherence of parts. And, no decision procedure is available to choose intelligence over other causes or sources of design. Philo concludes Part 8 by asserting: "A total suspense of judgement is here our only reasonable resource".

It is in Part 12 that Philo addresses Cleanthes' position first articulated in Part 2 that, despite lacking a specific resemblance to any particular type of machine, the design of the world can be compared to the design of machines, in virtue of the presence of means to ends relations and a coherence of parts. To indicate that this discussion carries on from Part 8, Philo begins by saying that a suspense of judgment in the present case is not possible, and that the disagreement in this case involves "a dispute of words" (D.88).

> That the works of nature bear a great analogy to the productions of art is evident; and according to all the rules of good reasoning, we ought to infer, if we argue at all concerning them, that their causes have a proportional analogy. But as there are also considerable differences, we have reason to suppose a proportional difference in their causes; and in particular ought to attribute a much higher degree of power and energy, to the supreme cause than any we have ever observed in mankind. Here then the existence of a Deity is plainly ascertained by reason; and if we make it a question, whether, on account of these analogies, we can properly call him a *mind* or *intelligence*, notwithstanding the vast difference, which may reasonably be supposed between him and human minds; what is this but a mere verbal controversy? (D.174-175)

Philo's argument holds that there is a proportional analogy and difference between the design of the world and the design of machines. In light of the resemblances, Philo insists that if we are not content with calling the first and supreme cause a God or Deity, "what can we call him but *mind* or *thought*, to which he is justly supposed to bear a considerable resemblance?" However, Philo now shows that any attempt to establish the precise resemblance and difference between the human and divine mind is doomed to failure.

> But there is a species of controversy, which, from the very nature of language and of human ideas, is involved in a perpetual ambiguity, and can never, by any precaution or any definitions, be able to reach a reasonable certainty or precision. These are the controversies concerning the degrees of any quality or circumstance. Men may argue to all eternity, whether Hannibal be a great, or a very great, or a superlatively great man, what degree of beauty Cleopatra possessed, what epithet of praise Livy or Thucydides is entitled to, without bringing the controversy to any determination. The disputants may here agree in their sense and differ in the terms, or *vice versa*; yet never be able to define their terms, so as to enter into each others meaning: Because the degrees of these qualities are not, like quantity or number, susceptible of any exact mensuration, which may be the standard in the controversy. (D.175)

This passage appears to run counter to a passage in Hume's *Treatise* when Hume discusses degrees in any quality as a source of 'philosophical relations'. Hume writes: "When any two objects possess the same quality in common, the *degrees*, in which they possess it, form a fifth species of relation. Thus of two objects, which are both heavy, the one may be either of greater, or less weight than the other. Two colours, that are of the same kind, may yet be of different shades, and in that respect admit of comparisons" (T.15)

In fact, however, the two passages are compatible. The passage in the *Treatise* concerns qualities which are quantifiable, and the philosophical relations center around determining an equality or inequality between two objects in virtue of a common property. The properties in question are always empirical, and as such, there is always the possibility of calculating how much of a particular quality exists in different objects. On the other hand, the qualities Philo discusses in Part 12 - greatness, beauty, praise - are based on feelings or sentiments, and, therefore, they cannot be measured with any accuracy. For example, in the *Treatise*, Hume has the following to say about our awareness of beauty:

> If we consider all the hypotheses, which have been form'd either by philosophy or common reason, to explain the difference betwixt beauty and deformity, we shall find that all of them resolve into this, that beauty is of such an order and construction of parts, as either by the *primary constitution* of our nature, by *custom*, or by *caprice*, is fitted to give a pleasure and satisfaction to the soul. This is the distinguishing character of beauty, and forms all the difference betwixt it and deformity, whose natural tendency is to produce uneasiness. Pleasure and pain, therefore, are not only necessary attendants of beauty and deformity, but constitute their very essence. (T.299)

Accordingly, any attempt to quantify these features will fail, and all disagreements will result in a verbal dispute. We must now attempt to determine why the dispute about God's nature in Part 12 is akin to considerations of greatness, beauty, and praise.

In the Introduction to the *Dialogues*, Pamphilus points out that dialogue form is particularly suited to the topic of natural religion, because of the obscurity and uncertainty of the subject matter, and the fact that human reason can reach no fixed determination with regard to questions concerning the nature of God: "Reasonable men may be allowed to differ, where no - one can reasonably be positive". (D.96) In the part of the debate we are now entering in Part 12, Hume attempts at least a partial reconciliation between the theist and the atheist on the topic of the divine mind. How to explain that Philo's attention now turns to the theist and the atheist? I submit that the shift to the theist and the atheist is not a move away from the characters, Cleanthes and Philo. The theist represents the Cleanthes - type of believer, and the atheist represents the sceptic, given that their atheism "is only nominally so, and can never possibly be in earnest" (D.176). The importance of the shift, therefore, is to move the debate away from the two disputants, Cleanthes and Philo, and render the reconciliation between different *philosophical* positions. Similarly, in a footnote in Part 12 of the *Dialogues* (footnote 18, the only passage in which Hume speaks in his own person) the dispute is held to be between the dogmatists and sceptics. Again, here, the shift moves the debate away from the two disputants, Cleanthes and Philo, and renders the reconciliation between different philosophical positions. This appears to be Hume's goal: to reconcile different philosophical positions (atheist and theist; sceptics and dogmatists), and, therefore, to go beyond the individual thinkers in the dialogue. Cleanthes can now be understood to be variously classified as a theist and a dogmatist[2], while Philo can be variously described as a (nominal) atheist and a sceptic.

In effecting the reconciliation, Philo begins with the theist:

> That the dispute concerning theism is of this nature, and consequently is merely verbal, or perhaps, if possible, still more incurably ambiguous, will appear upon the slightest enquiry. I ask the theist, if he does not allow, that there is a great and immeasurable, because incomprehensible, difference between the *human* and *divine* mind: The more pious he is, the more readily will he assent to the affirmative, and the more will he be disposed to magnify the difference: He will even assert, that the difference is of a nature, which cannot be too much magnified. (D.176)

The terms to note in this passage are 'immeasurable' and 'incomprehensible', indicating that the theist holds that we can neither measure nor understand the difference between God's mind and our mind.

Philo next turns to the atheist and raises the following question:

> ...[I] ask him, whether, from the coherence and apparent sympathy in all parts of the world, there be not a certain degree of analogy among all the operations of nature, in every situation and in every age; whether the rotting of a turnip, the generation of an animal, and the structure of human thought be not energies that probably bear some remote analogy to each other: It is impossible he can deny it: He will readily acknowledge it. (D.176)

This concession by the atheist is based on Philo's arguments in Parts 6, 7, and 8, in which he showed that all design, regardless of causal origin (vegetation, generation, a blind unguided force, etc.) is reducible to means to ends relations and a coherence of parts. In the passage above from D.176, Philo extends design to decay as well as to growth: all design in nature possesses the identical fundamental features, namely, means to ends relations and a coherence of parts. Now, utilizing the principle 'like effects prove like causes', Philo claims that the coherence of parts evident in all parts of the world countenances the conclusion that 'there is a certain degree of analogy among all the operations of nature'. However, given that the resemblance which exists among all the effects in nature is extremely general, we cannot achieve any specificity when we attempt to determine the particular resemblance among the operations of nature. Hence, when comparing the rotting of a turnip, the generation of an animal, and the structure of human thought, Philo concludes that these are energies 'that probably bear some remote analogy to each other'.

And now the second part of Philo's argument:

> Having obtained this concession, I push him [the atheist] still farther in his retreat; and I ask him, if it be not probable, that the principle which first arranged and still maintains order in the universe, bears not also some remote inconceivable analogy to the other operations of nature, and among the rest to the economy of human mind and thought. However reluctant, he must give his assent. (D.176)

In this passage, Philo extends his argument using the principle 'like effects prove like causes' beyond all the operations of nature in the world to cover the principle of order of the whole world. Philo argues that, just as all operations of nature within the world are bound by the features means to ends relations and a coherence of parts, so, too, the principle of design of the whole world is bound by these features of design. Therefore, if all operations of nature within the world bear some remote inconceivable analogy to each other in virtue of the presence of means to ends relations and a coherence of parts in their respective effects (following the principle 'like effects prove like causes'), then the principle of design of the whole world also bears some remote inconceivable analogy to all other operations of nature, including to human mind and thought. We learn, therefore, that thought has no primacy, when a comparison is attempted between God and the operations of nature. In no case can more be established between God and any operations of nature, including thought, than 'some remote inconceivable analogy'.

In Rule 5 of 'Rules by which to judge of causes and effects' in the *Treatise,* Hume writes: "where several different objects produce the same effect, it must be by means of some quality, which we discover to be common amongst them. For as like effects imply like causes, we must always ascribe the causation to the circumstance, wherein we discover the resemblance" (T.174). Although Philo consents to the fact that there is some remote analogy between the principle of design of the whole world and the various principles of design within the world, he insists on adding the word 'inconceivable', because the powers of objects to bring about effects is forever hidden from us.[3] Therefore, in no sense have we gained knowledge of God.

The verbal dispute between the theist and the atheist can now be revealed: since neither holds a position for which we can have determinate ideas, the degree of resemblance or difference between God and human intelligence cannot be determined by us[4].

Relying on the position attributed to the atheist, Philo offers the final pronouncement on the topic of natural religion, which, contrary to Yandell's view cited earlier, Hume holds that it is reasonable for us to accept:

> If the whole of natural theology, as some people seem to maintain, resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, *that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence*: If this proposition be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular explication…what can the most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than give a plain philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs, and believe that the arguments on which it is established, exceed the objections, which lie against it? (D.184-85)

The irony in this final pronouncement is now clear: since all design is bound by the same features of design, namely, means to ends relations and a coherence of parts, there is no philosophical significance in comparing the cause or causes of order in the universe to human intelligence: as we have seen, some remote inconceivable analogy obtains between, and among, all principles of order, given that the designs they produce are bound by the identical features of design.

In the end, Philo resorts to revelation as the only hope for a fuller understanding of the divine nature:

> But believe me, Cleanthes, the most natural sentiment, which a well disposed mind will feel on this occasion, is a longing desire and expectation, that heaven would be pleased to dissipate, at least alleviate this profound ignorance, by affording some more particular revelation to mankind, and making discoveries of the nature, attributes, and operations of the divine object of our faith. (D.185)

Once Philo has reconciled the theist and atheist positions in Part 12 (the end of paragraph 7), he proclaims "These, Cleanthes, are my unfeigned sentiments on this subject; and these sentiments, you know, I have ever cherished and maintained" (D.177). The passage quoted above from D.185, where Philo speaks of a longing desire and expectation for some more particular revelation to alleviate this profound ignorance appears 8 pages later, and, therefore, is not included in his 'unfeigned sentiments on this subject'. In short, Philo has neither the desire nor expectation that heaven will alleviate our ignorance regarding the divine nature.

One further point. In Part 2, Phil informs Demea that he argues with Cleanthes "in his own way" (D. 111) In this spirit, it is significant that when Philo attempts to reconcile the disputants in Part 12, it is not Philo's position, first stated in Part 2, which emphasizes that the Argument from Design can only succeed if we are able to classify the world as a particular type of machine, but Cleanthes' position that the strength of the Argument from Design is based on the presence of means to ends relations and a coherence of parts in all human artifacts and throughout the design in nature which is highlighted. In other words, from the beginning of the dialogue to its conclusion in Part 12, Philo argues with Cleanthes "in his own way".

Endnotes:

1. All references to David Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* are taken from David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,* edited and with an Introduction by Stanley Tweyman, first published in 1991, Routledge, London and New York. References to the *Treatise of Human Nature* are to the P.H. Nidditch/ Selby – Bigge, Second Edition, (OUP), 1978. References to Hume's *First Enquiry* are to the P.H. Nidditch/ Selby-Bigge, *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals,* Third Edition, (OUP), 1975.
2. Cleanthes fits Hume's definition of the dogmatist in the *First Enquiry*:"...while they see objects only on one side, and have no idea of any counterpoising argument, they throw themselves precipitately into those principles, to which they are inclined; nor have they any indulgence for those who entertain opposite sentiments". (E. 161)

3. Now nothing is more evident, than that the human mind cannot form such an idea of two objects, as to conceive any connection betwixt them, or comprehend distinctly that power or efficacy, by which they are united. Such a connexion would amount to a demonstration, and wou'd amount to a demonstration, and wou'd imply the absolute impossibility for the one object not to follow upon the other: which kind of connexion has already been rejected in all cases. (T.162)
4. The theist allows, that the original intelligence is very different from human reason: The atheist allows that the original principle of order bears some remote analogy to it. Will, you quarrel, gentlemen, about the degrees, and enter into a controversy, which admits not of any precise meaning, nor consequently of any determination...Consider, then, where the real point of controversy lies, and if you cannot lay aside your disputes, endeavour, at least to cure yourselves of your animosity. (D.176)

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Ordinary Language, Cephalus and a Deflationary Account of the Forms

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Abstract:

In this article I seek to come to some understanding of the interlocutors in the first book of Plato's *Republic*, particularly Cephalus. A more complete view of Cephalus not only provides some interesting ways to think about Plato and the *Republic*, but also suggests an interesting alternative to Plato's view of justice. The article will progress as follows: First, I discuss Plato's allegory of the cave. I, then, critique the cave allegory by applying the same kind of reasoning that O. K. Bouwsma used to criticize Descartes' evil genius. Next, I present what I think is a fruitful way to understand Cephalus. Finally, I draw some important conclusions regarding justice and offer some interesting critiques of Plato and Platonism.

Keywords: Allegory of the Cave, O.K Bouwsma, Cephalus, Ordinary Language, Plato

Plato's dialogues present one with a unique way of engaging deep and important philosophical issues. The dialogue format draws the reader in in a way that a more formal and analytic essay does not. Instead of just critically engaging the text one becomes part of the conversation. It is not surprising, then, that throughout the history of philosophy other philosophers have also presented their ideas in a dialogical form—a notable example is Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*. However, too often it seems that Socrates' interlocutors are not engaged as fully as they might be.

While Socrates is fairly well fleshed-out, his interlocutors remain two-dimensional caricatures and not fully realized characters. Instead of taking the interlocutors seriously, it seems that they are means to Plato's ends. In order to "get Plato right" one focuses on what Socrates is saying and does not give the interlocutors their due. It is with the foregoing in mind that this article begins.

In this article, I seek to come to some understanding of the interlocutors in the first book of Plato's *Republic*, particularly Cephalus. That being said, I do not mean to give the impression that this article will be merely a character study or simply a literary analysis. By engaging and trying to come to an understanding of who Cephalus is and what he is about, I contend that important light can be shed on Plato's motivations and insights. Further, a more complete view of Cephalus not only provides some interesting ways to think about Plato and the *Republic*, but also suggests an interesting alternative to Plato's view of justice. While I believe that this alternative is present in the *Republic*, it remains in a sense inchoate. By taking Cephalus more seriously, one is pushed to take the alternative his view suggests more seriously.

This article will progress in the following way. I will begin by looking at Plato's allegory of the cave; I will then critique the cave allegory by applying the same kind of reasoning that O. K. Bouwsma used to criticize Descartes' evil genius. While there are important differences between Plato's cave and Descartes' evil genius, the Bouwsma-esque critique helps to understand, in particular, Cephalus' worldview. I will then go on to present what I think is a fruitful way to understand Cephalus. In doing so I will be able to draw some important conclusions regarding justice and also present some interesting critiques of Plato and Platonism. Before continuing, I want to make clear that in all my discussion I will be limiting myself—when it is discussed—to justice as social justice. While I believe that what I present could be extended to an understanding of personal morality, et cetera, doing so would make this article needlessly cumbersome.

The allegory of the cave

I begin by presenting Plato's allegory of the cave. I will then go on to critique the epistemological-metaphysical worldview that the cave allegory implies. One important aspect of the critique will be that the critique will progress in the same way as Bouwsma criticized Descartes' evil genius. I will also point to some important differences between the Cartesian evil genius, and the Platonic cave. While granting that there are important differences between Descartes and Plato, the Bouwsma style critique will be helpful in suggesting how one is to understand Cephalus and Platonic epistemology/metaphysics.

Plato's allegory of the cave starts Book VII of the *Republic* and runs from 514 through roughly 517b, though it is continuously referred to throughout. Plato asks the reader, via his interlocutor Glaucon, to imagine a group of human beings fettered in a cave, and all those human beings are able to do is look at the cave wall directly in front of them. Light is provided by a fire behind them. Plato goes on to have the reader/Glaucon further imagine that there are other people—i.e. non-fettered individuals—"carrying all kinds of artifacts [for example,...] statues of people and other animals, made out of stone, wood, and every material. And, as you'd expect, some of the carriers are talking, and some are silent" (514c) (Plato 1992, 187). The fettered people or, as Plato would like to call them, prisoners have been there since birth and have no non-cave experiences.

Plato has now laid out his view of what the worldview of the fettered people is. For Plato, the fettered people's world is made up of shadows of artificially created objects that are images themselves of actual objects. Further, what the fettered people hear are echoes, and the echoes are, in a sense, completely unrelated to the shadows which the fettered people see. So, for Plato, the entire world of the fettered people is disconnected non-meaningful images of images. As he says, "the prisoners would in every way believe that the truth is nothing other than the shadows of those artifacts" (515c) (Plato 1992, 187).

Plato then goes on to have the reader/Glaucon imagine that one of the prisoners becomes unfettered and is forced to look at the fire and the artifacts. This is a painful experience for the prisoner because not only is the prisoner's worldview unable to cope with or make sense of what he or she is seeing, but the light from the fire is dazzling to the prisoner's senses. The former prisoner is then further compelled out of the cave into the outside world of actual objects, actual sounds and actual light. At first the prisoner is too overwhelmed to experience the objects directly and must view them indirectly as shadows and reflections. But, eventually the former prisoner is able to view the objects directly and even look directly at the sun—which Plato maintains is the source of all the objects. (516c) (Plato 1992, 188).

It must be remembered that the allegory of the cave is an allegory. Plato maintains it is an allegory of the human condition. As Julia Annas states: "[t]he prisoners are 'like us', says Socrates (515a). The Cave is, then, not just the degraded state of a bad society. It is the human condition" (Annas 1997, 153). Understanding that the cave is an allegory, and that it is an allegory of the actual human condition, some important conclusions can be drawn. For Plato, the shadow world of the cave is the actual world of lived experience. That would mean that Plato sees the actual world of lived experience as images of images that are disconnected but loosely held together. Further, it would mean that the basis of the real/shadow world are actual things which are in some sense, at least, connected, stable and meaningfully held together.

Bouwsma and the evil genius world

Now that there is some understanding of the allegory of the cave, I will now critique the allegory in a way similar to how O. K. Bouwsma critiqued Descartes' evil genius. First, as Bouwsma does, I will imagine an extreme evil genius world. In the extreme evil genius world, absolutely everything is illusory, i.e. the evil genius has created and controls everything that is perceived or conceived by a single thinking subject. To be clear, to say that the evil genius world is illusory in this way is to maintain that in some "objective" metaphysical-ontological sense the evil genius world does not have any real existence.

After the evil genius had established the deceived subject—who Bouwsma calls Tom—in the illusory world, Bouwsma imagines the evil genius becoming perturbed that there was no one to appreciate his handy-work. Because of this, the evil genius injects himself into the illusory world and has a conversation with Tom. The evil genius informs Tom "[his] flowers are nothing but illusions" (Bouwsma 1965, 94). Tom is incredulous and points out that his flowers are real while the reflection of the flowers in the mirror is an illusion. In support of his claim, Tom points out that one cannot feel pollen on the flowers in the mirror, that bees cannot suck honey from the flowers in the mirror and he cannot send the flowers in the mirror to his wife, Milly, all of which are possible with the flowers outside of the mirror (Bouwsma 1965, 94). Thus, *ipso facto* his flowers are real and not an illusion at all.

The evil genius then tries to explain that there are two types of illusion. One type are thin illusions, such as the flowers in the mirror. There are also thick illusions, "and the flowers before the mirror are thick. Thick illusions are best for deception. [...] From them [thick illusions] you may gather pollen, send them to Milly, and foolish bees may sleep in them" (Bouwsma 1965, 95). Tom remains unconvinced, stating, "I see what you mean by thin illusions is what I mean by illusions, and what you mean by thick illusions is what I mean by flowers. So when you say that my flowers are your thick illusions this doesn't bother me" (Bouwsma 1965, 95). Tom concludes that if the evil genius truly wished to deceive, the evil genius "must learn the language of those you are to deceive" (Bouwsma 1965, 96). The point is that for Tom the evil genius world is the real stable world. Because one can act and interact in the evil genius world in important and meaningful ways, that is sufficient to establish the world as real. More importantly, in order to doubt the world one must do violence to the ways which one speaks, means and intends.

I have only briefly sketched Plato's allegory of the cave, and Bouwsma's critique of Descartes' evil genius. However, I think enough has been explained in order for me to present a Bouwsma style argument against Plato.

Ordinary language and Plato's cave

In this section of the article, I will build on everything that was said above in order to present a critique of Plato's allegory of the cave. However, before continuing I would like to point out that the critique serves as a tool in order to help come to a better understanding of the interlocutors of the first book of Plato's *Republic*, and a critique of Platonism generally. I believe that the best way to begin the critique of the allegory of the cave is by quoting Plato.

> And if there had been any honors, praises, or prizes among them for the one who was sharpest at identifying the shadows as they passed by and who best remembered which usually came earlier, which later, and which simultaneously, and who could thus best divine the future (516c-d) (Plato 1992, 188).

The above quote points to two important things. First, unlike what was suggested above, it would seem that the shadow world does hang together sensibly. Not only is the cave world sensible[1], but it is also meaningful, understandable and predictable. Of course that would be true, however, because as has already been noted, the shadow world of the cave is the actual world in which humanity finds itself. Second, it is clear that the prisoners have a language with which they can explain, describe and use to make sense of their world.

If it were imagined, as Socrates had Glaucon imagine, that someone descends from the "outside" world, it would not merely be that the other prisoners would ridicule the journeyer. It is not merely that the prisoners would maintain that the journeyer had "returned from his upward journey with his eyesight ruined" (517a) (Plato 1992, 189). More importantly, it would seem that the prisoners would find what the journeyer was saying did not make sense. If, then, one imagines that the journeyer tells the prisoners that what they are perceiving is shadows of images cast by artificial light, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the prisoners would respond in a way similar to how Tom responded to the evil genius. So, one can imagine that the prisoners would respond by stating something like: "We see what you mean by shadows is what we mean by objects. So when you say that our objects are your shadows this doesn't bother us."[2]

One could go back even further, to the beginning of the cave allegory, and use a similar type of reasoning. First, it should be noted that Plato has set up his allegory to be disparaging of the shadow world—i.e. the actual world. Plato starts out by saying that those in the cave are fettered and are prisoners. Also, he says that the world of those in the cave is a world of "shadows" and "echoes" implying their unreality before he even begins. Further, he speaks of the journeyer as being forced out of the cave, and dazzled by the light of the fire and then by the light of the sun (514-517b) (Plato 1992, 186-9).

Now, if one imagines a prisoner being released and forced to turn around, once his or her eyes became accustomed to the light, in order to make sense of what he or she saw, one could assume that he or she would describe it in terms of the language he or she already knew and used. So, the artifacts would become images of the shadows, and the artifacts would be, in some sense then, less real than the shadows. That is the case because the shadow world would be primary, and in order to make sense of the new experience one would have to describe the artifacts relative to the shadows, and in that sense the artifacts would be derivative. Further, to describe the artifacts as derivative would be to experience the artifacts as derivative. Likewise, as the journeyer progressed out of the cave in order make sense of his or her experience it would be relative to the world of shadows. Thus, if the human condition is exactly the shadow-cave world, then the Platonic world of the Forms can only in some ways be derivative of the actual world.[3]

This interpretation, that the world of Forms is derivative of the actual world, can be strengthened if one notes as Annas does that "nothing that Plato has said has excluded our having knowledge of things that are not forms" (Annas 1981, 210). "So he [Plato] has not excluded particular objects of experience from being known just because they are particular objects of experience" (Annas 1981, 211). The reason that Annas' assertion strengthens the primacy of the shadow-cave-actual world claim that is being made here is that even Plato must grant that those in the shadow-cave-actual world do have knowledge. If that is so, and if it is the language of the shadow-cave-actual world that determines the experiences of the prisoners and the journeyer then any knowledge of the "outside" world of the Forms is at least in some sense knowledge based on the knowledge of the shadow-cave-actual world.

I have briefly sketched a Bouwsma-esque critique of Plato's allegory of the cave. I am in no way trying to prove that this reading is the correct reading of Plato, my intention is to lay the groundwork for establishing the worldview of the interlocutors in the first book of Plato's *Republic*. Before proceeding to the interlocutors, I will acknowledge some differences between Plato and Descartes. This is necessary because Bouwsma was critiquing Descartes because Bouwsma found Cartesian radical skepticism troubling. Plato was not beginning from radical doubt, so a Bouwsma-esque critique may not be as problematic for Plato.

Julia Annas maintains that "Plato's search for knowledge is not the post-Cartesian search for a state immune to skeptical doubt. Rather it is a search for understanding" (Annas 1981, 212). Plato's search for knowledge is for an increasing intelligibility. As one moves from the shadow-cave world to the outside world and eventually to looking at the sun itself[4] Plato is trying to provide an increasing stability to one's knowledge.

Plato's view is driven by a principle of "one over many"[5]. So, in order to explain the diversity and the variability of predicates applied to particulars, a Form, as a perfect exemplar of the predicate, is used to ground the variable predication of the particulars. For example, because there are many objects to which one can ascribe the predicate of being square, and those particulars—because of perspective or the objects destructibility—are not always square, for Plato, in order to truly understand what "squareness" is there must be one thing that has squareness perfectly, which is the Form of the square. So, in order to explain the diversity of the application of the predicate "squareness" or "is square" there must be *one* example of perfect squareness to which the predicate "squareness" or "is square" refers. Thus for Plato, knowing the one perfect exemplar of a predicate deepens ones understanding of the predicate and makes the myriad applications of the predicate more intelligible.

An analogy can be made between science and Plato's theory of Forms. If one wants to build a structure one certainly can—humanity has been building structures from time immemorial. However, if one understands Newtonian mechanics, geometry, et cetera not only can one build a better structure, but one can explain why one structure is more or less stable than other structures.

To return to the "one over many" principle, since the Forms are able to instantiate their particular property perfectly one must have an explanation as to why the forms can have a property perfectly while phenomenal objects cannot. The reason the forms can have their particular property perfectly is because they have "Form-al" ideal properties such as immutability, eternality and the like. So, Plato needs to again explain the diversity of the application of those properties to the myriad Forms. The Form of the Good then provides the ground for the Forms having their ideal properties in the same way that the Forms provide the ground or reference for particulars having particular properties.

Finally, as has already been mentioned, Plato believes that his epistemology/metaphysics provides an increasing and deepening of one's understanding. One can, on Plato's view maintain their knowledge of the phenomenal world but just have a clearer understanding of the phenomenal world by moving out of the cave, that is to say, by understanding the Forms. This, then, is much different than radical skepticism. However, it seems that the Bouwsma-esque critique offered above can still be instructive. In essence, what the Bouwsma style critique does is turns Plato on his head, or rather on his feet.[6]

As has already been stated, what the Bouwsma style critique does is give primacy to the actual/shadow world. One's understanding, knowledge and language there are the basis for an understanding of one's journey out of the cave and into the world of the Forms. Insofar as "The

Good" or "The Forms" have any meaning or sense it is derivative of ones understanding of the actual world.[7] Thus, what the Bouwsma-esque critique offers is two-fold. First, given the primacy of the phenomenal-actual world, if "The Forms" or "The Good" are meaningful at all their meaning comes from the knowledge and language of the phenomenal-actual world. Second, the critique provides the background for an understanding of how to interpret the interlocutors in the first book of Plato's *Republic*, particularly Cephalus. I will now turn to a discussion of Cephalus.

Giving Cephalus his due

In this section, I will begin my discussion of the interlocutors in the first book of Plato's *Republic*. My primary concern will be with giving a fuller understanding of Cephalus. Building on the critique of the cave allegory, I will present a worldview that Cephalus might in fact hold. By focusing on a fuller understanding of the interlocutors, one can develop important criticisms of and responses to Plato as Socrates that were not present when Plato had Socrates engaging them. Finally, some interesting insights will be had regarding some of Plato's views and about alternative views of social justice.

Cephalus is introduced right near the beginning of Book I of Plato's *Republic* (328b-c); it is his home and property that provide the backdrop for the dialogue. Further, it is Socrates engagement with Cephalus regarding moderation, wealth and old-age that is the springboard for the discussion of Justice and all that follows from that in the *Republic*. While Cephalus' presence is short-lived in the dialogue (328b-331d) his importance should not be underestimated. A filling out of Cephalus as a character—his worldview, his motivations and responses he might have made to Socrates had he not left so hastily—can thus be beneficial.

Julia Annas interprets Cephalus fairly negatively.[8] On her reading, Cephalus is seen as morally complacent and philosophically/intellectually immature. I do not believe that this is a fair reading of Cephalus. I am more inclined to agree with C. D. C. Reeve: "Cephalus is an attractive character, portrayed with dignity and respect" (Reeve 2006, 6). Further, Reeve points out that Cephalus poses a problem for Plato. Cephalus "is to some degree moderate, just, pious and wise without having studied philosophy or *knowing* what the virtues are" (Reeve 2006, 6).[9] Reeve goes on to note that there are "striking similarities between the description of Cephalus and the description of Socrates given in the *Apology*, and later in the *Republic* itself. Both men avoided injustice and impiety. Both face death with good hope... Neither knows what justice is" (Reeve 2006, 6).[10]

There is ample proof from the description of Cephalus in the *Republic* that Reeve's reading of Cephalus is, in general, correct. A few examples from the *Republic* should be sufficient to support the claim that Reeve's reading is, in general, correct. First, it is clear that Cephalus is a pious person because he is first introduced while engaged in a sacrifice to the gods (328c). Further, despite the pleasure he takes in talk and conversation (328c-d) he excuses himself to return to the sacrifice (331c)—that is to say that Cephalus' obligations to the gods trump any personal pleasures he might have. Also, Cephalus' moderation is well established in various places, in his discussion of old age (329d), and in his relationship to money (330b-c). The examples can of course be multiplied but the ones given should be enough to justify Reeve's reading.

One point that Reeve perhaps did not notice, however, is the fact that Cephalus is intelligent, reflective and philosophical in his own right—though not necessarily philosophical in a Platonic sense. The fact that Cephalus is a successful money-maker/businessman speaks to his intelligence. However, Cephalus' intelligence should not be dismissed as mere cunning or business acumen since it is coupled with reflection (329d, 330b-c), that is to say his intelligence is not merely "knowing how" to be a successful businessman but is tempered by his piety, moderation and justice (330b-c, et al).

A further fact that establishes Cephalus' character as reflective and philosophical in his own right is external to the text. The actual, historical, Cephalus was intimately involved in the democratic movement in ancient Greece.

> He sired and raised two leaders of the democratic party [Polemarchus and Lysias]... He appears to support their endeavors and is hospitable, not simply to philosophical discussion in general, but to a particular discussion that resonates, in advance with the themes of Socrates's trial. For all these reasons it is not unreasonable to think of Cephalus as being closely associated with the democratic politics of late fifth century Athens, indeed as being himself a democrat (Steinberger 1996, 185).

Plato's criticisms of democracy aside, what Cephalus' involvement with democratic politics shows is that Cephalus did take seriously questions of justice, for example, and had come to definite conclusions about social justice and the best organization of society.

Now that there is fuller understanding of who Cephalus is, I will look to how this can inform the interactions that Cephalus has with Socrates. To begin, it must be noted the very unnatural way that Plato—as Socrates—introduces the discussion of justice. In his discussion of wealth, Cephalus mentions, in passing, that if one finds "many injustices in his life [... he] lives in anticipation of bad things to come" (330e) (Plato 1992, 5). Cephalus goes on to mention that the greatest benefit of wealth is that it allows a person to be able to pay off their debts, and can thus die in peace (331b). Socrates/Plato pounce on this fairly off-hand remark and suggest that Cephalus is giving a definition of justice. Socrates says explicitly "speaking of this very thing itself, namely, justice, are we to say unconditionally that it is speaking the truth and paying debts" (331c) (Plato 1992, 5-6).

Several things should be noted. First, Cephalus was clearly not giving a definition of justice. Cephalus was talking about old-age, death and wealth not justice. When Cephalus does mention justice, he is talking about particular cases of injustice or wronging someone in particular, not justice in general. Cephalus himself never assents to the definition of justice; it is Polemarchus that comes in to defend the definition (331d). Further, it is clear that Cephalus has a clear understanding of justice or right and wrong. For Cephalus does say that repaying debts is a just act (331b) and that one should not tell the truth to the mentally unstable (331c). Perhaps Cephalus cannot give a rigorous definition of what justice is, but that is not to say that he does not understand justice. In not being able to give a definition, Cephalus is in good company—consider Saint Augustine's discussion of time. Finally, it must be remembered that Cephalus is speaking from the perspective of the shadow-cave-actual world, the world of particulars. Justice there, or here, is particular examples of justice, Socrates is trying to introduce the one-over-many principle of the world of Forms, and as was noted above in trying to do so Socrates and Plato are departing from meaningful discourse.

What Plato and Socrates are asking for is a principle that can explain the diversity of the application of the term "justice". Yet, if one can already successfully and meaningfully apply a notion of justice it is unclear what purpose a broad and general principle would serve. As G. E. Moore has noted "to hold that we do not know what, in certain respects, is the analysis of what we understand by [...] an expression, is an entirely different thing from holding that we do not understand the expression" (Moore 1925, 199). What Moore is pointing out is that in order to successfully use and apply, in essence to understand, how to make a claim one does not need to know what it is that makes one's successful application of the term true. In other words, in order for Cephalus to understand what justice is, he does not need to know what it is about particular instances of justice that makes them just. This, then, is what is unnatural about Plato having Socrates introduce justice in the way that he does. People in the shadow-cave-actual world—represented by Cephalus—already know what justice is, they just do not have a hard and fast criteria that explains the diversity of application, to ask for that goes beyond what normal people mean when they use the term.

Yet, there is something to the Platonic questioning for a criterion. Plato wants to understand justice, and Plato is uncomfortable with the seeming transitoriness of the shadow-cave-actual world understanding of justice. There is something to Plato's desire, so in order not to be completely dismissive of Plato's account there must be something more substantial to the shadow-cave-actual world notion of justice—that is, something that is not just merely critical and defaults to ordinary language understanding. The upshot of interpreting Cephalus as he has been presented here is that Cephalus does represent such a substantial understanding. I will quote Peter Steinberger at length to make this point:

> [Cephalus'] friendliness and good humor, his evident devotion to the gods [...] and his interest in moderation make him a fair exemplification of a certain commonsense notion of justice and virtue. It is an idea of reasonableness and avoidance of excess, of the plurality of goods, and a making do within the limits of normal human desire. Presumably, it is something that virtually anyone can aspire to, hence is entirely consistent with, and might even serve as a constitutive principle of democracy as a philosophy of politics (Steinberger 1996, 193).

Thus, Cephalus is an exemplar of an alternative view of justice that avoids the Platonic abstraction to give a firm base to justice. The Cephalian version of justice is acquired "not through the application of the theoretical intellect but through a kind of habituation" (Steinberger 1996, 193)—that is, habituation in a Deweyan sense.[11]

A deflationary account of the Forms

Before concluding, I will discuss some other insights that can be gleaned from the analysis thus far. It has been shown that the shadow-cave-actual world should be understood as primary. If that is so, a better understanding of Cephalus can be had. Further, by giving primacy to Cephalus' worldview it was noted that there is a viable alternative to the Platonic theory of justice. However, questions still remain regarding Plato's metaphysics and the ontological status of the Forms. By giving primacy to the shadow-cave-actual world, it was suggested that the world of the Forms is derivative. It is to the derivative status of the world of the Forms that I will now return.

Plato's motivation for introducing the Forms and in particular the Form of the Good was to explain the seeming diversity in the world. By the principle of one-over-many, Plato maintains that in order to explain the seeming diversity in the world there must be some thing or some things that are stable that under-gird the application of various properties or predicates. As has been mentioned, Annas maintains that moving from the shadow-cave-actual world of particulars to the world of the Forms provides a deeper, more stable and more inclusive understanding. In this section of the article, I will present what I believe is a good way to interpret the world of the Forms. It will be suggested that one can maintain the Platonic Forms, but in order to do so the metaphysical status of the Forms must be deflated. Even the deflated version of the Forms remains problematic, however.

Above, when discussing the explanatory power of the Forms, I drew a comparison to science. I believe the comparison is apt. One comes to know the laws of physics by experimentation and the value of the laws of physics, for example, is that it helps explain and control the world in which one finds oneself—that is, the abstract laws of physics help one better manage, control and understand the actual lived world. In just the same way, Plato maintains that the Forms help one better understand the actual lived world. However, there is a difference, Plato maintains that the reality of the Forms is what give reality to the actual world. In science however, the laws are understood to be abstractions, the concrete particulars of existence help provide ones understanding of the laws, not vice versa.

It might be objected that it is in fact the laws of physics that provide the reality of the actual world, but it must be remembered that the laws of physics are abstractions. When presenting the laws of physics one uses "frictionless surfaces", "temperatures of absolute zero", and "objects moving at the speed of light" these are all things that do not really obtain in the actual world. It might in fact be that the actual world is controlled and shaped by laws, but one's understanding of those laws are as ideal abstractions which are not "real" in the way that concrete particulars are.[12]

Thus, if the Platonic forms are to be maintained they ought to be maintained in the same way these laws of nature are maintained. They might have great explanatory value and may perhaps deepen one's understanding of the actual lived world, but it is a mistake to give them a deep, or thick, ontological status, much less one that grounds the ontological status of the actual lived world. The Forms, at best, are abstractions that help explain the diversity of one's application and assigning of properties in a variety of circumstances. So, the form of Justice is not what makes a particular act Just, though it might help explain what it is about many different just acts that make them just, or how one might decide if a particular act is or is not just. Knowing how an abstract object at rest with a particular mass reacts when struck by an abstract object in motion with a particular mass would move on a frictionless surface helps understand how a particular billiard ball would move when struck by a cue, but one does not mistake the theory for what is actually happening. Further, it certainly is not the case that the particular billiard ball moves *exactly* as it does *because* of the ideal situation or abstract law. In just the same way, an abstract notion of justice might help explain why a particular act is just, one ought not mistake the theory for the particular or claim that an act *is* just insofar as it bears a certain relation to the Form of Justice.

Even granting Plato this deflated version of Forms remains problematic. First, unlike the laws of physics which have been expressed clearly and explicitly, not once throughout the *Republic* does Plato ever present a clear and explicit understanding of what the Forms are. Instead, Plato has Socrates suggest, imply and explain by analogy what the Forms *might* be. The reason that the laws of physics are useful is because they are explicit and applicable. In the *Republic*, Plato fails to make the Forms really explicit, and thus their applicability and usefulness is reduced to that degree.

The second problem with the deflated version of the Forms is that one need not know the Forms, at all, to be successful in the use of what would be their application. One need not know the laws of chemistry to be a great cook. In fact many great chemists are probably terrible cooks. Yet it is the laws of chemistry that are at work in cooking. In the same way, one need not know the Form of the Good in order to successfully be good or pick out good things. That of course is to be expected, since Cephalus is such a person.

It should be noted that both of the problems for the deflated view of the Forms would still be problems for the Forms if one maintained the ontological status that Plato gives them. However, the deflated view has a less complicated metaphysics, and can more easily account for the primacy of the actual world. Further, the deflated view suggests a way forward for the Platonist. Instead of devaluing the actual experiences of the shadow-cave-actual world, one should proceed like science. Instead of resorting to analogy, implication and metaphor, one ought to fully embrace an experimental approach. It would seem that, this would imply a move away from Platonism to Aristotelianism, that is one possibility, but there is potential for a more scientific Platonism.

Conclusion

In this article, I have tried to come to some understanding of the worldview of the interlocutors in the first book of Plato's *Republic*, particularly the character of Cephalus. The article began by presenting Plato's allegory of the cave and then critiquing the allegory in a way that is similar to O. K. Bouwsma's critique of Descartes' evil genius. While there are important differences between Descartes and Plato, the similarities are close enough to be informative. The main point to take away from the Bouwsma-style critique of the cave allegory is that the shadow-cave-actual world is given primacy, both in meaning and reality. The world of the Forms would thus be derivative.

I then went on to give a fuller characterization of Cephalus. Contrary to Julia Annas' reading, Cephalus should be understood as intelligent and virtuous. By acknowledging the positive characteristics of Cephalus, and the unnatural way in which the definition of justice is introduced, an alternative version of justice was suggested. Opposed to the Platonic ideal of the philosopher-king, Cephalus represents a commonsense, pragmatic and democratic version of justice.

Finally, it was suggested that a way to maintain Platonism would be to make it more scientific. Since the Platonic theory of the Forms is supposed to deepen one's understanding of the phenomenal world and fill an explanatory role in the same way the laws of physics and chemistry do, one should try to come to an understanding of the Forms in the same way one comes to an understanding of the laws of nature. This would of course deflate the metaphysical/ontological status of the Forms, but has the advantage of being a simpler metaphysics—i.e. less complex or ontologically crowded—and acknowledges the primacy of the shadow-cave-actual world.

Endnotes:

1. By sensible I mean that one can make sense of it, not merely that one has sensations of it, which is also certainly true.
2. A paraphrase of Bouwsma (1965, 95).
3. I will return to this point below.
4. I will leave aside the practical wisdom of staring directly at the sun.
5. This phrase "one over many" and the much of the following discussion of Plato's epistemology *cum* metaphysics is based on discussions and so forth I had with George Terzis.
6. Karl Marx makes a similar claim about his project regarding Hegel's idealism. Although, that is not the project here the reference should be noted. See the Afterward to the second German edition of *Capital*.
7. See note 3.
8. See Annas, (1981), Chapter 2.
9. Italics is mine, since as will be suggested below Cephalus does *know*. He just does not know the way Plato believes that one ought to know.
10. Again, knowledge is mentioned, and this will play an important role below.
11. See, for example, Dewey (1988).
12. A full argument of the status of laws of nature extends far beyond the scope of this article. I think it is enough to note that the rough version I have presented here has some intuitive appeal, and *prima facie* does not seem false.

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The Misgivings of a Pop Culture Enthusiast: On the intersection of philosophy and entertainment

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Abstract:

In recent years, dozens of books on philosophy and popular culture have been published. These books have been subjected to a number of criticisms in a number of venues—including other popular philosophy venues. In this paper, I will examine several versions of the criticism that such endeavors are frivolous entertainment. I will argue that, though most of these criticisms do not stand up to scrutiny, they nevertheless express a legitimate worry about the intercourse of philosophy and entertainment. This, I contend, is a criticism the 'philosophy and popular culture' genre must live with—and one that cannot easily be dismissed.

Keywords: popular philosophy, pop culture, entertainment, Postman, critical theory

Imagine a world...

Imagine for a moment the following: hell-bent on the destruction of philosophy, several ne'er-do-well PhDs get together with the aim of destroying the discipline. Their strategy: to release a series of books that put the standard tools of philosophy on display, highlighting some of philosophy's central questions and answers, introducing some of philosophy's most famous practitioners, and exploring the arguments they've offered. But, scandalous as it may seem, these PhDs want to make these questions *accessible*. That means leaving out technicality, and ignoring the difficult details. In other words, these revolutionaries will bring to publishing what they already bring to undergraduate instruction: a first-pass at the issues at stake, hoping to whet the appetites of those they encounter.

Philosophy is an old discipline. Our rogue PhDs know that defeating her will not be easy. She has survived execution, censorship, and countless announcements of her death. She even survived Wittgenstein 'ending' her—twice. The key to the death of the discipline is dazzlingly simplistic: these *espiegle* academicians have decided to show that philosophy isn't just for the well-trained, and it isn't just something one does in a college classroom. They've decided to make philosophy apply to *absolutely everything,* and to show that it is relevant *to absolutely everyone.* In this way, these hateful 'philosophers' are convinced they will kill the love of wisdom once and for all.

This is an exaggerated version of the kind of argument one sometimes hears about the various 'and philosophy' books that have been getting published in recent years[1]: pop culture cheapens philosophy, making it appear as frivolous, dispensable nonsense. When the gloves come off, we hear the further criticism that these books are not 'real' philosophy—or worse still, that they are *incompetent* philosophy.[2]

Few would deny that there's a difference between academic philosophy and popular philosophy, though this difference is harder to locate than one might initially suspect. One difference between pop philosophy and the more academic variety is, of course, *style.* But this isn't the entire story. Very few would object to a writer demonstrating his or her stylistic chops, even in the confines of the academy. A great many academic philosophers are stylists of the highest order (think Mill, Rorty, Quine). Moreover, a great many canonized philosophers of the past put style on a par with content (think Plato, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard). Indeed, philosophy as a form of popular writing is nearly as old as philosophy itself.[3] Objections to popular philosophy are very seldom objections to philosophy that garners a wide audience.

And yet the objections express a very real worry—one that emerges as we, as a profession, confront the rather unflattering public perception of our chosen discipline.

In some ways, the situation for philosophy seems dire: Nobel Laureates claim philosophy has got nothing to offer;[4] television personalities make fun of it; op-eds suggest it is an outmoded artifact no longer useful (if it ever was) to degree-seeking students.

For their part, proponents of philosophy and pop culture are usually forthright about what it is that they're trying to do. The oft-stated aim of pop philosophy that utilizes pop culture is "to provide students with the skills and the desire to engage in serious philosophical reading and reflection on their own" (Bassham and Austin 2008, 7). These skills, in turn, are lauded as necessary for building a better society.[5]

I feel no need to defend philosophy in this context. My question, rather, is this one: is there any reason to be worried about using pop culture as a way of introducing the general public to philosophy? Is there any truth behind the hyperbole of the conspiratorial objection with which we began? I think there is some truth to it—but not perhaps where critics believe. When philosophy attempts to add some reflection to an entertainment culture by engaging that culture on its own terms, it risks itself. This is a legitimate worry. Seeing why and how this worry emerges is, in my view, the best way to understand it.[6]

Two approaches to the popularization of philosophy: the birth of a tension

The United States is characterized by a stunning philosophically illiteracy.[7] The standard images of the philosopher are of the old white-male—robed, tunic-ed or toga-ed—staring off into the distance, pondering the imponderables. And yet the story of Thales, if it were known to the general public, might well resonate: Thales, the legend has it, was so absorbed in thought that he didn't notice the well he was approaching—and fell into it. Fixated on the operations of the heavens, Thales became blind to the realities of the world. Our cultural conception of the philosopher is decidedly Thalesian: the philosopher is so lost in esoteric thought that he cannot see the world around him; his abstraction blinds him to reality; he falls into wells when he encounters them.[8]

The many forms of popular philosophy—the blog, the op-ed, the 'pop culture and philosophy' books, the other attempts at mass appeal—have this much in common: they aim to make philosophy relevant to our daily lives. The *way* they do this, of course, differs remarkably. The philosophical public intellectual tries to bring the tools of philosophy directly to bear on the issues of the day: animal welfare, torture, social and economic equality, racism and sexism. The hope is that philosophy—here understood as the careful and critical examination of evidence and argument in order to discern the appropriate courses of action—will be palatable enough on its own, provided it's stripped of its often burdensome technical vocabulary. On the other end of the public philosophy spectrum, an attempt has been made to show how philosophical questions arise *everywhere*—and hence to demonstrate, somewhat indirectly, that the tools of philosophy are not as esoteric or impractical as one might think. This is a core motivation behind the many 'and philosophy' books that have now found their way into bookstores around the world. In both cases—the public philosopher and the pop culture enthusiast—the philosopher tries to keep Thales out of the well.

But the strategies differ. On the one hand, the public philosopher argues that the issues at stake are simply too important to ignore the significant advantages of philosophical education. Solving the problems of the world requires utilizing precisely those skills the study of philosophy is meant to provide: critical acumen, independent and creative thinking, and a concern for good reasoning. On the other hand, given the philosophical illiteracy of our culture and the negative public perception of philosophy, simply insisting on philosophy's value isn't likely to convince anyone. To get folks to employ the skills of philosophy, we've got to get them to understand what philosophy is, and how it can be used to tackle a host of current issues. To do this, though, we must engage people where their interests lie—and they lie in the popular cultural artifacts of our age.[9]

The public philosopher worries that his credentials aren't taken seriously; that his use of philosophical methods has been de-legitimated by a culture that esteems and degrades religion and science in equal parts, but which has no place for something called 'philosophy.' The pop culture enthusiast wants to change the public perception of philosophy too, but wants to do this by making philosophy as accessible as can be, and by meeting folks where they already are: in front of their televisions, reading their mass paperbacks and graphic novels, listening to Metallica and the Rolling Stones.

There is obviously a potential for tension between these approaches—and the tension has often been explicitly expressed. The worry is that the pop culture enthusiast demeans philosophy—makes it frivolous—by applying it to television shows, vampire novels, and blockbuster films. The worry is that such uses of philosophy will make it *more difficult* to get philosophy taken seriously by the public at large. The charge is thus sometimes made that the 'philosophy and pop culture' genre is actually doing the opposite of what it is trying to do—it is perpetuating the misconception that philosophy has nothing to offer, that it is pointless—that it is just so much more entertainment.

Culture Wars, Popular Philosophy Style

Maurice Natanson once said that "academic philosophy may be the last stronghold of subsidized madness." (1986, 2) Remarkably, he made this claim in a work of academic philosophy, albeit one with more style than most such publications can claim. Some of this madness gets expressed in often biting criticism of the genre of pop culture and philosophy. Indeed, this genre has become an occasion for some of the mad to sharpen their fangs. One blogger ('Spiros') bares his fangs as follows:

> The past several weeks have brought an incredible number of "calls for abstracts" for volumes in the various "pop culture and philosophy" series. As I've argued previously on this blog, these books are an embarrassment to our profession and should be boycotted. The enterprise reached a new low, however, this morning with the announcement of a volume on *Spider Man and Philosophy*.
> Yes, at first the idea of such a volume seems no more stupid and useless than the others. But wait. As is typical, the "call for abstracts" includes a rather long and random list of silly suggested paper topics. In addition to the obvious suggestions-- which involve nothing more than taking a perennial philosophical question and inserting Spider-Man into it (e.g., "Spider-Man and the problem of evil"; "Spider-Man and personal identity")-- there is the suggestion that one might write a paper on "Just how does Spidey-sense work?"
> Finally the series becomes aware of itself: An open invitation to utter bullshit.[10]

This is followed up by a 'comments' section that is brutally mean, where *ad hominem* attacks emerge in the guise of genuine empirical observation:

> All one has to do is take a look at any of the volumes to find that they're a haven for the incompetent.[11]

In response to a comment that attempts to defend these books, the anonymous philosopher ('Spiros') writes:

> To be sure, there are a few good things that happen to appear in these volumes. But on the whole, they're very, very bad: poorly written, poorly argued bullshitting, all under the deluded self-description of making philosophy "relevant" (by doing it poorly).[12]

As much as I'd like to pick on Spiros' remarks,[13] I think his blog contributes to the popularization of philosophy in one of its most central functions: critique. Besides, I actually *love* Spiros' blog—it's irreverent, cranky, and full of fun-loving cynicism. The interesting question, from my point of view, is what motivates the criticisms of pop culture books on a website that is itself attempting to bring a cranky variety of philosophy to bear on popular culture? Why do some people so vehemently hate this kind of popularizing of philosophy? What motivates one commenter to call the pedagogical efforts of the 'philosophy and pop culture' books 'pop fluff wankery'?

As these by-no-means isolated comments suggest, some professional philosophers worry that the work carried out under the auspices of 'philosophy and popular culture' is both frivolous and dangerous. It is frivolous, one might argue, because it makes philosophical labor seem to be more a matter of entertainment than a matter of serious scholarly activity. It is dangerous because these series have been astonishingly successful. From the point of view of the critic, then, such books are encouraging the view that philosophy itself is a matter of entertainment, and hence needn't be taken seriously. In a culture where philosophy is often seen as dispensable, or even worse as outright self-indulgent navel-gazing, philosophy and pop culture books thus sometimes seem to constitute more ammunition in the on-going assault against significant philosophical work.

And yet, what likely lies behind this hatred of the genre is a legitimate fear that the humanities are and will continue to be increasingly marginalized in cultural conversations. As philosophy departments are threatened with being shut-down (and then often are shut-down) because philosophy is regarded as irrelevant, it may be natural to think that books like *X-Men and Philosophy* or *Twilight and Philosophy* are contributing to an untenable conception of philosophy as merely entertainment. Is there anything to this claim?

Philosophy as/and Entertainment

To demonstrate that the pop culture genre of philosophy diminishes philosophy's public reputation, reducing it to mere entertainment, we'd also need to demonstrate, first, that the activities of professional philosophers do *not* contribute to the view that philosophy is mere entertainment. Second, we'd need to demonstrate that philosophy was taken more seriously *before* the release of books on philosophy and popular culture. If we couldn't show this, there would be no way to be certain that the 'pop culture' books were uniquely responsible for the public perception of philosophy as frivolous and inconsequential. And, to be blunt, I don't think it's possible to show either thing.

As noted above, a philosophical illiteracy characterizes American culture. That illiteracy, at least in part, stems from the specialization we find in every discipline—it is by no means unique to philosophy. Every discipline has its own language—its own set of established positions, and its established way of talking about them. As with any technical enterprise, philosophy has developed a technical language that is utterly foreign to the uninitiated.[14]

Our esoteric, technical languages are certainly part of the problem. An arcane, jargon-heavy vocabulary can make us seem, well, *irrelevant*. Most people have no sense of what philosophers actually do, let alone why they're doing it, or why it might matter. To many people (and here I'm offering only anecdotal evidence), professional philosophy really is just *entertainment*. We are viewed as engaging in boutique questions with boutique answers, and arguing about things that do not require argumentation. Do the activities of professional philosophers contribute to the view that philosophy is merely entertainment? Unfortunately, given the above considerations, the answer is likely 'yes'—not mass entertainment, to be sure, but *elitist* entertainment. We are too often seen as simply an irrelevant discipline. Given our irrelevance, members of the discipline—so the thinking goes—are simply navel-gazing. Since what we do does not matter, we must be merely entertaining ourselves (this dominant perception of philosophy makes the exceptions truly exceptional).[15]

Philosophy has always been taken seriously—perhaps too seriously—by some of its practitioners. But well before *Seinfeld and Philosophy* hit the shelves, the profession was busy worrying about its place in the popular imagination—and it was pointing fingers. Who's to blame for the way the profession is perceived? Today, as we've seen, some blame (in part) the philosophy and pop culture books.[16] But one can with equal plausibility argue that philosophy is not taken seriously because it has become so terribly esoteric. It has become, in part, the working out of puzzles—puzzles often generated by philosophizing itself—and we have done a poor job, as a discipline and in general, explaining how our puzzle-mongering connects with real-world issues. Or with anything, really.[17]

The view that the use of pop culture diminishes philosophy, then, faces an important objection: philosophy is *already* diminished in popular consciousness, and has been for a long time. If we make introductory philosophy entertaining, the pop culture enthusiast contends, we might at least expand awareness of the issues and skills that characterize the discipline. It's worth asking the question explicitly: is there something wrong with entertainment?

Philosophers like Montaigne and Nietzsche are among the few who have defended the value of entertainment—at least when this is construed in terms of something like playful amusement. Montaigne, for example, provides a more-or-less utilitarian argument for entertainment. As Shusterman characterizes Montaigne's view, "entertainment's diversion of mind is not a necessarily negative feature that diminishes the mind by distracting its attention but rather, in dialectical fashion, strengthens the mind's powers by providing it with both relief and alternative exercise in changing the focus and style of its activity" (Shusterman 2007, 137).

Of course, the fact that entertainment can be of instrumental value is probably not something too many philosophers would reject. The bigger issue is whether or not the pop culture genre has benefits that outweigh its drawbacks. If people who read philosophy and pop culture books are provided with "alternative exercises" that change "the focus and style" of their mental activity, even if only temporarily, this might count as a real benefit. But this general argument would also apply to *other* forms of entertainment—to *Seinfeld* itself, with or without philosophy.

To make the case that philosophy through pop culture has a distinct value as entertainment would require showing how it goes beyond the entertainment of other forms of popular culture. Thus, even a general defense of entertainment would not necessarily be a defense of philosophical entertainment. Indeed, it appears that defending this particular mode of entertainment requires showing that it is *unlike* all of the other readily available modes. If entertainment has its own value, in other words, it doesn't need philosophy to make it valuable.

I want to return, albeit very briefly, to the issue of context. If philosophical texts are a kind of dialogue between text and reader, and this dialogue, in proper Gadamerian fashion, can shape the person encountering a text, the question of whether or not pop philosophy has an effect on its readers will fundamentally hinge on *who the readers are.*

This is presumably a familiar point: whether or not a piece of writing is 'entertainment' is a largely contextual matter. Consider for a moment Plato's *Phaedrus.* In the dialogue, Plato's Socrates distinguishes entertainment from philosophy. Philosophy is what occurs in living dialogue; entertainment is what is written down to amuse. Ironically, Plato draws this contrast in a text that winds up being an *instance* of entertainment, rather than an instance of philosophy. (True philosophy, Socrates claims, cannot be written down. It can only occur in living dialogue. Plato's writing is thus not true philosophy, on this account, though it is certainly an *invitation* to engage in true philosophical activity).

Entertainment, on one reading, is just amusement—or that which amuses. It is often used in a pejorative sense implying that what is entertaining is in fact a distraction from those things in life that actually matter. In *Phaedrus,* what matters is the active exchange that occurs in dialogue (as opposed to the mere recitation of speeches that have been prepared in advance). Such speeches (like the one Phaedrus himself recites) do not aspire to true philosophical engagement. It has, rather, all the marks of mere amusement: it is passive, something one witnesses and consumes rather than something one actively participates in. True philosophy, Plato tells us, is *never passive.*

It is this conception of entertainment that undergirds the many criticisms of it we find in thinkers like Adorno, Heidegger, Arendt, Postman, and others. In the case of Plato, however, the critique applies to *Plato's own writings.* A written account of a dialogue is not a dialogue; a snapshot of a philosophical exchange is not a philosophical exchange. And yet, it would be absurd to think that Plato's writings are worthless simply because they meet one criterion of entertainment. Certainly Plato himself did not think that, despite the claim that he 'never wrote his true philosophy.'[18] Plato's works were, rather, an invitation to engage in proper philosophy. These invitations have been incredibly, though of course not uniformly, successful. Their success has much to do with their ability to entertain, and their ability to entertain has everything to do with their *style.* Consider the absurdity, again from *Phaedrus,* of Socrates' recitation of a speech while covering his head with a sheet. Or consider the account of female education in *Republic,* where Plato speaks of women 'riding studs while they're naked'—the clear sexual innuendo as present in the Greek as it is in the English. Such amusements are not incidental to Plato's texts. Plato aims to entertain *so that* his readers will be drawn into true philosophical engagement.[19]

Although this is precisely the aim of the 'and philosophy book,' it is somewhat perverse to compare these books to Plato's work. In Plato's writings, philosophy is *never* incidental. One cannot imagine Plato without the philosophical content. One *can* imagine *Family Guy,* or *The Office,* or *30 Rock* without it. One can philosophize in these arenas, to be sure, but the philosophy does not make them what they are. So, while the aim of such series has a powerful pedigree, it is disingenuous to suggest that they are therefore innocent by association.

The question thus remains: do these books manage to get beyond merely amusing? Pop culture enthusiasts should be prepared to admit that sometimes the 'and philosophy' books do not get beyond amusement. Sometimes they are just entertainment. Although essays in these books can be excellent, they can also be formulaic. In every volume, one finds, undeniably and perhaps inevitably, the formulaic application of famous theories to more-or-less routine popular scenarios: one would be hard-pressed to find *anything* involving human action that really couldn't be bludgeoned into illustrating utilitarianism. As readers deeply familiar with utilitarianism (or the mind/body problem, or the issue of freewill, or whatever), professional philosophers are more likely to regard these contributions as, well, not really contributions to the scholarly conversation. And they would be right, at least usually. But one person's mere entertainment is another person's window into something novel and stimulating. A standard introduction to utilitarianism, applied formulaically to some piece of pop culture, might well bore a reader of this piece to tears. But it might also provoke an entirely different reaction from someone who happened to be new to philosophy, or who had no familiarity with any of the 'literatures' we refer to when we do scholarship.

Is this enough to answer the objection? Can we simply point out that some entertainment might still be education to some readers, and leave it at that? I think there is a legitimate worry about the genre that lurks beyond the complaints we've so far been considering—and one that the genre must simply live with.

Entertaining philosophy (to death)

Philosophy ought to be engaging—but being engaging isn't the same as being entertaining. If Frankfurt School style philosophy excelled at anything, it certainly excelled at making this distinction—both on the page and in practice. Indeed, the criticism of so-called 'mass culture' became its own industry among the emigrant philosophers of Germany: Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man,* Adorno's *The Culture Industry,* and work by Hannah Arendt all pointed to the same thing: the growth of an industry designed merely to entertain us is a sign of cultural decline. As Arendt described mass culture:

> Its promoters are neither the masses nor their entertainers, but are those who try to entertain the masses with what once was an authentic object of culture, or to persuade them that *Hamlet* can be as entertaining as *My Fair Lady*, and educational as well. The danger of mass education is precisely that it may become very entertaining indeed; there are many great authors of the past who have survived centuries of oblivion and neglect, but it is still an open question whether they will be able to survive an entertaining version of what they have to say. (Arendt 1960, 284-285).

Neil Postman took up Arendt's criticisms and then applied them to television in what remains a very satisfying book. *Amusing Ourselves to Death,* in its way, captures the core problems with the notion of entertainment. Postman offers what he calls 'the three commandments of television'—commandments that may, with some modification, apply to the category of 'entertainment' in general:

1. Thou shalt have no pre-requisites ("the learner must be allowed to enter at any point without prejudice…television is a nongraded curriculum and excludes no viewer for any reason, at any time…[it] undermines the idea that sequence and continuity have anything to do with thought itself" (Postman 1985, 147))
2. Thou shalt induce no perplexity ("there must be nothing that has to be remembered, studied, applied or, worst of all, endured. It is assumed that any information, story or idea can be made immediately accessible, since the contentment, not the growth, of the learner is paramount" (147-148).
3. Thou shalt avoid exposition like the ten plagues visited upon Egypt ("Arguments, hypotheses, discussions, reasons, refutations or any of the traditional instruments of reasoned discourse turn television into radio or, worse, third-rate printed matter…Nothing will be taught on television that cannot both be visualized and placed in a theatrical context" (148)).

Postman explicitly claims that "the name we may properly give to an education without prerequisites, perplexity, and exposition is entertainment" (148). And there are some striking similarities between the 'commandments of television' and the instructions given to contributors in, for example, Blackwell's Pop Culture and Philosophy series: accessibility, clarity, and an injunction not to stray too far from the target piece of pop culture (no more than a couple pages without referring to it!). But there are obvious differences, too: every essay in the pop culture and philosophy genre *does* take up arguments and objections. It *does* engage in exposition, albeit exposition that anchors itself to its favored piece of pop culture. Writers in the genre are almost always at pains to note that they are *introducing* philosophy, not exhaustively displaying it. For whatever their limitations, the 'and philosophy' books maintain a foot in the 'print culture' that Postman idealizes.

Nevertheless, as Postman argues, the entertainment culture that surrounds us is not to be ignored—it shapes even our relation to the printed word. Arendt and Postman are not simply being curmudgeonly. They argue, rather, that certain sorts of thinking are intrinsically difficult, and that to make such things palatable to the masses will involve stripping them of those (difficult) characteristics that make them what they are. The true enemy of wisdom is not ignorance, Socrates says, but false knowledge. By presenting philosophical issues as entertainment, we encourage a false knowledge of the difficulty (and profundity) of philosophical reflection. It is seen as one more game people can play with language, except this time on a terrain of familiar distractions.

Is this different in principle from what we do in undergraduate instruction? The answer to this question has surprisingly wide-ranging implications. A philosophy professor who aimed at the entertainment of students might produce a greater knowledge of philosophy, but nevertheless promote a conception of philosophy as something to be consumed, or something to be engaged in recreationally, or something to be done when nothing good is on television. To paraphrase Postman's worry about television: the problem isn't that philosophy can be entertaining; the problem is that it won't be anything else. Or to paraphrase McLuhan: the medium destroys the message.

This is philosophy's version of a standoff: the pop culture enthusiast insists that using pop culture will increase philosophical literacy, and hence make available the tools of philosophical reflection for a larger audience. The pop culture pessimist thinks that the use of pop culture will increase philosophical *illiteracy,* as it encourages a conception of philosophy as just so much more entertainment—and entertainment encourages the easy, the shallow, the banal. Wherever one's hopes lie, the objections and the hopes are both serious ones.

There are two replies to this standoff that are worth considering. First, we ought to remember that Plato was not above employing entertainment for the very use we're now considering—to encourage further philosophical reflection. The Platonic dialogue was (on one reading) designed to get people to engage further in philosophical training (by coming to the Academy, for example). Plato himself also saw the danger in knowing too little philosophy: it would encourage a garrulous spirit that wasn't guided by the 'love of truth,' and persisted only in a desire to win arguments. This, to my mind, is a vindication of *both sides* of the standoff: entertainment *can* increase interest in philosophy, but it can also be dangerous. We are, of course, in a very different media environment from the one Plato saw. Plato regarded even *writing itself* as a threat to true philosophical exchange. We are in a much more dangerous position now, to be sure. But if our consistent danger is that we pass over all things without attention, regarding them only as more amusement, it must matter that some amusements are more reflective than others. Even if philosophy has become entertainment, it is at least *reflective* entertainment.

And this leads directly to another point: in a culture such as ours, it may be impossible to avoid *beginning* with an instrumentalized, entertainment-driven version of philosophy. If we take seriously the Heideggerian problem of enframing, or the Marcusian/Horkheimerian diagnosis of an eclipse of reason, or, indeed, Postman's *Brave New World* diagnosis of being amused to death, there may be no other way into philosophy except through the gauntlet of entertainment (doing x because x is fun). This is lamentable for many reasons, but it is, I daresay, better than nothing.

Nevertheless, I think the worry raised by Arendt (and Postman, Adorno, Marcuse, and others) is one that we ought to take seriously. If we begin in entertainment, we might not be able to escape it. Sometimes, for some readers, I'm sure we won't. If the medium shapes the message, as both Arendt and Postman (and McLuhan!) insist, presenting philosophy as entertainment may well change the very nature of what is presented—much like the use of images changed advertising, commercial breaks changed the news, and hyperlinks changed reading.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that this worry is somehow uniquely appropriate in this particular genre of popular philosophy. The very same critique potentially applies to everything that garners a wide audience: we are a culture of entertainment, and through entertainment, we may (inadvertently) change the very things that are colonized by entertainment: the news, education, politics, and yes, philosophy. This is a critique that ought to be made—and ought to be made again and again. It is a critique that points to a significant problem in our culture, but the critique is in itself not a solution. Applied to the use of pop culture to popularize philosophy, it is a critique of a symptom of a culture obsessed with entertainment. The critique is no different, in principle, from the critique of hyperbolic assertions designed to excite the attention of would-be readers—and this happens in a great many varieties of popular philosophy: the op-ed, the intro book, and even in the journal article that promises, in its title, to defend some bizarre view.

If the critique of the entertainment culture is correct, the 'and philosophy' books are guilty—but they are no more guilty than any other version of popular philosophy. The fact that philosophy must prostitute itself to popular culture to get noticed in such a culture, while lamentable in many respects, may nevertheless be unavoidable: one must entertain to be noticed by anyone but the specialist. The choice of the public philosopher may thus come down to a Faustian bargain of sorts: entertain, thereby risking the debasement of the very thing you hope to encourage, or die in the anonymity of a culture that will settle for nothing less.

And now, this…

To those outside of the discipline, *most* philosophy looks frivolous—that's precisely the problem. Whether or not the pop culture genre exacerbates this problem is, ultimately, an empirical question—and one not easy to answer. I think the objections should be taken seriously. As someone who participates in the production of philosophical entertainment, I *am* worried about the potential effects wrought by our entertainment culture on all things sacred, or at least all things serious. But I am equally worried about a world where philosophical thinking is sequestered in academic journals, and entertainment culture faces no attempt at critical thinking. I am worried about a world where only the truly devoted are able to know anything at all about the discipline I have given much of my life to. The 'and philosophy' books should be understood, in my view, as part of the attempt to combat an entertainment culture from *within* that culture—even if we risk undermining such attempts with the very strategies we employ.[20]

Endnotes:

1. One doesn't usually hear much about a conspiratorial plot (I added that bit for fun), but the core criticisms are the same.
2. Are these books really filled with 'incompetence'? A competent contribution to scholarship is one that makes advances—that deals with technical argumentative moves, surveys and responds to the existing literature. But to judge the genre on this criterion makes little sense. These books aim to introduce philosophy, not to advance the state of scholarship. To claim that the pop culture books are incompetent as an *introduction* to the central issues of philosophy, moreover, is simply ridiculous. I have never read a single contribution to such a book that was not competent. To be sure, I have disagreed with particular claims about, say, how to understand the significance of the unity of the virtues in Aristotle. But I have never seen a chapter that involved gross misrepresentations of central claims, or arguments, or even the lay of the theoretical landscape. This is hardly surprising. The vast majority of contributions come from persons with PhDs in the discipline, and all come from people with extensive graduate training. If these persons could not competently present basic philosophical ideas, the discipline would have a much more significant problem than our culture's current philosophical illiteracy. The problem would be that our graduate programs in philosophy were unable to produce competent teachers.

3. The genre of the Socratic dialogue, it must be remembered, was a *popular genre*. Nevertheless, it would be delusional to think that the volumes of popular philosophy now available are full of Plato-worthy writing. They simply aren't. Of course, the same could be said of *any* series of contemporary books.
4. Stephen Hawking made this claim, though he is hardly alone.
5. William Irwin has suggested this in a number of places—in his *Psychology Today* blog, for example.
6. In the interest of full disclosure, I should point out that I have edited (or co-edited) six books in Blackwell's Philosophy & Pop Culture Series: *Family Guy and Philosophy* (2007), *The Office and Philosophy* (2008), *X-Men and Philosophy* and *Twilight and Philosophy* (2009, both co-edited with Rebecca Housel), *30 Rock and Philosophy* (2010), and *Arrested Development and Philosophy* (2012, co-edited with Kristopher Phillips).
7. Carlin Romano's recent *America the Philosophical* notwithstanding.
8. The use of the masculine pronoun 'he' is intentional. 80% of professional philosophers in the US are male, compared to 60% across the academy. This has long been recognized (by some, at any rate) as a significant problem for the discipline. Our collective exclusion of minority groups of various kinds certainly does not aid the cause of public philosophy.
9. Plato's own approach to philosophical writing seems to have involved a fusion of both approaches. Plato applies the tools of philosophy to social and political questions, but he also utilizes many of the dramatic and comedic tropes of his day.
10. http://philosophersanon.blogspot.com/2009/04/doom-pop-culture-and-philosophy.html Last accessed June, 2016.
11. http://philosophersanon.blogspot.com/2009/04/doom-pop-culture-and-philosophy.html Last accessed June, 2016.
12. The first question one might ask is this: why has this blogger read so many of these books if he truly thinks they're worthless? The answer, of course, is that he hasn't. He probably has not read a single volume, let alone multiple. This doesn't mean he's wrong. Perhaps, like a number of essays in the pop culture books, he's attempting to illustrate a topic of philosophical interest: induction maybe, or the fallacy of hasty generalization.
13. By, for example, highlighting how vague the criticisms are, or how they aren't supported with even a little bit of evidence, or pointing out their implicit narcissism, or pointing out that the kind of blog Spiros is running is in fact in the same genre as the pop culture books. I will also refrain from pointing out the performative contradictions involved in making bad arguments against bad arguments.
14. Practitioners of 'analytic philosophy' (a redundancy, to be sure—as if any philosophy could do without analysis!) often complain about just this feature of the philosophical traditions of phenomenology and post-structuralism. Devotees of so-called 'continental philosophy' (an ugly, ethnocentric phrase that unabashedly proclaims that *the* continent that matters for philosophy is *Europe*) likewise find the jargon of analytic philosophy every bit as burdensome and esoteric as any phenomenologist's. A welcome development in recent years has been the emergence of a group of professional philosophers who speak both languages, and who can successfully translate between them.
15. Can we be blamed for this conception of the discipline? In part, I think we can. As we work away on our philosophical projects, we very often lose the desire to explain to those outside of the discipline what we're doing. (And we sometimes even lose the ability to do this). This was a problem even in ancient Greece. It is by no means new.
16. Was philosophy taken seriously in the years before the pop culture books? No. And at that point, we were busy blaming Derrida. (One merely has to think of the letters of protest written in response to the decision of Cambridge University (in 1992) to award Derrida an honorary degree.)
17. How do we handle philosophy's place in the cultural imagination? How do we successfully insist on its relevance in a culture that often seems to have little interest in it? It seems to me that two different answers have been offered. One answer has been to try to make philosophy itself into science. This

is an old idea, and one of wide-ranging appeal—it was advocated by Descartes, Kant, Husserl, Russell, and so many more. Another answer is to write more accessibly—to add to one's philosophical labors a civic one: popularizing. The two answers can be given at once. Descartes, after all, tried to do just that. He wanted philosophy both to be scientific and to be widely available—hence the translation of the *Meditations* into a common language (French) rather than just the language of scholars (Latin). But the answers can also pull in opposite directions.

18. This claim appears in the (sometimes contested) Seventh Letter.
19. For an excellent reading of specific Platonic dialogues in this light, see James Arieti's wonderful (and, in my view, under-appreciated) *Interpreting Plato: The Dialogues as Drama* (Rowman and Littlefield, 1991).
20. I would like to thank Bill Irwin for comments on an early draft of this paper.

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Cognition as Computation: From Swift to Turing

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Abstract:

If one is going to compile a catalogue of the central concerns of *Gulliver's Travels*, it goes without question or hesitation that the concept of *reason* looms large, if not possessing the uppermost priority, in Jonathan Swift's authorial agenda. Swift is not only interested in reason insofar as practical rationalities, rational practicalities, and moral mores are concerned but also in the nature and constitution of reason itself. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to look at Swift's treatment of the nature and constitution of reason and rationality in two of the Gulliver's voyages: *viz.* the journeys to *Brobdingnag* and *Balnibarbi*. What is intriguing is that Swift seems to anticipate in the former voyage Alan Turing's Imitation Game and in the latter voyage Turing's idea of computational mechanization of intelligence, where he relates the two tales with diametrically opposite sentiments. The discussion of Swift's anticipations is then set against the backcloth of the vicissitudes of the idea of Logical Machine from William of Soissons in the twelfth century to Alonzo Church's Theorem and David Hilbert's broad-ranging *Entscheidungsproblem* in the twentieth century.

Keywords: Church's Theorem, Computational Intelligence, *Entscheidungsproblem*, Imitation Game, Logical Machine

Alan Turing opens his classic paper, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence", with the question, 'Can machines think?', but quickly dismisses the question as verging on a lexical game of how words are commonly understood and used with no significant outcome and result other than being a statistical survey of some sort. In fact, later in the article, he goes so far as declaring it "to be too meaningless to deserve discussion." (Turing 1950, 442) Instead he introduces his (in)famously irreverent "imitation game" whereby an "interrogator" questions two unseen people, a man and a woman, in order to decide which is the woman on the basis of written replies supplied through teleprinter communication in which both man and woman are claiming to be the woman. Turing then goes on to imagine a similar game in which human and machine compete to assert their human status under the same conditions. Somewhat disconcertingly, Turing's initial comparative case turns out to be unnecessarily distractive as it diverts attention from his central concern. In the first game, a successful imitation proves nothing at all; physical gender *cannot* be determined by teleprinter responses. Yet, in the second game, Truing contends that the successful imitation of intelligence in teleprinter messages *can* prove something, for it *is* intelligence. Intelligence, in contrast with other features such as gender or any other physical attributes, is effectively demarcated by that which can be manifested through communication, especially through the "question and answer method" which, in Turing's view, "seems to be suitable for introducing almost any one of the fields of human endeavour". Turing thus conceptualises his idea of the imitation game as an attempt to draw a line between mental faculties and others such as "to shine in beauty competitions" or to "race against an aeroplane". Thereby he suggests that this is achieved by the conditions of the game, as "drawing a fairly sharp line between the physical and the intellectual capacities of a man." (Turing 1950, 434-35)

This brief delineation of Turing's imitation game should suffice to draw attention to an historical anticipation of Turing's Test in Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* more than two hundred years before Turing's discussion of the issue. It is interesting to find an almost identical scenario in Swift's imaginary case of Gulliver landing in *Brobdingnag* where he encounters a population of giants. Upon being discovered and observed first by a farm reaper and then the farmer himself, Swift tells the story of how Gulliver manages to establish his "rational" nature and humanity – albeit in an exceedingly small scale in comparison to the inhabitants of *Brobdingnag* – and thereby to secure his safety by *communicating* through a number of primitive *signs* such that "I made a Sign that he should place his [farmer] Hand on the ground" or "He [farmer] made me a Sign to put them [gold coins] again in my Purse, and the Purse again in my Pocket". (Swift 1961, 68) Indeed, it is through such signs, Gulliver relates, that the farmer "by this time was convinced I must be a *rational* Creature." (Swift 1961, 68; my emphasis) In fact, the farmer's wife's frights are only assuaged when she sees "how well I [Gulliver] observed the Signs her Husband made". (Swift 1961, 69) In fact, after a while, Swift writes, it "now began to be known and talked of in the Neighbourhood, that my Master had found a strange Animal in the Fields ... exactly shaped in every Part like a human Creature; *which it likewise imitated in all its Actions*; seemed to speak a little Language of its own, had already learned several Words of theirs ... *would come when it was called, do whatever it was bid*". (Swift 1961, 75; my emphasis)

Nonetheless, the parallelisms between Turing and Swift over the imitation game become more striking when Gulliver is taken to the royal court after spending some time with the farmer's family and in the meantime acquiring a "tolerably well" command of the native language. Having heard about the "Behaviour, and good Sense" of Gulliver from the courtiers who had seen him in a show in "the Metropolis", the king is rather sceptical even though, Swift writes, "he be as learned a Person as any in his Dominions; and had been educated in the Study of Philosophy, and particularly Mathematicks". (Swift 1961, 81) Initially, the king surmises that Gulliver "might be a piece of Clockwork, (which is in that Country arrived to a very great Perfection) contrived by some ingenious Artist", and thus attempts to set up his own verification of the "good Sense" of Gulliver. (Swift 1961, 81) By engaging in his own version of the imitation game through the "question and answer method", as Turing similarly proposes as a suitable means of testing the presence of intelligence, the king finds what Gulliver delivers in his responses "to be regular and rational". Lest he has fallen victim to an elaborate hoax, the king perseveres with his question and answer method by posing "several other Questions" where Gulliver triumphantly narrates that the king "still received rational Answers, no otherwise defective than by a Foreign Accent, and an imperfect Knowledge in the Language; with some rustick Phrases which I had learned at the Farmer's House, and did not suit the polite Style of a Court." (Swift 1961, 81)

What is, however, most fascinating is what transpires next in Gulliver's story that has a resounding resonance in Turing's discussion of the imitation game. After the king's "question and answer" examination of Gulliver, for the sake of further investigation, the king sends for "three great Scholars" of the dominion. But, we are told that the three scholars solely focus on Gulliver's "Shape" and, after much disagreement and discussion, come to the conclusion that he is only "*Lusus Naturae*" (a freak of nature), where Swift swiftly takes the opportunity to take a swipe at his contemporary European scientists who, despite their protestations to the contrary, have unwittingly fallen into "the old Evasion of *occult Causes*, whereby the Followers of *Aristotle* endeavour in vain to disguise their Ignorance". (Swift 1961, 82) There are two interesting parallels here between Swift and Turing. First, Turing is adamant that in setting up the imitation game any intrusion of physical features and characteristics – or "Shape" as Swift calls it – should be avoided as they do not shed any light on the central concern of whether an entity is capable of exhibiting intelligence or not. Secondly, like Swift, Turing persistently points out in his paper that his contention is to *demystify* the notion of intelligence and shun any account in terms of occult. One can easily see the echo of Swift in Turing's discussion of the argument from the *mystery* of consciousness against machine thinking: "I do not wish to give the impression that I think there is no mystery about consciousness. There is, for instance, something of a paradox connected with any attempt to localise it. But I do not think these mysteries necessarily need to be solved before we can answer the question with which we are concerned in this paper." (Turing 1950, 447)

Now, despite almost absolute convergence between Swift and Turing on the imitation game, their subsequent paths drastically diverge – more precisely, they traverse in diametrically opposite directions. For Turing the imitation game lays the foundation for the formulation of his *universal machine* capable of thinking and intelligence, whereas Swift takes a deeply dim view of such a *possibility* by actually parodying the idea in one of Gulliver's later voyages. Swift tells the reader that in his voyage to *Balnibarbi* Gulliver comes across a professor of the grand academy of *Lagado* who shows him a machine capable of improving and extending knowledge by "mechanical Operations." (Swift 1961, 156) The academician explains that "by his Contrivance, the most ignorant Person at a reasonable Charge, and with a little bodily Labour, may write books in Philosophy, Poetry, Politicks, Law, Mathematicks and Theology, without the least Assistance from Genius or Study." (Swift 1961, 156) So far as the other voyages are concerned, it is clear whom Swift meant to ridicule, the follies and foibles he wished to expose. *Balnibarbi*'s target is rather less obvious. Why was Swift so acutely roiled by mathematicians and natural scientists in a period when mathematics was being enriched by major discoveries, when mathematical physics was being systematically extended, and when experimental sciences were flourishing in almost every department? Nonetheless, the target of the above narrative is apparently to deride the *Organons* of Aristotle and Francis Bacon by exposing the inanity of supposing that any machine or instrument can do the work of the mind.

Nonetheless, the ambition to mechanise logic, in particular, goes back to Leibniz's dream of *a lingua characterica* – a logical language into which every clear question could be translated and then settled by calculation. Yet, in his *Metalogicon* John of Salisbury reports about one of his students, William of Soissons, that "he invented a machine for the purpose of subduing by force the old established principles of logic, for constructing unbelievable consequences and destroying the theories of the ancients." (Martin 1986, 565) William and Martha Kneale present this passage as the source for the recent suggestion that William's machine was possibly a physical device perhaps anticipating nineteenth century "invention of a logical machine". (Kneale and Kneale 1988, 201) Explicit mechanisation in logic finally emerged in the construction of logical machines by Stanley Jevons and Allan Marquand. (Burks and Burks 1988; Gardner 1958) Jevons was the first pioneer to realise mechanisation of logic and in 1869 succeeded in constructing a logical machine he exhibited next year to the Royal Society of London. (Gardner 1958) In one description, its appearance was like that of a very small upright piano which was somewhat whimsically referred to as the "Logical Piano". (Ketner 1984, 188) Marquand, of Princeton, who had been in correspondence with Jevons about his works, designed in 1881 "a device somewhat similar to that of Jevons', and in the next year built an improved model, using as a basis his own multi-variable diagram". (Mays and Henry 1953, 504) The upshot of this, not only *possible* but also *actual*, mechanisation was to set off many philosophical discussions on the nature of logical reasoning and its relation to mechanics[1], amongst whose early discussants one encounters the influential and formidable protagonist, Charles Sanders Peirce.[2]

Peirce was against psychologism in logic and expressed his qualms about it as early as 1865[3], which somewhat predates Fregean and Husserlian assaults, with the aim of avoiding "all possible entanglement in the meshes of psychological controversy." (Peirce 1982, Vol. 1, 308)[4] However, unlike Francis H. Bradley yet closer in spirit to Gottlob Frege's attempt to prove the existence of *Gedanken*, Peirce launched his criticism by rejecting the frames of reference in which the controversy was being conducted. To set the new boundaries, Peirce states that "in logic we are not occupied with *cognition* or *the mode of cognition*, but only with the forms of representation", *i.e.*, the concern is with formal relations between symbols. (Michael and Michael 1979, 85; my emphasis) To justify this change of arena, Peirce appeals to the following consideration: let there be an argument in a recently recovered ancient tablet in an *undeciphered* language. Obviously one would not say that such an argument was valid when it was understood and thought, and now that its language is undeciphered and not understood, it is no longer valid. The argument is valid, Peirce holds, in virtue of the relations between symbols irrespective of their being understood and thought. Thus, he remarks, "the unpsychological view makes that systematically evident, which it would seem were otherwise sufficiently axiomatic, that these laws apply not merely to what can be thought but to whatever can be symbolized in any way. (Peirce 1982, Vol. 1, 166-67) This change of the frame of reference paves the way for Peirce to state his direct argument against logical psychologism by considering the implications of the existence of logical machines.

It should be noted that Jevons' and Marquand's machines were not designed to check whether a given logical argument is valid, but to indicate implicitly conclusions that *could* be derived from given premises which alone were fed into them. Bradley, however, pressed the point that the "result that comes out and is presented by the machine, is not really the conclusion. The process is not finished when the machinery stops; and the rest is left to be done by the mind. What is called *"reading"* the conclusion is to some extent *making* it." (Bradley 1922, 384) Bradley thus denied that machines *can* perform inferences, but as he could see that Jevons' machine clearly did perform logical operations, he conceded that "it performs mechanically an operation which, if performed ideally, would be an inference." (Bradley 1922, 383) Obviously the issue turns on the nebulous phrase *ideal performance*. But, so far as one can gather from the text, what Bradley means by an ideal performance is 'an operation performed in the mind' which renders Bradley's position rather question-begging. What goes on in the mind during logical operations is rather obscure, but Peirce, contrary to Bradley's approach, urges that "needed light on the nature of the reasoning process" is bound to be shed by studying "how much of the business of thinking a machine could possibly be made to perform, and what part of it must be left for the living mind". (Peirce 1887, 165)

What is, nonetheless, interesting about Peirce's position is that he goes on to stress that no such light could illuminate *logic* itself, for it does not in actual fact depend on "the nature of reasoning process", but rather on *truth* which is quite independent of any thinking process. "How we think", Peirce writes, "is utterly irrelevant to logical inquiry." (Peirce 1960, Vol. II, 31) He supports this attack on psychologism in logic by arguing that its laws apply equally well to human or mechanical reasoning. If it be objected that machines do not think, Peirce's response is that thinking "has nothing to do with logical criticism, which is equally applicable to the machine's performances and to the man's." (Peirce 1960, Vol. II, 33) Indeed, it should be admitted that the machines of Jevons and Marquand, as well as Charles Babbage's Analytical Engine, all perform inferences and thus should be regarded as reasoning, since if "from true premises they always yield true conclusions, what more could be desired? Yet those machines have no souls that we know of. They do not appear to think, at all, in any psychical sense; and even if we should discover that they do so, it would be a fact altogether without bearing upon the logical correctness of their operations". (Peirce 1960, Vol. II, 31-32)

Peirce, therefore, uses *logical machines* to argue against psychologism in logic. There is, however, a problem of demarcation here. That is, if calculating machines also reason and, as Peirce states, "Babbage's analytical engine would perform considerable feats in mathematics" (Peirce 1960, Vol. II, 31), where should the line be drawn? For instance, can one say that at every revolution a steam engine works its problem in thermodynamics? In the context of contemporary cognitive science, John Searle thinks that this type of question parallels ones like 'Does the visual system *compute* shape from shading?' or 'Does the visual system *compute* object distance from size of retinal image?'[5] To make his point more striking, Searle claims that those questions are of a piece with a *fallacious* one like: "do nails compute the distance they are to travel in the board from the impact of the hammer and the density of the wood?" (Searle 1992, 214)

Notwithstanding the Searlian demur, one may attempt to sharpen the question in the case of logic, for example, by considering the issue of what exactly constitutes a *logical* machine. The answer to such a question lies in what Peirce phrases as the "secret of all reasoning machines". (Peirce 1887, 168) That is, it "is that whatever relation among the objects reasoned about is destined to be the hinge of a ratiocination, that same general relation must be capable of being introduced between certain parts of the machine." (Peirce 1887, 168) Peirce illustrates this abstract statement with the following concrete example. A machine can argue *syllogistically in Barbara* if there is a connection "such that when one event A occurs in the machine, another event B must also occur. This connection being introduced between A and B, and also between B and C, it is necessarily virtually introduced between A and C." (Peirce 1887, 168)

Then, Peirce argues that it must be admitted that *every* machine is really a reasoning machine, for in every machine certain relations between its parts will "involve other relations that were not expressly intended." (Peirce 1887, 168) Peirce extends this line of thought even to apparatus used in scientific experiments by calling them likewise "reasoning machines", yet noting that such instruments do not depend on the laws of human mind "but on the objective reason embodied in the laws of nature." (Peirce 1887, 168) Thus he remarks: "Accordingly, it is no figure of speech to say that the alembics and cucurbits of the chemist are instruments of thought, or logical machines." (Peirce 1887, 168)

Interestingly enough, Peirce's view appears to be an elaboration of a position expressed more than two years earlier, in 1885, by Bernard Bosanquet that all instruments of measurement and observation have a right to be called "reasoning machines". Bosanquet writes,

> It has always appeared to me that the element of knowledge incorporated in our instruments of measurement and observation has met with insufficient recognition from logical theory ... I think that a spectroscope, or a fine compound microscope with all sorts of illuminating devices, or even a first-rate chronometer, is perhaps as truly a reasoning machine as any logical apparatus that has been devised. ... Professor Jevons ... with his ingenious logical machine ... has called special attention to the principles by help of which our instruments furnish us with exact measurements. (Bosanquet 1885, 327-28)

A logical machine, Peirce holds, reasons no more than any other machine, but differs from others "merely in working upon an excessively simple principle which is applied in a manifold and complex way, instead of upon an occult principle applied in a monotonous way." (Peirce 1960, Vol. II, 32-33) The special truth-conditions satisfied by logical machines are not the exclusive mark of all reasoning which Peirce considers as no more than a terminological issue. What he emphasises on is that a man

> ... may be regarded as a machine which turns out, let us say, a written sentence expressing a conclusion, the man-machine having been fed with a written statement of fact, as premiss. Since this performance is no more than a machine might go through, it has no essential relation to the circumstance that the

> machine happens to work by geared wheels, while a man happens to work by an ill-understood arrangement of brain-cells ... (Peirce 1960, Vol. II, 33)

Nevertheless, Peirce's attack on psychologism stops short of endorsing the Hobbesian stance that "all reasoning is computation". (Peirce 1960, Vol. II, 31)

Hobbes maintained that all thought or reasoning is just *ratiocination*. The underlying nominalism is inspired by the 'Latines' who called accounts of money "*Rationes*, and accounting, *Ratiocinatio*: and that which we in bills and books of accounts call Items, they called *Nomina*; that is, *Names*: and thence it seems to proceed, that they extended the word *Ratio*, or the faculty of Reckoning in all other things." (Hobbes 1986, 106) To reinforce his nominalism by appealing to authority, Hobbes notes that the Greeks had but one word, *logos*, for both speech and reason, because they believed that reason presupposed speech. He had meanwhile become convinced that *reason* "is nothing but *Reckoning* (that is, Adding and Substracting) of the Consequences of general names agreed upon, for the *marking* and *signifying* of our thoughts". (Hobbes 1986, 111) The poignancy of this conviction becomes more striking when read against the following statement: "in what matter soever there is place for *addition* and *substraction*, there also is place for *Reason*; and where these have no place, there *Reason* has nothing at all to do." (Hobbes 1986, 110-11) He found support for this thesis in Pascal's construction of the first adding machine. (Boden 1964, 333-34) In the words of Pascal's sister, Madame Perier, the arithmetic machine "was an entirely new thing in nature, by which he reduced to mechanism a science which resides in the mind, and by which he found the means of carrying out all the operations with a complete certainty *without recourse to reasoning*. (Jaki 1969, 22-23; my emphasis) Thus, for Hobbes, reasoning is just a computational process whose mechanical nature is confirmed by such constructions as Pascal's machine. However, it should be said that Hobbes was in no position to show that all computation can be reduced to mechanism; nor could he show that, since a machine can do what had previously required a mind, a mind then is a machine.

Now, returning to Peirce's argumentation against psychologism, although he explicitly agrees with Hobbes that "numerical computation is reasoning" (Peirce 1960, Vol. II, 31), Peirce disavows the stronger flat theory of ratiocination in which all operations of the mind are traced back to addition and subtraction, *i.e.* all reasoning is computational. The reason for rejecting the latter claim lies in what Peirce perceives as the *essential* differences in reasoning between humans and machines.

Peirce claims that all logical machines suffer from "two inherent impotencies." (Peirce 1887, 168) The first impotency that Peirce finds in a logical machine is that it is "destitute of all originality, of all initiative. It cannot find its own problems; it cannot feed itself. It cannot direct itself between different possible procedures." (Peirce 1887, 168) To give an example, Peirce remarks that how can a machine automatically thread its way through such a labyrinth as von Staudt's long proof for Desargues' theorem – a simple proposition in projective geometry starting from a few premises but involving "no less than 70 or 80 steps in the demonstration." (Peirce 1887, 169) But, even if the machine can be programmed to do it, "it would still remain true that the machine would be utterly devoid of original initiative, and would only do the special kind of thing it had been calculated to do." (Peirce 1887, 169) Yet, Peirce, like many of his contemporaries, seems to have been rather insensitive to the fact that Babbage had already conceived, if not built, a machine which could execute *all* "possible procedures", and not just some "special thing". It is now part of the common lore that Babbage's vision of universal machines which can "direct themselves" between different programmes is readily realisable. However, it should be noted that Turing's argument that a universal machine must be considered to have "originality" if any machine has it begs the question whether any machine *does* have it. (Turing 1950, 450 *ff.*)

In Peirce's understanding, the second inherent inadequacy of any machine is that its capacity "has absolute limitations; it has been contrived to do a certain thing, and it can do nothing else." (Peirce 1887, 169) *Prima facie*, this sounds like the first one all over again, but Peirce's reason for this impotency, as distinct from the first one, is that existing logical machines can only deal with a limited number of symbols. In this connection, it is interesting to note that in Swift's story of the professor in the grand academy of *Lagado*, like a good contemporary fundraiser, the academician attempts to get the visiting guest, Gulliver, to contribute to his project as he needs "five Hundred such Frames" to improve and expedite the machine's production of knowledge. (Swift 1961, 156) Seemingly Swift was thinking along the same lines as Peirce in terms of machine limitations! Nonetheless, Peirce's diagnosis of the second impotency of machines immediately prompts him to note a comparable limitation on human beings which apparently undermines the force of his diagnosis. He writes: "The unaided mind is also limited in this as in other respects; but the mind working with a pencil and plenty of paper has no such limitation. It presses on and on, and whatever limits can be assigned to its capacity to-day, may be over-stepped to-morrow." (Peirce 1887, 169)

However, contrary to Peirce's claim about logical machines, this is merely a matter *of external memory* capacity which is assumed to be unlimited and potentially infinite for a universal machine. This is obviously an *idealisation*. "There is no theoretical difficulty", Turing writes, "in the idea of a computer with an unlimited store. ... Such computers have special theoretical interest and will be called infinitive capacity computers." (Turing 1950, 438-39) There goes the same rebuttal to Swift's similar criticism. And, as Roger Penrose points out, the advances in "modern computer technology have provided us with electronic storage devices which can, indeed, be treated as *unlimited*'. (Penrose 1990, 35; my emphasis)

The failure to fathom the full force of the idea of universal machines, as broached by Babbage's Analytical Engine, is also evident in the way that Peirce differentiates "non-relational" logic from the "logic of relatives". The former, in Peirce's view, has misled logicians into believing that deductive (necessary) reasoning was all a matter of following rigid rules: that is, rules which infer just *one* conclusion from given syllogistic premises. This has in turn led to the conclusion that machines might therefore perform *all* such reasoning. Peirce, however, thinks that this is not borne out by relational logic where "from any proposition whatever ... an endless series of necessary consequences can be deduced". (Peirce 1960, Vol. III, 407) This way of characterising relative logic also encouraged Peirce to attack Kant's view of logic as analytic in the sense that it "only elicits what was implicitly thought in the premisses" (Peirce 1960, Vol. III, 407), and consequently his famous analytic/synthetic distinction in judgements.[6] He argues that in the logic of relatives matter "entirely foreign to the premisses may appear in the conclusion." (Peirce 1960, Vol. III, 408)

What is noteworthy here about Peirce's conception of relational logic is that despite the fact that he lacks the terminology to express his conjecture precisely, he intimates the idea that the addition of relations to a monadic logic puts statements, generally, beyond the ability of machines to classify as theorems or non-theorems. Peirce's perception of an asymmetry of proof complexity between monadic and relational logical systems appears to be premonitory of certain metalogical theorems that were only developed later in the twentieth century. In hindsight, his claim that machines could generally classify statements in non-relational monadic logic, but the deductive theory of relations requires deductions that are sometimes regulated by "choice and a deliberate plan", was only given full formulation and explication by Alonzo Church's Theorem, or Church's Theorem together with the Turing-Church Thesis, a few decades later. Indeed, by emphasising the intrusion of "choice and a deliberate plan" in the proof constructions of relational logics, in the following passage dating back to 1883, Peirce comes close to one of the consequences of Church's Theorem that such proofs might require creativity for their discovery:

> The logic of relatives is highly multiform; it is characterized by innumerable immediate inferences, and by various distinct conclusions from the same set of premisses. …
> The effect of these peculiarities is that this algebra cannot be subjected to hard and fast rules like those of the Boolian calculus; and all that can be done in this place is to give a general idea of the way of working with it. (Peirce 1960, Vol. III, 200)

Yet, one has to admit that Peirce's remarks here are not unequivocal as they can be read in two different ways: either he could be saying that the logical theory with relations cannot be recursively axiomatised, or he could be saying that there are no "rules" for discovering proofs and disproofs. However, in an article entitled "On the Algebra of Logic" published in 1885, two years after the above remarks, Peirce attempts to offer clear rules for such discoveries. It, therefore, seems that he had either changed his views by 1885 or intended the 1883 statements in the first sense. Nonetheless, despite the presence of ambiguity and absence of precise conceptual vocabulary in his claims, as Randall Dipert observes, for Peirce to have made these observations, even vaguely, was a remarkable achievement as "most interesting metalogical results were beyond the vision of all other 19th-century logicians, including Frege." (Dipert 1984, 58)

In another piece of relatively the same period as the earlier claim that matter "entirely foreign to the premisses may appear in the conclusion", however, Peirce admits that even the logic of relations has failed to "eradicate" completely the idea that all necessary reasoning could conceivably be left to a machine. But, he continues, "it does show that much *unexpected truth* may often be brought to light by the repeated reintroduction of a premiss already employed". (Peirce 1960, Vol. IV, 506; my emphasis)

Again in retrospect, Peirce's point here may be made more precise by drawing on the undecidability of David Hilbert's broad-ranging *Entscheidungsproblem*. The problem can be couched in the following question: Is there some mechanical procedure for answering all mathematical problems, belonging to some broad, but well-defined class? The problem became poignant and part of the established lore only after Turing's demonstration that a machine such as Babbage's is able to find every such truth while remaining *itself* undecidable. (Turing 1936, 37) Any method for predicting what such a machine will do in general will be confronted with "unexpected truth" about its *halting* behaviour, so unexpected indeed that it will not predict them at all. Peirce, in fact, did not see any real difficulty in constructing a machine to work the "logic of relations" even with a large number of terms. His conjecture was that,

> … owing to the great variety of ways in which the same premisses can be combined to produce different conclusions in that branch of logic, the machine, in its first state of development, would be no more mechanical than a hand-loom for weaving in many colors with many shuttles. The study of how to pass from such a machine as that to one corresponding to a Jacquard loom, would be likely to do very much for the improvement of logic. (Peirce 1887, 170)

Although this was a fecund formulation of what was needed, Babbage had already done quite literally this by applying the punched cards of the Jacquard loom to the problem of mechanising arithmetic, while Turing later established that it could indeed "work the logic of relatives".

In conclusion, though Peirce's prognostication – as well as Swift's broadside – about machine impotencies fails to bear scrutiny, his use of logical machines to argue against psychologism was a novel and interesting approach. Also, it is worth noting that there appears to be an aura of paradox around logical machines *vis-à-vis* the status and nature of logical principles. On the one hand, one sees how Peirce argues that since logical operations (reasonings) can be adequately performed by logical machines, logic cannot be exhausted by such mechanical operations. The nature of logic *still* needs to be illumined. On the other hand, one encounters the Hobbesian, or in Searle's jargon the "strong AI" (Searle 1991, 28), camp that since "brass and iron of machines have been invested with reasoning functions and instructed to perform some of the most difficult operations of the mind," then there is *nothing* over and above these computational manipulations to logic and logical principles. One thus finds oneself with the following bewildering situation*: the same premise but contradictory conclusions*. Consequently one may adopt the conservative position that the premise in question, *i.e.* the existence of logical machines, on its own is insufficient for drawing any conclusion either way. The battle for determining the nature of logic should largely be fought on grounds and premises other than the existence of logical machines. But, what about computational intelligence? According to Turing, if anything including a *machine* can pass the imitation game successfully, it behoves one to credit it with *intelligence*. Similarly Swift seems to concur that his variant of the imitation game is as good as any other evidence to prove the "rational" nature of Gulliver to his giant hosts. So, given Swift's express and explicit aversion to *occult and* *inexplicable causes*, what made him take such an utter umbrage to the possibility that "the whole mind is mechanical"? (Turing 1950, 455)

Endnotes:

1. For a historical survey of the wider impact of the emergence of logical machines, for example, on economics, see Maas 1999.
2. It should be noted that Peirce had more than a philosophical interest in the issue of logical machines. In fact, Marquand was Peirce's student at Johns Hopkins University before moving to Princeton, and Marquand's first published design for a logical machine appeared in *Studies in Logic* which was edited by Peirce. (Ketner 1984) Moreover, Peirce was apparently the first person who suggested to Marquand to use electricity for computing logical operations. (Peirce Vol. 5, 1993, xliv, 421-23, and 482-83)
3. For an account of how Peirce's anti-psychologism can be reconciled with the *apparently* psychologistic proclivities shown in his later influential papers such as "The Fixation of Belief" and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," see Kasser 1999.
4. This, rather *accidentally*, reinforces what George Boolos phrases as "the iconoclastic tendency" of Putnam's article, "Peirce the Logician", in which he attempts to reinstate Peirce, as opposed to Frege, as the real precursor of modern logic. (Boolos 1994, 31) Putnam states his aim thus: "to show that much that is quite familiar in modern logic actually became known to the logical world through the efforts of Peirce and his students." (Putnam 1992, 252)
5. For an extension of the concept of logical machine to sense perception in Peirce and its epistemological implications, see Nesher 2002.
6. However, for the overall positive influence of Kantian conception of logic on Peirce's early metaphysics, see Forster 1997.

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Establishing a New Standard for Divine Omnipotence

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Abstract:

"Omnipotence" is one of the most critical terms in philosophy of religion. A significant amount of time has been devoted to determining precisely what omnipotence means and what it entails. The task of deciphering the meaning of omnipotence has generally been tied solely to specifying the kinds of tasks that an omnipotent being could do. Moreover, the discussion around this term has mostly been an investigation into what types of tasks an omnipotent being ought to be able to do, leaving out any discussion of *how* an omnipotent being goes about accomplishing those tasks. More than just the ability to carry out an action, the manner in which an operation is carried out can denote varying levels of power so when discussing omnipotence, the two aspects ought not to be addressed independently. As it is used in the philosophy of religion today and has been for a substantial amount of time, omnipotence is only concerned with the *what*, and not the *how* of divine acts. I argue that the *how* aspect of these divine acts is the real marker of omnipotence, and that such a reconceptualization of divine omnipotence can have consequences in both theology and philosophy.

Keywords: Divine; Attributes; Omnipotence; Efficiency; God; Christian; Religion

Introduction

Omnipotence, a central term in nearly every philosophical discussion regarding the nature and characteristics of the Judeo-Christian God, seems like quite a straight-forward concept but anybody who has taken a first-year philosophy of religion course knows that this is just not the case. This essay serves as a condensed treatment of some considerations that I originally address throughout several chapters in Harper (2020). Fittingly, there are many interpretations of just precisely what possessing divine omnipotence entails, and even more interpretations of how these entailments can be interpreted to explain the kinds of tasks that God can or cannot carry out. My intent for this article is not to put forward an idea of what I think the *correct* interpretation of omnipotence is, nor is it to carry on with the debate of what kinds of tasks an omnipotent God can or cannot carry out, instead my aim is to start where the work of previous philosophers has ended and to present a way to re-conceptualize God's omnipotence.

That is, I will argue that we ought not to evaluate God's omnipotence solely in terms of *what* He can do, but that we must also assess it by taking into consideration *how* He goes about carrying out the tasks that he does. I argue that, in the case of evaluating omnipotence, the method by which an actions is carried out is just as important as the action itself. When discussing omnipotence the process is an essential component of the product and the two are inextricably linked to one another. Up to this point philosophers have only discussed one aspect, largely neglecting to address the other essential component. To be sure, what I will go on to argue for in this essay will, if accepted, carry with it a slew metaphysical consequences; some, many, or even all, of which may be firmly resisted by classical theists since they may call for a substantially revised conception in the overall nature of the God of classical Judeo-Christian theism. In the interest of time and space, however, I will only briefly address one of these potential metaphysical consequences here and, aside from that brief digression, my aim is solely to discuss the divine attribute of omnipotence and how we ought to move forward with a new perspective.

Motivations

My motivation for writing a paper on the topic of omnipotence is that, while it is an essential topic within almost any discussion about the nature of God, I have found myself unsatisfied with many of the contemporary and historical philosophical accounts of exactly how we are to interpret divine omnipotence and what exactly any of those interpretations entails in terms of what kinds of tasks we can reasonably expect an omnipotent God to be able to carry out. Any plausible account of omnipotence ought not only to be theologically and philosophically consistent within itself but ought also to provide us with a reasonable, applicable, practical guide regarding God's action. While some accounts may be stronger in the former, they lack in the latter, and while some may be stronger in the latter, they lack in the former. Some of these accounts will be discussed in the following section.

Although we do not seem to have a plausible account of omnipotence that satisfies both theoretical and practical aspects of the topic, the discussion of omnipotence has largely become stagnant within the philosophy of religion. It seems that a consensus has been reached, but this consensus does little, if anything at all, to tell us what kinds of tasks we can reasonably expect an omnipotent God to be able to carry out. While I do not endeavor to provide a stable and unifying theory to put this problem to rest, I propose that we need to take another look at the topic, with fresh eyes, and approach it from a new perspective. Approaching the subject of omnipotence from another angle, namely the *method* through which God brings about whatever it is that He brings about, paired with the existing work that deals exclusively with what kinds of tasks it is possible for God to do, may bring us closer to attaining a unified theory that more fully satisfies the theoretical and practical requirements of a plausible account of omnipotence.

Foundations

To put forth a meaningful discussion on this topic, I must first present a sample of the foundational groundwork that has been laid by some other philosophers of religion on this topic. This groundwork will serve two functions. Firstly, it will allow for the arguments that I will go on to make to be comfortably situated within the greater historical dialogue. And, secondly, it will provide clarity to my proposed position since some of the ideas that I incorporate into my account draw from accounts of omnipotence first our forth by other philosophers.

At a glance, and perhaps most naturally, many could take God's omnipotence to entail that He can do absolutely any task possible – a sort of unlimited and infinite power over anything and everything. This kind of omnipotence is most famously argued for by Rene Descartes and later defended by Harry Frankfurt in his 1964 essay "The Logic of Omnipotence."[1] Most evident through his May 27th letter to Mersenne in 1630[2], Descartes argues that it is wrong to think that God can only do those tasks that can be described in a logically coherent way, writing that God is "...as free to make it false that all the radii of a circle are equal as to refrain from creating the world."

Similarly, in an earlier letter to Mersenne, Descartes writes "...we can be quite certain that God can do whatever we can understand, but not that He cannot do what we are unable to understand. For it would be presumptuous to think that our imagination extends as far as His power"[3]. Frankfurt, along the same lines as Descartes, would likely agree with Descartes in his interpretation that the "things that are beyond our imagination" include, and are reducible to, logically impossible tasks. Meaning that God can perform such things as drawing a square circle, making 2+2=7, and creating a stone so heavy that God Himself cannot lift it[4 5]. For God, as would argue Descartes and Frankfurt, to carry out logically impossible tasks is the ultimate display of His power and, since His power is unlimited, there is no reason that logical possibility ought to play any factor in determining His abilities or the kinds of tasks that He can carry out.[6] This kind of interpretation of omnipotence is one that is not typically accepted as plausible in most contemporary philosophical discussions and is an interpretation that is far too strong for my purposes here.

A conception of omnipotence argued for by Kenneth Pearce and Alexander Pruss is a conception that approaches defining omnipotence in a slightly different way than has typically been done. Pearce and Pruss say that we need to examine, describe, and attribute omnipotence not solely by listing off various difficult tasks that an omnipotent being would and should be able to carry out, but we must simultaneously look at the being's will to carry out these tasks[7]. Without going into too much detail on their account, Pearce and Pruss argue that for a being to be truly omnipotent, rather than just being able to perform any difficult task that an omnipotent being should be able to accomplish this being's will must be properly positioned as well. For any being "x is omnipotent if and only if x has perfect freedom of will and x has perfect efficacy of will."[8] Of course, there is a lot more to be said about what specifically freedom of will and efficacy of will mean, in this sense, and Pearce and Pruss go on to flesh that out in the remainder of their essay, but the critical aspect of their account, for our purposes here, is that they conceive of omnipotence not solely being determined in terms of particular tasks being carried out; instead they conceive of it in terms of that *in addition to* another factor. In this specific case, that additional factor is the will of the acting being.

Of the overall debate surrounding the nature of God's omnipotence, Nick Trakakis writes that "[n]o matter how much controversy and debate may currently surround the extraordinary attribute of divine omnipotence, there is virtually complete consensus amongst philosophers and theologians that Aquinas is correct in saying that 'anything that implies a contradiction does not fall under God's omnipotence'..."[9] so I do not choose to move forward with the views of omnipotence forwarded by Descartes and Frankfurt, as mentioned earlier. The conception of omnipotence that I adopt is closely related to the view first presented by Aquinas[10] and later forwarded by George Mavrodes[11] which do not argue for the irrelevance of logic when it comes to God's abilities to carry out specific tasks. Mavrodes argues that God's capabilities are limited by logic, in that He cannot carry out tasks that are logically impossible.[12]

In addition to that, due to God's nature, there are specific tasks that, while they may be logically possible to carry out for you or me, are not logically possible for God. The example used by Mavrodes is asking whether God can create a stone too heavy for Himself to lift, a classic dilemma traditionally used to question God's omnipotence. For if God cannot create a stone too heavy for Himself to lift then, through His inability to create such a stone, there is clearly at least one task that He cannot carry out, whereas if He can create the stone too heavy for Him to lift, through His inability to lift the stone there is still clearly another task that He cannot carry out. No matter how the question is answered, it seems that we arrive at the same conclusion: there is a task that is not inherently self-contradictory that God cannot perform, which means that God is not omnipotent. For Mavrodes, even though such a task is not self-contradictory for you or me, for a being whom we already view as omnipotent, this is a self- contradictory task, and cannot be appropriately seen as an object of power. He calls tasks like this "pseudo-tasks" and claims that the inability of God, or any omnipotent being, to carry out these pseudo-tasks is not damaging to the doctrine of omnipotence[13].

The account of omnipotence put forth by Mavrodes[14] is useful as a starting point but one that must also be expanded on. Mavrodes' account does not include much examination of pseudo-tasks, apart from ones commonly discussed: ones such as drawing a square circle, or of creating a stone too heavy for God to lift. I aim to extend this list of pseudo-tasks to include tasks that are not within God's nature and, more specifically, methods by which God we would not expect God to act. That is to say, it cannot be considered an object of power to expect God to carry out tasks in ways that are not consistent with His nature, and thus if He cannot perform tasks in ways that are not within His nature, it ought not to be viewed as detrimental to the doctrine of omnipotence. This will be another case in which specific tasks, while they are possible to be carried out by us since there is no apparent contradiction precluding us from acting against our general nature, cannot be carried out by God since His nature is absolute to a maximal degree.

My focus of something that would be out of God's nature, taking from the two-tiered approach of Pearce and Pruss[15], will be on God acting in a less than perfectly efficient way. Given God's great power and knowledge, it would be reasonable to suspect that, not only does He know the most efficient way to achieve certain ends, but He also can do whatever is necessary to achieve those ends most efficiently. For a being with such abilities, it would seem unnatural and unnecessary to go about actualizing some desire by any way other than the most direct and efficient way. Given this, acting in a less than perfectly efficient way is something that we ought to include in the realm of actions that are not within God's power to do, but poses no threat to His omnipotence. Anybody who wishes to propose that God can act in a less than perfectly efficient way ought to have the burden of proof placed on them, and they are then tasked with providing a reasonable explanation for why we ought to expect God to act inefficiently. There seems to be no reasonable motivation for the claim that there is anything to be gained by God acting in a less than perfectly efficient manner so to venture that we can, even in rare circumstances, expect God to act inefficiently would be a difficult, unnecessary and counterintuitive claim to put forth. I call this position, and overall approach to omnipotence, that denies the possibility for God to act in a less than perfectly efficient way Divine Efficiency.[16] Let us apply this directly to the case of creation and divine intervention.

The position and Consequence

In creating the world and all of the natural laws that govern it, God would have had the foresight and ability to create a world that thereafter carried on exactly how He so chose.[17] That is to say; He could have set up the initial physical conditions of the world in such a way as to allow for the natural laws to guarantee that certain events come to pass exactly as He would have wanted them to.[18] To assert that God needs to intervene in the natural world following its creation to actualize some state of affairs that He desires is merely to assert that God is acting in a less than perfectly efficient manner. To say that God intervenes in the natural world is to say the He is amending His initial creation and, for a being who could have created the world to play out in precisely the way that He wanted, the addition of divine intervention seems to be an unnecessary complication signaling something less than perfection. Again, the burden of proof here ought to be on the objector arguing for a more complex theory, providing us with reasonable assertions for why one would or should be inclined to posit a more complex account that carries with it no additional explanatory benefits.

Let us explore the concept of divine efficiency through an example that many of us will be familiar with. Let us imagine that Chris and Paul are both in the same upper-level philosophy course in their final year of university. They are both tasked with the final assignment of writing a philosophy paper on the epistemic justification of miraculous events. Let us also imagine that there is some objective marker that denotes a perfect philosophy paper, something greater than merely a 100% grade, rather something transcendent that make it THE perfect paper. The greatest conceivable paper, for lack of better term. Let us also imagine that the person who is grading these papers is required to choose one of the two papers as the superior one – which will also denote the better, or more powerful, student.

Now, let us finally imagine that, upon the due date of the assignment, both Chris and Paul independently, yet simultaneously, turn in assignments that are both identical and exemplify the perfect philosophy paper. They both exemplify the greatest conceivable philosophy paper yet, and it is not the case that *both* can be the greatest conceivable philosophy paper. We must also recall that, given the parameters of our thought experiment, our grader must choose one of the two papers as the superior one which, in turn, denotes the more powerful student.

Now, given that two final products are identical, how exactly are we to determine which of these two young men wrote the best philosophy paper and, in turn, displayed more power in producing their respective philosophy papers?[19], then how should we go about it?

To make such a decision, given the identical nature of the final products, we must explore the process by which each product came to be. In the first case, Chris wrote his philosophy paper in the traditional way with which many of us are familiar. Chris began by writing an outline for his paper, a draft, revised the draft by going through and making major and minor changes to his ideas, structure and overall presentation, and concluded with an editing stage in which he corrected all of the factual, grammatical and spelling errors that remained. After going through this process of construction, revision and correction over a period of time, Chris ended up with the perfect philosophy paper which he promptly submitted. On the other hand, Paul quietly sat down at his desk and wrote his paper from start to finish.

He did not go back to make any revisions, he did no editing and just ended up with the perfect philosophy paper which he, like Chris, promptly submitted. Now, if we are to choose which of these two young men displayed a higher degree of power in writing identical perfect philosophy papers, I would argue that it was Paul because of the high degree of efficiency with which he carried out his task. Surely, to be able to write the perfect philosophy paper is an excellent display of power, by any standards, but to draft one in the most efficient way possible, namely without having to go back and make any corrections or revisions, is a more magnificent display of power. Given two identical outcomes, the most desirable, powerful, and the best process of arriving at that outcome will generally be the most efficient one. Just as it is less efficient for us to write a philosophy paper using no punctuation and then go back and revise it by adding punctuation afterward than it is to write a perfect philosophy paper in the first place, it is less efficient for God to intervene in the world to actualize some particular state of events when He could have initially created the world in such a way that that state of affairs would come to pass naturally anyway. Now, rather than having just one thing govern the operation of the natural world (the natural laws), there is another entity that has been added to the equation to account for other aspects of the operation of the natural world (God).

Admittedly, it would be no extra effort for God to both create and introduce natural laws to govern the operation of the world while at the same time choosing to intervene within it actively, but this is merely an unnecessary and extra level of complication to the explanatory account of the processes in our world. So, just as Paul ought to be credited with the possession of greater power for his display of efficiency, so too must the deistic God.

Now, applied directly to the case of our world, this would mean that, in creating the world, God would be able to set it up in such a way as to allow for every event in the world to occur precisely as He so chose (if there happened to be any events that He desired to occur at some particular time or some particular place). To expect God to intervene in the natural order of things is to presume that He takes an indirect route.[20] In bringing about those particular desired events, where having taken a direct route (namely, initially setting it up so that the events would come to take place without His intervention) would have been more efficient and required no extra effort at all. There is just no reason to think that God would consider anything less than a direct route in actualizing His will and, as such, it would be against His nature to do so. Following the reasoning from above, performing such a task is not in the nature of God, and therefore it is not really a task, instead, it is a pseudo-task whose preclusion poses no threat to the doctrine of omnipotence. So, just as we cannot reasonably expect God to act in nature, we also cannot deem His inability to do so as detrimental to His omnipotence. Of course, the objection can be raised that the most efficient way for any process to be carried out is for God to merely intervene and actualize it Himself, rather than taking the indirect route of setting up natural laws that then govern the actualization of these processes. The problem with such an objection that calls for simplicity, however, is that there is no debate that natural laws are in place and are functioning to facilitate natural processes in our universe, and by positing an active God to explain the actualization of some processes a second mode of operation now becomes present in our world. So, in calling for simplicity through the insertion of an active God, such an objection muddies the waters by adding a secondary mode of actualization to work alongside the evident laws of nature. This additional mode of action would be required only if God's act of creating the world had failed to do everything that would ever be needed.

Potential Objection

One potential objection to what I have argued comes at the debate by introducing free will to the discussion. One could venture that God acting in the natural order of the world and circumventing natural laws is not a sign of diminished omniscience, omnipotence, or some other omni-attribute, rather it is simply an indication of the value that God placed on free will. This objection could go something along these lines: God values free will more than anything else (or at least it is near the top of his concerns) and in allowing creatures to have and display free will it is a consequence that certain potentially negative or unwanted states of affairs may come to pass. Rather than placing limitations on the free will of His creations, since He values it so much, God chooses to suspend or circumvent natural laws in order to bring about particular state of affairs that He so desires. This allows God's will to be done and for us to carry on without any intrusions on our free will and, as such, indicates no deficiencies in any of God's abilities.

While I have only presented a general outline of the possible objection it is easy to see how an objection of that nature could be easily put forth. The problem is, however, that such an objection waffles back and forth between two distinct targets and does not actually pinpoint the object of God's will. In the first case, the object of God's will is posited as the creation and continued existence of free will in His creations while in the second case the object of God's will is posited as bringing about some particular state of affairs. The proponent of this brand of objection cannot have it both ways and argue that both of these concerns top God's priority list. If God's desire, or top priority, was to create beings who exercised free will then He would simply do so in the most efficient way possible, namely through creating a world and populating it with creatures who enjoy free will. There is no need for the insertion of miracles or divine intervention. If, on the other hand, His primary concern was to create a world that played out in such a way that certain states of affairs come to be, then He would simply create a world in which the natural laws bring it about that these states of affairs come to pass, with or without complete free will. An objection of this sort simply confuses what God's actual motivation and intent was or is. It is not important what the specific intent was but what is important is that there was one and that we ought to believe that God chose the most efficient way possible to actualize that intent.

Conclusion

If, as I have argued, we ought to start evaluating God's omnipotence through, not just the kinds of acts He does but, how He does these acts, then this could have at least two significant and immediate ramifications for theology and philosophy of religion. In the first case, for theology, it would mean that theists would have to re-evaluate the nature of miracles and divine intervention seriously. If the theist hopes to maintain the existence of miracles and divine intervention or even to maintain the possibility of miracles and divine intervention, then this will have to be done at the expense of attributing God with a reduced sense of omnipotence.

Otherwise, the theist will have to deny the existence and possibility of all miracles and divine intervention to maintain a stronger sense of omnipotence that can be attributed to God.

Neither of these concessions leaves a particularly desirable outcome for theists, but this is the dilemma that they will have to deal with. In the second case, for the philosophy of religion, the adoption of such a conception of omnipotence would call for the reformulation of a substantial number of arguments for atheism. Since many arguments for atheism are based on unsatisfied expectations for particular acts or behaviors of God, these arguments will need to be revised because this new conception of divine omnipotence drastically changes what we can reasonably expect of God: namely, that we cannot expect Him to act in the natural world. So, the consequences for such a shift in conception will be felt both in the real world and in the pages of philosophy texts and would cause a substantial change in the way we talk about God and His active abilities.

Endnotes:

1. Harry Frankfurt, "The Logic of Omnipotence," *Philosophical Review* 73, no. 2 (1964): 262-3.
2. Descartes, Rene, *Letter to Mersenne* (May 27, 1630).
3. Descartes, Rene, *Letter to Mersenne* (April 15, 1630).
4. Whether these tasks are logically impossible or not is irrelevant since, according to Descartes and Frankfurt, God could still carry them out either way. It has been argued, elsewhere, that creating a stone so heavy that He cannot lift is a logical impossibility for God, given His nature, even though there is no inherent contradiction within the task. This will be discussed more, shortly.
5. Frankfurt, "The Logic of Omnipotence," 262.
6. Kenneth Pearce and Alexander Pruss (2012) provide some good reasons against accepting Cartesian omnipotence, ultimately arguing that such an analysis of omnipotence fails.
7. Kenneth Pearce and Alexander Pruss, "Understanding Omnipotence," *Religious Studies* 48 (2012): 405.
8. Pearce and Pruss, "Understanding Omnipotence," 405.
9. Nick Trakakis, "The Absolutist Theory of Omnipotence," *Sophia* 36 (1997): 55.

10. St. Thomas Aquinas, "Summa Theologica, part 1," in *The Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Anton C. Pegis (New York: Random House, 1945): 262-4.
11. George Mavrodes, "Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence," *Philosophical Review* 72, no. 2 (1963): 221-3.
12. Mavrodes, here, is building on an idea expressed by St. Thomas Aquinas in *Summa Theologica* in which he argues that God can only perform actions that are logically possible.
13. Mavrodes, "Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence," 223
14. Mavrodes, "Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence."
15. Pearce and Pruss, "Understanding Omnipotence."
16. "Divine Efficiency" is a term that is used by Edward D. Griffin in his 1833 book *Divine Efficiency Defended Against Certain Modern Speculations*, though I am applying it in a different sense here. Griffin seems to use the term to refer, primarily, to the process through which a believer can seek and confirm the truth of the existence of God. This is not the sense in which I mean to apply the term here, though some parallels could be drawn. Any discussion of the parallels or distinctions between mine and Griffin's applications of "divine efficiency," though I think would make an interesting discussion, are beyond the scope of this paper.
17. One could think of the kind of, what Richard Swinburne calls the spatial and temporal ordering of our universe in his 1979 book *The Existence of God*.
18. This is compatible with both free-will and deterministic lines of thought since, on this account, God could have chosen to set up the universe in whatever way He saw fit. I make no claims as to which of the two is preferable and to enter into a discussion on this is beyond the scope of this essay.
19. If we are to limit the evaluation of power to the production of the highest quality philosophy paper, and we are in a position where we have to decide which young man is more powerful.
20. While God acting would directly bring about an event, E1, in one sense, it is indirect in the sense that it is an external force coming in to change the natural course of events that could still have brought about E1.

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Goodman's *Grue* — Relativized Pluralism and Paradigmatic Thought Experiment (*Whack*)

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Abstract:

In this paper we examine Nelson Goodman's *Grue* 'new riddle of induction' from the perspective of research into semantics of thought experiment. Since *Grue* may be considered a productive epistemic paradox TE, we can't agree on the skeptical resolution of the neologistic thought experiment to near-common sense of Goodman's entrenchment theory. Instead, we consider the thought experiment a prototype of a Kuhnian paradigmatic or revolutionary thought experiment, which may cover famous examples from history of science, whereof we will analyze one in more detail as a specimen with help of temporal predicate logic ('all swans are whack'). Next, we argue for a pluralistic interpretation of the paradox thought experiment as in line with Goodman's philosophical position of irrealism--pluralism of the paradox is not the problem, it is the resolution of the problem. Partly on basis of analogous analyses of WVO Quine's *Gavagai* thought experiment, we conclude by opting for Quinean ontological relativity, which does not exclude pluralism, but makes it hook upon (physical) reality. Modal logic, possible worlds semantics is proposed as alternate to classical logic as to deal with relativized pluralism and possible paradigm shifts in science.

Keywords: Grue; semantics; paradigmatic/revolutionary thought experiment; (elementary) temporal predicate logic (ETPL); modal logic; modus tollens; Whack; neologistic thought experiment; entrenchment theory; pluralism; possible worlds semantics (PWS); ontological relativity; Nelson Goodman; Carl Hempel; Thomas Kuhn; Willard V.O. Quine.

1. Identifications – Neologistic and Paradigmatic TE[1]

Goodman's 'new riddle' of *Grue* (e.g. Goodman 1983) may be understood in context of discussions of the problem of induction, referring to many contributions in the history of the problem from David Hume's habits and regularities, Carl Hempel's theory of confirmation to Rudolf Carnap's views on probability, cooperating with colleagues (e.g. Goodman, Schwartz, Scheffler 1970), however, omitting important theories at the same time, e.g., new philosophies of science as Thomas Kuhn's.

As many authors observe (e.g. Fain 1967, Stalker 1994, Elgin 1997, Cohnitz 2016) the literature on *Grue* is extensive, Goodman included who kept on updating the problem of induction with revisions of the original 1954 edition. One may discern a manifold of interpretations of the TE, usually according with different positions in epistemology and philosophy of science with regard to problem of induction (habit, regularity, prediction, disposition, learning, diverse forms of probability, simplicity, similarity, deduction, projectibility, conceptual spaces, pragmaticism, evolutionary epistemology, thought experiment, epistemic paradox, counterfactual, inductive inference) or problems specific to the linguistic approach of Goodman (entrenchment, disjunctive, (un-, non)projectible, qualitative, positional, locational predicates).

In 90s there appeared two collections with essays on Goodman's *Grue*, Stalker 1994 and Elgin 1997, anthologizing the previous decades. Many well-known contemporary philosophers have replied to *Grue*, e.g., Sydney Shoemaker (1975/2003b), Richard Swinburne (1968), Rudolf Carnap (e.g. 1937, 1945, 1947a, 1947b, 1950 referred to in Goodman's notes—1947a/b are included in Elgin 1997, 1-16, 21-22), Donald Davidson (1966, in Elgin 1997, 126-128), Willard Quine (1965, in Stalker 1994, 41- 56), Hilary Putnam (who has written a foreword to 1983 fourth edition to the *Grue* text, Goodman 1983, vii-xvi), Noam Chomsky (2006, discussing *Grue* in context of problem of acquisition of language). Next, a couple of philosophers who became well-known because of TE as *Color Scientist Mary* Frank Jackson (1975, in Stalker 1994, 79-96) and *The Violinist* Judith Jarvis Thomson (1966, in Elgin 87-108). We will refer to some of the analyses and interpretations in the footnotes as loci paralleli of positions in our research.[2]

We defend various positions in this paper going back to before the skeptical resolution of Goodman's entrenchment theory.

First, in line with the new philosophy of science of Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper, analyzing *Grue* as a prototype of paradigmatic, revolutionary TE due to the disruptive shift at time *t* from one paradigm to another. After initial elementary temporal logical analyses of the neologistic predicates, we analyze *Grue* as a paradigmatic TE that falsifies an old theory and verifies a new theory, let's say, like a crucial (thought) experiment.

Second, rejecting the skeptical paradox we remain within (an undecidability interpretation of) Carl Hempel's pluralism of possible – only relatively verifiable – hypotheses until 'further notice of' time *t* when a possible paradigm shift may occur, which is consistent with the general outlook of Goodman's philosophy of pluralism, but contradicting the simplifying entrenchment theory as with regard to *Grue*.

Third, from a position of Quinean metaphilosophical gradualism we consider natural science as valuable as logic and philosophy – including empirical data from natural science (as wavelenghts and frequency measurements of light, e.g. Norton 2003/2006) and cross-cultural research into colors we arrive at a global cross-cultural color theory; beyond the general outlook of the problem of induction we are able to give some indications for a resolution of the limited problem of color perception.[3]

Fourth, in the one but last section we add two new (21st-century) postmodern conditions to the (20th-century) modernist (elimination) rules Goodman is looking for as resolution of the riddle, a global cross-cultural (and trans-historical) condition, whereof cross-cultural research into color perception is an example, and an environmental pragmaticist condition, safeguarding protection of human health and natural environment. Both pluralism and paradigmatic interpretations of *Grue* result from these considerations as with purpose of preventing unfortunate mistakes of the European scientific enterprise like they have been made in previous ages.

Fifth, finally, in the last section we concisely propose modal logic or PWS as alternate and successor to classical logic as to deal with relativized pluralism, global cross-culturalism and environmental pragmaticism, correct counter-intuitive results of standard logic and avoid one-dimensional short-term resolutions that may easily turn into, e.g., environmental disasters as caused by climate change.

Identification of the 'riddle' or 'paradox' of *Grue* as a TE precedes any logical analysis or epistemological interpretation. This identification is in no way controversial anymore since TE theory got more and more mainstream since the 60s and the very occurrence of *Grue* could be considered part of the second wave of TE that occurred after WWII (the first wave coincides with the rise of the experimental method in the sciences at the end of the 19th century as the design of experiments is quite often accompanied by TE preps). Quite a few philosophers discuss *Grue* as a kind of TE—e.g. Sorensen (2017, 1992a) discusses it as a 'epistemic paradox', when paradox is Sorensen's quintessential analysis of TE; Clatterbuck (2013) considers it a TE of a 'particular type of inductive inference'; Tittle (2005) lists it as an example of a TE in logic; Cohen (1979) analyzes it as a counterfactual-like TE.

Goodman's *Grue* TE or 'new riddle of induction' is often considered a paradox, e.g. an epistemic paradox. Epistemic paradoxes may be defined as according to Roy Sorensen in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (*SEP*)

> Epistemic paradoxes are riddles that turn on the concept of knowledge (*episteme* is Greek for knowledge). Typically, there are conflicting, well-credentialed answers to these questions (or pseudo-questions). Thus the riddle immediately informs us of an inconsistency. In the long run, the riddle goads and guides us into correcting at least one deep error – if not directly about knowledge, then about its kindred concepts such as justification, rational belief, and evidence. (Sorensen 2017)

Sorensen considers paradox analyses the quintessential approach to TE and holds TE are reducible to paradoxes.[4] The kind of epistemic paradox may still be considered part of our TE research since its goal doesn't seem to be about paralyzing or destructing the project of logic and reason altogether (in which latter case we exclude paradoxes from our TE definition which features on constructive pragmaticist devices designed to resolve predefined problems), but as Sorensen states, an epistemic paradox may in 'the long run' 'goad... and guide... us into correcting at least one deep error', e.g., correcting mistakes and inconsistencies that have been revealed by the paradox, and it may even be considered part of the process of error elimination which guides the progress of science as according to Karl Popper.

It is obviously Goodman's aim to try and resolve the epistemic riddle, but, alas, to no avail. Subsequent chapters of *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast* (Goodman 1954/55/65/73/83), in which book 'the new riddle of induction' appears, are mainly dedicated to designing 'rules of elimination', that reduce the complexity of the paradox, and which ideas are slightly changed from edition to edition as, e.g., from the 2nd (1965) to the 4th edition (1983), but in the end Goodman concludes that all he has offered is 'a study of some of the resources that a new approach offers us for dealing with a difficult problem' (Goodman 1983, 120) and that 'none of these speculations should be taken for a solution' (Goodman 1983, 123).

As we may see in the last part of this paper, there are some interpretations of Goodman's philosophy that may indicate the 'riddle' is stating an essential difficulty for, let's say, monism or realism in epistemology or philosophy of science, that is unresolvable if we don't leave these philosophical presuppositions for philosophical positions defended by Goodman in other parts of his oeuvre as irrealism and pluralism. This interpretation explains how Goodman could come up with so many innovative examples and extensions of the TE since *Grue* is, in fact, only a tiny part of a multiple series of TE that extends over many pages of *Fact, Fiction and Forecast*, including a rewritten Section IV.4 on conditionals, introducing neologisms like 'bleen', 'emerose', 'emeruby', 'sapphiruby', 'Eifferuby', 'grund', 'grare', 'gred', 'zig', 'bagleet', 'bagmarks', etc.[5] It seems no problem for Goodman to come up with ever new imaginative hypotheses that have 'equal confirmation' as the traditional, conventional hypotheses as if he is creating ever new versions of reality.

The use of neologisms may highlight another emphasis of Goodman's work, on choice of predicates and, generally speaking, language and symbolisms (as after, particularly, Ernst Cassirer), showing how wide the variety of predicates could be, and we may show how Goodman's 'entrenchment theory' – one alleged resolution of the TE – may relate to use of language first and only second to epistemology of these 'weird', 'outworldy' hypotheses (as according to the later Goodman). The resolution may be akin to skeptical paradoxes in Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (Wittgenstein 1953).

Because of the abundant use of neologisms we may baptize this new variety of TE 'neologistic TE.' The neologisms contribute to rhetorics and mystery of *Grue*, features that are often attributed to TE. In a strong TE multiple senses and connotations may ring true, it contains a manifold of condensed and possible meanings that can be explained in many ways. Part of mystery of *Grue* comes from magic of color shades in between green and blue, and 'grue' appears to be a linguistic technical term signifying possible cross-cultural and historical overlaps between green and blue (although Goodman never mentions this cross-cultural sense of 'grue').

In Section 2 we show the basic structure of the TE argument of *Grue* from the original text, the second lecture, printed as Chapter 3 in *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast* (Goodman 1954/55/65/73/83). The TE text remains the same over all editions of the book and includes, next to *Grue*, a *Bleen* TE.

In the deep analyses part (Section 3) we will, initially, propose a resolution which remains within the established presuppositions of realism and interpret the *Grue* paradox as 'undecidability' since the paradox TE may remain eventually a pseudo-problem, that is, on careful reading it dissolves immediately because we simply can't know yet about hypotheses about a future time *t*, and no one will deny we can't decide on it already now, since history shows sometimes we have to include the occurrence of what Nassim Taleb calls the highly improbable. For this deep analysis we use an elementary form of temporal predicate logic (provisionally, ETPL) to disentangle the neologistic predicates (see Sections 3.1 – 3.3). The irrealist, imaginative 'otherworldly', 'weird' hypotheses can't be necessarily excluded beforehand, but we may trust it won't change our world completely (although, of course, it is not excluded it will predict an inescapable disaster and in case of e.g. discussion of climate change the disaster is likely to come about if we won't do anything to prevent it).

To falsify plain conventionalism of common sense of the entrenchment theory, we will, next, show a historical example, which the *Grue* TE seems to be inspired by and only absence of any reference to it may one want to think differently. We will demonstrate that Goodman's *Grue* can be considered a prototype or specimen of a very strong type of TE, which we call 'paradigmatic' or 'revolutionary TE' as after Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, that are indeed about to change the world of science, as they are about revolutionary paradigm shifts in history of science and philosophy:

> It is no accident that the emergence of Newtonian physics in the seventeenth century and of relativity and quantum mechanics in the twentieth century should have been both preceded by and accompanied by fundamental philosophical analyses of the contemporary research tradition.... Nor is it an accident that in both these periods the so-called thought experiment should have played so critical a role in the progress of research. As I have shown elsewhere, the analytical thought experimentation that bulks so large in the writings of Galileo, Einstein, Bohr, and others is perfectly calculated to expose the old paradigm to existing knowledge in the ways that isolate the root of the crisis with a clarity unattainable in the laboratory.... (Kuhn 1970, 88)

Not only discoveries in theoretical physics have brought about paradigm shifts (as from meso-level of Planet Earth to macro-level of cosmology and micro-level of particle physics), but also the historical overseas discoveries of new continents as America and Australia have substantially broadened the scope of sciences as biology, geology etc.[6] These paradigmatic, revolutionary new discoveries have contributed to what TE philosopher Tamar Gendler calls 'reconfiguration of conceptual commitments' (Gendler 1996/2000 *passim*).

E.g., the concept of 'bird' has been broadened by discovery of many new species as the black swan, which falsified medieval European universal statements as 'all swans are white.' We will discuss this example in Section 3.4 as a specimen of paradigm change that may be explained with help of Goodman's *Grue* TE structure.

The 'reconfiguration of conceptual commitments' has, of course, effected changes of laws in the field, if the former has not been changed by the latter instead, like in the field of theoretical physics. We will discuss criticisms of Goodman's notion of 'lawlikeness' in the Interpretations part of the paper, e.g., the criticism that colors (as colors of gem stones) are not traditionally considered essential properties of entities but rather accidental properties (see Section 4.3). It is somehow abstruse that Goodman wants to discuss the differences between 'lawlike' and accidental statements with help of an example about possible change of an accidental property (as colors of emeralds).

Next, gemology is not considered a science that is vulnerable to change in the history of science, quite different from sciences as aforementioned physics and biology and if gemology has been modified as by changes in geology etc., Goodman does not draw attention to this possibility. Rest and continuity are among the cultural biases of science and background assumptions of induction, which are discussed in Section 4.4.

Furthermore, as recent research has confirmed (e.g. Berlin-Kay theory of basic color terms, Berlin and Kay 1969), not only connotations, but also denotations of color words like 'green' and 'blue' may differ from culture to culture, and 'grue' is, in fact, a scientific, linguistic cover term of both. This global cross-cultural interpretation is touched upon in Section 4.5.

Next to the interpretation in line of the new philosophy of science of Thomas Kuhn in Section 4.2, we will review Goodman's answer to the riddle, the so-called entrenchment theory or skeptical reduction of logic and theory to near-common sense of practice, in Section 4.1, and opt for a pursuit of the problem along the lines of Carl Hempel's tentativeness and Goodman's pluralism, albeit restrained by physical science to Quinean 'ontological relativity' (see Section 4.6).

In the last two Sections, 4.7 and 4.8, we emphasize the importance of global cross-culturalism and environmental pragmaticism (e.g. concern about human health and Earth's ecology) and add these conditions to an update of philosophy of science, visualized by an extension to one of Karl Popper's formulas about progress of science. In the last section we shortly indicate the outline of a modal logical, possible worlds interpretation, as different from Goodman's project of pluralism that could prefer mutually exclusive versions and visions over an 'actual world' among many more possible worlds.

2. Surface Analyses of *Grue* TE

The *Grue* TE text has been developed from three lectures delivered at the University of London, London, UK, in May of 1953 under the title 'Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.' Under the same title the text of the lectures has been printed, with ongoing revisions from the first British edition of 1954 to the fourth edition of 1983, when Goodman was still developing his ideas, particularly, about 'rules of elimination' to the criterion of lawlikeness. Our references are to the 1983 fourth edition, unless otherwise indicated.

The new riddle of induction is introduced in Chapter 3, Section 4, bearing the same name, 'The New Riddle of Induction.' It states its aim right in the beginning (and again in the end slightly revised)

> Confirmation of a hypothesis by an instance depends rather heavily upon features of the hypothesis other than its syntactical form. ... Only a statement that is lawlike—regardless of its truth or falsity or its scientific importance—is capable of receiving confirmation from an instance of it; accidental statements are not. Plainly, then, we must look for a way of distinguishing lawlike from accidental statements.
>
> ....

> [P_1/H_1] Suppose that all emeralds examined before a certain time *t* are green.... At time *t*, then, our observations support the hypothesis that all emeralds are green; and this is in accord with our definition of confirmation. Our evidence statements assert that emerald *a* is green, that emerald *b* is green, and so on, and each confirms the general hypothesis that all emeralds are green. So far, so good.
>
> [P_2/H_2] Now let me introduce another predicate less familiar than 'green'. It is the predicate 'grue' and it applies to all things examined before *t* just in case they are green but to other things just in case they are blue. Then at time *t* we have for each evidence statement asserting that a given emerald is green, a parallel evidence statement asserting that that emerald is grue. And the statements that emerald *a* is grue, that emerald *b* is grue, and so on, will each confirm the general hypothesis that all emeralds are grue.
>
> [C_1] Thus according to our definition, the prediction that all emeralds subsequently examined will be green and the prediction that all will be grue are alike confirmed by evidence statements describing the same observations. (Goodman 1983, 72-74—bracketed letters added – H_1, H_2 hypotheses are P_1, P_2 premises to C_1 conclusion)

This is the basic argument.
Next it is generalized to any predicate – 'if we simply choose an appropriate predicate' or 'any prediction whatever', to any object, to 'indeed about anything else.' Goodman mentions an example of the latter in a footnote

> Let 'emerose' apply to emeralds examined before time *t*, and to roses examined later (Goodman 1983, 74n10)

and the conclusion is generalized that without 'such criterion', i.e. a criterion for 'determining lawlikeness'

> [C_2] We are left once again with the intolerable result that anything confirms anything. (Goodman 1983, 75 – bracketed letter added – C_2 conclusion 2)

The *Grue* TE next multiplies to a series when Goodman is adding one more neologism in his search for a criterion of lawlikeness, 'bleen' TE (p. 78-81), after which the section of the new riddle of induction is concluded

> We have so far neither any answer nor any promising clue to an answer to the question what distinguishes lawlike or confirmable hypotheses from accidental or non-confirmable ones; and what may at first have seemed a minor technical difficulty has taken on the stature of a major obstacle to the development of a satisfactory theory of confirmation. It is this problem that I call the new riddle of induction. (Goodman 1983, 75)

In the next chapter, the third lecture of the 1953 London lectures, 'Prospects for a Theory of Projection', Goodman continues the search for a criterion of lawlikeness or 'projectibility' by adding more and more neologistic TE, as in the for the 3rd edition rewritten Section 4 of the last chapter, IV.4, 'Presumptive Projectibility,' focussing on conditionals, and in Section 5, 'Comparative Projectibility.'

As remarked, the neologistic TE are a new feature by which Goodman adds a new variety of TE to TE theory.

In next section on deep analyses we will see, however, that the neologistic predicates are easily reducible to existing predicates as by logical formalization. It is this feature of the TE that Goodman wants to resolve with help of the entrenchment theory, whereby he offers a sort of common sense resolution of the paradox. Goodman repeats this kind of skeptical reduction of the TE in *Ways of Worldmaking* (Goodman 1978 – please, see Section 4.1).

However, we hold that the paradox has already been resolved in many successful exemplifications in history of science and philosophy, notably in cases of paradigm change, and so that it may be considered a specimen of a revolutionary TE (see Section 3.4).

We can't agree on the skeptical reduction of the TE to (near-)common sense and argue that the paradox TE is consistent with Goodman's irrealism, in fact pluralism, so that we may conclude that the paradoxical ambiguity of the TE is not the problem, but, in fact, the resolution of the problem. Please, see Section 3.2 on 'undecidability', which analysis is prepared by application of temporal predicate logic to the neologistic predicates in Section 3.1.

Instead of reducing the paradox TE to near-common sense we acknowledge that there are a couple of reasons why *Grue* could be considered a pseudo-problem (see Section 3.3).

3. Deep Analyses – ETPL, Undecidability, Modus Tollens

We will show that Goodman's neologisms may be easily eliminated by use of an elementary temporal predicate logic (ETPL). We propose two undecidability analyses, the first one resulting in (Hempelian) tentativeness of multiple hypotheses, the second one reducing *Grue* to a pseudo-problem. Last but not least, we propose a new deep analysis of *Grue* TE as a prototype of a (Kuhnian) paradigmatic or revolutionary TE, which may fit in with wordings of Goodman's TE and could be easily applied to historical examples of (mini-) paradigm shifts as from 'all swans are white' to 'all swans are whack.'

3.1. Logical Elimination of Neologisms

The neologisms add to metaphysical—even possibly mysterious – appearance of the TE and may be easily eliminated by use of logic, as Rudolf Carnap already indicated in 1932/59 article on elimination of metaphysics through logical analysis of language. The logical elimination demonstrates it is not about irreducible metaphysics or logically or conceptually new predicates although they may still— possibly indirectly—refer to physically new, i.e., yet undiscovered, entities and features, in our example of Section 3.4, biological new species of the black swan (scientifically baptized 'Cygnus atratus' in 1790 by John Latham).

Of course, the hypothesis 'all swans are white' should never have been seriously entertained as one may expect from experience with many more biological species that they may appear in a manifold of colors and that color is rather an extrinsic than an intrinsic biological feature, property or predicate, extrinsic in the sense that it doesn't or does hardly effect biological functioning of the organism as a whole or the species as a whole.

It may be different in gemology, and that is why the example of Goodman could be considered exceptional, but nothing in his theory excludes entertaining examples from different sciences as biology since the TE was designed to tell lawlike statements from accidental statements without any restriction to range of examples.

The formalization includes provisional temporal logic as after Carl Hempel (e.g. 1945a, 11), using a two-place predicate, of which one variable is an indication of time, e.g., E(x, t), E(x, >t).[7]

Hempel uses universal and existential quantification over *t*, we only use five time indicators, t (at *t*), <t (before *t*, until *t*), >t (after *t*, since *t*), ≤t (before and at *t*, up to and including, through *t*), ≥t (at *t* and after, from *t* on).

Goodman's *Grue* may presuppose a concept of linear time countable infinity to future. We add infinity to the past when we use this kind of temporal logic to formalize historical examples of revolutionary TE as 'all swans are whack.'

[1]

Suppose

E(x) : x is an Emerald

GE(x) : x is Green

GU(x) : x is Grue

BU(x) : x is Blue

BE(x) : x is Bleen

t : at *t*, particular, but unspecified point in time, *t*, presumably, (near) future

<t : before *t* (until *t*)

≤t : before and at *t* (up to and including, through *t*)

>t : after *t* (since *t*)

≥t : at *t* and after (from *t* on)

E(x, t) : x is an Emerald at *t*

E(x, <t) : x is an Emerald before *t*

/\ : conjunction

\/ : inclusive disjunction

= : identity, is the same as

then

GE(x) = x is Green (before *t*, at *t*, and after *t*) (1)

GU(x) = x is Green before *t* \/ x is Blue at *t* and after (2)

The interpretations of *Grue* may vary with commentaries of secondary literature, but there are also ambiguities in the authentic TE text since usage may vary from passage to passage.

'Grue' is never unequivocally defined by Goodman, but only in context. Some more interpretations

GU(x) = x is Green before *t* \/ x is not-Green at *t* and after (2^1)

GU(x) = x is Green before *t* \/ x is Green or Blue at *t* and after (2^2)

GU(x) = x is Green before *t* \/ x is not-Green or Blue at *t* and after (2^3)

In all cases (1) and (variety of) (2) are 'incompatible' (p. 74 – or 'conflicting', p. 99) hypotheses

(2^1) – is the strongest interpretation, when (1) and (2^1) are incompatible in sense of contradictory

(2) – is still a very strong interpretation, when (1) and (2) are incompatible[8]

(2^3) – is as strong as (2^1) since 'or' in not-Green or Blue is inclusively disjunctive (\/), so it may be as strong as just not-Green because Blue is only a variety of not-Green; it may help to pick out observed emeralds that are blue first as kind of intermediary ancillary step to arrive at not-Green

(2^2) – is the weakest interpretation and it seems Goodman sometimes implicitly includes it and sometimes emphatically excludes it; we use an analogue for our interpretation of *Whack* in [5'], [5''].

3.2. Undecidability – Tentativeness

First, we may summarize our surface analysis, next, we apply quantified predicate logic including time indicators (elementary temporal predicate logic, (E)TPL)[7], which we have already used to eliminate neologistic predicate grue in 3.1.

[2]

H_1 all emeralds are green

H_2 all emeralds are grue

C_1 all emeralds are green OR all emeralds are grue

$(H_1 = H_2)$ \/ $(H_1$ \/ $H_2)$

C_1 says that two different hypotheses confirm the same evidence statements.

C_2 says that it is 'intolerable' that two different hypotheses confirm the same evidence statements. Missing premise is that the hypotheses are not only different but 'incompatible' (or 'conflicting' etc.), which explains step from C_1 to C_2.

Additionally *supposing* =/ not equal to, - negation, $-\wedge-$ incompatible, mutually exclusive, ----- (logical) inference (from premises to conclusion)

[3]

P_1/H_1

emerald a is green

emerald b is green
....
----
all emeralds are green

P_2/H_2
emerald a is grue
emerald b is grue
....
----
all emeralds are grue

C_1 all emeralds are green \/ all emeralds are grue
$H_1 \vee H_2$

P_3 H_1 and H_2 are incompatible, conflicting
$H_1 =/ H_2$
$H_1 = - H_2$ (contradiction as after *t*)
$\cancel{H_1 \wedge H_2}$

C_2 C_1 is 'intolerable', contradictory, false
$- C_1$

P_3 is hidden from the main argument but it is in the text of the TE:

> .... Thus although we are well aware which of the two *incompatible* predictions is genuinely confirmed, they are equally well confirmed according to our present definition.... (Goodman 1983, 74, italics added)

P_3 is repeated in Goodman's theory of projection in Chapter 4, as 'conflicting' (e.g. p. 99) hypotheses. H_1 and H_2 are only contradictory after *t* on the strong interpretation of H_2 or grue (2^1).

Additionally *supposing* \/x existential quantifier, → implication (if ... then ...)

$$\vee x\,(E(x) \rightarrow (GE(x, <t) \vee GE(x, \geq t))) \quad (1), (3'')$$
$$\vee x\,(E(x) \rightarrow (GE(x, <t) \vee -GE(x, \geq t))) \quad (2^1)$$

If we stay with (2) there is no logical contradiction and we need exact definitions of green and blue, e.g., with help of wavelengths. However, Goodman does not provide this kind of exact information, and the situation remains undecidable.

There is a strong similarity to WVO Quine's 1960 *Gavagai*, analyses of which TE may also yield result of (possible conclusion of) multiple hypotheses, with no obvious clue, so, undecidability which one is correct, fitting, but in *Gavagai* no misleading unresolvable ambiguity, or fallacy appears. Quine's TE would amount to Quine's doctrine of indeterminacy of translation and related theory of ontological relativity.[9]

Goodman's *Grue* TE may result in conclusion of multiple hypotheses, no obvious decidability which hypothesis is correct, fitting, but in *Grue* there is a possible misleading unresolvable ambiguity, which may render the argument fallacious and its pluralism resolution irrealist.

'Undecidability' formalization including elementary temporal predicate logic (ETPL)

[4]

P_1/H_1 $\bigvee x\,(E(x) \rightarrow GE(x))$ (1')

$\bigvee x\,(E(x) \rightarrow (GE(x, <t) \vee GE(x, >t)))$ (1'')

P_2/H_2 $\bigvee x\,(E(x) \rightarrow GU(x))$ (2')

$\bigvee x\,(E(x) \rightarrow (GE(x, <t) \vee BU(x, >t)))$ (2'')

C_1 $\{\bigvee x\,(E(x) \rightarrow (GE(x, <t) \vee GE(x, >t)))\} \vee \{\bigvee x\,(E(x) \rightarrow (GE(x, <t) \vee BU(x, >t)))\}$ (3)

This analysis including temporal predicate logic may reveal a basic ambiguity in the *Grue* TE, on which interpretation the argument is fallacious. In H_1 at *t* itself the emerald(s) is (are) green—$GE(x, \geq t)$ – and in H_2 at *t* itself the emerald(s) are grue, that is not-green and/or blue—$BU(x, \geq t)$, or $-GE(x, \geq t)$. The informal wordings of the TE hide this ambiguity which is only revealed by the formal temporal logical formalization. C_1 is only valid on condition of this ambiguity where the emeralds are green at *t* in H_1 and not-green and/or blue at *t* in H_2.

P_3 explicitly states that H_1 and H_2 are conflicting or incompatible which makes C_2 'intolerable' or false since H_1 and H_2 are contradictory. However, since P_3 is not very obvious in the restricted text of the TE, it may be considered 'smuggled in' from discussions in the next lecture and sections, partly revised in later editions.

Because 'grue' is not defined in a very exact manner, we can't make sure whether it is blue, not-green, or not-green and/or blue, or green and/or not-green or blue. On the latter interpretation the pluralist interpretation and paradigmatic, revolutionary paradigm shift interpretation is valid, as we will see in the *Whack* analogue, which describes a historical paradigm shift in, let's say, swan theory of ornithology.

3.3. Undecidability – Pseudo-problem

3.3.1 After falsification of the riddle by successful exemplification in, e.g., *Whack* – see next section – the riddle may still point to a pseudo-problem emphasizing undecidability of hypotheses about possibly future events, in other words, the paradox and riddle remain unresolved for any other hypothesis (than paradigmatic examples as 'all swans are whack') because of the nonexcludable occurrence of what Nassim Taleb calls the highly improbable.

Additionally, skeptics and sophists alike may not only want to invent the paradox, but also make the paradox come true in many trivial ways, playing tricks with reason and logic. This is a kind of abuse of TE and paradoxes, we exclude from our pragmaticist research that features on adequate resolutions of TE and paradoxes.

3.3.2 The strong interpretation (C_2: - C_1) may support and necessitate the near-common sense skeptical reduction that Goodman adheres to (e.g.) in his return to the riddle in *Ways of Worldmaking* (Goodman 1978) – 'Induction according to nonprojectible categories is not merely awkward but wrong ...'[10] (Please, see Section 4.1 on Goodman's entrenchment theory.)

Both sophist and skeptical non-resolutions we would like to avoid. Next to the scientific and logical alternates we propose in this paper, there have been developed many more approaches to find a criterion to distinguish lawlike from accidental hypotheses, e.g. by exploring concepts of simplicity (see e.g. Gilbert Harman's attempt in Section 4.4), by acknowledging natural science and global cross- cultural investigations as in the field of color theory (see e.g. wavelength theory of colors, BCT, Basic Color Terms, Berlin and Kay 1969 etc. in Section 4.5).

3.4. All Swans Are Whack (Falsification – (universal) modus tollens)

I can't breathe (George Floyd)*

From history of science we know that before discovery of black swans, the statement 'all swans are white' was considered universally true (see e.g. Hempel 1945b, Popper 1959/2002, Taleb 2007).

With discovery of the first black swan in the Swan River in Australia by Willem de Vlamingh in 1697 there was a kind of paradigm change in the field of swan theory, ornithology, biology, and aforementioned universal statement was falsified. It would take about one more century, until 1790, before the discovery was scientifically assimilated as with the description of, first, subgenus of Chenopis and, next, species Cygnus atratus (of genus Cygnus, swan) by John Latham, the 'Grandfather of Australian ornithology', who added many more Australian birds, such as the emu and Australian magpie.

We may now reformulate this mini-scientific revolution after structure and terminology of Nelson Goodman's *Grue* TE.

* Antiracist motto 'I can't breathe' is derived from the last words of African American George Floyd, one of hundreds of unarmed Black victims of police brutality of last decades, which have become a slogan during protests in many major USA cities in May - June 2020 (see Cornel West 2013, Havercroft and Haven 2016). Possible racial connotations of (Whack as a mix of) Black and White in the sense of names of ethnic groups aren't discussed in this paper, but in chapter on TE analyses and interpretations of Martin Luther King Jr.s 'I Have a Dream' in Hertogh 2015b, which text has been selected for presentation at two American conferences in 2019 (see Hertogh 2019). It was also the most favored topic of the seminars 'Thought Experiments: Capita Selecta,' delivered at Chongqing University in the first term of 2013-2014. Obvious analogy to the historical swan example is that Black people were not considered part of same human category as White people until, let's say, abolition of slavery (in 1865 in USA).

Reformulation

[5']

all swans are white
all swans are whack

white:	white (before 1697 and white in and after 1697)
whack:	white before 1697 \/ white or black in and after 1697

Logical symbolization

[5'']

Suppose

S(x)	: x is a Swan
WI(x)	: x is White
WA(x)	: x is Whack
/\x	: universal quantifier
\/x	: existential quantifier
→	: (material) implication, if ... then ...
-	: negation

Falsification as by (universal) modus tollens[11]

/\x (S(x) → WI(x)) (1)
\/x (S(x) → WA(x)) (2)

-/\x (S(x) → WI(x)) (3)

At this moment we don't need any possible worlds semantics nor any more neologisms than 'whack' to explain 'white' and 'whack', since the temporal dimension of the TE may be fully confined to the definition of the predicates.

At the introduction of ETPL we have assumed that the *Grue* TE presupposes countable linear time to the future, and that ETPL may add linear time development to the past. In the *Whack* example--more than in the imaginary examples of Goodman's *Grue*--there is revealed a further ambiguity of ontology versus epistemology or standard logic versus epistemic logic. *Whack* as formulated above is defined solely from perspective of the European western civilization--whack: white before 1697 \/ white or black in and after 1697. Ontologically, or realistically speaking, it should be

whack: white or black

without any differentiation to before, in and after 1697 because long before the European discovery of black swans there were already black swans in Australia (one must be an extreme eurocentric skeptic to deny this, furthermore, for Australian Aborigines may have held 'all swans are black'). We may express it with help of a dyadic predicate letter introducing agent variables, constants (like elementary temporal logic uses time variables, constants), e.g. WI(x, E) as 'x is White for E', where E stands for European, western civilization, science etc. Above definition is in fact a shortened epistemic definition relative to perspective of western science. However, as it has no effect on validity and soundness of above argument, we may as well keep on using the shortened one-place predicate letters, or even reduce the predicates to atemporal, nonepistemic notions as 'white' meaning transtemporal, transspatial (though restricted to Planet Earth) white, and 'whack' meaning white or black, adding 'until further notice', which clause is again abstracted from in the formulas. Lastly, it should be noted that 'white or black' also abstracts from some intermediary colors of swans, e.g. partially black, such as the black-necked swan (native to South America).

Whack is a successful exemplification of (weak versions of) Goodman's riddle (strong versions may suppose--a slightly different definition of--whack is contradictory to white after t). It stops the infinite quantification to all possible predicates since only some of them are indeed confirmed and it is not possible to principally have all possible predicates confirmed like it is not possible to finitely confirm a universal statement as 'all swans are white', as according to Hempel.[12]

We don't have to return to conventionalism, common sense, or jump on to irrealism, but may stick to, e.g., Willard Quine's ontological relativity, since 'all swans are white' was falsified by an extension of Europe's medieval epistemology, quite literally and physically speaking, by extension of (knowledge of) Earth's landmasses in 17th century as to include Australia. In this way *Grue* could be considered a prototype of a revolutionary TE depicting a paradigm shift.

4. Interpretations

4.1. Entrenchment Theory

In the last of the London lectures Goodman proposes the entrenchment theory as answer to the riddle:

> The answer, I think, is that we must consult the record of past projections of the two predicates, Plainly 'green' as a veteran of earlier and many more projections than 'grue', has the most impressive biography. The predicate 'green', we may say, is much better entrenched than the predicate 'grue'. (Goodman 1983, 94)

Although Goodman proceeds by arguing that, e.g. '(inherited) entrechment' and 'familiarity' are not the same, he eventually recapitulates his endeavor in *Ways of Worldmaking* by eliminating 'grue' and 'bleen' predicates as 'nonprojectible', 'trivial', 'awkward', belonging to a 'different world' and finally 'wrong'

> Induction according to nonprojectible categories is not merely awkward but wrong, whatever may be the outcome of the inductive conclusion drawn. Rightness of induction requires rightness of predicates projected, and that in turn may vary with practice. (Goodman 1978, 129)

On this interpretation the TE is kind of reductio ad absurdum, a skeptical paradox that concludes with reboot to practice, like Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations* (Wittgenstein 1953) argues about following a rule.[13]

Nassim Taleb interprets Goodman's 'riddle of induction' in a similar way as if the final resolution of the riddle would be skeptical:

> The riddle of induction is another version of the narrative fallacy—you face an infinity of 'stories' that explain what you have seen. The severity of Goodman's riddle of induction is as follows: if there is no longer even a single unique way to 'generalize' from what you see, to make an inference about the unknown, then how should you operate? The answer, clearly, will be that you should employ 'common sense,' [...] but your common sense may not be so well developed with respect to some Extremistan variables. (Taleb 2007, 188)[14]

We argue in this paper that much in line of Goodman's imaginative development of the TE and his philosophical presuppositions, the riddle should not be resolved beyond the conclusion that pluralism of more than one applicable hypothesis is not the problem, but, in fact, the resolution of the problem. We should hold on to the tentativeness that Goodman demonstrates in the 1953 lectures, that are the hallmark of Hempel's 'until further notice' clause.[15]

Pluralism does not necessarily contradict the entrenchment theory since the latter may hold particularly for use of language in inductive hypotheses beyond mere conditions to syntactical form as urged for by, e.g., Karl Popper ('features of the hypothesis other than its syntactical form'—Goodman 1983, 72—see Section 2 of this paper). Goodman acknowledges the restriction to 'linguistic practices' in the very last section of the book, 'Survey and Speculations':

> If I am at all correct, then, the roots of inductive validity are to be found in our use of language. .... The suggestion I have been developing here is that such agreement with regularities in what has been observed is a function of our linguistic practices. Thus the line between valid and invalid predictions (or inductions or projections) is drawn upon the basis of how the world is and has been described and anticipated in words. (Goodman 1983, 120-121)

It seems Goodman replaces one type of nominalism (from theory and neologisms) by another (reboot to practice of entrenched names). We suggest to go back to just before the reboot, and retain scientific and logical innovations as part of a productive pluralism that may be restrained by ontological relativity only.

Chomsky proposes a resolution from evolutionary epistemology and theory of learning that may not resolve Goodman's nominalist problem, but could nevertheless serve to unravel the riddle better than Goodman's language approach:

> … why every language-learner (in fact, every mouse, chimpanzee, etc.) uses green instead of grue as the basis for generalization. No doubt this is a simple consequence of certain properties of the sensory system, a conclusion that is quite uninteresting from Goodman's point of view, but not, for that reason, incorrect. (Chomsky 2006, 158)

4.2. Prototype of Revolutionary TE

It may not be possible to discover the new laws and hence new kind of lawlikeness before the arrival of a new paradigm that will be developed at and after *t* just because the laws (as with regard to gemology in Goodman's example) are part of another, completely new scientific paradigm that may hinge on another and completely new (scientific) world view. The paradigm shift will bring about changes in scientific principles and laws in many parts of reality and science, and it is likely that the first revolutionary, crucial experiments, the first development of the new paradigmatic laws, won't occur in the field of Goodman's investigation (as in this example gemology), but that this field of research will only be indirectly related to the field of the major paradigm shift (in this example it could be another theory of the history of the earth, geology, biology etc.), and, thus, it is impossible to discover a rule of relation between lawlike and accidental hypotheses. Goodman does not entertain the possibility of scientific revolutions and adheres to a strictly linear development of (western) science, but since the theory of revolutionary change of paradigm shifts is rather well accepted by the philosophical and scientific communities it should be taken into account. Anyway, Goodman could have made some remark on the possibility of paradigm shifts and how it relates to his TE and search for criterion of lawlikeness, and we couldn't find such a remark in *Fact Fiction and Forecas*t, also not in the later editions, which have revised sections, but still do not mention any reference to scientific paradigms.[16]

Both Fred Wilson 1983 and Steve Fuller 2000 contrast Kuhn's scientific revolutions to Quine's and Goodman's possible conservatism, e.g.

> …. Nevertheless, according to Quine and his Harvard colleague Nelson Goodman, if no foolproof method is available to determine which of two empirically equivalent theories should be pursued, then one should stick to the theory that has worked so far, rather than risking it on the theory that has not yet had a chance to work. This is what Goodman called 'entrenchment' and Quine 'conservatism'….. (Fuller 2000, 87)

4.3. 'Essential' versus 'Accidental' Property of Color

On introduction of the 'new riddle of induction' the example of lawlike statement is, e.g., 'all copper conducts electricity' versus an accidental statement as 'all man now in this room are third sons.' As previously remarked, it is somehow curious Goodman wants to discuss the difference between lawlike and accidental statements with help of an example about possible change of an accidental property (as colors of gems like emeralds). One may need to be an expert in gemology and related sciences as geology to possibly understand why color could be more essential or lawlike to gems than to (e.g.) birds, but again Goodman makes no effort to explain these complexities of the examples from gemology.

In the second conclusion of the *Grue* TE (C_2—see Section 2, surface analyses), Goodman generalizes with help of an example of 'emerose' to all possible entities and properties, so that one may assume that the choice of gemology is random rather than premeditated. Still, one could have expected more explanation (as about e.g. the very difference between essence and accident) and without such explanations one could consider the choice of an example of an accidental property for discussion of lawlikeness a basic category mistake on ground of which the TE may appear fallacious.

However, we need to add that, of course, the same criticisms may be raised against the choice of historical examples in logic like 'all swans are white' and 'all raven are black.'

Therefore, as in our discussion of Hilary Putnam's *Twin Earth*, we argue for an update of philosophical examples as to, e.g., 'water is H_2O' as an example of a lawlike statement and 'water is watery stuff' as an example of an accidental statement.[17]

4.4. Precautions against Overgeneralization

4.4.1. First, like more paradoxes in the field of confirmation theory and induction, e.g. Hempel's *Raven* and Quine's *Gavagai,* we may consider these TE, firstly, precautions against overgeneralization, jumping to conclusions. One should always be careful when making generalizations or conceiving of universal statements in science.[18] In terminology of Carl Hempel, our (empirical) hypotheses should remain relative, never become absolute, it is about 'relative verification'

> At any rate, the acceptance of a hypothesis on the basis of a sufficient body of confirming evidence will as a rule be tentative, and will hold only 'until further notice', i.e. with the provisio that if new and unfavourable evidence should turn up (in other words, if new observation reports should be accepted which disconfirm the hypothesis in question) the hypothesis will be abandoned again. (Hempel 1945b, 116)

4.4.2. Second, indeed the neologistic premises or hypotheses are, in fact, overgeneralizations making unwarranted and even imaginative claims about (possible state of affairs in) the future. It is obvious that we, in principle, can't make any statements about the future, surely not about an unidentified point *t* in the near or far future. To be sure we should remain 'undecided' about such a paradox TE; 'undecidability' is an interpretation philosophers, but foremost scientists, should arrive at in a first intuitional, instinctic reflex.[19] In words of Carl Hempel, in this situation we would prefer 'suspending judgement, awaiting the establishment of further relevant evidence.' (Hempel 1945b, 114)

4.4.3. Third, it is about neologistic overgeneralizations which run counter to background assumptions of daily reality and principles and constraints of physical reality as identity, rest, continuity, simplicity etc. by proposing hypotheses (sometimes even about different objects than the objects at hand) that are picturing the (near or far) future as changeable, discontinuous and complex.

We may stress that this need not be irrealist or unnaturalist as depending on which field of reality we are referring to. The example of gemology (gem stones as emeralds) is unfortunate in this respect as sudden changes could be possible here, but they are much less likely and lesser known from past history to a general public (and we must say Goodman does not mention any real example of change of color of gem stones, e.g. as effected by chemical or geological transitions) than, for instance, evolutionary biology, ornithology, developmental psychology, fashion, ecology. In evolutionary biology, developmental psychology, ecology, scientists study, respectively, changes in species as after mutation over ages of time, changes in cognition and behavior in the development from infant to adult, and the effects of pollution as by CO_2 on possible change of the climate of Planet Earth.

Goodman's examples of gem stones could make more sense when studying, e.g., geological changes over the past eons.

The historical examples of 'all swans are white' and 'all raven are black' are instances from biology, ornithology wherein there is a wide variety of animals, birds over different climate zones and regions of Planet Earth, so that any restrictive universal statement on, e.g., color of animals or birds may easily be falsified by investigating another climate zone or region of the planet, and finding (new) species whose colors falsify the presumed universal statement. These are not examples of pluralism in biology and ornithology, but foremost of ontological relativity since different species may occur in different regions of the Earth, and what may hold for animals and birds living in one part of Earth's ontology does not hold for animals and birds in another part of the Earth, e.g., like Galileo's and Newton's gravitation theory may hold for daily life of Earth's meso-level and Einstein's relativity theory for cosmological macrocosm and subatomic microcosm.

Quine's *Gavagai* is an example from behaviorist psychology of perception and linguistics akin to logical paradoxes about identity (and the like), which may indicate rest (Thales) or, contrarily, change (Parmenides—'one can't step twice in the same river'). Quine's *Gavagai* is akin to Goodman's *Grue* because it also questions identity, continuity, simplicity constraints.[20]

As Gilbert Harman's contribution on 'inductive simplicity' correctly emphasizes, there are good reasons to prefer maxims of simplicity over skepticism:

> In certain statistical learning problems, a policy of choosing simpler rules that account fairly well for data is likely to have less error on new cases than a policy of choosing complex rules that have less error on the data. The relevant kind of simplicity is not to be measured in terms of the number of parameters needed to specify a given member of a class of rules but might be measured in terms of the VC dimension of such a class. The rationale for using simplicity so measured can be extended to allow simplicity to decide among empirically equivalent hypotheses. The extended rationale provides reasons of simplicity to reject certain sorts of philosophical skepticism. (Harman 2003, 1[21])

4.5. Cross-cultural Color Interpretation

With help of natural sciences we may go beyond skeptical reductions to common sense. In ideal, scientific language of wavelengths (measured in nm, nanometer, 10^{-9} m, 1/billionth (AE) m. or 1/milliardth (BE) m.) 'green' as used in modern European languages represents range of ab. 520-570 nm., and blue ab. 440-490 nm. Research shows the distinction may be different in historical and non- European cultures and languages.

Wikipedia even states it may be about a particularly English lexical gap between green and blue:

> Many languages do not distinguish between what in English are described as 'blue' and 'green' and instead use a cover term spanning both. To describe this English lexical gap, linguists use the portmanteau word *grue*, from green and blue, which the philosopher Nelson Goodman coined in his 1955 *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast* to illustrate the 'new riddle of induction'. (*Wikipedia* Color term and basic color terms, Blue-green distinction in language – retrieved on February 16, 2018)

An example of Japanese color words evolution from a later study on color categories in thought and language

> A second observation about the Japanese nomenclature and the Berlin and Kay research concerns GREEN and BLUE terms and the historical separation of the GRUE category. Perhaps as late as 800 years ago, the modern Japanese term for blue, *ao*, included most of the green hues – that is colors which today would be called *midori* (GREEN). (Stanlaw 1997, 255)

Therefore, a global cross-cultural resolution applying ontological relativity (after e.g. Quine) may appear most appropriate in Goodman's particular example of grue, green-blue, too.

With regard to color words (colors of emeralds may need additional investigations), we may conclude with Clyde Hardin who bases his conclusion on research like 'Berlin-Kay theory of basic color terms' (BCT):

> ... It appears that a proper understanding of even the denotations – let alone the connotations – of a language's color terms requires a proper grasp of the relative contributions of biological, cultural, and environmental factors .... (Hardin 2013, 4)

4.6. Goodman's Pluralism and Quine's Ontological Relativity

When proposing a pluralist interpretation of *Grue* TE instead of a common sense interpretation we apply Goodman's later 1978 thoughts as expressed in *Ways of Worldmaking* to his early TE:

> The movement is from unique truth and a world fixed and found to a diversity of right and even conflicting versions or worlds in the making. (Goodman 1978, 10)

However, we assume that the conflict of Goodman's pluralism of competing hypotheses to explain one and the same set of observation reports, may be restrained and reduced to what WVO Quine calls 'ontological relativity.'

Both foundational shifts in theoretical physics, where Thomas Kuhn is referring to, and new discoveries of large areas of Planet Earth, may be considered extensions of daily and scientific ontology. If the new discoveries have not changed all of the scientific concepts and laws of science, they may still have changed relative parts of the epistemology and ontology of science. These paradigm shifts can be philosophically comprehended under the denominator of Willard Quine's ontological relativity, rather than Nelson Goodman's 'irrealism', since the conflict between competing hypotheses may be relativized to different parts of our daily and scientific ontology.

Ontological relativity does not need to support pluralism in principle, but says there is not one (monistic) theory that could explain all (parts of) reality, but different parts of reality obey different laws, are described by different theories etc., e.g., relativity physics rules cosmology and particle physics (as quantum physics), and (an approximation of) Galilean-Newtonian gravitation still rules meso-level of Planet Earth, generally speaking. The laws that rule consciousness are different from laws that rule mechanics. Linguistic rules are different from mathematical laws (see Wittgenstein 1953). In Europe swans are usually white, and (since 1697 Europeans may know that) swans in Australia are usually black. Exactly like in the *Grue* TE of Goodman 'all emeralds are green' hold before *t* and possibly 'all emeralds are grue' may hold (at and) after *t*. We don't have to make universal statements that may hold for all time and all space, but should relativize our empirical statements to a particular time and space. Goodman tries to unnecessarily overgeneralize his hypotheses to, anyway, all time, an infinite progress of time to the future. If wished, the relativization of the hypotheses to particular time and space may be considered pragmaticism.

Possibly multiple hypotheses could be reduced to, reconstructed or unified by one unitary theory (as possibly mediated by information technology IT), but as they stand they may be sufficient and most suitable to explain the part of reality that they are said to govern.

Still, we do adhere to pluralism in the sense of Hempel's tentativeness and possibly Quine's ontological relativity, viz. that there may be more than one theory to explain the same phenomena and we won't know at this moment which one is most correct.

Quine's *Gavagai* TE doesn't only demonstrate inscrutability of reference and indeterminacy of translation, but also ontological relativity as explained in the 1969 essay with the same:

> It is thus meaningless within the theory to say which of the various possible models of our theory form is our real or intended model. Yet even here we can make sense still of there being many models. For we might be able to show that for each of the models, however unspecifiable, there is bound to be another which is a permutation or perhaps a diminution of the first. (Quine 1969, 54)

We guess that both the young Goodman and young Quine may have entertained Hempel's tentativeness since their theoretical positions are well-known as Goodman's pluralism, even irrealism, and Quine's ontological relativity. It is like going back to before the skeptical reduction of *Grue.*

Goodman seems to apply his pluralism to paradigm shifts, too, as in *Ways of Worldmaking* (Goodman 1978) about geocentrism and heliocentrism:

> Perhaps, though, we can reconcile ... by relativization to points or frames of reference rather than to systems or versions. A simpler example will be easier to handle here. The equally true conflicting

> sentences concerning the daily motion of the earth and sun
>
> (9) The earth rotates, while the sun is motionless
> (10) The earth is motionless, while the sun revolves around it might be interpreted as amounting to
> (11) The earth rotates relative to the sun
> (12) The sun revolves relative to the earth, which are nonconflicting truths.
> (Goodman 1978, 112-113)

Although Goodman comes back from this consideration by a rather artificial example, we guess that usually we can still try and regard two 'more comprehensive systems and versions that [seem to] conflict' as having 'their realms' 'within one world' – rather than in 'two different worlds.' (Goodman 1978, 116—bracketed words added)

4.7. Environmental Pragmaticism and Global Cross-culturalism (Progress of Science and Society)

Environmental pragmaticism relates (applications of) progress of science to progress of society and says, e.g., that the more damaging effects (the societal applications of) a theory (have) has on human health and ecology of Planet Earth, the less sound (they) it (are) is (environmentally pragmatically speaking). Global cross-culturalism wants to say that in a global digital world we should avoid referring to cultural specific concepts and images, valuing one culture over another, etc.; research shouldn't remain within one culture but derive data from more than just one culture. These are not political issues yet, but remain within the responsibility of philosophers and scientists, e.g., relating to how they present their theories and views. The former may be considered part of constructive principles of (philosophy of) sciences, the latter of (philosophy of) humanities. The subtheses could be included as conditions to nowadays updates of Goodman's criterion of lawlikeness, prospects of projectibility, Hempel's studies into the theory of confirmation, and Popper's error elimination as part of progress of science.

We return to these proposals elsewhere, but at this moment we will already present an adaptation of one of Popper's formulas.[22] Karl Popper is well-known for his work on falsifiability and growth of knowledge. Hypotheses that are developed for testing should use logical formalizations that are (in form at least) both verifiable and falsifiable, and progress of science can't proceed without error elimination. Popper proposes (e.g.) next formula to summarize his ideas about progress of science

> Using '*P*' for problem, '*TS*' for tentative solutions and '*EE*' for error-elimination we can describe the fundamental evolutionary sequence of events as follows:
>
> ....
>
> $P_1 \rightarrow TS \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P_2$. (Popper 1972/1979, 243)

We want to add ecological and cross-cultural concerns to Popper's formula. If the TS, tentative solutions or theories, are not part of environmental or cross-cultural research, the possible negative effects on human health, natural environment and nowadays inclusive societies should be corrected as part of EE, error elimination. If we abbreviate environmental pragmaticism as EP and global cross-culturalism as GCC, we may add them to Popper's formula of growth of science like this

$$P_1 \rightarrow TS \rightarrow EE/EP\ GCC \rightarrow P_2$$

Please, note that EP and GCC involve effects of TS on society, so, by adding EP and GCC the formula now represents growth of knowledge in science and society since the possibly damaging effects of science on society are corrected in the phase of EE by focussing (/) on EP and GCC.

Nowadays, the additional epistemological condition of global cross-culturalism may require that one cannot generalize to all of mankind if there is no control research in at least one more culture; in this way one is able to double-check outcomes of humanities research on cultural biases. Nowadays, the additional epistemological condition of environmental pragmaticism may require to double-check if the possible societal applications of a new scientific theory will be hurting human health and natural environment, and, if so, the theory cannot be considered (environmental pragmaticist) sound.

4.8. Possible Worlds Semantics

Different from Goodman we will hold on to the tradition from modal logic (e.g. frame semantics, Kripke's PWS e.g. Kripke 1959, 1963, 1980) that there is an 'actual world' (e.g. w_0) or 'real world', e.g.

> The basis of the informal analysis which motivated these definitions [as (*universally) valid*, *satisfiable*] is that a proposition is necessary if and only if it is true in all 'possible worlds'. (It is not necessary for our present purposes to analyze the concept of a 'possible world' any further.) Now let A be a formula with $P_1, \ldots, P_m$ as its propositional and predicate variables and $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ as its free individual variables. ... In modal logic ... we wish to know not only about the real world but about other conceivable worlds; P may be true in the real world but false in some imaginable one, and similarly for $P(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$. Thus we are led not to a single assignment but to a set **K** of assignments, all but one of which represent worlds which are conceivable but not actual; the assignment representing the actual world is singled out as **G** .... (Kripke 1959, 3 – logical symbolism and vocabulary may change in later papers)

And we may define it as the meso-level of Planet Earth, that is Planet Earth as described or depicted as the 'outside', 'external' or 'natural world', that is intersubjective or objective and different from subjective inner worlds as Sartrean 'pour soi' and Nagelian 'what it is like to be an *X* for an *X*.'

But, still, the relevant (natural) laws are only actual 'until further notice' of change, falsification, and verification of new more relevant and adequate laws. Also if one won't like to consider this 'actual world' objective, it may still be considered 'intersubjective' as kind of point or frame of reference from which we describe the other 'possible worlds' as to establish meaningful communication etc. It is not a claim about 'the only truth about the only world' (Goodman 1978, 5), but a claim about the intersubjectively considered most likely truth about what we here and now consider the most appropriate approximation of the 'actual world.' It does presuppose that 'physics itself is fragmentary and unstable' since it remains a set of relative hypotheses, that are liable to change by falsification and verification of--at this moment yet (completely) unknown--new relative hypotheses. These truths may be less certain, clear and distinct to the subjective mind than taste and feelings, they remain the best available intersubjective guess (at a particular time and place).

'How to interpret such terms as "real", "unreal", "fictive", and "possible"' is not 'a subsequent question' (Goodman 1978, 2), but this interpretation is part of the task of philosophy and logic, possibly it is not yet the task of the individual sciences. The pluralism of multiple actual worlds needs to be restrained until there is at least one world view that most adequately depicts what we then will call the 'real' or 'actual world' (at a particular time and place).

With regard to the two subtheses of environmental pragmaticism (EP) and global cross-culturalism (GCC), we have seen in Section 4.5 that the latter applies to color words (e.g. Berlin's and Kay's BCT, basic color terms). The different PW could be designated to scientifically identified regions of language communities, probably wide-spread over the globe, and attain a status of physically possible, linguistic worlds instead of only logically, conceptually or metaphysically possible worlds.

In conclusion, we may indicate a modal logical account of induction by a modification of Nelson Goodman's account of induction. Though Goodman's *Grue* TE starts off promising, suggesting a temporal logical reconstruction of induction theory, the old problems that could cause mistakes (as 'all swans are white''s painful refutation in 1697) return when Goodman goes on to eliminate 'grue' and 'bleen' predicates as 'nonprojectible', 'trivial', 'awkward', belonging to a 'different world' and finally 'wrong.'

Instead we can retain these possible worlds in a modal logical account of induction as e.g. the 'different world' of 'grue' is likely to occur in different cultures where color words refer to different parts of the color spectrum (in fact 'grue' denotes cover terms for both green and blue in many cultures), or we can--less awkwardly than Goodman suggests--adopt different frames of reference when describing motion (e.g. Albert Einstein's *Elevator* TE, Einstein, Infeld 1938), less awkwardly than Goodman guesses (see Goodman 1978, 128) translate our inductive arguments, e.g. gravity arguments, from the heliocentric system back to the geocentric system, and, use an approximation of Galilean-Newtonian gravity instead of Einsteinian relativity when talking about the meso-level of Planet Earth (as relativity may only apply to micro- and macrocosm).

To avoid mistakes as the historical 'all swans are white' we can probabilistically quantify over PW instead of over only evidence statements of the actual physical world of Planet Earth, that is in Goodman's terminology (but not in accordance with his eventual entrenchment theory), quantify over both 'green' and 'grue' predicates, worlds etc.

The example of the historical black swan returns in the title of Nassim Taleb's 2007 *The Black Swan*, explaining in the subtitle it is about the impact of the highly improbable. In a 21st-century global cross-cultural world induction can't be based anymore on only (Humean) habits and (English) color denotations and connotations--cultural biases should be eliminated, and probabilities (PW) need to be reestimated without local biases.[23]

Moreover, in the analyses part of this paper we have demonstrated that the metaphysical neologisms of *Grue* may be eliminated with help of an elementary temporal predicate logic, and that, next to the traditional epistemological interpretations of philosophy of science, *Grue* may be successfully analyzed and interpreted as a prototype of a Kuhnian paradigmatic, revolutionary thought experiment as with help of Karl Popper's procedure of falsification by means of modus tollens.

Endnotes:

1. Abbreviations used in this paper e.g.
   TE: thought experiment(s)
   PWS: possible worlds semantics
   H_n Hypothesis n, P_n Premise n, C_n Conclusion n
   All logical symbols can be made on a (f.i. QWERTY) keyboard, except symbols from set theory, intersection and empty set--see also notes 3, 9.

   Research question that started this paper in 2017 is how to analyze *Grue* as a TE, as part of research into semantics of TE. The results were not fully foreseen, e.g. that we would hit upon a prototype of a paradigmatic or revolutionary TE (in the sense of Thomas Kuhn, whose philosophy is not mentioned by Goodman at all). Next, as usual we connect the results of the TE analyses with presumptions and general outlook of the philosopher who conceived of the TE, and this procedure yields remarkable conclusions in this case, since we found that analyses of *Grue* may fit in with a philosophy of pluralism rather than with common sense, where the later Goodman reduces the TE to (in any case, the neologism part of the TE, as possibly after Wittgenstein, who also goes unmentioned by Goodman).
   Taxonomy of diverse types of TE are discussed in PhD diss. Hertogh 2015b, e.g. Paradox TE.
   Kuhnian revolutionary or paradigmatic TE are called Deconstructive TE, i.e. TE that destruct, falsify an old theory and construct, verify a new theory. James Brown (1991) may call this type of TE mystifyingly Platonic TE, but we stay with John Norton (2004a, b) in an empirical view of TE that avoids mysteries and magic instead of adding to it, although the rhetorical force of TE can't be denied. Neologistic TE--Goodman's *Grue* is a superb example--may be defined as TE whereof TE workings hinge on neologisms.
2. We hereby refer readers, who are not familiar with (one or some of) the approaches or problems mentioned, to the references and literature. Many approaches are valuable and may trigger worthwhile discussions. This paper, however, mainly focusses on aspects and points of views of the problem that may have been overlooked, partly caused by vaguenesses, ambiguities and possible inconsistencies in the text of *Grue* (see e.g. Sections 3.1, 3.2), possibly because of lack of communication between the old theory (e.g. Goodman, Quine) and the new philosophy of science (e.g. Popper, 'anti-inductivist[s]', see Goodman 1983, xxii, and Kuhn, not mentioned at all in Goodman 1983 – see Section 4.2).
   Quite a few authors point to vaguenesses, ambiguities etc. in the text of *Grue* (apart from the ambiguities the epistemic paradox may trigger itself), e.g. Fain 1967, Jackson 1975, Shoemaker 1975/2003b, Chomsky 2006. Particularly with regard to the definition of 'grue', authors acknowledge that there is more than just one interpretation of 'grue', and, next, that their definition may deviate from 'the concept Goodman actually had in mind', e.g. Fain 1967

> I say 'less elliptically' somewhat hesitantly because a number of 'less elliptic' paraphrases of Goodman's casual definition of grue in *Fact, Fiction and Forecast* have appeared in the literature. On one interpretation, for example, grue objects are objects which are green prior to some time *t* and blue after *t.* The particular paraphrase used here is, I think, the closest to the text, although it may not adequately represent the concept Goodman actually had in mind. My analysis of the riddle of induction depends upon defining 'grue' exactly the way in which I do it. (Fain 1967, 61n3)

Shoemaker 1975/2003b observes in one of the first notes of his paper that there are 'various ways in which "'grue'-like" could be defined.' Shoemaker explains that his definition is different from a standard one, which he calls the 'Barker-Achinstein definition' (referring to Barker and Achinstein 1960)

> Sometimes Goodman's definition of 'grue' has been read differently from the way I read it; it has been read as meaning that for any time *t*, a thing *x* is grue at *t* if and only if either *t* is earlier than *T* and *x* is green at *t*, or *t* is *T* or later, and *x* is blue at *t*, where *T* is the time mentioned in Goodman's definition. Since the prevalence of this reading is due to an influential paper by Barker and Achinstein, let us call this, the Barker- Achinstein definition.... (Shoemaker 1975/2003b, 78)

Chomsky 2006 interpreting 'Gruebleen-like' 'languages' from point of view of universal grammar concludes that the notion is rather 'vague', 'unspecified':

> He [Goodman] argues that ... one must be '... aware ...' ... of what in general is 'the difference between Gruebleen-like and English-like languages'. I think that this is a rather marginal issue, since much more deep-seated properties of 'English-like languages' have been formulated and investigated, but, since he brings up this example, it is well to point out that the difficulties to which he alludes are in large measure a consequence of the vagueness of the question he asks. ....As long as Goodman's vague notions 'English-like' and 'gruebleen-like' are left unspecified.... (Chomsky 2006, 157, 158)

For Jackson's comments on the definition of *Grue*, please, see note 3.

3. With regard to the problem of induction, generally speaking, we suggest to start again with the logical methods of John Stuart Mill (1843/1882) instead of the psychological theory of David Hume (1740). Mill is mentioned but not really discussed in Goodman 1983. In Hertogh 2013, 2015b we propose a couple of inductive analyses of TE, e.g. Thomas Nagel 1974, *What It Is Like to Be a Bat*. In this paper the provisional analyses of Quine's *Gavagai* remain inductive, too, but this account is peculiar because the TE wants to show at the same time that induction of direct ostension fails.
Carnap 'generic scheme' of modus ponens instantiation in Carnap (1966, 7, 17) shows how deduction may be transferred into induction – and the other way around – by summarizing scientific explanation similar to scientific prediction:

> *1. $(x)(Px \rightarrow Qx)$*
> *2. Pa*
> *3. Qa*

This formula shows prediction, i.e., how conclusion 3 may be inferred from major 1 – general law, probabilistically formulated it runs fr (Q,P) = [e.g.] 0.8, where fr (Q,P) is the relative frequency of Q

with respect to P (e.g. 0.8, 80%) – and minor, instance 2 (modus ponens).
Conversely, it show explanation, 1 follows from 2 and 3, Pa, Qa, so, (x)(Px → Qx) – which accords with e.g. John Stuart Mill's inductive logic—it may be generalized like this

> 'Fa_1 & ... & Fa_n' gives a good reason for 'Fa_{n+1}' (Jackson 1975, 113)

where *Fx* is a property, *F* predicate letter and $a_1 \ldots a_n$, a_{n+1} logical constants, escaping from possible formal complexities of material implication (→) by 'gives a good reason for.' Goodman's problem is how to formulate (elimination) rules that govern the latter inference.
(Using logical symbols as used in e.g. Kutschera 1978 for Carnap's formula--
/\x (Px → Qx), Pa, Qa (deduction, modus ponens) and Pa, Qa, /\x (Px → Qx) (induction), where /\x is universal quantifier and → is material implication, if ... then ....)

4. See Sorensen 1992, e.g.

> .... Crucial to the diagnosis is identification of the tricky thought experiments as *paradoxes*.
> A paradox is a small set of individually plausible yet jointly inconsistent propositions. In chapter 6 I extrapolate to the thesis that every thought experiment is reducible to such a set. ... (Sorensen 1992, 5)

5. The neologisms are contractions or portmanteaus (linguistic blendings) of two adjectives or nouns – 'bleen' (blue, green), 'emerose' (emerald, rose), 'emeruby' (emerald, ruby), 'sapphiruby' (sapphire, ruby), Eifferuby (Eiffel Tower, ruby), 'grund' (green, round), 'grare' (green, square), 'gred' (green, red) 'zig' (vs. bag, marbles in helter-shelter selection), 'bagleet' (bag, naval fleet), 'bagmarks' (bag, make of car).
6. These overseas explorations are considered part of European Age of Discovery. However, last decades there have been developed competing non-eurocentric and non-western theories in an international, global cross-cultural context as that, e.g., America was first discovered by navigations of Muslim Chinese explorer Zheng He (郑和 1371–1433), who may already have discovered the new world in 1421 as recorded by e.g. Gavin Menzies, and whose name is well-known among Chinese college students.
Next, it is well-known that Africa, Arabia, Mesoamerica and Asia have contributed to mathematical, scientific and technological developments to a high extent. China was a world leader in science and technology in the Ming Dynasty (1368 - 1644) as by the Four Great Inventions, papermaking, printing, compass and gunpowder.
With regard to explorations of outer space the achievements of USA, Europe and Russia are about to be countered by projected Chinese moon landing as scheduled for 2025.
7. (Elementary) temporal predicate logic may be abbreviated (E)TPL as after Valentin Goranko's use of acronyms in *SEP*. Our ETPL is inspired by Hempel:

> ... or the psychological hypothesis, "You can fool all of the people some of the time and some of the people all of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time", which may be symbolized by '(*x*)(*Et*)Fl(*x*,*t*). *(Ex)*(*t*)FL(*x*,*t*).-(*x*)(*t*)Fl(*x*,*t*)', (where 'Fl(*x*,*t*)' stands for "You can fool (person) *x* at time *t*"). (Hempel 1945a, 11 – saying is usually credited to Abraham Lincoln)

Frank Jackson (1975, resp. 115, 116, 118) uses similar 'semi-formal terms' (see also note 3) to explicate 'the three common kinds of ways of defining "grue"', $grue_1$, $grue_2$ and $grue_3$:

> A typical example of the first way is:
>
> D_1. *x* is grue iff *x* is green before *T* and blue thereafter.

where T is a chosen time in the future ... [n. 4--cf. Blackburn 1969, Kelley 1971]
On D_1, 'grue' is atemporal--an object is grue or not once and for all, it cannot be grue at one time and not grue at another--and in this respect differs from 'green'.
....

A typical example of the second way... of defining 'grue' is:

D_2. x is grue at t iff (x is green at t & $t < T$) or (x is blue at t & $t \geq T$).

'Grue' on this definition is like 'green' in being temporal: an object may be grue_2 at one time and not at another.
....

... the following definition is close to that he [Goodman] uses in *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast*:

D_3. x is grue at t iff (x is examined by T and x is green at t) or (x is not examined by T and x is blue at t).

As indicated by the 'at t' in D_3, this definition is for enduring objects. ...

Jackson 1975 and more literature demonstrate there are many possible 'hairsplitting' interpretations, distinguishing between temporal and enduring objects and colors, examined and unexamined objects etc. (as partly discussed in Goodman 1983). Because of the common sense nature of Goodman's entrenchment theory we suppose the paradox should be understood in a common sense way, too, and we are only suggesting ambiguities with regard to measurement at time t, and names of colors and objects, which may be supported by cross-cultural and trans-historical research.
'Hairsplitting' is used in Taleb 2007 to describe Quine's *Gavagai* TE, which TE is set in a cross-cultural setting beyond common sense.

8. Please, note the colors the predicates represent as blue and green are not complementary or opposite colors (blue and yellow are, and green and red), but actually quite similar, near in color scheme range. Analogously, when logically interpreting *Grue* we don't need to exclude anything but grue is not-green, GU(x) = - GE(x). Actually, since blue and green are close to each other in color range, physically speaking wavelength, and grue may resemble a mix of green and blue as turquoise, our interpretation of *Grue* as referring to both green and shades of green that can't be considered green anymore, as turquoise and some shades of blue, GU(x) = GE(x) \/ GU(x), is closer to ordinary and scientific usage than the later Goodman's skeptical elimination of any intermediates between green and blue. (Please, see Section 4.5 on cross-cultural color interpretation.)
9. The *Gavagai* TE appears in Quine's 1960 main treatise, *Word and Object*, in the end of the first section of Chapter II, 'Translation and Meaning', called 'First Steps of Radical Translation' (Quine 1960, 28-30).
   The *Gavagai* TE is about a field linguist and a native of an unknown, noncognate language, when the former is trying to guess what the latter may mean by the sound 'gavagai', uttered by the native speaker when she sees a rabbit—Does 'gavagai' refer to rabbit, rabbit-part, rabbit-stage, or possibly rabbithood etc. ...?
   Quine 1960, also quoted in Putnam 1974

> There can be no doubt that rival systems of analytical hypotheses can fit the totality of dispositions to speech behavior as well, and still specify mutually incompatible translations of countless sentences insusceptible of independent control.

It may be provisionally analyzed as failed induction because of multiple possible hypotheses, which however may support claims of ontological relativity, involving undecidable pluralism as consistent with Hempel's tentativeness of retaining all possible hypotheses 'until further notice.'
In *Word and Object* the TE is framed as part of discourse on explanation of analytical hypotheses and stimulus meaning, the latter being Quine's methodology to naturalize epistemology and theory of meaning, semantics, in a behaviorist way.
On logical analysis—as from the explanation in 'Ontological Relativity', the first John Dewey Lecture (Quine 1968a) – *Gavagai* appears to amount to failed induction from skepticism about direct ostension.
In our criticism, however, we may conclude that it is actually about hasty generalization.

[6]

Suppose

$H_{1,2,3}$	analytical hypotheses of field linguist
Gavagai	g
rabbit (thing/whole)	r (or rt)
rabbit part	rp
rabbit stage	rs
(rabbithood	rh)
=	means, refers e.g. a = t : sign a refers to object/thing t

H_1: g = r (1)
H_2: g = rp (2)
H_3: g = rs (3)

----

g?

Although there may be more interpretations of Quine's TE, we guess Quine first introduces the *Gavagai* TE, concludes to the failure of radical translation, that is failure of direct ostension, and next infers to his doctrine of ontological relativity.

[7]

H_1: g = r (1')
H_2: g = rp (2')
H_3: g = rs (3')

$g = r \lor g = rp \lor g = rs$

[8]

H_1: g = r (1'')
H_2: g = rp (2'')
H_3: g – rs (3'')

$\cancel{g = r \land g = rp \land g = rs}$

Induction fails here (cf. [1] and [3] in main text), that is to say radical translation is not possible or direct ostension is not possible. One may only conclude to disjunction or impossible conjunction of analytical hypotheses that are not mutually consistent (in case of conjunction—cf. [3] conjuncts stricken through cf. incompatible, mutually exclusive in set theory, probability theory--intersection of two sets or events is empty $A \cap B = \emptyset$). [7] may show the inscrutibility of reference, (systematic) ambiguity, indeterminacy of (radical) translation, ontological relativity, since there is more than just one hypothesis about reference, (radical) translation, ontology of unknown language possible—this type of induction based on initial direct ostension cannot conclude yet to only one clear-cut hypothesis (theory). In fact, this kind of impossible situation occurs often as part of deferred ostension (e.g. referring to universal rabbithood by pointing to a particular rabbit cf. Becker 2012, 165). Quine wants to show with help of the *Gavagai* TE that direct ostension in case of (direct/radical) translation (i.e. translation of a yet completely unknown, remote language) is not possible.

We should note, however, that a single imaginary experiment or TE may not suffice to arrive at theoretical conclusions. According to scientific methodology, one needs much more experimental evidence, conduct more than just one experiment with more than just one respondent, repeat the experiments, conduct control experiments in different settings etc. to develop trustable and reliable theories. Concluding from the *Gavagai* TE that direct ostension or radical translation fails amounts to inductive fallacy of hasty generalization. Furthermore, the setting of the TE, Q&A in an open field, may indeed have a lot of possibly irrelevant information, experimental settings are quite often artificial, take place indoors, in a lab, etc. as to exclude irrelevant information. We may still use direct ostension in a classroom to teach students, whose mother tongue and culture are unrelated to the target language, new vocabulary.

In fact, in his 1968 lecture on ontological relativity, Quine gives many more examples, e.g. Japanese classifiers, to provide for more evidence for his doctrine. We may return to it elsewhere, possibly in another paper on inductive paradox TE.

10. Possibly Goodman wants to say here 'unprojectible' since in 1973 'Note to the Third Edition' Goodman distinguishes 'nonprojectible' from 'unprojectible', the former signifying something like neither projectible nor unprojectible, and the latter negation of projectible (Goodman 1983, xxi). However, we won't exclude the possibility that the use of these two or three terms may change from context to context (like 'grue'), cf. Goodman 1983, 100-101, Goodman 1978, 127-129.
11. See Hempel's logical analysis

> ...a purely universal hypothesis (symbolized by a formula consisting of one or more quantifiers followed by a sentential function containing no quantifiers) is falsifiable but not verifiable by an infinite universe of discourse. Thus, e.g., the hypothesis "(x)(Swan(x) → White(x))" is completely falsified by the observation report {Swan(a), - White(a)}; but no finite observation report can entail and thus verify the hypothesis in question. (Hempel 1945b, 113)

We follow the deductive logical analysis of falsification by Karl Popper as modus tollens:

$$\begin{array}{l} p \rightarrow q \\ -q \\ \hline -p \end{array}$$

The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Popper 1959/2002), e.g.

> ... My proposal is based upon an asymmetry between verifiability and falsifiability; an asymmetry which results from the logical form of universal statements. ... For these are never

> derivable from singular statements, but can be contradicted by singular statements. Consequently it is possible by means of purely deductive inferences (with the help of the modus tollens of classical logic) to argue from the truth of singular statements to the falsity of universal statements.... The falsifying mode of inference here referred to—the way in which the falsification of a conclusion entails the falsification of the system from which it is derived—is the modus tollens of classical logic.... (Popper 1959/2002, resp. 19, 55)

Modus tollens including quantifiers is sometimes called universal modus tollens (analogously to quantified modus ponens, which may be called universal modus ponens, akin to universal instantiation).
In formula [5''] the universal statement of the major (1, p → q) is contradicted by the example(s) of the minor (2, - q, WI(x) =/ WA(x)), and it results in negation, falsification of (1) in conclusion (3, - p):
without quantifiers

S(x) → WI(x)	if x is a swan, then it is white
- WI(a)	a is not white (for it is black)
--------------------	--
- S(a)	a is not a swan

Epistemic logic as indicated in Section 3.4 has been developed analogous to, e.g., Hempel's temporal logic (Hempel 1945a--see note 7). Hintikka 1962 on knowledge and belief introduces e.g. an account with predicate letters as K and B for Know(s), resp., Believe(s), next to a modal account. Although many TE seem to transcend classical logic, standard logic may often do to analyze the deep structure of the TE argument, particularly because some complexities as temporal and epistemic interpretations may be abstracted from in logical symbolization of the core of the argument, e.g. because they only apply to analysis of some predicates (like in *Whack*).

12. As Hempel explains it is not possible to finitely confirm a universal statement as 'all swan are white' – please, see end of Hempel's quote in note 11

> ... but no finite observation report can entail and thus verify the hypothesis in question. (Hempel 1945b, 113)

13. Saul Kripke (1982) discovers a skeptical paradox in #202 of *Philosophical Investigations* as with regard to following of a rule is a practice.

> And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it. (Wittgenstein 1953, #202)

Wittgensteinianly speaking we would remain with logico-philosophical treatise of *Tractatus* (Wittgenstein 1961) as an upstart to development of modal logic of PWS. For analyses of Goodman's *Grue* we may only need an elementary temporal logic without recourse to PWS.

14. Nassim Taleb's 'Black Swan' is not only a metaphorical name for the highly improbable, but for the problem of induction generally speaking (Taleb 2007, 27). Taleb's central distinction is between 'the Black Swan generating province of' Extremistan as 'the province where the total can be conceivably impacted by a single observation' and Mediocristan, 'the province dominated by the mediocre, with few extreme successes or failures' (Taleb 2007, resp. 6, 308, 309).
15. The common sense interpretation of *Grue* as because of neologisms is even stronger in *Ways of Worldmaking* (Goodman 1978) than in the third and fourth edition of *Fact Fiction and Forecast*

(Goodman 1973, 1983). However, we may distinguish neologism resolution of *Grue* (skeptically reducing neologisms to 'awkward' usage) from multiple hypotheses resolution of *Grue* TE. Different from Goodman we don't reject validity and soundness of *Grue* because of neologisms (which can be logically eliminated on our interpretation), but because of ambiguity of before *t*, at *t* and after *t* (ambiguity of t, $<$t, $\leq$t, $>$t and $\geq$t), and because of partly related ambiguity and vagueness--that is lack of exact definitions--of grue, bleen etc. predicates.

With regard to Wittgenstein interpretation, we could add that logic still has a good use in removing and resolving ambiguities of ordinary language; first, we shouldn't take ordinary language at face value, as there may be a kind of conservatism baked in it (possibly related to prevalence of Nietzschean nihilism and skepticism in ordinary language); and, second, many nowadays scientific theories have scientific languages (consisting of mathematical, physical, chemical symbols as +, -, c: speed of light in vacuum 3×10^8 m/s, H: Hydrogen, O: Oxygen, H_2O: water) that can't be easily replaced by or translated into ordinary language (like, of course, mathematics can't be easily replaced by ordinary language, which is a fact that Wittgenstein does not deny in *Philosophical Investigations*). In other words, when reducing philosophy to computation, we could reduce it to many more scientific languages and entities (as chemical atoms, molecules etc.), too, which, in fact, belong to micro-level of Planet Earth instead of meso-level of Planet Earth; ordinary language and common sense only belong to the meso-level.

16. Goodman delivered the lectures in 1953. Kuhn's *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* appeared in 1962. The quite substantial revision of section on conditional hypotheses, 'Presumptive Projectibility', was added in 1983, that is nearly two decades after appearance of Kuhn's first edition.
17. Please, see e.g. Putnam 1973, 1975a. We identify, analyze and interpret Hilary Putnam's *Twin Earth* as a (modal) TE in chapter 7 of PhD Thesis 'Semantics of Thought Experiments' (Hertogh 2015b) and possibly forthcoming publication in *Integrated Science Vol II, Transdisciplinarity across the Different Disciplines* (edited by Nima Rezaei).
18. Part of philosophy and logic is dedicated to investigations into universality, which universal statements are possible under which conditions, e.g. modal logic studies concepts as 'necessary' and 'possible.' In Goodman's riddle of induction it is about empirical sciences which are usually opposed to deductive sciences as logic. Examples as 'copper conducts electricity', 'all emeralds are green' are treated as examples from empirical sciences, physics, gemology. Hempel's *Raven* paradox, 'all raven are black', could be considered as an example to investigate deductive logic, strengths and weaknesses of material implication. Hempel, however, discusses it as part of empirical science and arrives at a couple of testable empirical hypotheses.
19. Compare Charles Pierce's and Nicholas Rescher's pragmatism. Both Rescher 1976 on plausibilistic inference and Rescher 1978 on Peirce's theory of induction define nonanalytical plausibility with reference to Peirce:

    > By plausibility, I mean the degree to which a theory ought to recommend itself to our belief independently of any kind of evidence other than our instinct urging us to regard it favorably. All the other races of animals certainly have such instincts; why refuse them to mankind?... Physicists certainly today continue largely to be influenced by such plausibilities in selecting which of several hypotheses they will first put to the test. (Peirce in c. 1910 as quoted partly in Rescher 1976 and wholly in Rescher 1978)

    This description comes close to intuition, the mental faculty that is mentioned perhaps most often as informal explanation of the psychological mechanics of TE.
20. Supplementary surface and deep analyses of Hempel's *Black Raven* and Quine's *Gavagai* are possibly forthcoming.

21. VC dimension: Vapnik–Chervonenkis dimension, called after Russian scientists Vladimir Vapnik (1936) and Alexey Chervonenkis (1938-2014). It is a measure for richness or complexity of a set of hypotheses. See Harman 1994, Vapnik 2000.
    Concisely explained e.g. – 'The point is that good inductive practice balances simplicity of rule against error in the data.' (Harman 2003, 3)
22. See e.g. Hertogh 2015b and 2016. In Hertogh 2015b the notions of environmental pragmaticism and global cross-culturalism are introduced as subtheses of progress of science and society view. In Hertogh 2016 a global cross-cultural interpretation is added to Descartes' Cogito, saying the Cogito ('I think, therefore, I am') does not only hold for white male European citizens of the 17th century, but for all mankind (which we assume is consistent with Descartes's intent).
23. See Hertogh 2015b, 68, where *Grue* is discussed as part of a section on critical thinking.

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The Expression of Value in a World of Fact

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Abstract:

This article examines the difficulties of expressing values consistently so that others are able to understand and draw conclusions about personal motives and behaviors. Recognized are the hidden and often unspoken beliefs and values found in everyday conversation and in moral theory-making. What is suggested is that seeking common values that are useful and shareable is no easy task. Given the utilitarian hypothesis that moral value is simply a matter of convenience and utility, the expression of value in a world of fact is and remains a precarious vision, but one to which we aspire.

Key Words: critical realism, culture, inference-making, innate, is-ought, intuition, pre-rational assumptions, representations, sensations, social hope, terminal, the not-yet, utilitarianism, value

The Expression of Value in a World of Fact

Thinking that is logical or rational or even thinking based on so-called commonsense has evolved as our humanity advanced encasing us in a multitude of pre-rational assumptions. These assumptions include beliefs and values culturally accumulated; including faith in logic and empirical methods, but, it is suggested that neither of these is terminal. Thinking is woven with cultural assumptions and, as such, is fluid and malleable. Thinking, cognition, wasn't always as it is today and what is called "thinking" will continue to change with our cultural histories. This means, among other things, what we call "character" – temperament, spirit, and/or disposition – is changing and developing and will continue so in the future. Although character defines the mental and moral qualities distinctive to an individual, it should not be confused with personality. As Alex Lickerman says,

> Character, on the other hand, takes far longer to puzzle out. It includes traits that reveal themselves only in specific—and often uncommon—circumstances, traits like honesty, virtue, and kindliness. Ironically, research has shown that personality traits are determined largely by heredity and are mostly immutable. The arguably more important traits of character, on the other hand, are more malleable—though, we should note, not without great effort. Character traits, as opposed to personality traits, are based on beliefs (e.g., that honesty and treating others well is important—or not), and though beliefs can be changed, it's far harder than most realize.[1]

All thinking involves conjectures and conclusions; the process of representing our world connecting and disconnecting value to fact and fact to value. This process is commonly called "inference-making." Obviously, inference-making begins with experiencing our world, but does not stop there; rather, the ideas and often unspoken assumptions of our culture are determiners, subjective antecedents, for applying value to our experiences as we identify, describe, and assess environmental inputs. From similes to metaphors and from the cave paintings of ancient man to a child trying to make sense of the world, we witness inference-making in progress. Inference-making, whether couched in an artistic image or in words and symbols, is basic to understanding.

In everyday conversation we label inferences in various ways: we have ideas and hold beliefs; are able to use our imagination and think intuitively; we have hunches, explanations, and arrive at what we think are rational conclusions; we possess feelings and attitudes, opinions, assumptions, and biases; and we create art the aesthetic nature of which we assign value. We also apply logic and mathematical acuity to our experiences through which we assign accuracy and validation. Involved in all of these is inference-making; this is their common ground. But, the language of thinking is not about logic, theory, and mathematical acuity only; thinking is about people more often than not guided and molded by unarticulated values.

Analytically, in our language – spoken and unspoken – inferring has the underlying structure of "If…then." This simple formula is often assumed and not explicitly expressed when we engage in discussions and arguments. We commonly say, "If this happens, then this will also happen; if this is true, then this is true also." Arguably, inference-making expresses a causal relationship, a connection, that begs for reinforcement with substantial factual information making the antecedent (signaled by "if") referentially important. This relationship, expressed as an inference, is often called a "correlation," or in mathematics, "equivalence," and it is within inference where meaning is discovered and expressed. For example, if a child paints a "red bird" gold, blue, or orange, we are wont to ask what meaning the child had in mind. How is this child connecting perception with conception, or does he or she just prefer one color over another? Just what is the connection? Meaning is clarified when we ask for an explanation.

Explanations

In his book, *Philosophical Explanations*, Robert Nozick[2] suggests an explanatory model of philosophical activity pointing out that "explanation increases understanding" as explanations represent our efforts to organize experiences and make rational our thoughts and behaviors. Important to ethics and morals is that explanation brings clarity and consistency increasing our confidence in moral human possibility. Rational thinking, as "explanation for understanding," is not terminal nor is it limited to inductive or deductive inference, the scientific method, nor to one moral theory or another. Purposely, explanation for understanding represents conceptual thought and meaning, the interconnecting of ideas and experiences evaluated for consistency, factual reliability, and for the meaning or meanings being conveyed. According to Nozick, the mind is always busy representing what is experienced; there are no unrepresented (interpreted) experiences. Nozick says philosophers often seek to deduce their total view from a few basic principles, showing how everything follows from their intuitively based axioms, He compares such an approach to building a tower by piling one brick on top of another: if the brick at the bottom crumbles or is removed, everything collapses, and even the insights that were independent of the starting point are lost. A conclusion from Nozick's discussion is that to reduce ethics to one view, one epistemology or another, narrows our value-focus and diminishes the possibility of creating value-based communities, from seeking moral insight in a world of value diversity. There is a need to strike a balance in our formulations of cultural pluralism, and recognize the need for understanding and tolerance as a foundation for a healthier multiculturalism.

Thus, explanation is the activity of interconnecting – inference-making – revealing no single or straight-forward line of reasoning connecting "what is" with what we believe "ought to be" or to our moral understanding of what "ought to be." We remain concerned for not only articulating what is "good," but living in communities that are safe, decent, and uplift human dignity. Important to ethics is the question asked by Roy Woods Sellars[3] in 1967, "In what sense do value judgments and moral judgments have objective import?" To clarify, Sellars offers a view he calls "critical realism"; namely, "that we decipher the external thing to which we are responding through and by means of, the information fed into us by the same object." This deciphering involves not just logic, but our cultural heritage of beliefs, values, and hunches about how life should be lived. Sellars comments,

> There is a good deal of selective and exploratory activity here. … To make a long story short, I take 'perceiving' to consist of deciphering any referential claims which are constantly being tested. From this we work out our cognitive claims about things, relating them and describing them. … It is in the recognition of what is involved that critical realism exceeds natural realism. Modern philosophy got off to a bad start because it did not understand the causal circuit in perceiving and made sensation terminal.

Moreover, Sellars notes that critical realism moves between what is *presented* to us by our senses to how we in fact "represent" such experiences pointing to their informative role. About value judgments is says "these are culminations of a way of thinking about referents of all sorts … a way of thinking essential to the human economy and feeds into choices and decisions. While it interplays with cognition, it is not reducible to it." He concludes that the reductionism of logical positivism or logical empiricism has forced careful thinking of valuation and moral language where the uniqueness of man must be recognized as a knower, a valuer, and an agent where there are broad patterns of functional feedback-integration. This is where human consciousness emerges.

Understanding Sellars' analysis, the phrase "the expression of value" is burdened with interpretation and validation as is the phrase "a world of fact." For many, the entire phrase "the expression of value in a world of fact" assumes a fitting of morals into natural philosophy; that is, a fitting of what should be into what is. This was a hidden assumption of David Hume[4] who simply labeled his fleeting sensations the "empirical self" compressing what many call "human essences" – mind, feelings, beliefs, values, etc. – and encapsulating, among other things, talk about ethics and morals within the language of scientific verification.

Lying just beneath the surface of this discussion is the old "is-ought" problem and is usually skewed in favor of "is", interpreted as "fact." Avoiding these difficulties, Richard Rorty[5] dispensed with the reality of the "self" as well as of human essences and espoused a bland morality of practical utility and procedural reasoning expressed as a usefulness, efficacy, and convenience. Logical-empiricism tells us there is no valid, rational, or objective connection between what is and what ought to be. From a logical point of view, this seems to be commonsense, but "ought" is more convoluted than what logic claims. A hidden value of logic is its interconnection to scientific validation and its bias towards facts, and doubts about value. But when Rorty offers a "social hope" for a more benevolent society, one can only wonder from where does his hope spring and how social hope can be socially and culturally articulated within the restricted language of utility. Undisclosed is that his moral ought is trapped within an empirical language his own theory is unable to support.

Charles Taylor[6] reminds us that much in life, in morals and values, is "suppressed by these strange cramped theories" as they "narrow our focus to the determination of action, and then restrict our understanding of these determinants further by defining practical reason as exclusively procedural." He says, "Having excluded qualitative distinctions for epistemological and moral reasons so effectively, indeed, that it has almost suppressed all awareness of their place in our lives, it proposes a view of moral thought focused simply on determining the principles of action."

Values' Interpretive and Normative Quality

Flowing naturally from the scientific enlightenment, it was assumed that logical reason supported scientific acuity and was the best path to knowledge; that is, logic has a practical, utility value in expressing truth. But the question of moral objectivity, initiated by logical empiricism, was not easily dismissed. Again, raised In 1957, G.E. Moore[7] argued that it is a mistake to try to define the concept "good" in terms of some natural property (thus, the name "naturalistic fallacy" when trying to derive an "ought" from an "is"). Moore argued, defining the concept "good" is impossible since it is a simple concept; a concept that cannot be defined in terms of any other concept. That this is a fallacy, not all agreed. To this utilitarians and pragmatists provided a different course; namely, defining "good", not as a single, un-reducible appellation, but in terms of "utility." This of course leaves the prescriptive nature of normal life hopelessly lost in the world of social analysis ignoring the delicate interplay taking place in the human consciousness. Moore called this a "moralistic fallacy" expressing what is, based only on what one believes ought to be, or what isn't based on what one believes ought not to be. Whether moralistic or naturalistic, Moore argued that "is doesn't imply ought" and vice versa.

Both Sellars and Taylor remind that "value" has an interpretive normative quality that requires rooting out its cultural as well as its universal characteristics. So too, "fact" ("facts") is burdened with interpretation. Many do not notice the normative aspect of facts; just accepting "facts" as products of the senses, of what is. But we know better for we are burdened today with so-called "fake news", slanted and inadequate reporting, and climate change deniers. Although many scientists agree that climate change is an existential reality, this idea or fact as been politicized and given a normative quality. Many skew "what is" with their own, personal, beliefs and assumptions. "Facts" bear the burden of interpretation and explanation as do values. Value has certainly wormed its way into our experiences making it difficult to wrench loose the connection between the two.

"What is" is more than what is perceived, heard, or reported. "What is" must be interpreted and understood implying the use of reason and critical thinking. Not to logically derive an "ought" from an "is" or an "is" from an "ought," we are presently weighed down by those who have made *sensation* terminal dismissing the normative and interpretive character of "is" as nonsense and making it difficult to distinguish between justified belief and opinion. This is a natural realism, even commonsense, but misses the importance of value claims. Critical realism, as Sellars noted, understands the *informative role* of sensations. Thus, when value is expressed we are involved in deciphering an external thing or an activity (behavior) to which we are responding as the thing or behavior feeds information into us. There is a good deal of selective and exploratory activity here. Facts too bear the weight of our selection – of means as well as ends – and the assignment of value.

Cognition is seldom terminal as experience teaches. Every thought moves, grows, and develops, fulfills a function, retraces itself, involves hunches, and often unexamined motives and values moving forward to solve a problem. This flow of thought occurs as an inner movement and must begin with an investigation of the different phases and planes a thought traverses before it is embodied in words. Listen to children as they begin to form their first words; watch their eyes, their gestures; listen to their brain struggling to make verbal connections with their physical and conceptual world. An analysis of thought is difficult for more often than not we are not clear where our thoughts originate and often assume their origin gives them credence. But the origin of an idea in no way constitutes its validation.

Pre-Rational Assumptions

This we understand: the pre-verbal and pre-rational assumptions we bring to the table of human discourse, to scientific investigations, to art or to the desire for learning, and to our ethical behavior for that matter are a snarl of cultural habits and presuppositions that are difficult to untangle. Suffice it to say, philosophy gives careful attention to "inference-making," but often left out of these examinations are the intuitive assumptions – presuppositions – that lie behind the antecedent (forerunner) of any theoretical formulation and the "causal" relationship(s) leading to its consequent. But what is assumed and unspoken often muddles this causal relationship. An example seems in order: The logical formulation "If P, then Q" (modus ponens) appears simple enough where "P" – the antecedent – is the logical cause (commonsense) for "Q" to occur. For example, *"If it rains Saturday (P), the ball game will be called off (Q)."* Although many focus on the result or conclusion of an inference, we should give our attention to the antecedent, the starting place which defines the *iffiness* of the inference itself.

Compound sentences of the form "If P, then Q" can perhaps best be understood as a promise. Truth for the whole compound sentence is decided on the basis of whether you think the promise is kept. Here P and Q are themselves sentences, each of which is true or false (but neither is both true and false). For the compound sentence to be true, both P and Q must be true. But, logically speaking, the compound can be true if P is false and Q is true, or if they are both false. Considering the *inferential* as promise-keeping, "P" could very well be a necessary condition for "Q" to have occurred, but given ulterior motives, motives that are unspoken and pre-logical in this sense, "P" may not be a sufficient condition for "Q" to have taken place. Thus, it's safe to say that the conditional "If P, then Q" is at best asserting a correlation not equivalence.

To accept this causal relationship at face value may be an item of commonsense, but real life doesn't always move in this way. Commonsense varies from culture to culture and from person to person revealing built-up pre-rational beliefs and habits. Thus we are often fooled by the decisions others make. There is an inherent limit to logic (reason) as reason can note facts and infer relations, but cannot create values or facts. Also, intrinsic motives are often left unstated, maybe assumed. *Values, like faith and belief are based on pre-rational choices and decisions that more often than not prejudice our inferences in some odd and many times unnoticed ways.*

The compound "If P, then Q" is in reality a projection into a future occurrence and this requires a bit of "faith"—in our above example, faith in the weather for one thing or faith in the decisions of both team coaches for another. Again the antecedal assumption is important for decision-making is seldom straight forward. This doesn't de-value the utility of reason or critical thinking, only puts us on notice that there is more "there" than our language reveals. Thus, an indecisive quality about inference-making emerges requiring future inductive evidence including the uncovering of motives yet to be revealed in the language of discourse: What if it didn't rain? If it did rain, was the field still playable or not? What if the coaches got together and decided to play rain or no rain? What if one coach thought his team had a better chance of winning in the rain and mush of a wet field? Clarification and explanation are required and this should engage, but often does not, the transparency of those involved. In life, course corrections are often required, among coaches and even among scientists relying on mathematical and technical calculations.

Hidden Connections

It's fair to ask, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for an inference to hold, to be counted as true? One must be careful here for we are referring to "pure reason" and in social discourse decisions are often made running counter to what an inference implies or even to the evidence that is presented; we often discover that reason isn't as pure as we once thought. In real life sometimes there is no perfect fit between the evidence found and the decision made.

There are hidden connections – connections and relationships that define who we are and how we respond to others. These hidden connections can be revealed by reason but reason doesn't create them. Our commitment to reason is itself a pre-rational commitment, a leap of affirmation pleading for consistency and contradiction avoiding. Thus, logical reasoning is never "pure reason" as mathematicians assume. Logic is a starting place, but secondary in our thinking, as the reality of pre-existing and often hidden assumptions motivate our behavior.

We learn from E.A. Burtt[8] that presuppositions are the given – the intuitively given – we present to reality that in turn modify reality and become reality itself. And we tend to shape our moral views, perhaps unaware of their cultural origins, by our own cultural genealogy. Presuppositions as culture are the "there" that is "there" but not-yet fully or intentionally realized or openly stated. We know about these presuppositions through the dialectic of discourse and argument, but ever so often they remain hidden and protected so as not to reveal their intended consequences. We witness this in American politics today as the hidden biases (values) moving immigration policies are usually left unarticulated and encapsulated in procedural reasoning and policy-making.

Our cultural assumptions have a motivational quality pushing us to discover the causal links that complete the theory our presuppositions (assumptions) entail. This dynamic relativity calls for discussion – the dialectic of conversation – for agreement and consistency to be sustained. So if it rains, a future conversation between coaches is assumed to take place. And if we are truly interested in world peace, transparency is required as the hidden motives of nations and nation-builders more often than not corrupt the peace process.

Social Hope

When we transfer this conversation to morals and ethics we will notice that the assumptions we bring to the table when answering the question "Why should I be moral?" often determine the answers we give. The theist brings his or her belief in God as law-giver and moral judge; the pragmatist, being oriented to science, recognizes that ethics lies outside of his or her method to procure and provides practical, social reasons for being ethical, the politician often brings the hidden desire for manipulation and control, and the psychologist, with some observations and a bag load of theories, assumes an innate moral compass although often explained sociologically and developmentally. This is the approach of Jonathan Haidt in his book *The Righteous Mind.*[9] But what is it that motivates either to pursue ethics in the first place remains hidden, lurking in the background of their beliefs and future hope. So, what is the "hope" that they hope for? From where does hope spring?

Noticing this uncertain quality, German philosopher Ernst Bloch[10] formulated what is called "the ontology of the not-yet" which is important to his idea of "social hope" and has significance for science and ethics as inference-making activities. Bloch's formulation reads, "P is not-yet Q" (strictly, "If P, then not-yet Q") and explains his commitment to avoid any possible closure to the dialectical interchange between individuals or groups of individuals. Bloch's "not-yet" encourages an unbiased vision of people and the discovery of better and more creative solutions to urgent social and moral problems.

Social hope implies a vision of *the not-yet* and cannot be contained in logical inference only or in un-exhumed assumptions and ideas. "Social hope" is an interconnecting value, connecting present facts with values and with interpretive force moving us to a moral vision of the future. The openness of hope is revealed in the vision it embraces and vision is forward-looking where hope, ethical or otherwise, is activated in the existential moment of decision-making. More often than not, hope is situation dependent and contingent, seeking not scientific validation but moral explanation and justification. It is within the murky waters of life as it is lived where hope finds meaning and musters the energy to move forward. Interpretation and explanation are paramount; value is implied.

Thus, logic and science are (or should be) open-ended as they are unable to completely close down the dialectic of exploration which is necessary for ethical decision-making. Both science and ethics are built-up from yet-to-be tested hypothesis – the not-yet – the beliefs, hunches, and commitments we bring to both: in the sciences from hypotheses that are yet-to-be tested (verified) empirically and in ethics from hypotheses that are yet-to-be assessed by one's experience in the social environment and what behaviors meet cultural expectations as to right and wrong behavior. Even in science one cannot discount the motivation of those offering a hypothesis or pet theory. More research and replication are always necessary to achieve objectivity (or correlation).

Thus, both ethics and science have an *iffy* quality about them with reference to that which has yet-to-be discovered and/or confirmed, the motives and unspoken values they entail, and, in ethics, to the decision or indecision of following a recognized ethical rule or intuitive ethical belief. Both involve interpretations of the real and recognized—the physical and the social nature of human living and the cultural expectations under which one lives. And although empiricism is the hallmark of science and scientific utilitarianism, what is unspoken and only assumed is as important as what is said and placed in theoretical discourse. And just as we cannot build a bridge from hope to certainty, we cannot build from logic a bridge from fact to value, from isness to oughtness. In ethics as in the physical sciences, dialectical communication is required as a method communication, discovery, correlation, and accommodation. As Marc Hauser[11] (p. 2) comments, "On the contrary, I argue that moral judgments are mediated by an unconscious process, a hidden moral grammar that evaluates the causes and consequences of our own and others' actions." Hauser says this shifts the burden of evidence (that we in fact have some sort of moral compass) "from a philosophy of morality to a science of morality." This is an assumption requiring our attention as it entails a search for the "hidden grammar" of moral discourse, the unspoken assumptions that drive our conclusions. This we should consider in both ethics and science.

Failed Arguments

Charles Taylor[12] concludes that morality is indeed concerned with what we ought to do. It is also concerned with what is "valuable in itself" and "what we should aspire to be" and "how we should aspire to live our lives," with what he refers to as a "different vision of the qualitatively higher." Ethical hope cannot be confined within a limited package of scientific assumptions.

Some utilitarians talk about "the greatest good for the greatest number," but only in terms of its utility value. For the utilitarian, happiness (sometimes the word "pleasure" is used but was dropped because of its intrinsic and ethereal quality) as a good can't be explained without reference to possessions and certain observed lifestyles. Happiness for utilitarians is not an intrinsic feeling or pleasure, for they deny that the intrinsic exists. We can ask, "What motivates this line of reasoning?" Existence cannot be confined to the sensory only and conveyed through the sterile language of the scientific method, a method replete with a-rational assumptions about which they don't speak. For utilitarians like Rorty, happiness as "the good" is only an expedient way of thinking and behaving but, for one thing, omits the utilitarian assumption (pre-rational presumption) that "happiness ought to be pursued." Looking more carefully at utilitarian theory, "happiness" and its "implied ought" are actually pre-rational assumptions, normative and not descriptive, and antecedent to their idea of social hope.

G. E. Moore[13], contradicting his earlier assertion that "good," as a value implied by a moral ought, cannot be defined by any other value, seems to concur with the utilitarians saying, "All moral laws, I wish to show, are merely statements that certain kinds of actions will have good effects. … What I wish first to point out is that 'right' does and can mean nothing but 'cause of a good result,' and is thus identical with 'useful': whence it follows that the end always will justify the means, and that no action which is not justified by its results can be right." What is left unexplained is "what is a good result?" How is "good" to be defined? "How would we know anyway?" And this is echoed by William James[14] who said, "The true, to put it briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as the right is only the expedient in the way of our behaving."

Here we are left in a values-confusion wondering about the place of values in a world of facts. Moore's "statements of a certain kind," and James' "expedient" are concepts weighted with pre-rational assumptions – unspoken presuppositions about the nature of good, right, and true. To be sure, "truth" finds its meaning in logic as a result of "pure reason," but "good" and "right" find their meaning in the unspoken genealogy of our cultural histories. Upon examination, we are caught in a language quagmire of metaphor swapping leading to a slippery slope of meaningless dialogue.

The result of such reductive thinking is, as Frederick Olafson[15] observes, "…to leave ethical thought in an isolated position and to raise in acute form questions about 'the place of value in a world of fact'." Michael Polanyi[16] believed this to be a state of "moral inversion" in which "a strongly moral form of motivation is paired with a failure to acknowledge the existence of a distinctively moral component in human personality and judgment." Polanyi believed to reduce humanity to a mechanical or purely physical interpretation was to lose what is humane and moral about people.

Naturally, most thinking people desire to be consistent in both thought and deed, to be logical. Logic is a practical discipline but look closer; often hidden in the grammar of logic are the patterns and values ensconced in our cultural genealogy, especially scientific verification. Here we should be reminded that ethics seeks justification not verification, justification in reasons immersed in the social environment and the hidden suppositions duly immersed within dialectical discussions where beliefs, values and conceptual disagreements occur.

Conclusion: Our Social Hope

Culture and the presuppositions and values it holds will always maintain a normative sway over our lives pushing us toward a unified, integrated, way of life, a life without deficiency, but this can be deceptive for as we are surely aware culture can often be discombobulated and divisive. Yet, there remains a social hope for ethical unity and for a universal moral human community. Admittedly, this hope is a pre-rational assumption driving ethics, both secular and theistic.

In ethics the meanings found in our culture are normatively important. These meanings are moral, material, social, political, faith-based, and intellectual pursuits spanning both fact and value. Meaning converges in both our words and actions, our beliefs and insights, and in our assumptions and implied conclusions. Thus meaning is found in the throes of the life that we live—our motives, beliefs, and the consequences of our behavior. Meaning, by its very nature, implies a cultural heritage which, in itself is an assessment of instrumental reasoning. Reasons are required in the throes of dialogical conversation to support our choice of values from the cultural mixture that is us. This never occurs automatically and absolutism, as found in many religious values, is not sufficient to convince. Absolutism is self-absorbed and reduces ethics or any hypothesis (theory) to an unchallenged dogma dangling hopelessly in the vacuum of belief. With an absence of dialogue, absolutism morphs into a narcissistic ethical relativity. Ethics and civility are cultural norms requiring our constant diligence and dialectical interaction.

And care must be taken for as Oswald Spengler[17] has noted, all cultures are organisms which eventually petrify and externalize themselves into civilizations which suggest a decline from the organic to the mechanical. This we find in utilitarian theory as its view of ethics and life reveal a sterile mechanical impulse, a utility value harnessed to natural impulses. The ideas and arguments of philosophers, theologians, educators, and scientists are embedded in a morass of unstated beliefs and assumptions. The clarity of their statements, the logic of their arguments, and the axiomatic assumptions guiding their theories provide only an illusion of objectivity as reason cannot create value, only recognize and evaluate the values we inherently and culturally hold.

Social hope is a metaphor implying the intrinsic nature of human commitment and motivation – the real hidden behind what appears to be, although impenetrable. And hope doesn't imply just wishing for something better to happen; it is not merely a future projection but implies an ethic that is to be internalized and activated in every moment of life as our present decisions are the antecedal properties of the hope we project. The values received from culture are to be taken as general principles and not laws of behavior and are not absolute and unchanging, but require interpretation and application in the concrete moment of everyday life. Daniel C. Dennett[18] has reminded that, human consciousness is a product in large part of cultural evolution, which installs many thinking tools in our brains, creating thereby a cognitive architecture unlike the 'bottom-up' minds of animals. Thus, our brains are empowered to be intelligent designers of artifacts and of our own lives. This observation supports Sellars' thesis that we continually *represent* experience through our beliefs and values the cultural heritage of which often lies hidden within the background of our antecedal assumptions influencing the objectivity we so often prize.

Understanding this, we can conclude that limiting moral explanation and evaluation to logical empiricist thinking is too simplistic forgetting that culture is fluid, not static, manipulating, persuading, and impacting our moral perspective. Culture is an internal-external social energy that moves and changes and in doing so, changes us as well. Life is flexible and unpredictable expressed as "the not-yet." Life is cannot be expressed in only physical or biological or theological terms. Values admit principles and convictions are not self-contained but are socially malleable. In the context of life they are and must be interpreted and applied. Also, each situation will vary. Reason is required but cannot produce the values to which we adhere. Reason's task is instrumental as utilitarians claim: to clarify, organize, give reasons for, explain, and maintain contextual consistency of the values to which we indeed adhere.

Joseph Fletcher[19] has remarked:

> We must realize, however, that pragmatism, as such, is no self-contained world view. It is method precisely. It is not a substantive faith, and properly represented it never pretends to be. Pragmatism of itself yields none of the norms we need to measure or verify the very success that pragmatism calls for! To be correct or right a thing – a thought or an action – must work. Yes. But work is to what end, for what purpose, to satisfy what standard or ideal or norm? Like any other method, pragmatism as such is utterly without any way of answering this question. Yet this is the decisive question.

Most of us claim to be rational, but care must be taken as Burtt reminds us, "Reason, in its power to apprehend deductive form and self-evident axioms, is a single faculty, and once it has found itself, it claims universal authority." This is often a conversation closer, but we know from the history of ethics that Kant's supposedly universal Categorical Imperative based on "pure reason" has opened more than 200 years of continuous discussion. Universalism is a claim difficult to maintain whether in politics or ethics as the discovery of new information testifies and our motivations to maintain a consistent ethical view intensifies. All moral rules, assumed to be absolute, bare this stain.

Often neglected in our theories and logical formulas is the passion and commitment we give to our views at the neglect of the views of others, especially in the light of new information or ideas, or the defects discovered in our own reasoning. Reasoning is seldom "pure," even reasoning that is pursued with logical precision. Pre-rational assumptions and unspoken convictions are the drivers of reason's course. Reason is more involved than just "means." Surely, as Sellars reminds, "We deliberate about ends and look at them in terms of value judgments." It is important to acknowledge the unswerving influence of our beliefs, commitments, and assumptions existing as hidden apparitions in the background of our rational discourse. Perhaps we only think about what is important to us and, as Hume suggests, maybe this is the way it ought to be. This is a fact, one that is difficult to dispute, one that continues to plague ethical decision making.

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Identity Change in Jhumpa Lahiri's Novel *The Lowland*

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Abstract:

The topic of identity is very prominent in Jhumpa Lahiri's novel *The Lowland* (2013), and different characters can be analysed in terms of it. One of the main characters is an Indian woman Gauri who becomes a widow and marries the brother of her former husband. When they move to America, Gauri starts discovering her new multiple (possible present and future) identities. Therefore, the article aims to discuss how Gauri's identity changes throughout the novel. The discussion is based on Identity Theory and its relevant concepts. It reveals how migration becomes an eye-opening experience and influences Gauri's identity.

Keywords: Jhumpa Lahiri, *The Lowland*, Identity Theory, multiple identities, identity salience, possible identity, future self, identity change

Introduction

Identity Theory is not a new theory, for its ideas primarily come from symbolic interactionism and the theory of perceptual control (Burke and Stets 2009, 18). However, the present article will not focus on these but rather on certain cornerstone concepts from the fields of sociology and socio-psychology which Identity Theory employs. According to Jan E. Stets and Peter J. Burke, well-known sociologists researching the topic of identity, "[w]hile identity theory has developed as a theory over the past 25 years, simultaneously, the theory has found application in a variety of [...] areas" (Stets and Burke 2014, 82). They mention such areas as crime, law, education and others. Even though literature is not included in the list, various concepts of the theory can be successfully used not only in discussions about real people and their behaviour but also in analyses of literary works and their characters. The topic of identity is very prominent in Jhumpa Lahiri's work in general as well as her novel *The Lowland* (2013). This is why different characters can be analysed in terms of it. In this article, the character of a woman called Gauri has been chosen with an aim to discuss and analyse her complicated identity that keeps changing throughout the novel, as she moves to live in different places. TK Pius has rightly noted that "all other characters in *The Lowland* follow a predictable path, [but] it is Gauri who comes across as the most complex, unpredictable character" (Pius 2014, 110). Joel Kuortti writes about "non-translation of identity in Lahiri's writing and touches upon the issue of hybrid identity not only in her work but also in the writer's life, as she has written about herself as having such an identity" (Kuortti 2007, 205). Lahiri (b. 1967), who is considered to be an American author of novels and short stories, has Indian roots and often writes about characters who move from India to other countries and various issues they face while migrating or growing up in families that are immigrants in America. It seems that the story about Gauri may have been influenced by Lahiri's life in the United States, Rhode Island and Boston in particular.

On Identity Theory

It is quite difficult to define the concept of identity, for identity formation is always in progress and one's identity keeps changing all the time. Lawrence Grossberg, for instance, claims that "[i]dentities are always relational and incomplete [...]. Identity is always temporary and unstable" (Grossberg 1996, 89). In addition, Rosemary Rich notes that "an individual has an active role in the construction of their own identity" (Rich 2014, 2). Therefore, one's identity depends on various choices the individual consciously or subconsciously makes. In fact, it is not possible to speak about one identity, since each individual has more than one, usually many. Burke and Stets provide the following example that helps to understand how one can have a number of identities in different contexts:

> One can be a teacher, a wife, a mother, a friend, [...] and so on. Each position has its own meanings and expectations that are internalized as what we would now call an identity [...]. Each of these multiple selves we now recognize as different identities. Each 'self,' as we use the term, is therefore, made up of the multiple identities a person has. (Burke and Stets 2009, 24)

Similarly to the concept of multiple identities by Burke and Stets, Grossberg refers to this phenomenon of having a number of identities as "multiplicity of identities" and focuses on identity fragmentation, for identities "are [...] always contradictory, made up out of partial fragments" (Grossberg 1996, 89-91). Therefore, sometimes the concept of hybrid identity comes into play, too, especially when different nationalities or ethnicities are involved. In short, the self can be seen as a jigsaw puzzle, since it has many pieces which are different identities that are put together. Unlike a puzzle image which is always the same when it is assembled, the self can be and often is different depending on the context, for identities that form the self are neither stable nor complete. Sometimes they co-exist, but at other times they contradict each other and identity change takes place.

It is important to emphasise that individuals need to feel comfortable about their multiple identities, so they seek approval of those identities by negotiating them with other people. Stets and Burke refer to this process as "identity verification" (Stets and Burke 2014, 62). Such verification is needed in relation to both present and future identities, but different identities may be negotiated with different individuals or groups of individuals. In other words, there are identities that individuals already have, but there are also others that they might see as possible to have in the near or distant future. According to Daphna Oyserman and Leah James, possible identities can be either positive or negative and might "differ with life phase, life transition, and life circumstance" (Oyserman and James 2011, 117). Moreover, "possible identities [...] provide a goal post for current action and an interpretative lens for making sense of experience and so should influence both well-being and motivation" (Oyserman and James 2011, 117). Here it becomes possible to use the concept of "future self," because it "is that part of the self-concept focused on the self one might become" (Oyserman and James 2011, 119). Nevertheless, the connection between the present and the future selves might be complicated, for "the future self may not feel connected to the present self" or "the future self can influence the current self" (but not necessarily does) (Oyserman and James 2011, 118). If the present and future identities are conflicting ones, it is a good idea to ask why and when (which includes context and circumstances) one or the other identity wins, especially when the future one does (Oyserman and James 2011, 119), since the winning identity becomes more important. This identity affects not only the individual who has it but also others around him or her.

An individual can have multiple identities, but Sabine Trepte argues that all identities "are not of the same importance at the same time" (Trepte 2006, 258). That is, some identities may be more important than others in all contexts or the importance of certain identities might differ depending on the context in which one is involved at a particular time. In the provided example by Burke and Stets above, one's identity as a mother might be more important in all contexts at all times while her identity as a teacher may seem not very prominent when she is at home, but it does not mean it is always so for an individual who is both a teacher and mother. In other words, some identities may be more dominant than others. Karina V. Korostelina notes that a "dominant identity replaces all other core social identities and becomes the most salient and actual identity prevailing in the system of social identities" (Korostelina 2007, 76). This kind of identity is often referred to as salient or the most salient identity. Stets and Burke define it as follows:

> The salience of an identity is the probability that a particular identity will be activated across a variety of situations and thus influence the role choices made by the person. Identities that are more salient are more likely to be enacted or activated across situations. (Stets and Burke 2014, 59)

Even though an individual may have more than one identity, these multiple identities are not activated at the same time. The most dominant or salient identity will have a higher chance of being activated in a variety of contexts, while not so salient identities might be active only in a particular context and may be changed by others, more salient ones.

As discussed, identities are not stable and continue changing. This "change occurs when the meanings in one's identity shift over time" (Stets and Burke 2014, 75). As a result, identity change may be observed during a long period of time rather than quickly. Usually "the less salient and committed identities may be more likely to change or to change more than identities that have higher salience or commitment" (Stets and Burke 2014, 77). The next part of the article will discuss how the identity of one character gradually changes in Jhumpa Lahiri's novel *The Lowland* (2013). Since identity change is a process, the way different identities gain or lose salience will be discussed almost chronologically in terms of the plot line of the novel.

Gauri's Changing Identity in Jhumpa Lahiri's Novel *The Lowland*

Having married Subhash, Gauri, an Indian woman who is one of the main characters in the novel, comes to live with him in the United States. She is twenty-three years old and five months pregnant at that time, so Subhash becomes both a husband and father. It is his idea to marry the widow of his brother Udayan, who has been killed by the police because of his involvement in one political movement about which Subhash does not want to know much. Subhash wishes to protect Gauri from both dangers related to his brother's activities and his own parents who have not treated Gauri well. To Gauri, meanwhile, this marriage is both "a means of staying connected to Udayan" (Lahiri 2013, 150), because the two brothers have similarities, and a way to start a new life in a place where no one knows anything about her, including her earlier marriage and her child's biological father, since everyone in America assumes the child is Subhash's. In fact, it seems that while living in India Gauri is presented as a rather passive character that neither makes decisions nor fights for her happiness, but in the United States she explores different possibilities and gradually takes her life into her own hands by choosing to become the person she wishes to be. The wish for change could have been caused by or related to the traumatic experience of losing her husband Udayan and the way her parents-in-law have treated her afterwards, since they never approved of this marriage. However, this article does not employ trauma studies and thus provides a different reading of the novel through Identity Theory.

According to Kuortti, "One of the more visible geographical contexts of diasporic Indian women's writing is the United States" and the "thematics revolve around cultural identity, cultural hybridity, and cultural conflict" where "the connection between India and the United States is of importance" (Kuortti 2007, 207). The issue of identity and Indian-American context are of primary importance in Lahiri's novel in question. Gauri's first impressions of America are full of surprise, and there are things she finds difficult to understand. For example, she finds it difficult to understand English. Even though she has studied English, in Subhash's car she can hardly understand the news on the radio. Moreover, she saw that food came from "icy packets from the freezer that slowly melted and revealed their contents during the course of the day" and nobody "offered to help, or seemed to care if they spent money or not" while shopping (Lahiri 2013, 153). Furthermore, once she goes shopping alone and buys cream cheese but thinks it is chocolate and eats it all (Lahiri 2013, 155). Despite numerous misunderstandings, she accepts her new environment as something that is better for her child and their future: "This was the place [Rhode Island] where she could put things behind her. Where her child would be born, ignorant and safe" (Lahiri 2013, 148). In other words, after their arrival in America Gauri sees herself mainly as a mother who tries to secure a happy future life to her child who is not born yet and is willing to adapt to the new circumstances.

At first Gauri spends her days at home, since Subhash is at work, but soon she starts visiting nearby places alone. She explores the campus and is amazed by the fact she can walk freely in the campus buildings, since no one stops her: "No armed soldiers sitting on sandbags, as they had for months outside the main building at Presidency" (Lahiri 2013, 155). She compares the campus in which she studied in Calcutta (at present referred to as Kolkata) in India and the one in Rhode Island in the following way: "she was [now] in a place where no one was afraid to walk about [...]. [...] At the top of the hill was the campus police station. But there were no curfews or lockdowns. Students came and went and did as they pleased" (Lahiri 2013, 148). Soon enough the campus becomes the place where Gauri feels comfortable. She becomes a non-official student when she finds the department of philosophy and goes to an undergraduate class to listen. She even takes notes in the margins of the newspaper she has, since she has no paper with her but rewrites everything carefully when she is at home. Gauri secretly attends classes twice a week and does the reading in the library using Subhash's card. This is the moment when Gauri's identity as a student starts gaining salience, for her academic activity engages her and helps her spend the time she has, since has no friends and the baby is not born.

In her classes and the campus in general Gauri sees many women who look very different from her, for she wears the clothes, such as saris, she has brought from India. It seems that she admires the looks of other women, and there comes a point when she wants to change her appearance to look like them or at least more American: "She began to want to look like the other women she noticed on the campus, like a woman Udayan had never seen" (Lahiri 2013, 159). Gauri does not consult anyone about her wishes to change. She probably does not plan to change on a particular day but makes this decision spontaneously. Once Subhash comes back home and finds Gauri's hair and all her saris and other clothes cut into pieces. Gauri is not there, but when she comes back and is asked why she has done that, she answers: "I was tired of it" (Lahiri 2013, 167). She does not ask Subhash or anyone else if they like her new appearance, which means she does not ask for anyone's approval of her changing identity. Since then Gauri has dressed like other American women of her age that surrounded her (tight clothes, accentuated breasts, etc.). In other words, since her arrival in America Gauri has acquired two identities – that of a non-official philosophy student and that of being less Indian but more American (at least in terms of hair and clothing). The latter identity is completely new, while the former one could be seen as an identity that she had in India, when she did her bachelor's degree in philosophy. This identity lost salience after her studies had been over and now has returned to take an important place in the scale of identity salience.

The reader might expect motherhood to change Gauri once again, since she will have to play yet another new role that at the beginning of her life in America she imagined and was ready to take. Gauri gives birth to a girl: "She was relieved that her hope had been fulfilled, and that a young version of Udayan had not come back to her" (Lahiri 2013, 170). However, despite her relief that her newborn is nothing like her deceased husband and it is not even a boy, Gauri does not like her identity as a mother:

> Though she cared for Bela [her daughter] capably, though she kept her clean and combed and fed, she seemed distracted. Rarely did Subhash see her smiling when she looked into Bela's face. [...] Instead, from the beginning, it was as if she'd reversed their roles, as if Bela were a relative's child and not their own. (Lahiri 2013, 188-189)

Gauri's mother had tuberculosis and could not take care of her children, so Gauri and her brother Manash (even though they had older sisters who were teenagers then) were sent from their village to the city to live with their grandparents, aunts and uncles. Later it made sense for them to stay there, since they needed to start school. Gauri's parents died in a car accident when she was sixteen, so she lived with her brother and two uncles with their wives and children then. Gauri liked living in the city, since "rural life held no appeal for her" (Lahiri 2013, 68). In addition, she "didn't think she resented her parents for not raising her. [...] Really, she appreciated them for letting her go her own way" (Lahiri 2013, 68). She grew up with her relatives rather than her own parents, and now she has her own child but behaves as if it is somebody else's. While writing about her other works, Lavina Dhingra notes that "Jhumpa Lahiri subverts stereotypical gender roles as she portrays her male and female characters' behaviour in unexpected and atypical ways" (Dhingra 2012, 147). Taking the background information into account, it is possible to assume that Gauri is portrayed as a character who does not know how a mother behaves, for she hardly remembers how her own mother did. Their connection was not strong either, and she felt neglected: "She had no memory of spending a moment, even in a house of such an isolated place, ever, alone with her mother or father" (Lahiri 2013, 72). This may have caused a trauma that she has repressed and has never been able to overcome. It may be the reason why losing her grandparents was worse than losing her parents: "It was a blow to lose them [parents] suddenly, but her grandparents' death more recently, had saddened her more" (Lahiri 2013, 68), for they were closer. At first she plans a bright future for her child, but being a mother does not become Gauri's salient identity, since raising Bela is "not bringing meaning to her life" (Lahiri 2013, 194). Although at that time Gauri does not have any other visible salient identity, it is evident that being a mother is not going to become one. It does become a relevant part of the self only years later.

Lahiri also pays attention to Gauri's sexual identity in the novel. Before meeting Udayan, Gauri did not feel attractive: "Around men she'd felt invisible. [...] She was a disappointment to herself, in this regard" (Lahiri 2013, 72). When they are married, this topic is almost not described. Udayan does not even learn before his death that he would be a father. When Gauri marries Subhash, the topic of sex is out of the question, for they are more like friends rather than a married couple. In the glove compartment of Subhash's car Gauri finds a hair tie, which probably belongs to a woman he was seeing some time ago, but Gauri assumes he is seeing someone and is not angry, just the opposite:

> She was relieved that she was not the only woman in his life. That she, too, was a replacement. [...] [S]he was thankful that he was capable of hiding something.
> It validated the step she'd taken, in marrying him. [...] It suggested that maybe she didn't have to love him, after all. (Lahiri 2013, 160-161)

Strangely enough, Gauri is happy Subhash has replaced her with somebody else, just like she has replaced Udayan with his brother. Yet, she does not know that Subhash takes this marriage seriously and is faithful to her, despite the fact that they are not close. Only later they discuss a possibility of sex, but Gauri wants to wait till her child is born. There comes a time when Gauri understands she can no longer avoid it and tells Subhash she is ready to have sex with him. That is, the relationship between Gauri and Subhash develops in a reverse order: they get married first and then become lovers. At first none of them seems to enjoy it, but later she starts directing his hand where and how she wants to be touched. Her sexuality is awakened, and she cannot be seen as a passive character anymore: "she learned that an act intended to express love could have nothing to do with it. That her heart and her body were different things" (Lahiri 2013, 192). Gauri even pays attention to one other man she sees sometimes on the campus. She could not have thought about anything like this before. At first she does not like him; later she feels attracted to him and starts preparing for possible encounters, but they never talk. She even follows him only to see him kissing another woman. Gauri feels disappointed but aroused at the same time, so she masturbates in the toilet on the campus. Moreover, many years later, when she lives in California, probably in Los Angeles, she explores her lesbian identity when she becomes involved with a woman called Lorna, a graduate student: "She has no recollection of crossing a line that drove her to desire a woman's body. With Lorna she found herself already on the other side of it" (Lahiri 2013, 284). In short, Gauri's sexual identity is not less complicated than her overall identity and keeps changing. If she had she stayed in Tollygunge in Calcutta (Kolkata), she would never have dared to experiment with it. In other words, the impact of migration on Gauri is that her identity is changing and encompassing more and more possible selves, since migration is an eye-opening experience for her, even though it does not seem to be at first. Being far away from her homeland sets her free and makes her think about her forgotten parts of the self and adopt the selves she has never even thought about. This is the reason why this experience may be seen as a sort of rebirth for her.

After some time since giving birth to Bela, Gauri starts studying. She attends a survey of German philosophy (a class at a university in Rhode Island), so she becomes a real student once again. She does her master's degree and in some years searches for possibilities to continue her studies in a doctoral programme. As she is admitted to one in Boston and later even teaches a philosophy class two times a week, she lives between Narragansett (Rhode Island) and Boston (Massachusetts). When she is away, she wants to leave Bela with somebody else to look after her, but Subhash adjusts his schedule in order to take care of Bela himself. To put it another way, Subhash appears to be more involved in the process of parenting than Gauri whenever she is in Narrangansett or Boston. According to Resmi Dutt-Ballerstadt, in her works of fiction "Lahiri, rather than concluding the fate of [...] 'housewives' and 'professor's wives' as incapable of adjusting to America and making their nomadic condition as a disability gives each of them particular functions to perform that portray the complex reality of migrancy for these well-educated migrant women" (2012, 171). Gauri is such a female character that that is well-educated. As previously discussed, Gauri has not seen herself in the role of a mother from the very beginning, but at least she has taken care of her daughter. It is likely that now she feels a need to make a choice between being a mother, which has never been the most salient identity of hers, and being an academic, which is something she might become in the future. Kuortti analyses Lahiri's short story "This Blessed House" and notices the following: "In the relationships, [...] there is [...] a reversal of the conventional gender roles: romance, care, beauty, and girlishness are given as male characteristics whereas curiosity, raucousness, carelessness, and assertiveness are seen as female qualities" (2007, 208). It is possible to claim that this is a recurrent theme in other works of fiction by Lahiri, too, and *The Lowland* is not an exception, as Gauri is the one who is portrayed as curious and assertive, not Subhash, even though he is portrayed as a well-educated man, too.

When Subhash's father dies, Subhash and Bela go to India without her. By the time Subhash and Bela come back to Rhode Island, Gauri is gone. She has moved to California to teach in a college without informing anyone, but she has been thinking about leaving for a long time, for this decision would affect not only her future self but also the future of Subhash and Bela: "She had wanted California to swallow her; she had wanted to disappear" (Lahiri 2013, 278). The future self is usually either "connected to [...] or [....] disconnected from the present self" (Oyserman and James 2011, 119). In Lahiri's novel, it seems that Gauri's future identity is very much disconnected from her identities of being a wife to Subhash and a mother to Bela. It is possible to see parallels between *The Lowland* and Lahiri's early works of fiction, such as *Interpreter of Maladies* which "outlines a strategy of diasporic as well as gendered resistance towards existing colonial and patriarchal hierarchies in the post-colony" (Kuortti 2007, 217). Gauri chooses a future identity of an academic for herself, and it becomes her most salient identity. Even though usually it is important for people to have their identities, especially the salient ones, verified by others, this does not happen in *The Lowland*. Since Gauri does not need her identity to be approved, she does not negotiate it with anyone. It might mean that she is presented as a strong female character who knows what she wants and constructs her own identity. In India, she used to be a good student and thought she could be a teacher (possible self) someday: "I could teach philosophy at a college or school" (Lahiri 2013, 69), she remarked once. Therefore, her pursuit for an academic career is not very unexpected. In addition, Gauri's grandfather was a college professor, so he "inspired her to study what she did" (Lahiri 2013, 69). While living in India different identities of hers, such as being a sister, girlfriend (later a wife to Udayan) and others, were probably more salient, and the possibility of studying further and becoming an academic in the future did not gain importance. Nevertheless, moving to America and living close to a university campus in Rhode Island changes this. In general, moving from place to place becomes not a necessity but a choice she makes and gets further and further away from the people she knows.

The reader might question the consequences of the choices Gauri makes, but the novel does not judge this character for her decisions. Pius even claims that "Lahiri [...] wants to enlist our sympathy for Gauri as a person of tragic emotional integrity" (Pius 2014, 112). However, it does not seem to be the case. On the contrary, having chosen to leave her husband and daughter she finds her happiness as an independent woman, even though it lasts only for some decades but not for the rest of her life. At the same time, this twist in the story helps Lahiri shift her focus to other characters of the novel. Only much later in the novel, when Gauri is around sixty years old, the author returns to Gauri's story, and the reader is probably not surprised to learn that she has achieved much as an academic: she has been very productive in terms of publishing books (three of them) and articles, and she is liked and respected by both colleagues and students: "Her colleagues welcomed her. Her students admired her, were loyal" (Lahiri 2013, 278). She has not always stayed in one place after leaving Rhode Island: "After her first job she'd moved briefly north, to teach in Santa Cruz, and then in San Francisco. But she had come back to Southern California to live out her life" (Lahiri 2013, 277). That is, "nomadism [...] runs through the veins of Lahiri's work" (Dutt-Ballerstadt 2012, 170) or at least through this novel. Despite various difficulties, Subhash and Bela learn to live without Gauri being present in their lives, while Gauri never looks back while she is searching for herself.

Gauri is a green-card holder considers the possibility of becoming an American: "For the sake of retirement, for the sake of simplifying the end of her life, she would need to become an American" (Lahiri 2013, 280). However, even if she became an American, "in spite of her Western clothes, her Western academic interests, [she would still be] a woman who spoke English with a foreign accent, whose physical appearance and complexion were unchangeable and against the backdrop of most of America, still unconventional" (Lahiri 2013, 281-282). Her wish to look American in terms of hair and clothes was satisfied a long time ago, but only decades later she understands that only she sees herself as more American and less Indian, not others. Others do not see her as an American woman, and she has not blended in all these years. Her passport says she is Indian, and she could change it to serve her in the future, but it does not mean she would become an American, even though she has lived in America longer than in India. To put it another way, Gauri has succeeded in achieving her aims in relation to her academic identity, but her Indian and American identities turn out to be contradictory and need to be negotiated. According to Daphine Munos, "Lahiri's work appears to be buried alive beneath the immovable stone of 'hybridity talk'," and many scholars have looked at her work either from the point of view of culture or ethnicity (2013, xiv-xx). This is the reason why Munos (2013, xx) focuses on the literary and the psychological instead when analysing Lahiri's works of fiction, whereas this article focuses on a broader sense of identity rather than only Gauri's ethnic identity which does not seem to become less complicated by the end of the novel.

Gauri should leave for a conference in London, but as soon as she lands there, she realizes she is not going to participate in it and will take another flight to visit India instead. This decision is probably made because of an identity crisis that Gauri undergoes, for her identity as an American is questionable and the identities of being a wife and a mother, which have not been salient at all for two decades, become important again. For instance, usually she says she has no children, but once, when she breaks her arm and takes a weekend off, she tells one couple at her hotel that she has a daughter and is still waiting for grandchildren. However, Gauri's identities as a wife and mother are not approved by others, since Subhash divorces her to marry someone else, while Bela considers Gauri to be dead to her. As a result, unlike her other identities, these identities must be negotiated, but it may be too late. Gauri comes back to Rhode Island only to learn Subhash is not at home and see Bela and her daughter Meghna, to whom Gauri is presented as a friend of her grandmother: "That makes her your great-aunt. I haven't seen her since your grandmother died" (Lahiri 2013, 372). In other words, Gauri is not allowed to be a grandmother now, since she stopped being Bela's mother years ago. This shakes Gauri's neatly built identity once again.

A trip to India might be a means to return to her roots and understand who Gauri really is, in other words, reconsider her identity. She visits the places in Calcutta (Kolkata) that have stayed in her memory all these years, but "[s]he was unprepared for the landscape to be so altered" (Lahiri 2013, 383). Her expectations are different from reality, since everything has changed and even the place where Udayan, her first husband, was arrested looks different. This trip does not make her feel better or help to understand herself, and Gauri even considers committing suicide: "She imagined swinging one leg, then the other. [...] It would take only a few seconds. Her time would end, it was as simple as that" (Lahiri 2013, 386). Nevertheless, she does not take action and returns to America, since answers to her identity questions can probably be found only there, as she needs to re-evaluate the importance of different identities she has or would like to have. She may even be given a chance to be a grandmother after all. Thus, the end of the novel gives hope for a happy future.

Conclusion

To sum up, in America, Gauri redefines her overall identity. While moving from city to city, country to country, which involves leaving her family, getting to know new people and preserving other values, she is changing. This change seems to be intentional and, as Gauri thinks, does not require any negotiation with others in relation to different identities that form her new self. Her most salient identity becomes the one of being an academic although she wishes to become more American and less Indian as well and thinks she succeeds at first. Only much later, when many years pass by and it is too late, since Subhash and Bela do not need Gauri anymore, Gauri would like to be in their lives, especially as a mother and grandmother, but these identities are not approved. In addition, even though Gauri visits Calcutta (Kolkata) for some days at the end of the novel, she does not re-embrace her Indian identity, for this return is only one more disappointment, which calls out the destructive part of the self rather than helps to understand herself, and at the same time understands she is less American than she has thought. Therefore, her identity now is in-between the two (American and Indian).

The ending of the novel provides hope that some of the identities that Gauri has given up on might have a possibility to return. This illustrates the very concept of identity well, for identity is never stable and keeps changing: some identities lose salience while some others gain salience, and there is always place for future identities that one might choose to pursue just like Gauri does in Lahiri's novel *The Lowland*. Gauri demonstrates a complex identity that she negotiates neither in the United States nor in India. It the end she realises that she will have to negotiate some parts of it in order to be happy, but on the other hand, she does not regret the decisions she has made.

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The American Hero Redeemed in Frances Khirallah Noble's *The New Belly Dancer of the Galaxy*

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Abstract:

The American hero made his literary debut as a rugged individual who exhibited courage, decency, common courtesy to others, but the antihero who lacked most basic values soon stole the stage. Although some consider Kahlil Gibran Hourani, the main character in Nobel's novel, an antihero, I argue that Kahlil, a Syrian American man who is abused by men who consider him a terrorist, suffers through the abuse perpetrated against him and emerges from his ordeal with his values intact. After escaping his captors, he embarks on a journey home to his wife, resigned to face her ire; however, during this journey, he finds the courage to stand up for the rights of others, as he does when he helps the illegal aliens being abused by their handler, and he is also still capable of treating other people with courtesy, as he does when he encounters the homeless woman in the Laundromat. Kahlil exhibits courage, empathy, simple human decency, the qualities that define a hero. He is the American hero, redeemed, no longer an antihero.

Keywords: Belly dancing, September 11, anti-hero.

Frances Khirallah Noble's *The New Belly Dancer of the Galaxy* recreates the traditional hero's journey home to his family and to self-awareness. However, because this is a post September 11 novel and because the main character is a fifty-three-year-old Syrian American man, the adventure is an appropriately adult story of seduction that very quickly culminates in betrayal. Perhaps because his wife refuses to believe that he sees the ghost of his grandmother, Kahlil Gibran Hourani feels so lonely that he follows the scent of a woman, Jane Plain, to Santa Vista, California, where Jane is competing in a belly-dancing contest. This trip to Santa Vista is his separation from what he knows as real. At the Palace of Arts where the contest takes place, Kahlil is captured by the man in the brown suit and the fire marshal, taken to a secluded place, and questioned as a terrorist. Being captured by violent men who abuse him tests his character. After he escapes from his captors, Kahlil undertakes a journey home that will further test his character, his sense of decency, and his humanity. Through his ordeal, Kahlil Gibran Hourani proves himself to be an introspective, sensitive man who values other people, a man made of the stuff heroes are made of.

The notion of the American hero has evolved from Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier man to an ordinary literary "every man" like Nick Carraway to bigger-than-life movie action heroes made popular by actors like Bruce Willis and Harrison Ford. Turner's statement that "to the frontier the

American intellect owes its striking characteristics" (9) celebrates the "coarseness and strength combined with acuteness and inquisitiveness" that characterized the American frontier man, but it values "that dominant individualism, working for good and for evil, and withal that buoyancy and exuberance which comes with freedom" (9) that is common to all American heroes, real or fictional ones. Using the qualities identified by Turner, Katie Pretzinger points out that the frontier hero "was an individual who undertook a mission and successfully mastered one or more aspects of an unsettled and often uncertain environment" (37). Pretzinger applies Turner's notion of the frontier hero to men like Charles Lindbergh and Edwin "Buzz" Aldrin, men who "successfully mastered" their own missions, but she also adds that, during their lives, Lindbergh and Aldrin exhibited courage, the one "basic qualification for the hero role" (39). The point in Pretzinger's essay is that men who master their missions and exhibit courage are in fact American heroes.

The hero in *The New Belly Dancer of the Galaxy* is an average man, an optician who finds himself caught in the nightmare created by men who hate him, take the law into their own hands, and are themselves defined as heroes by people who share their beliefs. The fire marshal and the man in the brown suit claim to be "keepers of the peace" (*Belly Dancer* 95), but they do not identify themselves as police officers or the FBI; they simply abduct Kahlil, interrogate him for being a terrorist, brutalize him, and threaten that they will "find everything we need to send you away for a long time" (116). Even though they do not appear to be connected to law enforcement, they act as if they are carrying on somebody's orders to detain and interrogate Kahlil. They disrespect him repeatedly by calling him the wrong name or by absurdly made up names like "Huron"; they also simply laugh when Kahlil complains that they cannot do what they are doing because, "I'm a citizen" who has "the right to express my opinions" (94). The man in the brown suit and the fire marshal are themselves ordinary heroes of the far right, a group encouraging "Americans to turn away from liberal misadventures and an emerging multi-cultural America and to embrace a Republican conservatism that privileged the white male, the cult of the individual, and the militarized nation-state" (Graebner 521). To them, Kahlil is the enemy whether he has committed a crime or not.

The man in the brown suit and the fire marshal are the heroes of their own stories. They firmly believe that Kahlil is the enemy, so that justifies taking the law into their own hands and brutalizing him in order to force him to admit that he is a terrorist. Unfortunately, these men are not alone in their fear of Kahlil and others like him, men who can claim their ancestry to Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, or any number of Middle-Eastern countries where the United States is involved in conflict. According to their logic, the man in the brown suit and the fire marshal are heroes because they position themselves as protectors of American values. Jeff House claims that "a culture creates heroes who embody the values it most honors," which is why he adds that for the hero in post World War II America "success isn't found through conformity with social values; it is found through personal integrity, by adherence to one's own morals" (70-71). The problem with this definition of heroism is that it defines both sides of the quarreling men in *The New Belly Dancer of the Galaxy*. When the man in the brown suit and the fire marshal "adhere to [their] own morals," they in fact break the law and abuse an innocent man. People who agree with their hateful philosophy, however, consider them heroes. Kahlil Gibran Hourani, guilty only of cheating on his wife, becomes the target of these men; his stand against them and escape from their clutches send him on a journey home to self-awareness, the classic journey of ancient literary heroes.

According to Joseph Campbell, the hero is "represented in the rites of the passage: separation-initiation-return" (30). American literature has produced heroes who follow Campbell's scheme for the rites of passage and anti-heroes who tend to break the rules; however, the anti-hero has been the most popular character in American literature since the modernist period, which explains why Carol Fadda-Conrey assumes that Kahlil is an antihero and dismisses *The New Belly Dancer of the Galaxy* by mentioning in a footnote in one of her articles that the novel is "an antiheroic tale of the middle-aged Syrian American Kahlil Gibran Hourani" (551). Simply defined, the antihero is someone who lacks basic heroic qualities like courage and morality associated with traditional heroes, but this does not define Kahlil. Shadi Neimneh, in "The Anti-Hero in Modernist Fiction," compares the antihero to the hollow men in T. S. Eliot's poem and adds that "the hollow men are spiritually and culturally lacking in the substance of traditional heroes" (76) like courage, selflessness, humility, moral values. Neimneh's excellent study focuses on characters from the modernist period. She points out that "modern anti-heroes are lacking in largeness, grace, power, and social success" (77) because the conditions of the time create them. She argues that "a fragmented society—torn by war, conflicting values, cultural crisis, and different aspects of modernity—produces its own heroic model: sick, anti-social, and introspective anti-heroes whose salvation is individualistic in the midst of social and cultural disarray" (78).

Neimneh rightly points out that characters who emerge in the early twentieth century are the product of their time because "Darwin, Freud, Nietzsche, and Marx dealt a heavy blow to man's belief in his dignity, innocence, and secure position" (76) in the world. Modernist writers who had read the work of these thinkers were influenced by their ideas and by what was happening around them. Thus, "the anti-hero became the expected presence in many modernist novels" because "a changing society with a changing cultural climate necessitated a change in the models of heroism" (76). According to Neimneh, a character like Jake Barnes "is the emasculated, anti-heroic narrator" of *The Sun Also Rises* because he is "a product of violent modernity," and the novel's "anti-heroism is symbolically generalized within a moral wasteland of war damage, empty relations, drunkenness, and promiscuity" (82). Jake Barnes is a product of his time. He is a broken man who can only be an anti-hero.

Interestingly, Neimneh goes on to argue that the anti-hero can redeem himself when he exhibits qualities such as empathy and common courtesy. She redefines the anti-hero when she looks at Joyce's Leopold Bloom and posits that, in *Ulysses*, Joyce "explores how we can find the potential for modern heroism in the very anti-heroic" and adds that Leopold Bloom "is not entirely devoid of heroism," but "his heroism stems from the internal effort of his mind to endure betrayal, reconcile his life conflicts and demands, and impose order on the chaotic flux of modern experience" (80). Although the novels in which Leopold Bloom and Jake Barnes appear were published within four years of each other and *Ulysses* was published first in 1922, Neimneh can see a potential for something other than anti-heroic hedonism in Leopold Bloom's character. For Neimneh, Bloom's "heroism is being a sensitive human and a pacifist in a dehumanized, violent age" (80), which suggests that Neimneh is rewriting what it means to be heroic.

Neimneh uses Bloom's apparent lack of heroism, one of the qualities previously used to define the anti-hero, in order to see the hero differently. She suggests that the modern hero can undergo the same pattern internally "or without the grandeur associated with myth" in order to be considered a hero. For this redefined hero,

> The journey without becomes a journey within the mind or within mundane surroundings; the initiation becomes a lesson he learns about his limitations and weaknesses, and the return journey can be a survival in a chaotic world reinvigorated by the ability to adapt to changing circumstances. (78-79)

The point made by this revision of the anti-hero is that "the modernist anti-hero can transcend the ironic to effect some sort of regeneration or salvation" because "in a dehumanized machine age, humanity and honesty, or what remains thereof, can redeem" (78). The new hero does not require the supernatural qualities of a mythological hero. He can simply be the best kind of human that he can be.

The redemption of the American hero is written large in *The New Belly Dancer of the Galaxy*, a post September 11 novel in which Kahlil Gibran Hourani, an American of Syrian ancestry, is both tempted and tested, lured away from home, and made to suffer before he can embark on a dangerous journey home during which he will prove his courage and decency. At the beginning of the novel, Kahlil does not notice that, "in the weeks, months, and years after 9/11, hate crimes, workplace discrimination, bias incidents, and airline discrimination targeting Arab and Muslim Americans increased exponentially" ("Arabs and Muslims in the Media" 161). Evelyn Alsultany points out that, "according to the FBI, hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims multiplied by 1,600 percent from 2000 to 2001" (161). Kahlil, however, appears to be unconcerned about the anti-Arab fervor raging across his country after the September 11 attacks. His ignorance of the historical moment in which he is living is very disturbing and reminds the reader of Adrienne Rich's call to "Catch if you can your country's moment" ("An Atlas" 12), a call that Kahlil fails to heed.

Kahlil's lack of concern with the anti-Arab feeling in his country may be an allusion to his innocence and reminiscent of R. W. B. Lewis's claim in 1955 that the American hero was "a new kind of hero, the heroic embodiment of a new set of ideal human attributes" (5) closely resembling Adamic innocence, something which is hardly possible in contemporary America, but is in fact the reason for Kahlil's "fall." He does drive off to Santa Vista, California, chasing a woman, which is what the bite of that original apple in the Garden of Eden was about. Lewis posits in *The American Adam* that because America was "new" "unlike the Roman myth, too—which envisaged life within a long, dense corridor of meaningful history—the American myth saw life and history as just beginning. It described the world as starting up again under fresh initiative, in a divinely granted second chance for the human race "(5). Lewis's argument that American writers were not "burdened" by the European history that they had left behind allows him to claim that American writers create a brand new man in the new world garden, a man "emancipated from history, happily bereft of ancestry, untouched and undefiled by the usual inheritances of family and race" (5), a statement that contemporary writers appear to be challenging when they create characters who cannot be "emancipated from history."

Lewis' version of Adamic innocence is not available to contemporary American writers or the heroes whom they create because, as Adrienne Rich reminds us, "history is made of people like us, carriers of the behavior and assumptions of a given time and place" ("Resisting Amnesia" 144). Kahlil cannot be "emancipated from history" because the historical fervor happening after the September 11 attacks forces him to come in contact with people who hate him and consider him guilty of a crime that he did not commit. They punish him simply because he is an Arab, which is what the statement about the "inheritance of family and race" refers to. Kahlil's Arab ancestry marks him as dangerous at the post September 11 historical moment, so his innocence does not matter to the men who abduct him. He is at that moment "bereft of ancestry" only because his *Situe*, his connection to his family history and his favorite family member, has died, but he does identify as Syrian, and he will demonstrate throughout the novel his preference for Syrian food and culture. What he does not understand when the novel opens is that his Syrian ancestry has suddenly become a problem for other people.

At the beginning of the novel, Kahlil does not appear to fear that people can harm him simply because he is Syrian, but he is very aware of how he looks to other people. When he goes looking for Jane Plain's apartment so that he can deliver her glasses, he introduces himself to the manager of the complex, a white man who immediately asks him, "'What the hell kind of name is that?'" Kahlil assumes that the manager is asking about Jane Plain's name. He answers, "'Good question. One wonders what her parents had in mind'" (*Belly Dancer* 16), but the manager very quickly corrects him, "'No, yours.'" Kahlil is so comfortable as an American that he does not realize that people will judge him because of his ancestry. His inability to judge the motives of others becomes clear when he explains to the man who questions his ethnicity that "'my mother named me after our most famous poet,'" but "when the man looked emptily at him," he explains that the poet was "'Kahlil Gibran, the famous Lebanese American poet'" (17). What the white manager hears in this explanation is that the man standing in front of him has just admitted to being Lebanese.

The manager of the apartment complex knows nothing about poets or how long this particular Lebanese has lived in America, but in his mind Lebanon is associated with Arabs and he could not have missed news reports arguing that Arabs were enemies of the state. Being named after a Lebanese poet makes Kahlil guilty by association; he becomes the dangerous Other who is somehow trespassing on the white man's turf. This man's almost immediate reaction is, "'for all I know you could be a terrorist,'" to which Kahlil responds, "'I'm not a terrorist. I'm an optician'" (17), but the man has already tagged Kahlil as a terrorist simply because of the way he looks. Interestingly, Kahlil elicits positive responses from his women customers who tell him that he "reminds [them] of Omar Sharif" or that "he looks like Rossano Brazzi" (5), attractive, foreign-looking men who were usually cast as lovers in Hollywood movies.

Writing about how the perception of Arab Americans radically changes in the United States after September 11, Carol Fadda-Conrey explains that "the post-9/11 backlash against Arabs and Muslims in the US ultimately erases internal differences within the Arab American community, depicting all Arabs in the US (whether they are recent immigrants, second-, third-, or forth-generation Arab Americans, residents, or students and regardless of their varying political and religious beliefs) as the enemy or at least as a potential enemy" ("Arab American Citizenship" 541). Kahlil is Syrian American, a Christian, and his family has been in the United States since the 1920s when his grandfather arrived. Philip M. Kayal points out that "nearly ninety percent of all Arabic-speaking immigrants arriving [in the United States] before 1924 were Syrian Christians from Mount Lebanon who were either Roman Catholics of Eastern rite or Syrian (Eastern) Orthodox. They were not 'Arabs' in the popular sense of the word. Nor were they Turks or Assyrians classified by the Immigration Department. Rather they were Semitic Christians who were Arab only in culture" (409-410). The man who questions Kahlil's loyalty to the United States by calling him a terrorist does not know the history of Syrian immigration to the United States. He wants to see difference as dangerous, so Kahlil's connection with a Lebanese poet, even if it is in name only, automatically brands him as a terrorist.

What Kahlil does not understand at the beginning of the novel is that the world has changed. As Georgiana Banita points out, "after September 11, Arab Americans have fallen one step behind other social outsiders, being branded not only as second-rate citizens but also as social hazards" ("Race, Risk, and Fiction" 246). Kahlil is still the same man whom he has always been, but other people now see him differently. When he continues to look for Jane Plain's apartment, Kahlil finds himself "moving quickly through the courtyard with his flashlight on." He is looking for an address through the complex but he is also trying to look inconspicuous, "removing, he hoped, any potential fears that he was a prowler or burglar" (*Belly Dancer* 17). At this point, before he is abducted, brutalized, and questioned by the man in the brown suit and the fire marshal, he simply tries to avoid bringing suspicion to himself, but by the end of the novel, as he makes his journey home in a train car, Kahlil realizes that "he was not merely an illegal passenger, trespasser, hobo—which seemed bad enough—but an *Arabic* illegal passenger, trespasser, hobo" (243). He learns to question his own right to exist, to move freely in a country he had until then considered his own. He tells himself that, "when he got home and had time to reflect, he'd have to rethink his mixture: how many parts Arab, how many parts husband; how many parts father; how many parts optician, church member, voter (not down party lines, usually). Man?" (243). By the end of the novel, Kahlil has been brutally forced to question his place in America.

Kahlil Gibran Hourani begins the story as a businessman, a respectable member of the Hashanian Mutual Aid Society whose members gather in the parish hall of Saints Peter and Paul

Syrian Orthodox Church. This society, however, is barely surviving. At 53 years of age, Khalil is the youngest member in a group of thirteen, and he understands "only a little Arabic" (4), which suggests that his connection to his Syrian past is weak because, as Mohammed Albalawi points out, "Arabs are an ethnic group whose defining characteristic is the language" (201). Unfortunately, "the Arabic language, for the most part, was not passed down from immigrants to children" (149) according to Steven Salaita. Khalil looks Arab enough to be questioned by the manager or targeted by men who hate him, but he neither speaks Arabic nor knows much about his ancestral history. However, after September 11, his racial difference makes him a target, which is why his journey home becomes so significant as it allows him to define himself as an Arab in America, but an Arab who does not give in to hate and retains his values, even as he is brutalized. Kahlil survives his ordeal as a hero, a decent, courageous man who continues to help other people even at his own risk.

In order to ponder the possibility that Kahlil could be an American hero, the author burdens him with impotence, Jake Barnes' problem. The novel opens with Kahlil's admission that he may have fallen sleep on his wife the night before as they were making love. He admits that "he wanted to please her" and "he tried," but "it was no use," so his wife "sent him to the doctor" (1) to discuss his problem. Instead of feeling like a lover, Kahlil feels "like a man with the weight of the world on his shoulders" (4) and, as he tells his psychiatrist about his conversation with his dead grandmother, as "a man without direction crippled in my search for truth" (4). He tells the psychiatrist that "he would have prayed, but he wasn't sure God would approve of what he was asking. Not that he was sure he believed in God anymore." At the ripe old age of 53, Kahlil is approaching "despair" (4). He may not know that people hate him for who he is, but he is painfully aware that the world is in trouble and he is burdened by it. Thus it makes sense that, at Kahlil's lowest point, a woman who claims to be named Jane Plain should enter his store and speak the words, "You're open?" (5), suggesting that perhaps Kahlil is not only open for business but also open to other possibilities.

Even before he learns her name, Kahlil is drawn to Jane. He follows her around the store "in his practiced professional manner—directly behind, just enough distance between them—ready to assist, to accommodate, to guide" and "close enough to notice her tantalizing scent," which "seemed to fill up the room. Pungent. Musky. Distracting" (6). He is so intoxicated by her scent that, even when she sits directly in front of him so that he could "finalize his measurements" and they "could feel each other's breath" (7), he still does not notice that he is in the presence of a temptress, a woman who will lure him away from his home. She tells him that her name is Jane Plain, and she is "a dancer, an actress. Lots of things" (7). When she orders her glasses, he is so taken with her that "he resolutely refused identification when she paid with an out-of-town check" (8) and thereby risked losing money on his most valuable merchandise, something that he would never have done before.

Kahlil's folly in trusting Jane Plain marks the beginning of a journey that will teach him a few things about himself. Her presence in his shop draws him out and makes him behave unlike himself. When Jane Plain's glasses arrive at the shop, he calls her and leaves her several messages to come pick them up, but she does not answer. This once again leads him to behave recklessly as he sees "the box containing her glasses [sink], like lead, into the top of the display counter," and he claims that "their weight was tipping the store" (14). The fact that Jane Plain neither answers his messages nor comes to pick up the glasses could be part of her plan to lure him to her. Kahlil's need to see her again leads him to imagine that the four pairs of glasses weight so heavily on the counter that "soon the floor would be at a steep angle and all the cabinets and fixtures and inventory, the velvet stool, and the one potted plant, would slide to one side of the room, pile up, break, spill" (14). Something magical, the weight of her glasses sitting on a counter, forces him out of his comfort zone and into the outside world where he will soon be tested. Kahlil's attempt to find Jane Plain begins his journey and culminates with his encounter with the manager of the apartment complex and a very hard and painful fall.

Pursuing Jane Plain leads Kahlil to a great fall, both literally and figuratively. When he reaches her apartment complex, he finds himself tracking "her by the scent of her special perfume," and "just when he thought he sensed a whiff of it, just when he breathed deeply to inhale more, the toe of his left shoe caught in a hole in a stretch of green indoor/outdoor carpeting." Tripping on a carpet causes "a swift, hard fall," a literal "fall that conspired with the force of gravity to inflict as much dull, deep pain as possible" (18). When he hits the ground hard, Kahlil suffers in silence, but he does not change his mind; instead, he alters his narrative in order to "recast himself in his own mind as one of the Knights of the Roundtable: injured, but undeterred. Or as Odysseus, overcoming obstacles in pursuit of his quest" (18). Instead of assuming that perhaps his attempt to find Jane Plain was a little too dangerous, that the fall was a sign that he should go home to his wife, and that his encounter with the racist manager was too clear a sign of what he could expect from others like him, Kahlil returns home even more determined to find Jane Plain and casts himself in the role of a knight in search of his maiden.

Kahlil's pursuit of Jane Plain also causes a figurative fall. Until he goes off in search of Jane Plain, Kahlil has been loyal to his wife, a fact that he admits to the men who question him when he says, "until Jane I was completely faithful" (140). He does not even know how to lie to his wife and sweats profusely when he lies at the airport. After many years of marriage and the birth of two children who are now grown, Kahlil and Sophie are not as invested in their marriage as they once had been because, "in spite of reasonably good intentions, Kali and Sophie had worn each other down to about the same degree" (32). Apparently, his "immersion in unsolvable cosmic problems" pits him against her "focus on inner pains partly induced by her failure to capture her husband's attention" (32), so they do not enjoy a very good relationship, but neither one has strayed. The fact that he falls asleep when they are making love suggests that he is bored, not impotent, which is the problem associated with an anti-hero like Jake Barnes. Kahlil is not a broken man; he is simply a man so distracted by the unsolvable problems of the world that he does not know how to deal with his immediate reality, like his wife. His figurative fall comes when he blatantly lies to Sophie in order to pursue Jane Plain and thereby damages the sense of values by which he has lived up to that point.

In order to pursue Jane Plain, Kahlil tells Sophie that he is going to a conference in Cincinnati. Sophie insists "on driving him to the airport" (35), which complicates his plan for a quick get away because, at the airport, she also insists on waiting until he boards the plane and, worse, helping him to carry his luggage. He had planned to rent a car to drive out to Santa Vista, but having lied to Sophie he actually has to go to the airport and act as if he were going to board. Already nervous about lying to his wife and about having seen his dead grandmother appear near by, Kahlil explodes when Sophie "reached for the briefcase a second time." He says no "in a voice so loud it carried over the commotion of the check-in line to the X-ray machine" (37), which of course means that he gets noticed by the people around him. Immediately, the not-so-innocent loud statement of a man lying to his wife takes on a darker meaning as "the security guard took note of the anxious expression on a man's red and perspiring face, the man's excessive hold on a briefcase, and the agitation of the woman who accompanied him" (37). Lying to Sophie about the reason for his trip exposes Kahlil to the scrutiny of others.

Kahlil's "agitation" makes him a target because men like him are no longer allowed to display their private emotions in public in the new American landscape. As King Hainsworth points out, after September 11, "many Arab Americans" had to contend with "a loss of personal safety" (201), so a display of emotions at the airport is hardly a good idea. After Sophie finally leaves, Kahlil attempts to rent a car and tells Ruchelle, the trainee behind the counter, that "saving money just doesn't matter." He wants "to rent a car as quickly as possible" (*Belly Dancer* 38) and then commits the colossal blunder of telling the truth when she asks about the purpose of his trip. He tells her that he is going to a "belly dancing contest" (39), information that she uses when she reports him as a "suspicious person" (40) because, according to her, "he'd convicted himself." She provides as evidence of his conviction

> that name; the name of his business; the way he brushed off every good point she made in her sales pitch; the way he got impatient when she asked him a question; saying he didn't know where he'd be staying. But the clincher, the most important evidence against him, was that MONEY WAS NO OBJECT. (40)

Everything Kahlil says in response to the trainee's questions marks him as suspicious, and she even adds at the end of her report that "he says he's going belly dancing, but he didn't look like a belly dancer to me" (40). A relatively foolish young woman passes judgment on this man and, thereby, complicates his life forever.

At the Palace of Fine Arts where the belly-dancing contest takes place, Kahlil is confronted with a knowledge that comes to him instinctively, essentially. As he observes the dancers, he asks himself, "Who were these women? Why were they doing this?" (54). From what he can see, the dancers on stage "didn't look like the dancers he remembered. These moved in fits and starts and, heavy or thin, looked angled and pointy and sharp" (54). One of the women on stage is Jane Plain, who tells him when she comes up to him, "'I'm trying to look authentic'" and follows up with "people have certain visual expectations for a belly dancer'" (54). Kahlil answers, "'how true'" (55), but he has already proven that he also has visual expectations because, when he sees the women belly dancing, he thinks they are not very good at it; however, he recognizes the teacher as someone "from the old days." Kahlil remembers details about his past when he sees the dancers. He notices that the teacher "did anything she wanted to up there. She had authority. And no desire to please. She teased her students, danced past the steps they knew. In curves they couldn't follow" (54). As far as Kahlil is concerned, the teacher is the real belly dancer, but he does not tell Jane Plain what he is thinking. He has driven across California to spend time with her, so he knows better than to start their time together with an argument about how authentic a belly dancer she really is because this would accentuate the differences in their cultures.

After breaking the law by parking in a no parking zone, getting a ticket from a policeman, and obviously getting noticed once again, Kahlil finally gets to take Jane Plain back to the hotel with him. When she exits the Palace of Fine Arts and sees him waiting in the no parking zone, she simply "opened the back door of the car and tossed in her bag and carefully hung up some plastic-covered clothes on the hook by the window. Then [she] got into the front seat next to him and asked, 'where are we staying?'" (56) as if this had been the plan all along. Jane exhibits no coyness, no subterfuge, no pretense. She sees him in the car and assumes that he has come for her. As she sits next to him, he "recognizes" her almost for the first time because "the car filled with the smell of ginger and citrus and sweat" (56), the very scent that drew him out of his home and into danger; however, the fact that she gets in the car without asking makes him wonder who this woman is. Even though Kahlil likes the intimate connection that he makes with Jane Plain, he asks her what she would have done if he had not come along, "how would [your life] had unfolded if I hadn't come along yesterday? Where would you have stayed?" Her absurd answer is, "Is my Kali jealous?" (60), which does not answer the question. Kahlil wants to know how she could come to another city far from her home without having rented a room for the night or even having the money to rent a room. He thinks that she does not make plans, but the reader begins to suspect that perhaps Jane's plan includes luring Kahlil to Santa Vista. It is also entirely possible that Kahlil asks Jane what she would have done without him because he wants this woman to validate him, to make some statement of appreciation for him.

During their two days together, Kahlil learns very little about Jane, but the one thing that stands out is that she eats well. After they spend their first night together, Kahlil orders breakfast, and she eats so much that he makes a mental note that "he had never seen a woman eat so much: pancakes, bacon, eggs, toast, hashed browns, orange juice, coffee" which "she bit and chewed in ceaseless motion" (61). She eats before and after a performance, and this makes it look suspicious when, the night of the performance, she refuses to eat. When he offers her food, she tells him, "not before a performance" (75), but it later becomes clear to the reader that Jane refuses to eat from the plate that he offers her because she knows that the food has been lazed with something that will soon incapacitate him. As soon as she refuses the food, "the man in the brown suit walked around the buffet tables, loading his plate" (75), although he is never seen eating. Shortly thereafter, when the performance begins, "Kali appeared to pass out." This is when "the man in the brown suit grabbed Kali's arm, and the fire marshal moved quickly to assist. Together they pulled Kali out of the row and out of the room to the elevator" (76). The food that Jane Plain refuses weakens Kahlil to such an extent that he cannot protest or defend himself from being dragged into the worst experience of his life. The men put him "into the back of a dark sedan" (76), a fact that will later become significant when Kahlil escapes from his captors and the men use the dark sedan to chase him. This is the same "brown sedan that had been trailing him since he turned the key in the ignition and left the airport" (42), but Kahlil does not know this.

The man in the brown suit and the fire marshal take Kahlil to "'the basement of an abandoned building'" located "'about fifteen miles north'" (91) of Santa Vista, according to Kahlil's grandmother's ghost who has been carefully monitoring everything from the safety of her invisibility. When he asks her, "'who are these people,'" her wise response is "'the cast varies, but the script remains the same'" because, according to her, "'it's the same everywhere, only the uniforms change'"(92). When they interrogate him, "Kali felt the proportion of fear to courage shifting slightly. More courage. Less fear" (93). Even though he tells them his name, they mock him and call him "Mr. Huron" (93), "Harary" (106), "Harmouni" (119), anything but his name until they start calling him Kali. Kahlil "wondered what they thought they were accomplishing by it" (117). They threaten his family when they tell him, "'We know what Philip is, don't we?'" (123), suggesting that Philip, his son, is gay, but Kahlil's answer is, "'I don't care. I never cared.'" However, to scare him, they add that "'Philip's motorcycle is vulnerable to blowouts'" (123), indicating that they could hurt his son.

Kahlil tries to protect his family, but he does not react the way that the two men expect him to react. He is not afraid of them, and at one point he attacks the man in the brown suit; the next day when the questions begin again, the man's "lips were split top to bottom in several places; there were handprints around his neck" (116). Even though Kahlil realizes that they could kill him, "in spite of this grim possibility, however, Kali stood his ground. He no longer dreaded what might happen, because it seemed to have happened. He had confronted a real calamity, an unavoidably immediate and personal event, and made it through" (117). Kahlil confronts the violence perpetrated by his captors with courage and dignity. He not only defends himself against their abuse but he also refuses to side with them in their hatred of his son's possible homosexuality.

That he fights back against the man in the brown suit and the fire marshal demonstrates Kahlil's courage. The fact that at no point during his ordeal does he ever claim to be the "right" kind of Arab demonstrates that Kahlil is a man of honor. Carol Fadda-Conrey points out in "Arab American Citizenship in Crisis" that "according to the binary logic shaped by post-9/11's 'citizen-patriot' dictum, the good Arabs are those who successfully and consistently distance themselves politically, religiously, and often even physically from the bad Arabs, or those bodies both in the Arab world and in the US purportedly bearing the neo-Orientalist designations of fundamentalism, terrorism, and cultural stagnation" (536). Kahlil does not attempt to paint himself as a "good Arab" in order to escape his ordeal. Instead, he questions his captors, reminds them "'I'm an American citizen! I was born here'" (*Belly Dancer* 79), and remains true to his story, which is the truth. He never denies his ancestry or argues that he is Christian instead of Muslim. He does not give his captors what they want from him, an admission that he is not "one of them."

Through the beatings and the interrogations, Kahlil's story remains the same. He tells them about his attempt to deliver Jane Plain's glasses and finding a note on her door telling him where to go; then, he states, "'I honestly don't now [sick] how she knew I was coming, do you?'" One of the men quickly answers, "'Of course not. How would we know?"" (110), but his quick answer and his sense of outrage leave the reader wondering about the connection between these men and Jane Plain. When the fire marshal asks Kahlil, "'You expect us to believe that you weren't going down there to get a whiff of Jane again? To inhale those perfumed oils she wears?'" the man in the brown suit inadvertently adds, "'Citrus and ginger' [. . .] 'She mixes it herself'" (109). When he hears this, "Kali winced" (110) because he hears what he does not want to hear, that Jane Plain is either connected to this man or that she has already taken up with another man. Either way, Kahlil now has a clearer picture of the woman whose scent lured him to Santa Vista. Eventually, the men change tactics and bring in two "prisoners," Orville and Shadrack, a swindler and a rapist, to get "the truth" out of Kahlil. Orville tells him that their presence in that room is his fault because he and Shadrack "were, conducting our business at the Empire Motor Hotel [. . .] and we got scooped up in your net" (130). Orville wants Kahlil to believe that police officers went to the motel to investigate his disappearance but, when they could not find him, arrested him and Shadrack.

The assumption is that, if Kahlil feels responsible for Orville's and Shadrack's arrest, he may be willing to talk. Orville tells Kahlil a few things about himself and then encourages him to "relate everything in detail. From the beginning. Leaving out nothing," but he makes the mistake of adding too much information when he says, "starting with when Jane Plain brought in her three prescriptions and ordered four pairs of glasses" (133), information that Kahlil had not given him or his other interrogators. Kahlil asks him, "'How did you know she had three prescriptions?'" (134), but he now knows that the presence of these two men in his cell is part of the plot to get him to "talk" and somehow implicate him in a terrorist conspiracy. Orville commiserates with him when he tells him, "'terrorists are getting even poorer treatment these days than we are.'" Kahlil once again states, "'I'm not a terrorist'" (127), but he knows that he is wasting his time because "the truth had done [him] no good whatsoever since his abduction" (136). The men who abduct him are not interested in the truth.

Eventually, Kahlil decides to speak because he realizes that "this may be his last—and only—opportunity to make a complete record of all the things he wanted to say." He believes that "he was probably going to be killed before this was all over," so he resolves that, "if it turned out he was going to die here, he'd die having said it all" (137). Interestingly, he believes that "he'd lost the power of speech" because "his struggle to see and understand the collision of personal decision with the forces of history had shut him down" (138), but when he speaks he simply relates his personal history. He tells Orville and Shadrack about Jane, about following her to Santa Vista and spending the night with her in the motel. He admits that, "'until Jane I was completely faithful'" (140), but Orville is not interested in the details of Kahlil's life. He wants to hear about his "'Arab brethren'" (140) who "'embrace the jihad'" (141). Kahlil responds, "'I don't divide the world into Arab and non-Arab or Muslim and non-Muslim. I don't think in those terms,'" to which Orville replies, "'Then you're one of the few these days who doesn't'" (141).

Kahlil does not answer, but Shadi Neimneh's statement that Bloom's "heroism is being a sensitive human and a pacifist in a dehumanized, violent age" (80) applies to Kahlil in this case because, even though he does not think of himself as a hero, he behaves like one when his moral code keeps him from claiming that he is different from the terrorists, that he is a "good" Arab and therefore deserves better treatment.

By this point, it is clear even to Kahlil that Orville and Shadrack are in the cell to continue the interrogation from a different angle. Instead of beating him, Orville tries to draw words out of him. What he gets from Kahlil is the admission, "'I've just tried to live a good life'" (141) and a few basic details about his very ordinary life, like his involvement with the Hashanian Mutual Aid Society and the shame that he now feels over the fact that, when he was a boy, he felt shame that his father was considered a "colored man" by other kids at school. Kahlil worries that "his life with Sophie was probably over" (148) because he lied to her, and he now admits to himself that Jane is "an awkward, inarticulate belly dancer" because belly dancing "wasn't in her blood" (149). He tries to tell Orville about "his immortal soul. For, it seemed to him as he spoke, in that particular room, that he had one" (149), but Orville is not interested in Kahlil's philosophical musings any more than Sophie had been. He tells him "'Let's wrap it up, Kahlil'" (149), which at this point is practically impossible because Kahlil is pondering the seriousness of his crime, his sin against Sophie. He tries to diminish its seriousness by asking, "'didn't statistics show that adultery was a common occurrence in modern society? Not the end of the world by any means. There, he admitted it: he'd committed a simple act of adultery. Or two. And he was appropriately ashamed'" (149-150). Orville's response is, "'You've moved in a very narrow world, Kahlil'" (150), which may be the reason why, by the next day, Orville and Shadrack are gone, the door to the room is left open, his wallet and shoes are at the door, and Kahlil can finally escape.

Fearing for his life, Kahlil runs to a Laundromat where he finds an old woman who allows him to demonstrate his generosity. When the woman sneaks up beside him, he says, "'You surprised me"; the woman "pointed her index finger at her head and spun it around in a circle," telling him that she was crazy. His response is, "'Crazy? Ah, well. Me, too,'" and even though he "was desperate for something to drink," when he buys a soda from the coke machine, he hands it to her, saying, "'Here, you take it'" (153), and then he buys another one for himself. Consideration for the needs of others is not one of the virtues that people associate with heroes, but a redeemed American hero exhibits his own virtues. He is what contemporary Americans refer to as an "ordinary hero," risen from what William Graebner calls "the thesis of the new social history" which posits "that ordinary people in every situation, no matter how difficult, could and did shape and give meaning and dignity to their own lives" (542). Kahlil thinks of the woman's needs before he satisfies his own. In spite of what he has suffered, he does not forget his manners or neglect to feel sympathy for this woman who appears to be homeless. What happens next is a glorious, magical moment as the woman "stood and began swishing the seven or eight skirts she was wearing back and forth in time to the music." She was "directing her nearly toothless smile, radiantly, in his direction. 'Well . . . how nice,' he said, because it would have been rude to ignore such sincere attention and besides—whether she knew it or not—she could be somebody's grandmother, somebody's *situe*" (*Belly Dancer* 152). Kahlil pays attention to the dance because he is a kind man and because he has respect for his elders, as his culture has taught him.

Even though he was exhausted, hungry, afraid that the men who brutalized him were looking for him, Kahlil stops to watch the woman dance. When his captors come to the Laundromat and ask the woman if she has seen "any suspicious characters in here this evening?" (155), she points "directly to the industrial-sized dryer into which he had climbed" (156). The man who asks the question ignores her pointing and calls her a "fucking nutcase" (156), even though he would have found Kahlil, the "suspicious character" that he was looking for, if he had paid attention. He stays true to who he has been and once again ignores the truth in favor of passing judgment on other people. The homeless woman also stays true to who she is and innocently points to the dryer in which Kahlil is hiding, but she does not do it out of hatred or malice. Unlike Jane Plain, the woman at the Laundromat simply answers the question truthfully. Fortunately for Kahlil, his abductors are not interested in the truth.

This is the beginning of Kahlil's journey home, a journey that will take him through yet another series of experiences with people who are not what they claim to be, but he must find the truth and learn from it. He has already figured out that Jane was a fake, and he also understands that his captors may have been independent agents or working with the authorities. While he is at the Laundromat, before the men come looking for him, he "had decided to make his way to a busy street, flag down a car, get to the police, and go home. Or, maybe go home first and then call the police"; however, because of what he has suffered, he wonders if "his interrogators *were* the police" (155). If this is the case, he cannot expose himself; he was a man "kidnapped and injured, the object of a manhunt. A fugitive avoiding his pursuers" (160), and he is now convinced that "the fire marshal and the man in the brown suit *were* the authorities" because "they had acted like they were the authorities" (161). Nothing that he sees is what it appears to be, but even fraudulent things can teach him a lesson.

Hitching a ride in a big rig is a quintessentially American experience for men who find themselves in trouble or simply on the road. For Kahlil, the journey home begins when a big rig slows down and the driver shouts at him to "get in fast" (162), and he does. The driver tells him that he is driving on that road by chance because "two cars going northbound on the freeway ran head-on into each other" and caused an accident that was, according to the driver, "a real incinerator" (165). This accident causes the detour that brings Benny to this road. Kahlil and the reader will find out later that the two cars that collide are Kahlil's "Tyrolean blue rental sedan" and the sedan driven by the man in the brown suit. The accident leaves "the shells of two burned-out vehicles, the ashy remains of four bodies, and three heads" (253), but Sophie is notified that her husband is dead because his "wallet flew from Shadrack's hands out of the window [. . .] and landed safe and sound, with Kali's driver's license and credit cards" (254) in it. The authorities assume that the headless body is Kahlil's body because his driver's license is found in Shadrack's wallet. When Kahlil returns home claiming to be alive, the police, instead of investigating what happened, are told "to find out what Kali knew and then put a lid on it. No further publicity, no arrests, no nothing" (255). Kahlil then knows that "the reason they didn't ask about the man in the brown suit, the fire marshal, and Orville and Shadrack was because they *did* know about them. And they didn't want him to know they knew" (257). His suspicion that he could not have gone to the police for assistance after he escaped his captors is now confirmed.

Benny, the driver who picks him up, tells him almost immediately that he is carrying "a few Mexicans" (166). Kahlil points out that carrying Mexicans is "illegal," but Benny replies, "it's inevitable" (166). When Kahlil says that perhaps he should get out because he has "enough troubles as it is" (166), Benny admits,

> 'I can't pull over on the freeway just to let you out. That'll bring the highway patrol down on me for sure.'
> 'True," Kali agreed reluctantly.
> 'And you don't look like an innocent bystander.'
> 'True again,' Kali said.
> 'I have a regular stop in a while. You can get out there. Meanwhile, try to relax. Take a nice, hot shower. You could use one.' (167)

Interestingly, when Benny's "regular stop" arrives and Kahlil has the opportunity to get off the rig to go home, he chooses to stay. It would have been nice if this unlikely hero had by this point already decided to do something heroic like helping the Mexicans who are hiding in the back of the rig, but he has not yet met them. He does not yet know that the Mexicans are in danger. His reason for choosing to extend his journey by staying in the rig is his fear that, "once he went back he'd have to explain his disappearance, why he looked like he did, and everything else. He'd have to confess his lies and hope for forgiveness" (172). For the first time, Kahlil takes the coward's way out. He tries to justify his choice by thinking that "there was a possibility that he was still in danger and that going home would bring that danger to his wife and family and friends," but he is really afraid "to endure the torrent of Sophie's emotions" (172), so "the freeway signs came and went" (173) without his making the choice to get out.

Kahlil chooses the journey because he fears confronting his wife. This cowardly choice, however, puts him in the truck when he needs to protect the Mexicans against Mario. Benny thinks that he is helping the Mexicans to find new lives in America. What Benny does not know is that Mario, the man who travels with the Mexicans, is a "coyote," their smuggler and captor. When Benny stops at the Galaxy Casino, Kahlil visits the Mexicans in the hidden compartment in the back of the truck. Even though the only one who speaks English is Mario, Kahlil immediately figures out that something is wrong. Innocently, Kahlil tries to tell the Mexicans a story, something he has learned from the ghost of his grandmother during his journey, but the Mexicans do not react. When Kahlil tells Mario that he is "trying to comfort" them, Mario asks, "'With a fairy tale?'" (185). Mario is a cynic who does not believe in stories. He has his own sad story about having been "arrested for murdering a man who never existed" simply because he had "had an affair with another man's wife" (187). According to Mario, the woman's husband ruined his life and caused his family to spend all their money to buy his freedom. In order to pay his family back, he makes money "the most efficient way," by smuggling people into the United States. Kahlil listens to Mario's story, "resisting his desire to condemn before hearing the whole story," but "he did not like this man. He did not trust him. He was wary of tricks and lies. At bottom, he disapproved of infidelity, including his own" (187). Kahlil does not yet know for certain that Mario is delivering the Mexicans into slavery, but he now knows that he will have to confront him.

What Kahlil knows almost instinctively is that Mario is abusing the Mexicans and is using the woman for his own pleasure. When Mario nods to the woman, she stands up, and Kahlil notices her body language when "Mario led the woman through the door and into the passage-way. She did not resist; she did not acquiesce" (188). To help the woman, Kahlil jumps out of the truck and runs to the casino "where there were people, where there was help" (188), but he runs into a problem because of how he looks. Although he tells the guard who stops him that he needs help, he is not taken seriously. He has "a scabbed and swollen face" and is wearing "a jumble of ill-fitting clothes," Benny's clothes. He is also "ardent and agitated," so the guard laughs at him after asking "'You giving yourself up'" (190). Kahlil is judged by his looks. Even though the guard does not consider him dangerous, he also does not take him seriously, so Kahlil leaves the casino without finding anyone to help him rescue the Mexicans in the back of Benny's truck. Later, when Benny returns from the casino, Kahlil tries to tell him that Mario "mistreats those people" (193), but Benny also does not listen and instead attacks Kahlil because Kahlil reminds him that he was once a woman, and a woman is being abused in his truck. Kahlil must act alone.

Kahlil is heroic, but he is not a violent man. Since he feels that he must do something, he decides to attack Mario; however, when he enters the back of the truck and finds himself with a flashlight in his hand, he "couldn't do it" (199). He could not hit Mario over the head to knock him unconscious so that the others could escape. Instead, he tells Mario that immigration authorities are near. Mario does not want to believe him, but Kahlil tells him that he has heard the news from "the best authority." He cannot admit that he heard it from his grandmother's ghost because Mario would laugh at him, but he stresses the fact that Mario "can't afford not to" (198) believe him. As an illegal alien himself, Mario cannot take the risk, so he "jumped from the truck, strode across the parking lot, entered the casino, and effortlessly disappeared into its crowds" (199). Without resorting to violence, Kahlil wins his battle against Mario and liberates the Mexicans.

After winning his first battle against a formidable enemy, Kahlil leaves Benny's rig to walk home; he sleeps out in the open, "his bed, a concrete base that held in place one of four giant legs of a giant windmill" (201), a whimsical allusion to Don Quixote that does not quite work. Kahlil is conscious of what he is doing while Don Quixote was struggling with dementia and saw the windmill as his enemy. Kahlil, however, is attracted to the windmills, "for when he looked up and out, they were all he saw and their soft, spinning songs called to him" (201). As he stands there admiring the windmills and talking to his grandmother, Kahlil becomes so involved that he does not notice the rattlesnake near him. He is shocked into reality when a voice tells him, "'DO . . . NOT . . . MOVE'" and "an explosion at his left shoulder threw him to the ground." The man who appears behind him and shoots the snake adds, "'Come on,' the man said cheerfully. 'We'll have it for dinner'" (214). Even though their meeting begins with a shock, Kahlil is taken in and made to feel safe by someone who lives on the margins of society. Max comforts Kahlil immediately by telling him that he "'shouldn't feel bad'" about not noticing the rattler because, "'even if you weren't deaf, you probably wouldn't have heard it. They only rattle sometimes. They're quiet as smoke when they want to be'" (216). Max assumes that Kahlil is deaf. He does not know that Kahlil does not hear the snake because he is deeply involved in a conversation with his dead grandmother, who disappears as soon as Max appears.

Max and Kahlil become quick friends, which Kahlil finds "a surprise—this fit, this unexpected harmonious meeting of apparently dissimilar human spirits" (216). Max feeds him, provides him with water, and even takes him to an abandoned nuclear plant where he used to work so that Kahlil can shower in a regular bathroom. During their brief time together, Kahlil tells Max that he comes "from a long line of storytellers" (219) and tells him the story of his family. Max eventually feels comfortable enough with Kahlil to tell his own story and admit that he "'wasn't in Nam'" and that he "lost [his arm] by accident, plain and simple'" (237). For Max, admitting that he was never in Vietnam comes as a surprise even to himself because he has been using Vietnam as an excuse for the way he is living. One wonders if his life will also change after Kahlil goes home, but the novel does not follow Max's narrative. He is simply a kind man who helps Kahlil on his journey home. Kahlil helps Max when he tells him that the moving objects that he sees in the distance are not people coming to get him but "'floaters.'" He explains that floaters are "'small bits of debris—maybe cells, maybe pigment—trapped inside the eye.'" Max does not like what he is hearing, but Kahlil adds that "'it happens when we get older'" (240). Kahlil delivers this information to Max just before they part, which suggests that he is slipping into his role as an optician even before he gets home.

When Kahlil crosses the Los Angeles River and goes home, he does not enter his house. Instead, he stands outside watching Sophie through the window and deciding what to do. The man who faces brutal interrogators without cracking, tricks a coyote into abandoning his human cargo, and faces the solitude of the California canyons, sleeps outside his home because he is afraid to face his wife. He knows that he cheated, and he does not know how to approach the subject with her. When he wakes up the next day "in the dirt before the window," he sees that Sophie's sisters have already arrived and are planning "a day trip up the coast" which leaves "no time for Kali to accomplish gradual reentry. No possibility of a subtle broaching of delicate subjects" (251), so "he knocked," which he "would have done so out of respect for his wife, even if he did have his house keys." When Sophie opens the door, "two neighbors called 911 upon hearing the screams" because the "sisters, with their power-packed voices, screamed again and again" (252). Kahlil, contrite, tells his stunned wife, "'I don't blame you if you're upset, but can I come in? Please?'" Ever considerate, he adds, "'I know my shoes are filthy. I'll take them off. I'll leave them out here on the porch.'" Sophie, too stunned to speak, "extended her hand" to him and tells him, "'You missed your funeral.'" Sophie welcomes her husband home with no questions. His fear of facing her and having to admit to his lie dissolves as "they held each other's hands. Then pressed together their shuddering bodies" (255). Sophie is too happy to see her husband alive to ask him what happened, but that in itself presents a problem.

Kahlil does not know what happens to Sophie during his absence, but she mentions immediately that he was assumed dead and that he had missed his own funeral. He is happy that Sophie offers "not a word of recrimination or anger. No probing, no cross-examination" (261), but Sophie's apparent lack of interest in what happened to him hurts. She simply is not concerned enough to ask what he had been doing for the last two weeks. Even after she has lived with the knowledge that he was dead, she still shows no interest in how his wallet was found near a car wreck in California when he was supposed to have boarded a plane headed for Cincinnati. The one question she asks of him is, "'Was there another woman?'" which Kahlil answers with a blatant lie, "'Sophie, I can tell you in all honesty, no'" because "as he sat there then, in his current condition, knowing things he now knew, there had been no one else" (265), but this is a revision of what actually happened. Kahlil leaves the relative safety of his home to follow Jane Plain, and he does spend two days in a hotel with her. He justifies his lie by thinking that his feelings for Jane are not real because he is not in love with her, as he believes he is in love with his wife.

At the end of his journey, however, Kahlil is as lonely with his wife and as burdened by the chaotic events taking place in the world as he was at the beginning of the novel. His situation at home remains unchanged; what changes for Kahlil is his newly found awareness of who he is as a Syrian in America. Although he is taken prisoner and sorely tested, he is able to defend himself and proves himself a descent, generous man; he survives the abuse of others without becoming an angry, hateful man who resents others. He also does not allow what happened to him to alter his sense of what is right and what is wrong. Kahlil's life is directly affected by the wave of anti-Arab hatred that follows the September 11 attacks, but he does not allow the hatred of others to influence what he believes. After he escapes his captors and he fears that the men are following him, he takes the time to appreciate the woman who dances for him at the Laundromat; he risks his life to help the Mexican prisoners, and he helps Max to understand that the loss of his arm was an unfortunate accident, not something that should force him to stay away from human contact. Kahlil also stays true to the memory of his Situe, whom he will not renounce no matter what his wife says. As Shadi Neimneh says of Bloom, Kahlil demonstrates that "heroism is being a sensitive human and a pacifist in a dehumanized, violent age" (80). Unlike the modernist anti-hero who lacks basic human decency and values, Kahlil proves during his journey that he has the courage of his convictions and the courage to stand up to people who abuse other people. He is the American hero, redeemed.

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A Saintly Woman is Not a Starving Woman: *Parrhesia* in "Birgitta's Heart is a Pot of Delicious Food"

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Abstract:

This article focuses on Chapter 54, "Birgitta's Heart is a Pot of Delicious Food", of Birgitta of Sweden's *Revelationes extravagantes*. This vision is striking in its use of *parrhesis*, the idea of speaking "truth to power", particularly because this vision is less edited by an *amanuensis* than any other section of Birgitta's works. Also striking in this vision is the use of food, which is often presented in medieval women's visionary texts as a temptation; in Chapter 54 food is framed in a positive way. It is only ash from a fire that the food is cooked over, framed as worldly temptation, that is problematic. As such, the emphasis in the vision is balance between an understanding of the secular world and how it can coexist with one's spiritual nature.

Keywords: Birgitta of Sweden, Parrhesis, Foodways, Visionary, Authorial Voice

In Chapter 54 of *Revelationes extravagantes* Birgitta of Sweden recounts a vision which is now known as "Birgitta's Heart is a Pot of Delicious Food". In this vision, Birgitta relates that:

> Once when Lady Birgitta was at prayer, she saw before her in a spiritual vision a small fire with a small pot of food above it, and delicious food in the pot. She also saw a man splendidly dressed in purple and gold. He went around the pot on bended knees, now blowing on the fire, now stirring the wood, and busying himself in this way around the pot. Finally he said this to her as she was watching: 'You who are watching this, did you ever see anyone as humble as I am? Can you see, I am dressed in golden clothes but still show so much concern for this pot. I go around it on bended knees. I lay my head on the ground to blow on the fire. Now and then I bring pieces of wood and pile them up or move them apart, sparing no efforts. This is the proof of my great humility.
>
> But I will show you what all this means. The pot signifies your heart. The food in it is the sweet words given to you by God from above. The small fire is the fever of the love you have from God. I am the devil, and I envy the consoling grace you have. That is the reason behind my humble concern. I blow on the fire not to make it burn more but to stir up the ashes of earthly affections so they get into the pot of your heart and make the appetizing food of the Holy Spirit's words inspired in you lose its taste. I move the wood and sticks around to turn the pot of your heart toward the earth, that is, toward earthly acquaintances or relations so that God will thus be less loved by you'" (Searby 2011, 274-5).

This vision is excluded from *Revelationes*, Birgitta's most widely read work, as it is problematic in its unorthodoxy. While it is not uncommon in medieval mystical texts to find food used as a rhetorical device, specifically as a "metaphor for interaction with the divine," food is most often represented as a corrupting force (Bynum 1998, 117).[1] "Birgitta's Heart as a Pot of Delicious Food," however, challenges this powerful religious and rhetorical expectation and uses food as a site of authorial power. In *Writing a woman's life,* Carlolyn Heilbrun (2015) notes that "power is the ability to take one's place in whatever discourse is essential to action and the right to have one's part matter" (18). This statement from a modern American feminist echoes the importance of an Ancient Greek term *parrhesis,* or "speaking truth to power". It is the focus of this study to use the concept of *parrhesis* as a frame to analyze the *Revelationes extravagantes*, specifically "Birgitta's Heart is a Pot of Delicious Food," as a text that works against the medieval rhetorical expectation related the place of women in the medieval world and the place of women in in the medieval Church. When one views Birgitta's vision in this way, it is clear that she is a woman in a unique position to be a part of two words—the secular and spiritual—but that she must learn to keep the two in balance; this is Birgitta's "truth to power"

Context of the *Revelationes extravagantes*

Saint Birgitta of Sweden is a woman of contrasts. She was born in 1303 to a family with connections to the Swedish king. At 14 she was married to the wealthy upper class Ulf Gudnarsson, and subsequently gave birth to 8 children. For the first 41 years of her life, her family and social environment was one of privilege and expected gender roles for a woman of her class and time[2]. This very well could have continued after 1344, when Ulf died, but instead, Birgitta's life changed drastically and with intention. For instance, she organized a new order of religious, the Order of the Most Holy Savior, or the Brigittines. She embarked on a life of poverty and service. Most notably, though, she encountered various mystical visions, collected and known today as the *Revelationes*. Although a change from secular engagements that dominated her early life, the foundations for these later activities were laid early on. Birgitta, for instance, received her first vision when she was only seven years old and she engaged in care for unwed mothers and their children while she was a young mother, herself. While these activities were more sporadic before Ulf's death, they intensified in frequency after she was freed from married life and could devote herself fully to religious and charitable pursuits.

Perhaps because of Birgitta's early life, where she was tempered in the secular world of Swedish aristocracy and politics, once she becomes a full religious she maintains her elevated status. Part of her authority derives from being the head of the Brigittine Order, as being in this position makes her not only a religious leader, but an administrative leader as well. Even more so, Birgitta's main source of authority and credibility derives from her visions. The visions in the more widely read *Revelationes* are refined linguistically, as compared to those which are found in the *Revelationes extravagantes*, but they contain a similar wide range of topics[3]. Some of these include advice on how to pray (Chapter 14); on the nature of the love of God (Chapter 38); and spiritual pitfalls, such as greed (Chapter 17) and disrespect (Chapter 46). In addition to these, there are numerous visions related to direct revelations from Mary (Chapters 8, 10, 27, 35, 42, 50, 51 and, 53) or Jesus (Chapters 46 and 57) regarding spiritual matters ranging from Mary's childhood to the wayward nature of man. While these are not completely unusual topics for medieval mystics' visions, they do move away from the more common emphasis on the connection of the mystic to Christ, particularly the idea of the mystical union or marriage with Him found in many medieval female mystics' texts. Hadewijch, for instance, has been described as having written "some of the most affective, sensual, even erotic descriptions of union with Christ ever penned" (Bynum 1998, 153-4) in her discussion of her mystical marriage with Christ.

Although more clearly physical than other accounts, Hadewijch is not alone in basic descriptions of mystical marriage in her visions; mystics ranging from Catherine of Siena to Margery Kempe focus on a mystical union with the divine, often with real, potent, and physical descriptions[4]. The presence of mystical union does appear in Birgitta's work—she refers to herself as "Bride" (Chapter 2 and 24)—but she does not describe her union with the Divine in erotic physical terms, but rather qualifies how "A Spiritual Marriage Is Compared to Human Marriages" (Chapter 26) in a more objective and removed way. I believe that in the discussion of marriage in the more widely read *Revelationes* that we get a small glimpse of the "balance" that Birgitta grapples with in the *Revelationes extravagantes*. In this instance, the balance is easier to manage because Birgitta has experience with being a wife and mother and therefore knows the joys and trials of these roles. As such, she can compare secular and divine relationships in a way that a virginal cloistered nun never could; she can be objective in comparisons of the two types of marriage and not describe marriage in the imagined, ecstatic, and erotic language of her virginal counterparts.

Birgitta's visions, which deal with spiritual, and to a lesser extent secular, topics were most often revealed to Matthias, canon of Linköping, and Peter Olafsson, her confessor, and were used as part of her application for canonization, granted in 1391. The rapidity of her canonization a mere 18 years after her death is remarkable, especially considering that the Western Schism occurred in 1378 and disrupted all normalcy in church business, including applications for canonization. As part of the application, among other items, Birgitta's *Revelationes* and *vita* were submitted. As noted in a *vita* for Birgitta, reportedly translated into Middle English by Thomas Gascoigne in the 16th Century,

> In these revelations [the *Revelationes*] are contained the high secret mysteries of the most glorious Trinity, of the Incarnation, the nativity, the life and passion of our savior Jesus Christ, as well as the plain and true doctrine to know virtue and the great intolerable pain and damnation that shall fall to sinners who die in deadly sin. (Gascoigne, 1991, p.1)

In contrast to this, the *Revelationes extravagantes* are not nearly as orthodox in scope and far more secular in nature. Dennis Searby (2015), translator of the Oxford edition, notes that it is during one of the "lulls in the canonization proceedings", likely due to the Western Schism, that Prior Petrus of Alvastra "took [home] with him a body of supplementary material"…. a selection of 'extravagant, stray, isolated'" visions (119). Johannes Jordersson prepared these vision into one volume, known as Codex Falkenberg, and in it gives us the opportunity to read these visons that "for various reasons had been excluded from the central corpus of the *Revelationes*" (Searby 2015, 119). It is not surprising that many of the visions in the *Revelationes extravagantes* were excluded from the more widely-read canonical work, as most are not as orthodox in nature as the corpus collected and presented in the *Revelationes*. For instance, the secular nature of many of the visions is revealed in topics that focus on spices, taxes, clothing, and even bed sheets; these are "mundane" secular themes that were not religious or orthodox enough to fit the narrative of the more widely read work which privileges matters that are more spiritual in nature. Through the use of Chapter 54—"Birgitta's Heart is a Pot of Delicious Food" as an example, one can see that the *Revelationes extravagantes* often challenge standard imagery used by female medieval mystics. The undermining of expectations of imagery and the framing of authorial voice are two important elements of the concept of *parrhesia* in Birgitta's work and show her to be intentionally dealing with the desire to balance the spiritual and secular in her life and work.

Birgitta and *Parrhesia*

Renae Frey's (2015) dissertation "Speaking Truth to Power: Recovering a Rhetorical Theory of *Parrhesia*" is an invaluable resource in understanding the impact and importance of Birgitta's *Revelationes extravagantes*. In it Frey (2015) notes that *parrhesia* is "not commonly used in current vernacular speech", even though we often "valorize those who risk their safety to resist oppression" (2). Indeed, Frey's (2015) definition of *parrhesia* focuses on how dangerous the concept can be; these are "disruptive rhetorical acts that challenge hierarchy and power inequalities, often at great risk to the rhetor" (2)[5]. Why one would engage in these acts even though death could be a result is important to understand. One doesn't engage in *parrhesia* simply because of recklessness or disregard for one's life; *parrhesia* encompasses acts that may be qualified as "a deeply held truth value" for the speaker (2 and 3), truths important enough to die for. Although Birgitta was not martyred because of her visions, some of them could have led to appearance at ecclesiastical court, excommunication and/or death. One of these visions is "Birgitta's Heart is a Pot of Delicious Food", in which it is not Mary or Christ of the canonical visions who imparts a vision to Birgitta, but the Devil. The idea of a demonic figure communicating an instructive vision is a dangerous concept in the medieval world.[6] It is possible that the words from the Devil might lead one astray, causing the visionary to falter individually, or worse, lead others to damnation. It is for this reason that visions needed to be validated as deriving from a divine source.[7] The fact that Birgitta still told the vision to her confessor, even though it could have been dangerous for her to do so, indicates just how important the vision was to her. Even though the vision might have had significance for Birgitta, this vision was not included in the main application for canonization, likely because of the controversial speaker in the vision, and, thus, was only submitted in "supplemental materials"[8].

It is fortunate for us, as modern readers, that "Birgitta's Heart is a Pot of Delicious Food" was not included, for its exclusion means that Birgitta's amanuensis "edited" this and other *Revelationes extravagates* far less than her other works. The idea of the amanuensis editing texts by female authors is not uncommon. Perhaps the most thorough discussion of how texts from a female voice are altered may be found in the work of another female medieval mystic, Margery Kempe.[9] In her fine work "Reexamining *The Book of Margery Kempe*: A rhetoric of autobiography", Cheryl Glenn (1995) notes that Margery

> reveals herself to be a woman who could neither read nor write, dependent upon amanuenses to record her story. In fact, the manuscript begins with the priest's incipit, recounting his tribulations in attempting to revise the previous priest's transcriptions of Margery's text" (55-6).

Glenn aptly highlights the words of Margery's own amanuensis and the work that he does to "revise" Margery's text; through such a comment, the control that he has over the shape and direction of Margery's text is clear. Although Birgitta is a very different woman than Margery, being able to not only read and write but organize and run an abby as well, there is a parallel between the two women through the "fingerprints" their amanuensis leave in their texts. Clarie L. Sahlin (2000) emphasizes the "complex collaboration between Birgitta and her confessors" (33). Searby (2015) is somewhat more cautious in his characterization of the relationship, suggesting that "some of the *Extravagantes* may be early drafts of the same originals, or the first stage of an ongoing revision and reworking by Birgitta and her confessors" of works that will later appear in the *Revelationes* (221). Nevertheless, the idea that the visions that appear are later "reworked" is significant in Searby's framing of the *Revelationes extravagantes,* and goes to the control, or rather lack of it, that a female medieval mystic had over the transcription of her visions.

This idea of revision is important when one considers that in the *Institutio Oratoria* Qunitillian "delineates between *exclamatio*, which is a figure that is 'simulated and artfully designed' as opposed to 'exclamations [that] are genuine'" (Frey 2015, 3). The carefully framed visions that appear in Birgitta's application for canonization are *exclamatio*--"artfully designed", orthodox in nature, and collected in the *Revelationes*; these are the texts that most people read and think of as Birgitta's visions. Contrary to the visions that appear in most standard volumes of Birgitta's work, what appears in the *Revelationes extravagantes* are "early drafts" that don't benefit from "ongoing revision and reworking". As such, one may posit that a more realistic version of Birgitta's authorial voice may be found in these visions. These visions are formative, less edited/revised, and often contain ideas that run counter to the expected themes and rhetoric used by most medieval female visionaries. The content of these visions, such as "Birgitta's Heart is a Pot of Food" may be considered to be Birgitta's "truth to power" before it is softened and modified by her amanuensis.

This is particularly important when one considers the changing nature of *parrhesis*, originally relating to public discourse, but by the time of Plato governing private discourse as well (Frey 2015, 5). Glenn (1995) asserts that the dynamic of public and private discourse is a concern in all women's writing of the medieval period; "because of the continual crossing of self and other, the continual conversation among the voices, women's writings often blur the line between public and private" (67). Although I do not dispute Glenn's assertion, I believe that there are some variations of women's writing that are marked more by the "blurring of lines" than others. In the *Revelationes*, this dynamic of public and private is particularly significant. The visions are received by Birgitta as a private, mystical experience, but through her voicing of them during her life and their use as part of her application for sainthood after her death, Birgitta's visions enter the public realm.

Frey (2015) continues her discussion of the changing role of *parrhesis* in society by "examining the role of women and other marginalized populations….crossing over from the realm of the private to the public…[which] marks women's parrhesiastic action in the nineteenth century" (18). If the public and private roles/voice of a woman in the nineteenth century is constrained, one might consider how even more potent this idea of public/private *parrhesia* would be for a woman in the 1350s, where gender roles and expectations were even more narrowly defined. Elizabeth Petroff (1978) highlights this dynamic in her seminal work "Medieval women visionaries: Seven stages to power" in which she makes the observation that "women saints of the thirteenth and fourteenth century did become visible. This in itself would seem to be paradoxical, for according to medieval ecclesiastics, the best women were absolutely invisible" (35). A woman in the 19th century might better be seen than heard, but a woman in the Middle Ages was expected to be both not seen and not heard.

There are medieval women who challenge this social expectation. Another medieval female writer, Christine de Pizan, is useful at this point in considering the idea of public/private voice and authority in text. De Pizan's life parallels that of Birgitta in that both women were born to upper class educated families, both spent their early lives as wives and both began only to create texts after their husbands' deaths. Although de Pizan's writing is secular in nature and Birgitta's spiritual, the moving of woman's voice from the private to the public sphere is problematic in both writers' texts. For instance, in de Pizan's *Treasure of the city of ladies*, Fortune transforms the speaker's body to become male. Jenny Redfern (1995) underscores the importance of this in relation to authorial credibility: "this imprinted gender transformation was a major step toward developing her [de Pizan's] authority as a teacher and rhetorician" (79). This same sort of problem may be recognized in Birgitta's text, but she did have an advantage that de Pizan did not; she had the shelter of the Church and an amanuensis, whose "complex collaboration" or "ongoing revision and reworking" gave the *Revalationes* authority (Searby 2015, 221). Even so, there is a tension in Birgitta's work concerning the public/private nature of her visions which are revealed through her as a female vessel. Gasgoigne (1991) underscores this tension in the *vita* by stressing that:

> She would gladly have hidden and kept secret the special gift that she had of our Lord in the *Revelations* except that our Lord frequently commanded her to write and to speak them boldly to the Pope, to the Emperor, to kings, princes and other people, so that through them they might the more quickly be converted from their sins.

Birgitta may have wanted to keep her voice/visions private, but she makes her visions public at the behest of the Lord. Although God desires that these visions be made part of the public sphere, there is still a problem with the vessel through which they are delivered. Like de Pizan, Birgitta is a woman. Also like de Pizan, Birgitta's flawed body attains a "modified shape" when in a mystical trance: "And when she was in prayer and contemplation, she was often seen by many devout persons to be elevated and lifted up from the ground about the height of a man" (Gasgoine 1991). Although one may interpret this as Birgitta levitating, I think that a more accurate reading of the passage is that Birgitta takes on a presence which equates her stature to that of a man. The height and the reference to sex imbues Birgitta with an authority that she might not otherwise have. This is a very important detail in the *vita* because Birgitta's life recounted in it frames all of her work, including the *Revelationes extravagantes*. Indeed Gasgoine (1991) references "four goodly chapters to be read as prayers along with certain *Revelationes* called the *Extravagantes"* just before noting the change in Birgitta's manner/height as evidence for her authority. It is a striking juxtaposition of Birgitta's stature and the *Revelationes extravagantes*, making them seem to be even more of a quiet testament to *parrhesia* in Birgitta's work, especially evident in "Birgitta's Heart is a Pot of Delicious Food".

Birgitta's Heart is a Pot of Delicious Food and Imagery of Food

Most often in medieval texts by female mystics there is a focus on the self-denial of food as a form of sacrificial piety. Birgitta's *vita* even notes as evidence of her piety the extreme fasting that she engages in: "She not only kept the fasts and vigils that holy Church required, but she also added so many others to them that she went beyond the church's commandment and fasted four times each week" (Gascoigne 1991, 1). It should be noted that this description of Birgitta's fasting is written after her death, and part of an application for canonization; the emphasis on her fasting would be seen in this context as a sign of her spirituality and would have been framed as a positive attribute. Such contexts have been extensively discussed, perhaps most persuasively by Caroline Walker Bynum (1987) in *Holy Feast Holy Fast*. In her book, Bynum explores the idea of fasting as both a form of self-control (189) and also a site of resistance against church authority (243); in this way the female mystic gains authority over her own body and also within the church structure as a "holy woman" who has credibility and authority.

Granted, this dynamic is not always accepted. There are a number of daughters of the upper class whose families find the fasting of their daughters to be disturbing, and there is even an active resistance against this activity. As noted by Bridget Ann Henisch (1976) in *Fast and Feast: Food in Medieval Society* , "in every case, a fast was to be endured for its spiritual benefit: dazzling displays of willpower and austerity were frowned upon" (28). Bynum (1987) reiterates this caution when she notes that "thirteenth- and fourteenth-century writers, busy defining exactly who should fast when, urged spiritual more than physical abstinence" (42). Contrary to the wording emphasizing Birgitta's extreme fasting in her *vita*, her visions seem to emphasize an alternative view of fasting. For instance, in the *Revelationes extravagantes* Chapter 13 "On Rules for Fasting" it states, "It is good for the healthy to fast on bread and water, but it is not the highest good. The highest good is charity, without which there is no salvation. Anyone can be saved without fasting on bread and water, provided they have perfect faith and prudence and a good reason" (238-9). Another example is in Chapter 58 "Three Aspects of Birgitta's Fasting", in which Mary tells Birgitta that "My Son is more pleased when you eat than when you fast contrary to obedience....fast in an intelligent way" (278-9). These are just two visions in the volumes of Birgitta's work where there is a reference to, and admonition against, extreme fasting.

In addition to the reframing of fasting in Birgitta's work we also get visions in which food is seen as "quite homely in tone" (Searby 2015, 222). For instance, Chapter 35 is "Four Women and Two Men May Help in the Kitchen" (256-7) and Chapter 36 is "On the Use of Spices" (257). One might consider that the focus of these and other chapters on the mundane nature food draws on the female experience, more specifically the running of a household, a position that Birgitta held for the first 41 years of her life and which would have been quite familiar to her. The focus in the visions on elements that would be part of Birgitta's personal experience is not unexpected. Bynum (1989) frames a discussion of this more generally, but her commentary may be aptly applied to Birgitta. She asserts that while male mystics "stressed male/female contrasts and used imagery of reversal to express their dependence on God, women expressed their dependence on God in imagery at least partly drawn from their own gender and avoided symbolic reversals" (1293-4). I would agree with Bynum's assertion that women will use imagery from their own experience; indeed, in the instance of "Birgitta's Heart is a Pot of Delicious Food" the cooking of a pot of food is used to symbolize the spiritual dynamic of the vision. The main elements of the first section of the vision are:

> The pot is Birgitta's heart.
> The food is the Word of God.
> The fire is the love that Birgitta has for God.

Even though the elements of this triad are composed of "homely images" there is an underlying profound spiritual significance to the elements. When one considers the use of food in a positive way in the Church, one of the first images that comes to mind is the spiritual nourishment of the bread used during the Mass—the Eucharist. The Eucharist, at once the body of Christ and the bread of life, is something that Birgitta focuses on in another vision. In Chapter 63 in *Revelationes*, Birgitta recounts a vison of Christ and the Devil debating the "Presence of Jesus in the Holy Sacrament of the Altar". In it, Christ argues about the use of bread as a his body in the Eucharist noting that

> Does it, perhaps, entail an effort for My Divinity to unite that which is least with that which is heavenly, the earthly with the most sublime?....I can reveal something through a visible sign and shape that, however, truly is one thing in what is signified, yet is seen as something else" (Searby, Volume II, 2015, 118).

In this vision the base and the divine are connected in the form of the bread via transubstantiation, making the bread and the body of Christ one. Likewise, in "Birgitta's Heart is a Pot of Delicious Food" there is a joining of the base and the elevated—delicious food, most likely a soup as it is in a pot, and the word of God.

This positive depiction of food is very important in light of Gillian Feeley-Harnick's (1994) commentary in *Lord's table.* In it she reminds us that early Christians incorporated into their traditions the Jewish notion of food as embodiment of God's wisdom/law (107). Birgitta's vision, which emphasizes the word of God as food, seems almost like a return to this early equation of food and God's wisdom. In addition, the Eucharist is perceived as a community practice or event; a Christian taking part in the Eucharist is at once communing with the Divine and with all others who take part in the rite (116). Thus, the idea of many grains of wheat combined to form one loaf of bread, from which all members of the community may be enriched spiritually, can be seen as analogous to the many ingredients that are combined into Birgitta's homely pot of food, which, though unidentified, are presumably an amalgamation of many parts. Indeed, Bynam (1987) rightly notes that early Protestant and Catholic theologians lament that there is the loss of the idea of the communal meal in the Eucharist in favor of individual piety in late medieval works (61). "The many" sadly reduces to "the one", and a suffering/sacrificial one at that. Like the reversal of food as useful only as a sacrifice, so Birgitta also reverses the idea of a disconnected and singular piety through the depiction of God's wisdom as a quintessential communal dish—a pot of food. This reversal, which Bynum (1987) would ascribe only to male mystics, is another way in which Birgitta in the *Revelationes extravagantes* goes against the expected norms of her gender and asserts her own truth, her own power, in her visions.

Although the first part of the vision creates a connection between the heart and food and, through this connection, Christ and the community, one must not forget the final part of the vision—the finely dressed man is revealed to be a Devil whose goal is to corrupt Birgitta so that she turns away from God and back toward the world. It is important to underscore the significance of the Devil, not the expected characters of Christ or Mary, who teaches Birgitta in this vision. Although Christ often appears in the mystical marriage with Birgitta and debates the Devil, as in the vison about the Eucharist recounted earlier in the text, it is Mary who makes perhaps a more impactful presence in Birgitta's visions. Nancy Bradley Warren (2007) notes that "Brigittine texts contain frequent discussions of the Virgin Mary as one who translates the divine Logos into the human realm" (397). The orthodox characters of Christ or Mary lend authority and credibility to the visionary text. It was vitally important that the visions descended from God or his intermediaries for, as Elizabeth Petroff (1978) notes "visions….told the women who they were, what they must do, what others were thinking, what would happen in the future, and what Christ and the Virgin Mary felt for them and for all humanity" (34) If the vision was deemed to be orthodox, then it would lead people to Christ and salvation, but if it was demonic in origin, then this could lead to the ruination of souls and eternal damnation. It is for this reason that the commentary in the Prologue to the *Revelations extravagantes* is particularly important. Here, it is noted that

> Prior Petrus and Blessed Katherina, daughter of St. Birgitta, testified to the truth of these revelations (i.e., that they were divinely revealed) before her [Birgitta's] canonization, and anyone who takes a careful look at their testimony will, for the most part, find this to be obvious" (Searby 2015, 229).

Such a comment was vitally important, for the idea of a vision being explained/taught by the Devil, rather than Jesus or Mary, would have been seen to be problematic. Without clarifying that there is orthodoxy to such controversial visions, it could have cast doubt on the believability and validity of all of the visions, as they may all have the taint of the demonic.

It should be clarified that there are instances of the Devil appearing in medieval female mystics' writings and even instances where the temptation that the Devil offers a woman is food. In Frederic Tubach's (1969) *Index*, there are two recorded instances where the Devil tricks women out of fasting and toward the world (78). These visions, though, are about food as a form of temptation, a corrupting force in itself.[10] Like temptation from the Devil, food also may be seen as something that taints or contaminates the body and soul in medieval mystical texts. For example, it is quite common in medieval mystical texts for imagery of breastfeeding to be used; sometimes it is Christ who feeds the mystic, but often he is shown as being nursed as well[11]. Although these are the images that are the most often used in mystical texts, there are some instances where even this earliest form of food is shown as being capable of being corrupted. For instance, in her later life, Birgitta's daughter, Catherine, recounts a food contamination vision of her own. Catherine recounts a vision she had of herself as an infant who refused to breastfeed because her mother's (Birgitta's) breast milk had been contaminated by the conjugal engagement of her parents the night before (Bynum 1998, 119 and 215). Although most often breast feeding is used to show nourishment in mystical texts, in this vision the life giving milk is turned sour because of the "sin" of sex.[12] In this instance, real food is refused and physical nourishment is impeded because the food is qualified as "corrupted". What is perhaps more disturbing than physical food being refused is when spiritual food is framed as corrupted. As Bynum (2015) notes, an unnamed fourteenth-century visionary saw the Eucharist, itself, as contaminated. In her vision, she laments that as the "body of the Lord [was] raised on the Alter, I kept thinking, because of the afterbirth [of his human delivery] that the host was something polluted. That's why I could no longer believe it was the body of Christ" in/as the Eucharist (qtd. in Bynum 1987, 266). The idea of contamination/food had been taken so such an extreme in this case that the host is rejected, isolating the speaker from the essence of spiritual nourishment, grace, and communion.

In "Birgitta's Heart is a Pot of Delicious Food", though, the food is a not a site of temptation or contamination; the world is temptation. The Devil notes that "earthly affections" and "earthly acquaintances or relations" might draw Birgitta away from the Church and toward the secular world. This likely was a concern for Birgitta as she lived in the world for half of her life, only leaving it in her 40s. In Birgitta's *Revelationes extravagantes*, as well as her more well-known visions, there are many examples of visions that are completely secular in nature. For instance, in Chapter 2 the focus is on "The Sick Should not be Allowed Extra Bedclothes", Chapter 15 "Baths Should be Taken Regularly," Chapter 24 "The Virgin and the Devil Argue about Land Rights", to as already noted Chapters 35 and 36 on the running of a kitchen and the use of spices in foods. These are decidedly worldly concerns.

If the ash that floats up from the fire are "earthly affections", then unlike other female mystics who frame food as a form of temptation, it is the world which is Birgitta's temptation. As noted earlier, Birgitta's life circumstances make her much more part of the secular world than other female mystics were. As such, Birgitta falls squarely into the "rise of lay spirituality" as described by Bynum (1987) vis a vie Vauchez's *The spirituality of the occidental Middle Ages*. She discusses that "From the later twelfth century on, the church....felt a greater and greater responsibility for ordinary layfolk, devoted more attention to defining for them their characteristic forms of devotion, and canonized more and more lay (even married) saints", which connects well Birgitta's experience (qtd. in Bynum 1987, 239). Granted, by the time that people were lobbying for Brigitta's sainthood she was a widow and a nun, nevertheless she had spent a good portion of her life as a wife and mother, a woman of the world. It must have been somewhat disconcerting, especially initially, to not focus on matters of the household and the intricacies that would be of importance in a typical, secular life. These issues, therefore, have the tendency to creep into Birgitta's works and can be seen as the "earthly affections" or "earthly acquaintances or relations" that might draw her away from her new, spiritual existence. Should she turn her face toward the world, or away from it? This seems to be the underlying tension that Birgitta deals with in "Birgitta's Heart is a Pot of Delicious Food".

Because of this dynamic that exists in Birgitta's work, the binary that Bynam (1987) proposes doesn't neatly fit. To recap, Bynam (1987) notes that "symbolic reversals are less important in women's spirituality than in men's" and that because of this, there is less duality in female visionary writing than in men's (280). Concerning the first point, in "Birgitta's Heart is a Pot of Delicious Food" there is a startling reversal as the finely dressed man who seems to tend the fire and have good intentions is actually the devil who is there for ill will. Also, the pot of food, which would normally be framed as a temptation, is quite positive. It is only the ash, the worldly concerns, which might contaminate Birgitta's spiritual life if she is not careful. The element of reversal which Bynum (1998) notes is a hallmark of male visionary texts also appears as a significant element in Birgitta's vision.

Bynum's second point about men having a straight "either/or" duality in the text, with the female text being more nuanced, does track with how Birgitta sees herself in "Birgitta's Heart is a Pot of Delicious Food" and I believe, by extension, in many of the visions in her work. She does not, in the end, see herself as only a woman of the world or a woman of the church. She is able to "have one foot in each world" and be a woman of both. This is why in her works, especially in her *Revelationes extravagantes*, we perhaps get her "true voice" which shows that Birgitta can be part of two worlds, but only if she can keep them in balance.

Most often in medieval texts by female mystics there is a focus on the self-denial of food as a form of sacrifice or mystical nourishment, such as the Eucharist. In Birgitta's vision, seeing herself as food, and potentially contaminated food at that, is significant. Food becomes not that which tempts one to the world, but rather food is framed as positive, even going so far as being the heart of Birgitta which is touched by the love of God. Thus, the vision creates a connection between the heart and food and through this Christ and the world, showing that a balance between the spiritual and the material can exist. It is only with the addition of the ash/sin that two may come to be out of balance, be contaminated, and cause Birgitta to turn back to the world. In this way Birgitta's vision affords her the luxury that many other female mystics of the Middle Ages don't have—the luxury of being a woman of dichotomies, a woman of both the spirit and of the world. The only caveat is that she keeps these two in balance. This, in the end, is her truth to power.

Endnotes:

1. Some examples of women who exemplify the idea of food as a corrupting force are Mary of Oignies, who "mutilated her flesh out of guilt over eating;" Catherine of Siena, who was known for extreme fasting, and even Birgitta of Sweden's daughter who, as a baby, "refused not only the breast of her sinful wet nurse but even the breast of her saintly mother, Bridget, whenever Bridget had had conjugal relations the night before" (Bynum 1998, 119 and 215). For a more thorough discussion of the connection of food, contamination and fasting, please see Carolyn Walker Bynum's seminal *Holy feast and holy fast: The religious significance of food to medieval women*.
2. As is often the case in married female mystics lives, the lady convinces her husband to live a life of chastity after being directed to this life via a vision. In the case of Birgitta, this vision occurred while on pilgrimage and she returns after vowing to live a chaste life. Parallels can be made between this dynamic in Birgtitta's household and Margery Kempe's, which also became a chaste marriage after a vision from God.
3. The refined nature of the linguistic elements and content of the *Revelationes* will be discussed in the next section of this work, Birgitta and *Parrhesia*.
4. For more on the mystical marriage, please Bynum's (1998) *Holy feast holy Fast* for an overview of the subject. Many more specific discussions have been penned, including Kugeler-Race's (2018) "Carnal manifestations of divine love in the mystical writings of Elsbeth of Oye, Mechthild of Magdebrug and Margery Kempe," Smith's (2001) "Remembering the rhetorics of women: the case of Jane Leed" about an Early Modern mystic, to Graziano's (2004) *Wounds of love: The mystical marriage of Saint Rose of Lima*, about the first New World saint.
5. Frey's dissertation dovetails nicely with Victor Vitanza's (1997) *Negation, subjectivity, and the history of rhetoric* in which he notes that connections can be made between positions of rhetorical power and oppression. This concept of rhetoric and oppression is reflected upon in Gray-Rosendale and Gruber's (2001) edited volume *Alternative rhetorics: Challenges to the rhetorical tradition*. In the introduction to Part I of the volume, Changing Histories, Changing Lives", the editors ask pointed questions regarding rhetoric and power, most importantly for this study "What examples of historical accounts of rhetoric should be unearthed, and how does doing so shift how we view received histories of the discipline? (16). One might equate this to how power and authorial voice in Birgitta is "unearthed" in the *Revelationes extravaganes* as opposed to the more refined and polished texts presented in the more widely read *Revelationes*.
6. There are various articles that deal with the demonic in visionary texts. Two of the many valuable resources on the dangers of visions which include the demonic include Gwenfair Walters Adams (2007) chapter on "Spiritual Warfare in Medieval Encounters" and Nancy Caciola's (2007) *Discerning spirits: Divine and demonic possession in the Middle Ages.*
7. To validate the visions, it is noted that "Prior Petrus and Blessed Katerina, daughter of St. Birgitta, testified to the truth of these revelations (i.e, that they were divinely revealed) before her [Birgitta's] canonization" (Searby 2015, 229).
8. As noted earlier in Searby (2015), these visions were included in a "body of supplementary material".... a selection of 'extravagant, stray, isolated'" visions (119).

9. There are many fine works regarding the authorship of The Book of Margery Kempe. Some of the most salient include Francois Le Saux's (1992) "'Hir not lettyrd': Margery Kempe and writing", John Hirsch's (1975) "Author and scribe in the Book of Margery Kempe", and Elizabeth Passmore's (2003) "Painting lions, drawing lines, writing lives: Male authorship in the lives of Christina of Markyate, Margery Kempe and Margaret Paston".
10. One might liken this to the temptation of Eve in the Garden of Eden by the Devil. Mary of Oignies, for instance, engages in flagellation because she gives in to the temptation of tasting earthly food, thus subverting the importance of relying on heavenly food for sustenance. As Bynum (1998) rightly point out, there is a desire among many mystics for to substitute "holy food (Eucharist) for ordinary eating" (117) as the former was considered "pure" and the latter "corrupted" and not as nourishing for the body/soul.
11. It should be noted that most often male mystics are fed by Christ, whereas female mystics are shown to feed him.
12. I have "sex" in quotation marks here, because there is no indication that there was a restriction, as was common in the Middle Ages, on the day/time of year in which the conjugal visit occurred. Because of this, there is no indication that a restriction was transgressed and that the married couple sinned in their relations.

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Nomadic Subjectivities: Reflections on Exophonic Strategies in Yoko Tawada's *Schwager in Bordeaux*

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Abstract:

The author Yoko Tawada is well known for her exophonic and experimental work. Writing in German and in Japanese, she joyfully plays with questions of identity, nation-state, culture, language, among other. As exophony in theory and practice is at the center of each of her novels, it thus appears interesting to look closer to the strategies Tawada develops in order to disturb and subvert categorizations. Taking *Schwager in Bordeaux* as a case study, this paper intends to analyze how Tawada's exophony de/construct subjectivity. It will first put light on the very concept of exophony, before leaving the space for a close reading analysis of the novel on two specific aspects: dematerialization and rematerialization, which both will aim to draw an exophonic portrait of nomadic writing through its focus on subjectivity.

Keywords: Exophony, Subjectivity, Language, Yoko Tawada, *Schwager in Bordeaux*.

Introduction: Marking the Subject/s

In response to being asked why she writes not only in German, but also in Japanese, Yoko Tawada [多和田葉子/Tawada Yōko] explains: "I am a bilingual being. I don't know why exactly, but, for me, it's inconceivable to stick to only one language." (Gutjahr 2012, 29; my translation)[1] In her portraying a subjectivity navigating offshore, that is, away from monolingualism, the author has created an impressive body of work: since 1987, she has published more than 55 books – approximately half of which are in German, and performed 1170 readings around the world (Tawada 2020, online). She is recipient of numerous prestigious prizes for her literary oeuvre, such as the 1993 Akutagawa-shō (Japan), the 1996 Adelbert-von-Chamiso-Preis (Germany), the 2005 Goethe-Medaille (Germany), the 2013 Yomiuri bungaku-shō (Japan), or the 2016 Kleist-Preis (Germany) (*ibid*.). Her work has also been extensively researched: from dissertations to articles over anthologies, from German to Japanese including French or Dutch. For the past two decades, critics have not ceased working on Tawada's writing. In 2010, for instance, two anthologies were published: Christine Ivanovic's *Yoko Tawada: Poetik der Transformation. Beiträge zum Gesamtwerk* [Yoko Tawada: Poetics of Transformation. Contributions to her oeuvre] and Bernard Banoun's and Linda Koiran-Leiduck's *L'oreiller occidental-oriental de Yoko Tawada* [The

Occidental-Oriental Pillow of Yoko Tawada]. Interestingly, "Tawada's scholarship is a bit tipsy [...] from so much – admittedly necessary – talk of her writing project as a transformative one." (Adelson 2011, 166) For critics, transformation appears to be the author's strategic approach to topics such as culture, identity, colonialism, language, translation – the process through which she aims to question the globalized world in which we live.

Nevertheless, Tawada cannot be placed among writers of *Migrationsliteratur* [migration literature], for not only does this term reduce her writing practice as such, but it also tends to consider her work as being from a Japanese author who sees Germany with a Japanese eye (Horst 2009, online). Nor can she be considered solely as a writer of *Nihon bungaku* [Japanese literature] because she also writes in German, she thus stands in between (Tawada 2003, 7-10). This in-between creative space enables her to claim an "exophonic literature" (*ibid*., 7; my translation), in which translation is central. The "rare language combination with relatively few joint readers," the constant "switch[ing] between her two languages," and the inscription of "bilingual perspective into each of her oeuvres in subtle, deconstructive ways" construct "[t]he particular form of Tawada's literary bilingualism" (Yildiz 2012, 111).

The very act of writing in a foreign language, as an exophonic act, is illustrated by her novel *Schwager in Bordeaux* [Brother-in-law in Bordeaux] (2008), which was first written in German and then translated into Japanese (Saito 2010, 526). Tawada tells the story of Yuna, a young Japanese woman who studies and works in Hamburg, and who wants to learn French. Through her relationship to Renée, an older German woman, with whom she has an erotic connection, she obtains the opportunity to go to Bordeaux and stay in the house of Renée's brother-in-law, Maurice. The novel is less the story of this stay than an eclectic amalgam of recollections of past events and experiences in which a great number of secondary characters navigate. Exophonically playing with languages, Tawada also "[s]trategically insert[s] non-translation [...] in [her] writing[]": *Schwager in Bordeaux* namely contains "two-hundred-and-seventy-five *kanji* throughout [the] German text" (Brandt 2014, 183). Yet, the paragraphs' content holds on to the meaning/s of the ideograms introducing them. This exophonic translation cannot but disturb the idea of construction. In fact, inasmuch as the author reveals binarism by depicting two linguistic and thus two identity shores on which she does not want to disembark, incorporating a sort of nomadism, she points to a problematic conception of the world, as she states: "These days, everything has to be fast and easily understandable." (Horst 2009, online; my translation) Thus, a question arises: How does Tawada's exophony de/construct subjectivity? Taking *Schwager in Bordeaux* as a case study, the following sections will first shed light on the concept of exophony. This paper will then turn to a close reading of the novel which will focus on two specific aspects: dematerialization and rematerialization. Both will aim to respond to the question *mark* regarding subjectivity in Tawada's text. To better understand the paradoxical feeling that one might feel while reading *Schwager in Bordeaux*, for "it's not easy to give a 'whatness' to her writing," although it entails a "[m]agnificent [s]trangeness" (Galchen 2012, online), let us *exophonize* about this "crazy book" (Martin 2009, online).

On Exophony: Subtle *Schweinerei*

In her essay collection entitled *Ekusophonī: bōgo no soto e deru tabi* [Exophony: Traveling Outward from One's Mother Tongue], Tawada explains the concept of exophony, of which she first heard at a literature symposium in Dakar in 2002 (2003, 3). Eschewing any easy categorization of it as creole or migration literature, she states: "exophony refers to the general state of being outside one's mother tongue" (*ibid*.; my translation). Further, she considers exophony as symphony, and thereby implies the variety of *musicality* in other languages, hearing new/foreign words being the first step taken outside one's mother tongue (*ibid*., 7). She also insists on the particularity of exophonic writing as making what one does not see visible, which can prompt a feeling of strangeness to the native speaker (*ibid*., 10). Nevertheless, this strangeness is not to be understood as a misuse of words, grammar, etc., but as the way in which exophony appears. This resistance to the monolingual paradigm (Schyns 2019, 127) enables one to consider exophony "as a means with which to resist fixity and assimilation" (Young 2016, 193). Victoria Young is thus correct to point out that exophony is "the condition of displacement as something innate within *all* language and writing" (*ibid*.; emphasis in the original). This displacement echoes Tawada's very position, which she explains as that of being, in her case, between two languages (2003, 36).

Three aspects can be discerned in Tawada's theory on exophony as the process of: defamiliarization, deconstruction, and translation (i.e., the emphasis on the symphonic quality of language, the displacement and movement within language, the strangeness in the use of a foreign language). They are very much interconnected, as they all refer to the *sensuality* of language, that is, the visual/graphic and the acoustic elements of language with which Tawada delightfully plays.

First, Tawada insists that the foreign language should be used as a medium for everyday interactions as well as for creative writing (Suga 2007, 26). This implies a detachment from one's mother tongue: an author should stand outside of it (Koiran 2009, 259). As Yasemin Yildiz rightly states: "This detachment is enabled by a multilingual environment, not because any specific language is preferred over another one, but because multilingualism can defamiliarize the very language structures in which we exist." (2007, 80) Considered as a process of defamiliarization from one's own language, exophony also refuses the assimilation of the foreign language as a second mother tongue: the former cannot become the latter. Creative writing appears to Tawada as "a foreign language" in itself (Koiran 2009, 277; my translation). Referring to the author's work of defamiliarization as an avoidance of mere repetition of words that have already been heard (Suga 2007, 27), the confrontation with the foreign tongue allows the writer to 'work on' words and ensures a reflection on language and its use. The reformulation of words and the defamiliarization process go hand in hand: to distance words from their meaning enables the very act of creative writing.

Second, the process of defamiliarization invites a "creative destruction" (Mae 2010, 380). Exophonic writing appears as a form of language deconstruction, which entails its reconstruction on the author's own terms (Tachibana 2007, 153). Here one might recall postmodernism, the focus of which is "to *de-naturalize* some of the dominant features of our way of life" (Hutcheon 1989, 2; my emphasis).

In this way, it becomes possible to see the very metamorphosis of language (Mae 2010, 379) through the exophonic appropriation of a foreign language. Interestingly, this materialization of language, insisting on its visual/graphic and acoustic aspects, enables at the same time the dematerialization of meaning: thwarting the assertion of a possible pre-lingual meaning to words, Tawada joyfully presents a sort of depth to words in their interconnections with other words of their own linguistic category as well as with other languages. Hence, language moves in itself: this "autonomous metamorphosis of a text" (Sakai 2010, 442) relies less on the "transmission of meaning" (*ibid.*, 441). Rather, Tawada's deconstruction highlights her predilection for wordplay, irony, and humor, among other techniques, which ensure a constant going in and out of a linguistic area that cannot but recall the very act of translation.

Third, exophony implies translation, so as "to make visible what is invisible and repressed in the language we use in our daily life" (Arens 2007, 64). In fact, Tawada's will to find words to depict the undepictable calls for this necessary translation. As the author herself states: "When I'm writing, it is always a translation in its broad sense" (*ibid.*; my translation). Thus, translation combines with creation, revealing the very act of writing (Suga 2007, 21). Translation here is not to be understood as "a process of literal translation from the mother tongue" (Wright 2010, 26), but as the deconstruction of the myth of the original. Tawada's creative writing exposes exophony as a "translation[] without original[]": broadening perspectives, exophony presents "languages from unexpected vantage points" (Anderson 2010, 55), while allowing the author, as well as her readers, to "discover something in 'unexpected' tunes" (Tachibana 2010, 282). Two characteristics stand out here: on the one hand, this shifting pertains to a "mizo (gap) or 'Zwischenraum'" (*ibid.*, 277), a 'within' that yet does not imply bordering; on the other hand, it "involves a constant process of self-translation" (Suga 2007, 27), which echoes an *in-between-ness*. Referring to language, especially to its phonetic and semantic features, Suga Keijirō's above observation of self-translation also resonates with Susan C. Anderson's comment about the "surface translation" particular to Tawada's writing (2010, 64): "Language in Tawada's works is [...] physically real but also alien, and the only way for the subject to express this strangeness is through translating. This is always both insufficient and liberating" (*ibid.*, 66). A sort of unlocatedness that is entangled in a sense of the nomadic, permeates the novel and calls into question the materiality of the authorial persona.

Hence, if languages cannot contain an identity, how does an author exist and what do they*[2] permit by creating something quite concrete in this vagueness? What position can they* take while detaching themselves* from language? In fact, in her essay entitled "Tawada does not exist," Tawada affirms the importance for the author of detachment from the text: the author as human being disappears, for the focus is on "[t]he authorial image produced from the work [– an image, which] is the true author, and the living person who exists as the author may be, in relation to the text, a complete stranger." (2007a, 15) Not that the author is dead (as Roland Barthes stipulated), but that the "author in the traditional sense," in the view of postmodern creative writing, does not exist, for a text is not considered as being "original": it is seen as a collection of other texts, revealing its whole intertextuality (Broich 1997, 251). Tawada indeed explains that "[t]he meaning of the author's nonexistence will itself have changed" (2007a, 17). The authorial 'I' is thus merely a role taken on by it and symbolizes the very play and production on a stage (Gutjahr 2012, 26-27). It dresses up, depending on the story and on the content, which reveals a form of adaptation. This recalls again the process of translation. As a result, one is confronted with an author as "in-between space" (Arens 2007, 62): the authorial 'I' cannot be located so easily, if at all, or be reduced to belonging to one place. This inspires and responds to the nomadic aspect of the text, and also reminds us of postmodern writing. As Linda Hutcheon states: "No longer to believe in the 'author' as a person may be another way to restore the wholeness of the act of enunciation. The producer would be known as a position [...] to be filled within the text." (1988, 81)

Further, the author's unlocatedness influences the possible narrator's unlocatedness; both mirror the nomadic aspect of Tawada's texts. Language here seems to become the means to disrupt boundaries of enunciation, and to multiply acts and positions of enunciation. Chantal Wright's assertion concerning one's acquisition of a foreign language is thus questionable. She argues that "[t]o write in a language which is not one's mother tongue means that one has already made it one's own and, if it proves unsuitable for one's purposes, that one hammers it and bends it and shapes it until it goes where one wants it to go and does what one needs it to do." (Wright 2010, 23) Foreign language appears here at the service of the author, *forcibly* transformed to correspond with their* intention. As much as Wright warns us not to evacuate the author's intention in their* use of a foreign language by enumerating points of tension for the translation of such texts (*ibid.*, 26-33), she does not take into account the very process of "defamiliariz[ation] and foreigniz[ation] [of] the German language" with which she concludes her article (*ibid*., 36). Underscoring the "confrontational" of German exophonic text, she is surely insisting on the resistance of "straightforward translation" (*ibid*.). However, the 'violence' that seems to result from such exophonic texts does not render the "free floating and transnational intellectuality" as well as "the emancipation from identity schemes" (Ivanovic 2010, 175). The author does not force a foreign language to reveal itself, so as to express what they* want to convey; they* show the finite and infinite in every language, that is, the process of defamiliarization, deconstruction, and translation surpasses the dubious reduction of a word to a pre-lingual meaning, while, at the same time, overcoming the monolingualism and entering a postmonolingual space. This "postmonolingual" refers both to a "temporal dimension" of "the effects of the monolingual," and to "a critical function," highlighting "the struggle *against* the monolingual paradigm." (Yildiz 2012, 4; emphasis in the original)

Therefore, exophony appears as an act of redefinition of space, time, persona, people, things, etc. and calls into question subjectivity as much as materiality. Identity is put at stake, echoing the hybridity of its composition and refusing its reduction to a culture and a nation. Author, narrator, protagonist, and characters all find themselves in this in-between space, and so, incorporate this very unlocatedness. For instance, the following passage illustrates the process of exophonic writing in its creativity.

> 肉
> [...] In dem Schwein ist Wein enthalten, und in dem Wein liegt ein Ei, sagte Yuna. (Tawada 2011 [2008], 114-115)
> [肉 [...] In the swine is wine contained, and in the wine lays a *yellow eye*, said Yuna. (my translation, focusing on the meaning and the wordplay; my emphasis)]

The *kanji* (ideogram) "肉" (*niku*) introduces the most obvious topic of this paragraph: meat as eaten by humans and flesh as eaten by animals. The free association of "Schwein" [pork] with "Wein" [wine] implies a meal: meat and drink. "Ei" [egg], which also contains proteins, mirrors "Schwein" and "Wein." The visual/graphic deconstruction of language responds to a defamiliarization through the play around the invisible: a native speaker might not automatically *see* the words "Wein" and "Ei" in "Schwein". Yet the acoustic aspect of "Ei," of course phonetically connected to "Schwein" and "Wein," does point us to a less obvious topic: subjectivity linked to translation. In fact, while the German words "Ei" and "Schwein" connect with the Japanese word "肉" (*niku*), the sound of "Ei" recalls the English "I" and "eye." Therefore, this passage provides a good example of multilingualism, considered in its 'postmonolingual' sense, enabling a *moving* translation. The "Ei"/"I" refers to a subjectivity that is yet not fixed, while "Ei"/"eye" implies, in a tune of defamiliarization, deconstruction, and translation, the visual/graphic aspect of language, which helps Tawada to play, experiment, and create language/s in a multicultural space (Finger 2011, 261). Confronted with a subtle *Schweinerei* [mess], which is produced from the wordplay around Schwein/Wein/Ei, the subjectivity's meat [*niku*] echoes the words' flesh [*niku*], so as to overcome the mind/body separation and at the same time question materiality.

Tawada's theory and practice of exophony thus pertains to defamiliarization, deconstruction, and translation, and underscores questions of subjectivity and materiality. Those are the very keywords around which the selected novel, *Schwager in Bordeaux*, is built and is building, as the following analysis will demonstrate, for

> [i]n your mother tongue, words are attached to your person, so you rarely experience a playful, pleasurable sense of language. In your mother tongue, thoughts cling so closely to words that neither can take flight independently. In a foreign language, however, you have something like a staple remover: it removes what makes things cling to one another. (Tawada, McNichol 2014, 143)

Dematerialization: The Sea of Death

Extending exophonic strategies to question subjectivity, Tawada depicts a dematerialization of identity. Through a critical position about the "unequivocal identity assignments" (Pelletier 2015, 190; my translation), the author throws her readers into a sea of strangeness: the ideograms introducing each paragraph of the novel reflect alterity, as few readers will have access to both her German and Japanese work (*ibid*., 191); they also echo the fragmentation of memories that form the basis of the novel's content. Those very elements could lead us to the importance of death in the novel: the death of a stable identity. Putting "existence [...] under the sign of nomadism" (*ibid*.; my translation), Tawada thus offers us an impressionist painting of the sea of death: making visible the invisible, rendering dematerialization possible – a process that will be analyzed in the following three points.

First, the author disrupts the expectations that the title of the book advances: *Schwager in Bordeaux* does not tell about the protagonist's family story, for Maurice who lives in Bordeaux, is the brother-in-law of Renée, a friend in Hamburg with whom Yuna has an erotic relationship (Genz 2011, 64). Although Julia Genz explains that the second half of the title symbolizes disorientation because Maurice is not staying in Bordeaux, which enables Yuna to stay at his house (*ibid*., 65), one might also point out that the word "Schwager" itself contradicts Maurice's behavior, for it implies a certain stability through marriage. Therefore, exophony is here displayed: while the defamiliarization can be taken in its literal sense of troubling family relations, the deconstruction also blurs the structure of locatedness and status. Further, translation appears particularly in "Bordeaux": phonetically and orthographically recalling '*bord d'eau*' [waterfront], it also evokes a "state of uncertainty" (Koiran 2010, 337; my translation), which refers to the *in-between-ness* of temporal and spatial departure and arrival on which the novel builds (*ibid*., 346). Indeed, even as Yuna is arriving in Bordeaux, she is recounting memories of her time in Hamburg, the place of her departure. Translation, having no original for Tawada, insists on the nomadic identity, which can no longer rely on a specific space and time.

Moreover, the protagonist's arrival in the central station of Bordeaux (Tawada 2011 [2008], 7-8) underlines this *sense* of displacement. Explaining the "displacement from one's native tongue" with a blurred vision, Young argues here on the "disturbance of sight" that entails a "disorientation felt by Yuna." (2016, 198) However, given that the protagonist has already been disoriented by her arrival in Germany and by her confrontation with the German language, her disorientation in Bordeaux does not refer to her mother tongue, Japanese, but to a foreign language, German. That is not to say that the latter becomes the former, in terms of category. Rather, this displacement of sight is doubled: neither Japanese – present through the use of ideograms, nor German – serving as the text language, can help Yuna in this "unfamiliar cacophony" (*ibid*.) formed by suitcases, in cafés, etc. (Tawada 2011 [2008], 7) In fact, the protagonist and Maurice, who comes to pick her up, are communicating in English (*ibid*.). The delightful lost-in-translation state (in) which Yuna navigates, recalls the title. The cacophony becomes a symphony, which could be linked to the metaphoric dynamic of waves, for movements (separated or not) compose symphony. Thus, the image of water acquires its full meaning: "it is maybe a standing still and a hearing at the edge of sea, at the waterfront in Hamburg (the North German coast) and at the other waterfront (bord d'eau)." (Waterhouse 2011, 57; my translation) The displacement of space, time, and language reveals its potential in the dematerialization of identity – diluted in water, deafened by languages, yet realizing itself in nomadic ways.

Second, this assertion of a constant movement, that is, a displacement of persona in an undefined range of space and time, can be observed in Yuna's way of dealing with death.

> Eine Katze im Meer suchen: dieses Sprichwort behauptet nicht etwa, dass die Suche umsonst sei, sondern dass man in einem Meer alles Mögliche finden kann, sogar etwas Unerwartetes. Fahr zu einem Meer und starre auf seine Oberfläche. Stundenlang, tagelang. Eine Katze im Meer suchen: ein Sprichwort, das Yuna erfunden hat. (Tawada 2011 [2008], 200)
> [Looking for a cat in the sea: This proverb does not more or less claim that the search would be pointless, but that one can find anything possible in a sea, even something unexpected. Go to a sea and stare at its surface. For hours, for days. Looking for a cat in the sea: a proverb that Yuna invented. (my translation)]

In this quotation, one might see a sort of conclusion, implicitly containing all the elements proper to Yuna's story. The homophony between *see* and *sea* that we will allow ourselves here, points to a sort of fluidity: not only does it reveal a constant displacement through the motif of water (sea), but it also highlights a fuzziness through the multiplication of viewpoints (see). In this area without border, in this *in-between-ness*, Yuna tells of her grief in fragments. The cat in this sea that Yuna seems to look for ("suchen"), which implies the use of sight, recalls her dead cat Tamao (Tawada 2011 [2008], 93-94, 197). This also reminds Yuna of the people she has known in her life who have died (her friends Carl, Ingrid, and her colleague Walter), disappeared (Maurice, her office's cleaner Gera) or who are somehow stuck in life (her friends Lilie, Elena, and her acquaintance Hilde, Uta) (*ibid*., 195-196, 199-200). This motionlessness of the characters, for they stay in one place and one situation, seems thus to oppose Yuna's presumed mobility, as she travels to Bordeaux.

Further, Yuna points to an "Oberfläche" [surface], which alludes to the "surface translation" as a sign of "strangeness" (Anderson 2010, 64). It also evokes the surface of the human body in responding to this idea of motion. Here, the surface can be interpreted as skin. As Jeremy Redlich states, "[s]kin can be understood as a protective sheath that ultimately conceals the authentic essence that lies beneath, thereby making it foreign and external to the 'true' self. On the other hand, skin can be viewed as the essence of the subject itself, standing metonymically for the whole as opposed to foreign to it." (2010, 75) However, the "Oberfläche" disturbs any essentialism: not only is the "Oberfläche" the surface of water, pointing to blurred boundaries and constant redefinition or dilution, as if identity were becoming *invisible*, but it also refers to the superficial (in German: *oberflächlich*), that is, the irrelevance of boundaries. Aligned with this connection between surface/skin and body, the "Oberfläche" thus "unsettl[es] the congealed materiality of human borders [...] [and] [u]ltimately the very notion of a 'natural' body or 'authentic, essentialised' identity" (*ibid*., 76). The deconstruction of identity here leaves space for the unexpectedness and the infinite possibilities that the quotation implies, and relies on both the protagonist and the secondary characters: Tawada describes their "perpetual state of transformation" (*ibid*.). What is/becomes strange is identity in its fixed form; what is/becomes familiar is subjectivity in its dematerialized form.

Third, one could say that the novel is more a story of others than of Yuna. If Bernard Banoun suggests a transferred autobiographical pact between the protagonist and the author because of the Japanese and German languages they both understand, unlike the readers who are defamiliarized, and because Tawada's novel is a *mise en abyme* of Yuna's writing project (2010, 463), he does not question the notion of subjectivity. In fact, it is not a "similarity" between Yuna and Tawada (*ibid*.), which would contradict the author's postmodern posture, but a fusion between protagonist and secondary characters that ensures a dematerializing of identity. As Genz rightly argues, all author characters in the novel are "infected by a reduction of their writing activities" (2012, 195; my translation). This point of convergence alludes not only to a merging between characters, but could also signify a sort of destruction of materiality in its first sense: Yuna, Maurice, Renée, and others do not write anymore or are only barely able to do so, that is, the words cannot be materialized, made visible. Hence, Genz's interpretation of the triangular relation between Yuna, Maurice, and Renée as a sort of Japanese *translation* of Racine's *Phèdre* in Nō theater style (2011, 65), like the one the protagonist claims to be willing to stage (Tawada 2011 [2008], 13), is relevant less for its interesting argumentation, than for the accent on the Nō theater. Because Kabuki theater focuses on family relations – relations that are already put at stake in the title, as shown above, Nō theater appears as the best option: it stages ghosts and death (Genz 2011, 66), which shed light on Yuna's close bond with death in her encounters with others (e.g., her work colleague Walter's suicide (Tawada 2011 [2008], 65, 199-200)) and in her life (e.g., Tamao's death).

Hence, Tawada deprives the characters of any markers of fixed identity – such as an ID card, a paper stating name, space, and time, or by giving them a ghostly shape, extending Genz's argumentation and echoing the motif of water. The very fact that they have writer's block implies the impossibility of telling themselves about themselves, and thereby overcoming the fixating on one aspect that a normative identity tends to do. Interestingly, Yuna appears in the third person singular, already implying that she is not telling her story herself (Genz 2012, 195-196). The fact that the narrator is reduced to a mere observer underscores the fact that she has no point of reference (*ibid*.). Bearing in mind the process of translation inherent to exophony, one could argue that the feminine third person singular in German (*sie*) cannot but suggest the (feminine, masculine, and neutral) third person plural (*sie*) as well as the polite pronoun (*Sie*). One might go as far as underlining the phonetic and graphic similarity between those pronouns and the conjugation of the verb "sehen" [to see] in the present tense: *du siehst, er/sie/es sieht* [you see, he/she/it sees]. Inasmuch as the viewpoint can be multiple here, the narrative posture of the novel has already established a displacement of subjectivity that goes beyond place and time, beyond boundaries. Moreover, although others fill the novel through Yuna's memories, they are merely considered as a whole. The visual aspect, mirroring the graphic aspect of language in '*sie/sehen*,' reveals itself at its fullest: the protagonist tends to reduce these other character to mere colors. This process of depersonalization takes place in present of narrative, that is, when Yuna is at Bordeaux's swimming pool, while remembering past events. She then *sees* a boy with "some red welts" and "a woman with a blue swim cap" (Tawada 2011 [2008], 189; my translation). One might also detect a doubling effect: colors can be diluted in water. Not only the personae cannot have a *present*, but they are also deprived of any *fixed* identity, as if they were thrown into a sea of death.

As an exophonic text, *Schwager in Bordeaux* reveals the very tension inherent to materiality. Being outside any boundaries, Tawada's characters navigate in murky areas. This lack of substance is not so much the result of an immateriality that Douglas Slaymaker considers as typical of Tawada's writing and in which "travelers move across space, across time, back into memories, and out again into the future" (2007, 2); rather, it is referring to one's confrontation with a dematerialization as an experiment on identity, which aims to free it from any frame. The water as a true companion on this quest for death responds to the interconnected aspects of exophony. From the dilution of identity, in the sea of death, Tawada thus proposes a "reinvention of subjectivity as a conjoined literary and social project in [her] oeuvre." (Adelson 2011, 158)

Rematerialization: The Tower of Babel

The complexity of *Schwager in Bordeaux* reveals itself in the apparent contradiction between dematerialization of identity and rematerialization of language. Not quite an opposition, but rather a continuity in Tawada's practice of exophony, this ambivalence should be considered as a means to illustrate the constant translation with which characters deal. In fact, "language threatens one with captivity and suffocation, but words also provide the keys to loosen such constraints." (Slaymaker 2007, 6) Control, as synonymous with conventions, does not exist (anymore). Rematerialization responds to deconstruction, the aim of which is to reconstruct language *weirdly*, *strangely*. Through this process, language enables subjectivity to embrace freedom from normative injunctions, as much as does the dematerialization of identity, specifically with the merging of characters. Rematerialization also induces defamiliarization from one's mother tongue and from foreign languages. As Tawada claims, "[I] lose [...] Japanese when I'm writing in German, and then I have to reclaim it. I have to start from scratch" (Horst 2009, online; my translation). Polyphonic and hybrid – so: exophonic, *Schwager in Bordeaux* thus offers us the sinking of the Tower of Babel in deep water, as the following will describe in three stages.

First, exophonic creative writing calls into question rules in and for language, through which the process of defamiliarization, deconstruction, and translation appears. Grammar symbolizes conventions here, as if "grammar were a law" (Tawada 2011 [2008], 62; my translation) and puts the persons learning a foreign language at risk, insofar as they may overrule the norms. The phonetic and orthographic similarity between *law* and *low* that we will allow ourselves here, cannot but illustrate the imprisonment: breaking the law means being low in the social hierarchy, which is made by language and only becomes visible by the very breaking of law. 'Low' could also allude to Yuna's frustration: at a younger age, she indeed tried to learn French in a school in Osaka; yet she was mocked – that is, lowered – by her teacher Viviane whose Japanese was perfect (*ibid.*, 60-61). Hence, grammar can be regarded as the imposition of law, the overstepping of which results in a criminalization, which in turn hinders imagination, that is, the enthusiasm of learning (Genz 2012, 190). Interestingly, Tawada does not suggest the necessity to master language here, but only to consider it in its uncertainty. In her subverting of linguistic rules by playing with words and following the principle of free association (Bay 2012, 261), the author insists on the "non-availability [of language]," which echoes the exophonic translation without original (Genz 2011, 66). In a process of rematerialization, ideograms are used, and then meaningfully deconstructed in a paragraph in German, in order to demonstrate the "experience of/in the moment" (*ibid*.; my translation), which is bound to a *sense* of defamiliarization.

Further, this sense of defamiliarization is less the effect of the detachment from one's mother tongue, than of the ridiculed insistence on grammar and other linguistic 'laws,' as the following example demonstrates:

> 迷
> [...] Hätte Yuna alle Wörter streng nach Kategorien sortiert und eingesperrt, hätte sie sie sofort wieder finden können. Vogelnamen zu Vogelnamen, Schimpfwörter zu Schimpfwörtern, Adjektive zu Adjektiven. (Tawada 2011 [2008], 98-100)
> [迷 [...] Had Yuna strictly arranged and locked up all words in categories, she would have been able to find them again immediately. *Fowl* names to *fowl* names, *foul* words to *foul* words, adjectives to adjectives. (my translation, focusing literally on the meaning and the acoustic; my emphasis)]

The apparent necessity to arrange words in categories is here an irony, as in German, the word for 'categories' is synonymous with the word for 'swear words.' The subversive accumulation of names appears even more humorous through their metonymic relation as well as the flattening of proper speech to familiar speech: "Vogelnamen" ['swear word' in familiar speech] echoes "Schimpfwörter" ['swear word' in proper speech]. In addition, one might note the possibility of overcoming the revulsion to grammar. In fact, deconstruction can free language from the cage that "Vogelname," literally meaning 'bird's name,' implies. As much as "language [is] [...] [a] perpetual failure and [this] failure [is] [...] [a] chance" (Finger 2011, 261; my translation), this failure is itself doubled. Using Cécile Sakai's suggestion to consider ideograms as plurivalent in Tawada's writing (2010, 434-435), one might argue that the *kanji*迷 (*mei*) recalls, through its meanings, the failure of one to learn (迷 as astray, lost) as well as the failure of language to explain (迷as err, illusion), which Yuna herself observes earlier in the novel (Tawada 2011 [2008], 32). The rematerialization of language surpasses boundaries. Paper is thus seen to be as fluid as water, and language as irregular as subjectivity; both *incorporate* the nomadic.

Second, the disruption of language caused by its deconstruction appears in the exophonic conception of multilingualism. Because Tawada's narrator and even the author can be seen sometimes as a medium, a conduit, or the "pavement trampled in the onrush of language and speakers" (Slaymaker 2007, 6), the focus turns to the words themselves, which still need to be conveyed, yet are freed from any assigning: "[a] word can be many words, as much as a language can, at the same time, be many languages" (Tawada 2007b, 27; my translation). Thus Yuna remembers reading a book by a Hungarian author, which had to do with the movie theater "Utopie" in Bordeaux (Tawada 2011 [2008], 98). Interestingly, the protagonist highlights the author's inclination towards multilingualism as a means to avoid a tower of Babel, for "a high tower is always dangerous." (*ibid*.; my translation) Contrary to imprisoning stability that the tower of Babel represents, and in an inversion of the biblical blight of a multilingualism used to punish humanity for its hubris (Genesis 11:1-9, online), Tawada proposes multilingualism as a gift, and insists on its fluid materiality, which is inherent to translation. "[D]rawing beyond [her] primary languages of German and Japanese" (Adelson 2011, 157), the author goes on to French and Portuguese: thus the Japanese パン (*pan*) is not taken from the French '*pain*,' but from the Portuguese '*pão*' (Tawada 2011 [2008], 150): the fluidity in/of words enables the constant metamorphosis of language, not in order to propose new rules, but to point out the danger of framing.

Moreover, recalling Slaymaker's consideration of the narrator/writer as a medium or a conduit (2007, 6), the effect of language on body that Shigemi Nakagawa reads out of the novel as experiment (2010, 660) or that Michiko Mae understands to be a part of Tawada's "aesthetic strategy" (2010, 381), takes on here its full meaning: not only is the body of the protagonist doubtful through her merging with secondary characters and their depersonalization, as explained above, but the confusion of Japanese and German also calls the body of the text into question. Although each paragraph in German begins with a *kanji*, the length of the paragraphs as well as the importance of the *kanji* are constantly disturbed. Visually speaking, large-sized *kanji* are printed on pages where there is no German to see, even if they recall the paragraph in German in which they occur. Pushing the limits even of paper as material and considering it as language in itself, this multilingual structure, in being *exophonically* decomposed in front of our eyes, restores a certain freedom to language and cannot but recall its fluidity. One might wonder how far Tawada can push the motive of water in her conception of language; if the novel's *un-structure* surely illustrates exophony through its process of defamiliarization, deconstruction, and translation, Tom Rigault's observations will appear revealing. He claims an "art of confusion," an "editorial poetics" in Tawada's oeuvre, that is to say that the very text as object echoes the complex expression of multilingualism (2017, online; my translation). *Schwager in Bordeaux* is thus the theater of fluid multilingualism: blurred to sight, adaptable to touch, cacophonic to hearing, water enables the cracking of the tower of Babel. Tawada proposes here a rematerialization of language, which struggles against its traditional (and familiar) conception, *waving* at a dematerialized subjectivity.

Third, the novel's end, which revolves around the very de/materialization of Yuna, is the epitome of this rematerialization of language, for it binds the questioning of grammar and multilingualism through the motive of water. Interrogated on the novel's title, which could be easily misread as "*Schwanger in Bordeaux*" [pregnant in Bordeaux], Tawada validates the hypothesis, even explaining that the lack of a determiner permits such association (Klook 2008, online). The protagonist could be the very prototype of exophony. In fact, Yuna is living an "existential crisis" (Genz 2012, 200; my translation): at the Bordeaux swimming pool, the protagonist carries with her a dictionary (German-French), which is stolen, as she is in the pool. Lost, she runs after the thief whom she calls Zoé, because only the last letter of the alphabet is free (Tawada 2011 [2008], 192-196) –

ironically playing with the arbitrary rule of the alphabet's ordering. Once again, one is faced with a doubling effect: as much as Yuna loses language through the loss of her dictionary, which is very material, the letter Z of the name Zoé signifies an end, as a sort of death of language. Interestingly, it is the thief who enables Yuna to open her changing room: having given up on finding Zoé and her dictionary, the protagonist stands helpless – even speechless – in front of the changing room, not remembering the code, which is her birth date (*ibid*., 202). Zoé *literally* pops up and enters the code, opening the room (*ibid*., 204). Here, the code, that is, numbers, becomes a "minimal biography" (Genz 2012, 200; my translation) to Yuna: numbers are translated into letters, insofar as the birth date enables a legalizing of a birth name. This alternate access to writing (*ibid*., 201) can therefore be interpreted as a rematerialization of language.

Further, the motive of water helps to rematerialize language as much as to de/materialize Yuna. Already implied by the changing room that Andrea Bandhauer rightly sees as a "transitory place of function," that is, a "place on the threshold of water, that fluid place, where dissolution and change are for Tawada made possible" (2012, 212-213; my translation), water gains its importance through the symbolism of maternity. In fact, shortly before Yuna got stolen, the water around her becomes pink (Tawada 2011 [2008], 192), as if to signify that the novel's waters were breaking to give birth to a protagonist. By going out of the pool to run after the thief and later 'receiving' her birth date, Yuna seems to reclaim her subjectivity through a play of rematerialization in a fluid dematerialization. However, this subjectivity is not to be misunderstood as identity, which the very last *kanji* of the novel highlights. As Yumiko Saito explains, the ideogram 汝 (*nanji*) means 'you' and is composed of the radical for *water* (水/*mizu*) on the left, while the part on the right signifies *woman* (女/*onna*) (2010, 530). She also finds an interesting mythological reference in the novel's last *kanji*, which she sees as symbolizing the river of the goddess Lethe: to drink from this water would mean to forget one's past (*ibid*., 532). Yet the novel's end does not so much represent the erasure of the past, which would too easily combine water with purification; rather, it focuses on the coming to terms with one's past: all the dead friends and acquaintances of the protagonist as well as her cat appear in the closing pages, as to lead her in the way of grief (Tawada 2011 [2008], 199-200). In this way, the last *kanji*, 汝, illustrates a rematerialization of language: putting names on the dead, recalling here a fluid sequence of events for which words have been missing. This hypothesis is strengthened by Genz's interpretation of this ideogram as "exceeding the position of the third person" (2012, 201; my translation). Indeed, the *kanji* ends the novel itself, for it appears large-sized on the last page, taking (over) the whole space (Tawada 2011 [2008], 205).

Yet, not that Yuna could possibly take the narrator's position (Genz 2012, 201), but that the first meaning of 汝, that is, 'you' and by association to another and more common way of saying 'you' in Japanese: あなた (*anata*), underscores Tawada's "idea of mother tongue as *anata*, a strange or foreign entity." (Taniguchi 2010, 271) Language, the very act of speaking and writing, portrays subjectivity as being external to conventions. The ambivalence pointed to at the beginning of this section as echoing the nomadic finds its resolution here: the rematerialization of language enables the dematerialization of identity. The tower of Babel sinks under the pressure of water – an *anormative* pressure?

Conclusion: Fluid Circling

"We are constantly changing, and change is not a threat. It is much more difficult to try to understand this process of transformation than to hold on to a rigid, permanent shape." (Brandt 2006, 43) Here, Tawada excludes any linear transformation, for that would contradict her position on exophony – and in a broader sense on subjectivity and language – as being a translation without original. Mirroring this statement, the novel's end is thus neither a "renaissance," nor a "baptism": it is a "regression up to even the blood of the womb," (Bay 2012, 266; my translation) implied by the pinkish water around Yuna (Tawada 2011 [2008], 192). As much as this regression implies the constant metamorphosis of the protagonist, relieved from any fixed identity, it is also about the eternal return to/of words, lightened from any pre-lingual meaning. Thus, "the I is comparable to a circle" (Koiran 2009, 271; my translation). That is not to say that creativity would disappear; it is exactly through this process that "something new becomes possible." (Bay 2012, 266; my translation) Creative writing takes form and loses form, forms and deforms.

Hence, the circle cannot but recall Tawada's conceptualization of exophony. The process of defamiliarization, deconstruction, and translation that composes it, is itself not only in constant relation, for the three aspects explained earlier cannot be separated, they do function together, as a whole – as a hole, that is, *metaphorically*, a circle, but this process also allows calling into question subjectivity and materiality, providing an *in-between-ness*, an unlocatedness that echoes the position of Tawada's protagonist – or, better: her *a-position*, and Tawada's own position – or, perhaps: *non-position*. Yet the author does not refute placement, she grasps it as displacement. Therefore, to the question of how Tawada's exophony de/constructs subjectivity, one can answer that *Schwager in Bordeaux* is the result of a non-ending subjective experiment that a play of de/materialization helps to de/form. The focus is on the nomadic, which is understood as constant movement. This nomadic aspect induces a dematerialization of identity as fixed and stable, and a rematerialization of language, for the fluid multilingualism means becoming, not being.

Further, it comes as no surprise to read the reflections on identity Yuna has, after being contacted by the police as a possible witness at a crime scene in Hamburg's harbour district (Tawada 2011 [2008], 50): "This I had no name, no past, it came and went like a pattern of clouds in the sky." (*ibid*., 51; my translation) Insofar as the 'I' that should be built on an identity, that is, name, status, etc., appears as ephemeral as clouds, the protagonist empties this pre-lingual meaning given to identity through the pre-lingual meaning of language, unballasted, too. The ephemeral here means less a disappearance than that which may be symbolized by the water cycle: the water contained in clouds will fall, evaporate, form clouds, fall, evaporate, and so on. This cycle points to a fluid circling: a nomadic way to strangely shape subjectivity.

Tawada explains that she had "rather be between language A and language B, [and] might want to go, find, and fall into a poetic *gorge*." (Tawada 2003, 36; my translation and emphasis) So, in exophonic terms: a gorge, a ravine… 峡谷 (*kyōkoku*) [gorge], 郷国 (*kyōkoku*) [one's native land]. Here is the dilution of the myth of the original: subjectivity appears in its hybridity, detached from any citizenship, that is, as a "free floating and transnational intellectuality" (Ivanovic 2010, 175). Perhaps, exophonically: a gorge, a ravine… a gorge, *la gorge* [throat]; a gorge, *die Gurke* [cucumber]; a gorge, *la gorge* [bosom]. The sexual/ized words induce a sort of gender fluidity: the gorge possesses a cyclic form in which the cucumber, too linear, cannot fit. This calls into question language again, for from the throat come words. Yet, is it the throat that enables foreign words or is it the bosom that reveals the mother tongue? Putting together the subjectivity resulting from the first exophonic play and the gender fluidity appearing in the second one, one cannot but agree with Yildiz, when she claims: "Subjectivity is thus identified as a site where belonging to nation and gender are potentially reconfigured in new ways through a process of detachment. Exposure to a foreign language is hence part and parcel of the process of producing a desired new female subjectivity" (Yildiz 2012, 123).

Indeed, "we have to try to give form to what we see, as far as possible, so that we can talk about it, about things which bother one, which are frightening." (Horst 2009, online; my translation) So says Tawada.

Endnotes:

1. All quotations are in their original orthography and typography.
2. "They/their" followed by * is used as epicene pronouns, and thus is gender-neutral.

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(Post)Colonial Discourse and the Irish Self in the Writings of J.C. Mangan

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Abstract:

Both Gothic and postcolonial theory centre on the self and the other, and on the relationships of dominance concurrent to them. Gothic literature has traditionally explored this relationship through the dichotomy self vs. other, identifying the former with the protagonist while the latter would be everything else in that world. Postcolonial theory applied to Ireland has traditionally understood this axiom in the realization of the opposition Irish vs. English. The short stories of J.C. Mangan, however, challenge that axiom by further complicating a reductionist perception of the Irish (literary) scene. The main argument of the present paper, therefore, is that far from being a dichotomy, the Irish case is better understood as a triangle in which two of its vertices are fixed—Catholics/Irish and English—while the third vertex, that of the Anglo-Irish, gradually shifts positions from the English to the Irish one, following a creolization process in which they are both victims and victimizers.

Keywords: postcolonial literature, Irish literature, discourse and identity, Gothic literature, J.C. Mangan, colonial literature, short story

Both Gothic and postcolonial theory centre on the self and the other, and on the relationships of dominance concurrent to them. In Gothic literature this relationship has traditionally been expressed through the dichotomy self vs. other, in which the self is the male protagonist while the latter is "everything else in that world" (Day 19), Gothic literature being, thus, an exploration of the formation of identity. In colonial Gothic[1] this is brought under the axiom colonizer-colonized, and, therefore, characters are analysed as manifestations of a dichotomy which usually links first the other to the monstrous, who is subsequently presented as the colonized subject. However, as pointed out in previous research (Jorge 2019), the Irish case further complicates this simple binary relation. The running argument of the present paper is that far from being a dichotomy, the Irish case—as the writings of J.C. Mangan portray—is better understood as a triangle in which two of its vertices are fixed—Catholics/Irish and English—while the third vertex, that of the Anglo-Irish, gradually shifts positions from the English to the Irish one, following a creolization process in which they are both victims and victimizers.

Jim Hansen's *In Terror and Irish Modernism* (2009) is a perfect example of this as it explores domesticity as a metaphor for the Irish-English relationships. As Hansen explains, after the 1800 Act of Union both British and Irish media employed this metaphor to show the usefulness (or uselessness) of the Union. In Hansen's dichotomy, the British are portrayed as the sturdy husband, ready to give protection to the feeble, weak female-portrayed Ireland. While traditional postcolonial readings have read in such depictions an attempt to colonize and subjugate peoples, in the Irish case the same metaphor was deployed by both colonized and colonize alike, even if their purposes differed (Jorge 2019). Irish Gothic displays the peculiarity of presenting marriages as the failure of the domestic sphere; far from being liberated by the marriage institution, women are entrapped in it, isolated and recluse, in what can only be seen as an abrogation of the British ideological apparatus (Jorge 2019). As an exploration of Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* makes clear, familial relationships present in Irish Gothic can be read in such political terms, "[m]oreover, by imagining the social world via the metaphor of domestic affection, Burke conflates the affective language of the intimate and domestic spheres with the practical and political language of the public sphere." (Hansen 2009, 13)

As Jorge (2019) explicates, "This use of domesticity, however, reveals more than female representations in Irish Gothic. It must be remembered that the perception of Ireland as feminine was extended to the country itself and not just to its female inhabitants." (72) It naturally follows that the Irish male was presented in female terms, an instance that can hardly be considered new, as the Irish—indeed, the Celt—had always been subject to such portrayals, in what postcolonial theory has come to define as a feminisation of the colonized other, presented as effeminate and child-like, somehow inferior to the Anglo-Saxon race (Innes 2007, 139). Such readings do not significantly impact male characters in Irish Gothic fiction. Quoting Hansen at large,

> The Irish male depicted in this fiction experiences the internal incommensurability that follows from this apparently impossible dualism. Like the women of the female Gothic, he finds himself confined in Gothic houses, but if he attempts to escape, he is immediately coded as excessive, violent and irresponsible. Irish masculinity finds itself [...] incapable of wholly embodying either the masculine authority or the feminine passivity demanded by the dualistic and misogynistic Western culture. (Hansen 2099, 12)

It is precisely because of this dualism that the male characters portrayed in the fictions of J.C. Mangan resist an easy classification under the dichotomy self vs. other, since in many instances they are both at the same time. This paper examines this dualism of the Anglo-Irish elite as both colonizers and colonized, prototypical of *creole* and settler societies, and how this is portrayed from the perspective of a Catholic (presumably outsider) Irish writer. Read in the context of the Protestant cultural nationalism of the 1830s, Mangan's writings appear to promote a creolization of Irish society in a move away from the ties which link the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy class to their English background, laying the foundations for later writers' contribution to the Irish Gothic short story, most notably J.S LeFanu and Bram Stoker. Protestant cultural nationalism, it must be remembered, is a coinage to term the early nineteenth century rise of a sentiment among Irish Tories to label their

Irishness in opposition to the incipient Catholic nationalism. Having Edmund Burke (1729-97) as its main ideologist and its main means of expression in the literary *Dublin University Review,* the principles of this movement have been summarized by Samuel Ferguson in his 'A Dialogue between the head and the heart of an Irish Protestant,' published in 1833 in the *DUM,* which contains "the early and cogent expression of the dilemmas of Protestants, disillusioned with British governments and seeking cultural leadership in a country, the religion of whose majority they disliked and suspected." (Murphy 2003, 80)

Characterisations and representations of the self are essential tenets in this process. Magan's stories explore the complex relationship between colonized and colonizer subjects with their native lands and with the metropolis simultaneously, representing the struggle of the self and the other, whose division is obscured due to their ambiguous situation. These two principles are controlled by two antagonizing forces—submission and possession—which are also at play in the tense relationships between the colonized and colonizer. Thus read, "the act of writing texts of any kind in post-colonial areas is subject to the political, imaginative, and social control involved in the relationship between colonizer and colonized" (Ashcroft 1989, 29). However, as the present analysis proves, the characters at play do not epitomize the figure of the colonizer; instead, such characters "portray in-between figures, colonizers but not quite, in an attempt to 'decolonize the mind,' and in a move forward to the creation of a shared national consciousness" (Jorge 2019, 73).

It is surprising that J. C. Mangan chose as the main subjects for his stories an array of characters which can only be related to the upper-Protestant classes, especially if one is to remember the main aim of postcolonial writers—"to recover and reclaim lost identities, to recuperate and reinvigorate and free a dominated culture" (Jorge 2019, 73). A rapid review of Mangan's protagonists will reveal an array of noblemen (Amelrosa in "Love, Mystery, and Murder"), bankers (Braunbrock in "The Man in the Cloak"), idle proprietors (Basil in "The Thirty Flasks") or doctors (Grosstrotter in "The Threefold Prediction"). Such representations are striking, as they represent a class to which Mangan was—rather conspicuously—an outsider.

Such characterizations appear in direct opposition to the general tendency in postcolonial writing, "in which the need to reclaim history, to tell the many histories of colonized peoples from the point of view of the marginalized other, seems to be the main priority" (Jorge 2019, 73), what Boehmer (2005) terms "historical retrieval", a process "through which historically damaged selves could be remade" (185) and which would require some sort of reclamation of oral memory. Peasants, slaves or fishermen, are thus noticeably absent, in the vein of much colonialist narratives (Boehmer 2005, 63), or they perform secondary roles, usually remaining in the background.

It must be noted, however, the growing tendency to ascribing greater importance to such characters in the evolution of the genre—no doubt a reflection of the importance Catholics were gaining in Irish society throughout the nineteenth century; however, it still remains true that "the Irish Gothic short story does not give voice to the subaltern in an overt way as other postcolonial traditions would do" (Jorge 2019, 73). This, however, does not imply a lack of criticism of the colonial question. The method, already observed in Mangan's *Literae Orientales* (Baggett 2000, 173), consists in adopting the imperialist perspective to be able to criticize it later on, even if in a somewhat veiled way.[2] It is what could be termed a criticism from within, "a denunciation of the colonial situation but placing the focus on the figure of the colonizer rather than on the colonized. A clear act of what postcolonial theory terms abrogation" (Jorge 2019, 73), posing a striking contrast to most postcolonial writing, as the self whom the reader encounters in these stories *seems* to be that of the colonizer.

Employing '*seems*' here is not gratuitous—it betrays an ambiguity, an ill-at-ease state, as characters do not comfortably fit into this class. The opening assumption for the present research was the reductionist nature of the dichotomy colonized-colonizer, suggesting that some parallelisms could be drawn between the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy and these characters, most remarkably, their social status. A further key element which would classify them into this class is the fact that "they are not *real* colonizers. Their social position, inherited from their colonizer forefathers, places them as agents—and sufferers—of the colonial quest" (Jorge 2019, 74). Lawyers, landlords, members of ancient landed families, all enforce and benefit from what can be read as colonial rule but there is no "protagonist concerned to define his own identity, enthusiastic about training for imperial service, and convinced of his ability 'to shine'" (Boehmer 2005, 60). In contrast, the reader is presented with an array of characters very much at odds with their inherited roles, a streak "which starts with Mangan and which is continued through other Irish Gothic writers such as J.S. Le Fanu and Bram Stoker" (Jorge 2019, 74).

Even when in their prime—as estate house owners and/or as members of the nobility—, the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy is usually surrounded by an aura of decay. Edgeworth's *Castle Rackrent*, written just right after the momentous loss of the Anglo-Irish Parliament pre-empts subsequent similar representations. Likewise, John Melmoth's aristocratic family inhabit their now rundown mansion—"As John slowly trod the miry road which had once been the approach, he could discover, by the dim light of an autumnal evening, signs of increasing desolation since he had last visited the spot, - signs that penury had been aggravated and sharpened into downright misery" (Maturin, *Melmoth the Wanderer* 200, 11). It is a remarkable coincidence that the ascent of the Irish Gothic short story coincides with the waning of the Ascendancy.

By the time Mangan was writing his stories—mostly during the 1830s—, "most of the revolutions which had taken place during the first years following the Acts of Union—White-boys, Shanavest, Caravats—were over, including the failed attempt led by Robert Emmet in 1803" (Jorge 2019, 74). Despite the widespread sentiment of Anglophobia and the recital of historical grievance (Foster 1989, 155), the 1830s saw a "new wave of nationalism in politics led by the charismatic Daniel O'Connell, who would manoeuvre to obtain political capital for himself and for Ireland, mostly through peaceful means" (Jorge 2019, 74), a movement which significantly influenced Mangan. Similar happenings, such as the Tithe Wars, were over by 1830, having been politically addressed by the Irish Church Temporalities Act (1833) and the Tithe Rent Charge (1838). Despite sectarianism being on the rise both in Britain and Ireland in the first three decades of the nineteenth century, by the 1830s the Ascendancy rule over Ireland was effectively over, in part due to Westminster's efforts to "develop a neutral machine of control" (Murphy 2003, 22). Dublin, for instance, had "become an amalgam of lawyers and doctors belonging to the—mostly Protestant—upper-middle classes. The education issue had been also partially addressed through the creation of a National Education System, which did much to enlighten the poor classes" (Jorge 2019). Despite inequality being still evident, there was aura of prosperity to be had by some Catholics and Presbyterians who now belonged to the middle-classes and the bourgeoisie, an ascent mainly prompted by the Napoleonic Wars, "a fact which might have preoccupied the Ascendancy class, since it constituted a threat to their privileges and status" (Jorge 2019, 74). Despite this, it would be wrong to think that the separation between the Protestant Ascendancy and the native Catholic population was over. As Foster asserts, "[t]o be a Protestant or a Catholic in the eighteenth-century indicated more than a mere religious allegiance: it represented opposing political cultures, and conflicting views of history" (Foster 1989, 136). Such division was to be heightened by a crucial episode in Irish history—*a Gorta Mór* or the Great Famine.[3] There can be no doubt that some of the guilt which plagues some of these characters originates in the role the Protestant Ascendancy played during those years. It is, however, this last term, 'Ascendancy', which is problematic.

Irish society was, at that time, "a more complex construct than more reductionist views would have it" (Jorge 2019, 75), implying that the traditional view Colonizer/Protestant Ascendancy vs. Colonized/Catholics, needs reinterpreting—"Recent scholarship promotes an interpretation that escapes this binary model, arguing that—especially in the Irish case—it is reductive" (Jorge 2019, 75). As Wright asserts, "we need to question more thoroughly the utility of binary formulations in order to grasp more fully the complexity of an imperial history that reaches across, and builds upon, different historical moments, geopolitical situations, imperial ideologies, and discourses of resistance" (Wright 2007, 5-6). In a similar line of thought, Hansen argues that

> This critical approach often imagines Anglo-Ireland as the lone name for colonial false consciousness, rather than as one hybridized component of a more complicated cultural and socio-political matrix that includes Catholics of the bourgeois, proletarian, and agrarian variety, a divided, declining Anglo-Protestant ascendancy, and an oft-overlooked Anglo-Protestant middle class. (Hansen 2009, 9)

On a first reading, characters appear to be perpetuating the figure of the colonizer and of colonial status and, therefore, the subaltern other is filtered through the colonial gaze, thus maintaining the mainstreams of colonial discourse, or "the systems of cognition [...] which Europe used to found and guarantee its colonial authority" (Boehmer 48) by which the other is shown as "less human, less civilized, as child or savage, wild man, animal, or headless mass" (Boehmer 2005, 76). However, criticism and scholarship should consider whether such superficial reading holds.

In this line, Jorge (2019) reminds us that "A deeper reading will show this figure to be just the opposite of what the prototypical colonialist figure ought to be—weak and feeble, terrorized rather than terrorizer, in awe of the other instead of subduing it" (75). As Boehmer (2005) recollects, "masculinity and its exertion of power were pivotal in the colonial quest" (71); thus, by making the male figure the centre of its criticism, "the Irish Gothic short story performs a double function—it exposes the unsuitability of the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy as a ruling class for their inaction and connivance with the colonizers, and it criticizes the application of the colonial system in Ireland" (Jorge 2019, 75). Mangan's short narratives would, thus, be questioning one of the principles of colonial discourse, which is "appropriated and subverted, and exposed in a completely different light. Mangan's appropriation of the colonizers' voice establishes a trend in the Irish Gothic short story which will be continued by J.S. Le Fanu and Bram Stoker" (Jorge 2019, 75). Far from being colonialist literature,[4] Mangan carries out an analysis and a criticism of the Anglo-Irish elite by showing them as "helpless and self-centred characters, embedded in a paralysis product of their double status as colonized and colonizer subjects, thus questioning their identity as a class" (Jorge 2019, 76).

In Mangan, the protagonists are the victims of a Gothic world which is outside their control and from which they find themselves unable to escape, a world, however, they enter of their own accord and spuriously. Rarely, however, does Mangan make them appear before the reader as deliberately treacherous and malignant. Instead, it could be asserted that their flaw is that of *naïveté*, for their actions are oftentimes presented under a cover of romance and idealism. By so arranging his characters, Mangan displaces the burden of malignity and misdoings from the colonized other to the colonizer self, thus reversing colonial discourse.

"The Thirty Flasks" (1838) introduces us to the character of Basil Theordore Von Rosenwald, a young man of aristocratic descent, who despite his rights and advantages inherited as a nobleman, finds himself close to ruin. This, the reader soon finds out, is due to his having run up large debts in gambling, "Last night in my madness I rushed from the *rouge et noir* room to the *roulette* table—my brain was on fire—and in twenty minutes, without well knowing how, I found that I had parted with notes for four thousand florins!" (Mangan 2002a, 179). Basil is thus revealed as a flawed character—he suffers from the vice of gambling, which he himself terms as a "madness", an uncontrollable malady which has brought him to forfeit even his most precious treasures—his family inheritance, "You recollect the diamond bracelets, my mother's miniature set in brilliants, the other trinkets that hung there—each of them once dear to me as life [...]" (Mangan 2002a, 179). The reader is thus aware that not only does Basil suffer from an uncontrollable disorder—gambling, a vice close to sin in the eyes of the Victorians—but he has also been unable to keep hold of his legacy. He is, however, not shown in a bad light to the reader. To counterbalance this flaw, Mangan shows Basil as a man in love with Aurelia Von Elseberg, an almost impossible love, due to the circumstances—let us not forget—into which he himself has got; when Aurelia's nineteenth birthday arrives, her father confronts Basil thus, "On this account I regard it as imperative on me to make every exertion for the advancement of Aurelia's *real* welfare; and you will not take it ill, Mr. Rosenwald, if I say I conceive that your present circumstances are not exactly those which could justify me in looking forward to you as her husband and my son-in-law" (Mangan 2002a, 198). This scene is very telling, since it performs a double function in the story. On the one hand, Basil is revealed as a man in love, which balances his gambling habits and shows him in a good light in the reader's eyes, and which gives him a pretext to enter the Gothic world—he needs to recover his fortune if he is to wed his love. On the other hand, it also reminds the reader that, under the present circumstances, Basil is unable to provide *welfare*, a word whose double meaning Herr Elseberg implies as a pun upon Basil, since he is talking about "*real* welfare", that is, pecuniary stability as opposed to happiness, thus reminding the reader that the marriage institution is, above all, a form to maintain property and wealth, and thus status. Basil is metaphorically unmanned—he is no longer a provider, he cannot fulfill his task to maintain and increase wealth and richness.

Thus caught in the imbalance of being and not being masculine, his only resource is to enter the Gothic world and agree to a Faustian compact, even when the Nabob explicitly denies it, '"Sell my soul to the Prince of darkness?"—interposed the Nabob. "No, my dear brother," [...]. "You do me justice in believing me incapable of that extreme act of insanity and impiety"' (Mangan 2002a, 185). The compact, consisting in exchanging inches for wealth, is so wicked and convoluted that Basil—in an example of nineteenth-century rationalism—assumes it to be false,

> "This is not all: your appearance otherwise becomes altered for the worse; and, in short, by the time you have drained the thirtieth flask you will have sunk down to mu height, and present precisely such a spectacle to the eyes of all who see you as I do now, while I, on the other hand, shall be in possession of all your present advantages of feature and figure. You understand me definitely and clearly?"
> "Really, my worthy Sir," said Basil, still laughing, "your solemnity would impose on the devil himself. I do understand you—and am willing to go any length you like to countenance your joke. I trust you will not find me ungrateful. (Mangan 2002a, 191)

Even though, in the end, the Nabob is exposed as an evil figure—Maugrabant—, it should not escape the reader's perception that, as far as the compact goes, Basil was never cheated, since the terms were always clear. Thus, Basil is unmanned a second time, only on this occasion, physically. Viewed in the post-Act-of-Union Ireland, it is easy to associate it with a criticism of the paralysis that characterizes Anglo-Irish ruling classes since the loss of parliament in Green College and which contrasts powerfully with its previous bulging activity.[5] Like the Anglo-Irish, Basil is paralysed, incapable of taking decisive steps, for his actions are in reality a vicious circle which drags him more into the Gothic world he finds himself unable to leave—he forfeits his inches in exchange of money with which to pay off his debts but, instead, he uses that very same money to go on gambling, and thus the story repeats itself. Published in 1838 in the *DUM,* the story is reminiscent of the state in which the Union had left the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy. As Murphy poses it, "By the early 1830s the days of Ascendancy rule in Ireland were effectively over" (Murphy 25). Trapped in this paralysis and unable to break away, Basil's future, like that of the Ascendancy class, is literally a diminishing one.

Hansen attributes this paralysis to the fact that male characters are torn between two equally opposing forces. As he asserts, "In the context of the colonized Ireland of the nineteenth century [...] the masculinity stands as confined and exiled, terrorized and terrorist. It comes to embody both vulnerability and the threat to all things vulnerable" (Hansen 4). In other words, caught up in the double status of simultaneous being and not being—colonized and colonizer—, characters find themselves unable to *define* themselves. As the story progresses and Basil keeps losing his inches, he becomes someone else—a mockery of his previous being—and yet remains Basil Von Rosenwald at the same time. The following dialogue, which happens towards the end of the story, illustrates the point,

> "I have been inquiring for Mr. Rosenwald," said the stranger. "Can you, Sir, direct me where to find him?"
> "I am he," said Basil.
> "What! You!" cried the stranger.
> "I am the wreck of him who *was* Basil Rosenwald," replied our metamorphosed hero. (Mangan 2002a, 235).

Paradoxically, it is through the aid of the colonized other that these characters eventually find salvation, opening up a recurrent theme in Mangan: salvation achieved through redemption. Mangan's characters find deliverance through a mixing of opposites, establishing a trend which will be continued and enhanced by Le Fanu. His stories, then, give answer to that school of criticism which promotes a return to an idealized past through the utter rejection of the colonized present, a futile task as the legacy of colonialism "could not be entirely eliminated" (Boehmer 2005, 78). Ultimately, Basil is saved by the appearance of a figure come from the East—Rubadubb Snooksnacker Slickwitz, who is the executor of Basil's parental uncle, who "has lately died in Aleppo, and has left you heir to all his immense property" (Mangan 2002a, 236). Not only does this allow Basil to recover his inches—and thus his self—but it also allows him to marry Aurelia, ultimately delivering him from damnation and restoring lost equilibrium, "[a]s for Basil and Aurelia they have been now for some years married; and their union has been blessed with a large family of small children, who bid fair, [...] to inherit the singular beauty and plural virtues of their estimable parents." (Mangan 2002a, 238)

This union of opposites also has a deeper reading in terms of national identity, in consonance with the principles of Protestant cultural nationalism as defined by Burke and according to which the Protestant elites should be leading the aforementioned union. As Murphy poses it, "[u]nder the Union [...] parts of the Ascendancy embraced a Celtic cultural nationalism which they saw themselves as leading" (Murphy 2003, 41). This idea of reconciliation of opposites leading to a happy ending, to a seemingly perfect union, is, no doubt, a reflection of the cultural nationalism of the 1830s and 40s, which further reinforces the argument of the creation of a shared national identity. Let us not forget that Mangan's short-story writing career spans for something less than a decade (1833-1841), the years in which the Anglo-Irish Protestant Ascendancy had begun to understand that their rule over Ireland based on dominance was waning, "[t]he 1830s were to be years of Tory cultural nationalism which was wedded to Ireland's union with Britain and place in the empire, just as the 1840s were to be the years or a romantic political nationalism, in Young Ireland and the Nation newspaper, which aspired to political independence" (Murphy 2003, 78). Interestingly enough, the two stories which speak more clearly of reconciliation, "The Thirty Flasks" and "The Man in the Cloak", were both published in the *Dublin University Magazine* in 1838, the same magazine which had published, in 1833, Ferguson's "A Dialogue between the head and the heart of an Irish Protestant". By then the *DUM* was the new focus and heart of the Protestant intelligentsia in Ireland (Hall 2000, 4), and adhered to Ferguson's idea of a shared culture, "[Ferguson] believed that Celtic models would provide a cultural common ground for Irish Catholics and Protestants" (Murphy 2003, 81). That Mangan participated of this idea of a shared culture is clear from his taking part in such cultural projects as the Ordnance Survey. However, Mangan's commitment to the national cause was made even clearer when he started publishing for the *Nation*, the newspaper founded by the Catholic Charles Gavan Duffy in 1842 with O'Connell's blessings to attract younger Protestants to the repeal cause (Murphy 2003, 88). Yet, it is not clear if by the end of his days Mangan still conceived this idea as possible—his last story, "The Threefold Prediction", is perhaps his most overt attack on colonialism and, by the end of the story, any attempt at reconciliation is impossible—"The whole blame was flung on me, and, though I was pitied, my medical reputation received a mortal wound. I, too, shortly afterwards quitted Vienna." (Mangan 2002b, 147)

Additionally, the story subverts two other principles which can be applied to the Anglo-Irish. Hansen identifies terror as a driving force, both political and cultural, which has shaped Irish identity. However, in the Irish case, both sides of the conflict believe themselves to be terrorized,

> Throughout the nineteenth century, the disenfranchized Gaelo-Catholics will see themselves as the victims of the usurping, tyrannical Anglo-Irish, and the Anglo-Irish will see themselves as victims of the barbaric Gaelo-Catholic agrarian violence and terrorism. [...] Both the Gaelo-Catholic and the Anglo-Irish become accused of and caught up in the double bind provoked by terrorism. The dynamic seems driven by what we might call the logic of the justified victim. Each side identifies itself always and only as terrorized in order to justify its own occasional terrorism. (Hansen 2009, 15)

Basil sees himself as a victim, a sufferer of a swindler. Thus, when he meets Slickwitz, he describes his situation in the following terms, "[o], stranger, whosoever you are; if you have any power over the villain, exercise it, I implore you, in forcing him to restore me to that of which he has robbed me!" (Mangan 2002a, 235). Basil refers to the Nabob as a "villain" who has "robbed" him of his inches even though the reader already knows that he has agreed to the compact of his free will; in fact, he is obliterating the fact that he is the main and only causer of his own misfortunes since he has lost his inheritance due to his addiction to gambling. Basil's unfounded accusation only reinforces the idea of his guilt.

In a similar vein, the story tackles an issue which troubled Victorian society—fear of miscegenation. Mangan, like J.S. Le Fanu and Bram Stoker, must have been aware of the different theories which were widespread during the Victorian era. Proof is that Mangan ridicules phrenology in several stories, most notably in "The Man in the Cloak". Excessive population and urban congestion represented causes for anxiety for the early Victorians, as did the widespread of cholera, also known as "the Irish disease" (Gibbons 2004, 46). The fact is that massive migration from Ireland to the ports and industrial heartlands of Britain meant overcrowding and poor hygiene. This, together with the theories of such social reformers as Thomas Malthus or Dr. William Duncan, contributed to the perception of the Irish as a source of contagion and pollution, "of the 'foreign and accidental' infection that invades the system" (Gibbons 2004, 44), which threatened social stability.

The compact the Nabob proposes is exactly that which Victorian society most feared—the usurpation and collapse of their identity by that of the monstrous other. Close to the climax of the story, Basil visits the Nabob, who has been altered to "five feet eleven" while Basil is a mere "three feet seven" (Mangan 2002a, 234). Basil's nightmare is also that of the Victorians and of the Anglo-Irish. Mangan abrogates that concept, however, by displacing again guilt from the other to the colonizer. When accused of deceiving Basil, the Nabob retorts, "[y]et what right, I repeat, have you to complain? You have not been choused out of a single rap. [...] you voluntarily chose, with your mouth open, to drink away one of the noblest gifts with which Providence had endowed you—your stature" (Mangan 2002a, 233-4). Mangan is thus reminding his contemporaries of something they were acutely aware—their guilt. The Anglo-Irish, as part of the British colonial campaign, were conscious that their privileges and status emanated from the dispossession of the native Gaelic-Catholics, and thus they lived in fear of an oncoming Catholic rebellion. As Julian Moynahan comments, "the Anglo-Irish voted for the Union out of fear. Fearing a retribution by Catholics that might follow upon the full enfranchizement, they sought to sink their political identity into the larger identity of Protestant Britain's parliament, where they could never be outvoted, so they thought, by a native Irish majority." (Moynahan 1995, 9)

Endnotes:

1. Boehmer distinguishes between *colonial literature* and *colonialist literature.* The former is defined as a general term encompassing "any writing concerned with colonial perception and experiences, written mainly by metropolitans [...] during colonial times" (Boehmer 2), while *colonialist literature* refers to "that which was specifically concerned with colonial expansion [...] written by and for colonizing Europeans about non-European lands dominated by them. It embodied the imperialists' point of view." (Boehmer 3)
2. It would be an omission to assert or imply that Mangan started such a deployment of mirroring by not dealing directly with the voice of the colonized, since Mangan and subsequently Le Fanu and Stoker applied a technique which had a lot to do with genre. In Gothic literature criticism operates at a more subconscious level, as any appropriation of a genre must still be recognizable as stemming from this genre, that is, they must operate reasonably within the margins of the genre, or else the appropriating effect would be lost. As Christopher MacLachlan puts it in his introduction to *The Monk*, "Gothic in general [...] gives expression to deep disquiets of its time but cannot offer solutions. Instead, it raises some of those fears and uses them as the oblique referent of its surface meaning" (xxii). Due to the very own nature of the stories Mangan set out to write, the colonial question cannot be addressed directly; instead, it dwells under the surface, appearing every now and then in the shape of guilt and remorse. The colonial question, then, is treated but in a subtle way, through subterfuges, apparitions and ghosts that come to haunt the self.
3. Although Mangan's last short story, "The Threefold Prediction", was published in September 1845 and the Famine started in August that same year, it had not yet reached catastrophic proportions, since the first deaths by starvation were recorded in 1846 (Murphy 96). Its impact on his writings cannot have been, therefore, as great as on Le Fanu or Stoker.

4. See note 3.
5. As Curtis asserts when describing the effects of the 1800 Act of Union in Ireland, "[f]or Dublin the change meant from one prosperous and stately capital to that of a dull provincial city with stagnant trade." (Curtis 353)

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Confessionary Evidence and the State of Exception: A Conversation between Visakesa Chandrasekaram and Para Paheer

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Abstract:

In an investigation of narrative representations that voice anomalies and irregularities in the prosecution of Tamil political prisoners in Sri Lanka, the paper sets in conference stories of torture and trial in Para Paheer's *The Power of Good People*, and Visakesa Chandrasekaram's *Tigers Don't Confess* and *The Use of Confessionary Evidence under the Counter-Terrorism Laws of Sri Lanka.* The paper investigates the judicial space in which these cases were tried as a corollary of the state of exception practiced in Sri Lanka resulting from long term use of emergency regulations and counter-terrorism laws. By drawing on constitutional changes and amendments from 1978 to the present – and by referring to the state's intimidation and undermining of the judiciary – I investigate the process by which exception was sustained as a governing philosophy in Sri Lanka, and locate the judiciary as an organ compliant of government. The paper also holds to discussion the fate of Tamil political prisoners eleven years after the conclusion of the Sri Lankan Civil War in 2009, the slow progress of post-war reconciliation, and the challenges they face in ongoing imprisonment.

Keywords: Political prisoners; Sri Lankan War; Exception; Torture; Judiciary

In 2011, having being saved from a capsized boat transporting illegal immigrants to Australia, Para Paheer (Paheertharan Pararasasingam) was delivered to Australian authorities and placed in an offshore detention facility. Since the end of Sri Lanka's Civil War (1983-2009) in May 2009, Paheer – an ethnic Tamil, married, and with a newborn son – had been living with a nagging sense of insecurity. He had already been "taken in" for questioning on two occasions and in the second instance he was severally tortured. In fact, in order to ensure a "fair hearing", Paheer had had to bribe officials (Paheer 2017, 176). Following his release, Paheer left to India with his family and, later, paid human smugglers to find him passage on a boat bound to Australia. The journey was a precarious one and the boat was far from being seaworthy for a long journey. Close to Australian waters, when the boat capsized, thirteen passengers including two children were drowned. Twenty-odd were rescued and handed over to Australian authorities. For seven years, Paheer was in detention and it was not until 2017 when he was released to the Australian community where he was later joined by his wife and son.

Paheer's story is narrated in *The Power of Good People* (2017), which he wrote together in Australia with refugee rights activist Alison Corke. In the book, Paheer recounts a childhood and young adulthood growing up in the war-affected Sri Lankan north, and a youth spent amidst a ceasefire which brought a fleeting promise of peace that lasted for four years (2001-2005). In 2006, as the cessation of hostilities caved in, war resumed and culminated in Mullaivaikkal, north-eastern Sri Lanka, in the total destruction of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Its violent and decisive end, to date, has provided a controversial topic for human rights lobbies. In many respects, Paheer's story attempts to bring together the plight, lost hope, and despair of a generation of northern Tamil youth who, in the 1980s, was born to a war which was still in its infancy. This generation came of age in an environment shadowed by suspicion, incarceration narratives, abuse, torture, and imprisonment which became a part of its consciousness in the same way arbitrary killings, the display of dead bodies, and enforced disappearances became routine in the course of daily life.

As a witness narrative and a document of militarism, Paheer's biography is an affidavit of the circumstances that gave birth to desperate refuge-seeking in a universe dominated by conflict. The Sri Lankan Civil War by itself is an established discourse in literary representation and its complexity has been conveyed through an expanding corpus of refugee writing and narratives of forced migration. This includes numerous biographies, works of fiction, commentaries, graphic novels, and narrative forms that go beyond conventional generic boundaries (such as, for example, Shobasakthi's *Gorilla* and *Traitor*)[1] to which Paheer can be identified as a contributor. Paheer's daring journey to a land and a culture far removed from his own, at its most fundamental level, is an escape from the haunting fear of being caught and trapped within what Visakesa Chandrasekaram terms a "legal war". This "legal war" has to do with the complex battle strategy of the Sri Lankan government in fighting the LTTE, where Tamil men – taken into custody as suspects – were detained, prosecuted, and sentenced through trials without a jury. The men who were produced in court were often arrested arbitrarily, threatened or tortured, and prosecuted based on confessionary evidence. These men were brought to court already stigmatized as "Tigers suspects", and while some had no access to legal assistance (The Social Architects 2013), others faced trials heard in a language they didn't understand in a courtroom and a judge before whom they didn't feel confident of being justly represented.

In his *The Use of Confessionary Evidence under the Counter-Terrorism Laws of Sri Lanka*, Chandrasekaram identifies as an integral artery of the Sri Lankan government's war strategy "a legal battle using counter-terrorism laws to punish the Tigers in the courts" (Chandrasekaram 2018, 9). The standard approach in this "battle" was the use of confessions supposedly given by rebel "Tigers suspects" as evidence in court (Chandrasekaram 2018, 9). Within this "mass prosecution strategy" involving thousands of such suspects Chandrasekaram identifies a threefold process: arbitrary arrests followed by indefinite detention, the use of confessions recorded by the police as evidence, and the transfer of the burden of proof to the accused who would be challenged to disprove the "voluntariness" of their confessions (Chandrasekaram 2018, 9). By 2009, Paheer had already been arrested twice – both arbitrarily, and without a warrant. He had been tortured and treated with degradation (Paheer 2017, 171-177), and had had to bribe officials (whom he chooses not to disclose) to earn a "favourable hearing" and a "fair verdict" (176). His traumatic experiences in custody and the fear of being further persecuted by the military and police, force Paheer to flee the country.

The first time Paheer was arrested the military surrounded his house in Mannar, in north-western Sri Lanka, at night and took him away in a van. However, through the intervention of a Catholic priest of the area Paheer was soon released and returned to his family. On the run up to the arrest, Paheer was insecure and felt as if "being watched" on and back from work. In the following year, he was arrested for a second time in Dehiwala – an outer suburb of the capital, Colombo – which resulted in him being tortured in custody. Being stripped and suspended against a wall, Paheer was beaten with metal bars and wires (Paheer 2017, 171). Chilies were smeared on his face. He was caged in a cell that was too small for a human where Paheer was forced to crouch at all times (171). The police questioned Paheer about activities during his student days at Jaffna University where he was the President of the Students Union. Paheer's torture reached a disturbing high when an iron rod was introduced through his anal cavity which resulted in his losing consciousness (Paheer 2017, 174)[2]. Referring to the bribes he had to offer, Paheer insinuates that such bribing was widespread – if not, routine – in the judicial system; specially so, in cases involving Tamils who were arrested as "Tigers suspects". "Many of the prisoners had no one to help them," Paheer narrates. "[Other detainees] kept telling me that I would be disappeared if I didn't get out in twenty-eight days" (Paheer 2017, 177). The prisoners without financial means – Paheer seems to suggest – faced an uncertain future. In his book, Paheer questions a precarious territory expanding from arbitrary arrests by the police to documents presented in court that determine a verdict's being "favourable" to the suspect (or not): a process that is corrupt in its being hinged on bribery and arbitrariness. The verdicts given at the end of this process carry prison sentences of varying lengths – including life terms – and are commonly understood and appreciated by society as fair, just, and determined by a rational process. Bribery, corruption, arrogance, or pre-determination are rarely attributed to or associated with these verdicts. In fact, such an attribution would grossly undermine the validity of edicts and regulations that govern the legal due process.

Visakesa Chandrasekaram is a legal practitioner, a creative artist, and an academic whose work synthesizes and engages with the use of confessionary evidence. In his novel *Tigers Don't Confess* (2011) – a narrative set around the trial of a Tamil youth who had been arrested and charged in court as an LTTE gunman – Chandrasekaram reflects on the torture of suspects in custody and the police's use of fabricated confessions as evidence. At one level, *Tigers Don't Confess* collaborates with and is informed by Chandrasekaram's academic work and human rights activism: in particular, his *The Use of Confessionary Evidence under the Counter-Terrorism Laws of Sri Lanka* (2017). Through a study of twenty eight confessions obtained by the police from "Tigers suspects" between 1993 and 2004, Chandrasekaram works towards addressing the gaps between these "confessions" and the truth behind each sentenced Tamil man and woman. In the process, Chandrasekaram takes an interest in characterizing the political and legal conditions that are conducive to and encourage the manufacture of such fabrications. *Tigers Don't Confess* dramatizes the trial of a Kumaran

Mylvaganam: a young Tamil university student who had been arrested and prosecuted as a member of the LTTE pistol-squad, and the author of several high profile killings. Customary of LTTE-related cases, Kumaran's trial was held on the discretion of a single judge, and without a jury (Chandrasekaram 2011, 130). Resonant of cases against Tamil political prisoners, Kumaran's "confession", too, had been recorded and his case was prosecuted in Sinhalese (Chandrasekaram 2011, 132-153): a language the majority of the Tamil prisoners were ill-proficient in.

Kumaran's defense is hinged on a medical report which brings to light torture inflicted on the defendant's body: a brutalization that preceded his supposedly voluntarily and unforced confession (Chandrasekaram 2011, 218-222). Torture inflicted on Kumaran included his being beaten with wooden poles and PVC pipes filled with dried concrete, of being burned with cigarettes, and of his fingers, toes, and genitals being exposed to electricity (219). On occasion, Kumaran's head was forced underwater, and was forced in a bag that had been filled with petrol (219). Among the torture positions he was put through, the "Palestinian suspension method" (in Sri Lankan parlance, the "Dharma-chakra method") – admittedly a harsh form of torture that caused disorientation – had been used on Kumaran (219). While these characterizations corroborate with overarching patterns of bodily torture often represented in survivor narratives by Sinhalese and Tamil political prisoners, they also collaborate with Paheer's prison experience as a visceral trajectory.

Sellapulle is a "Tigers suspect" who, based on a "confession" he supposedly made to the police, had been convicted and sentenced for life. When Chandrasekaram met and interviewed Sellapulle, he had already spent fourteen years of his long sentence. In *The Use of Confessionary Evidence under the Counter-Terrorism Laws of Sri Lanka*, Chandrasekaram reproduces Sellapulle's "confession" which, in October 1994, had been used as evidence in court:

> ... the LTTE was recruiting members from my village and other adjacent villages. Later, I went to the LTTE office at Vandaramullai to join the LTTE. I met Vengan, the local leader, and gave my personal information to him. I stayed there and later went for training at Pondukalchenai camp. There were about 250 young men receiving training. First I received physical training and then training in arms and battle tactics. There, I also received training in using SLR, SMG, G3, M-70 weapons and hand grenades. At the end of this training, I was given the nickname Sujee and I was told that my membership number is 514. Also, all those who have received our training were called Batticaloa 12. First of all five of us including myself were sent to the camp in Kiran village. A person called Ruban held the leadership there. Here I received an M-70 type weapon, a magazine with ammunition and a cyanide capsule. Meanwhile, in 1990 the LTTE movement captured several police stations in Batticaloa. I too participated in that event (qtd. in Chandrasekaram 2018, 12).

Based on this "confession", Sellapulle was found guilty of conspiracy, receiving military training from the LTTE, taking part in military operations against the government forces and abducting police officers. In July 1995, he was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment. Speaking to Chandrasekaram, Sellapulle claimed that he was tortured at the Criminal Investigation Department in

Batticaloa, in the Eastern province. He denied having given a confession, and claimed that he was forced to sign a paper typed out in the Sinhalese language. Sellapulle was unable to read or write in Sinhalese (Chandrasekaram 2018, 12). It was only when his indictment was served that Sellapulle learnt about the contents of his "confession", and of its being false and malicious (12-13)[3].

Quite in contrast to the report in the "confession", Sellapulle had been captured by the army and the police when his village had been sieged in September 1993:

> All the villagers were summoned and paraded before a spotter who was covering his face with a gunnysack, hiding his identity. There were two holes in the sack so the spotter could see us. He nodded his head identifying me as a Tiger…When I was produced before the court, even before the trial began, the judge said, 'I will give you 30 years' conviction'. I was convicted wrongfully. I have been in prison for nearly 15 years. My life has gone. I don't have a future. I have given up. Now I am 30 years old and I have been in the prison for 14 years already. (qtd. in Chandrasekaram 2018, 15).

From the perspective of justice, the judge's exclamation "I will give you 30 years' conviction" is both disturbing and revealing. Even though Chandrasekaram clarifies that "Sri Lankan judges are known for making these types of comments in the open court" (Chandrasekaram 2018, 16) the flippancy and the arrogance of the statement, as a symptom, suggests a preconception of the defendant's guilt to govern the hearing. It articulates a prejudice and a lack of impartiality of the judicial system which, in turn, seems to discriminate against the defendant. The statement demonstrates a conceited undermining of the key foundational ethics of justice – that of one's being "equal before the law" and "free until proven guilty" – and, as a mask falls off unexpectedly to show the face of an actor, it betrays the court proceedings as a necessary performance of the state's "legal war".

The arrogance with which the judge presides over Sellapulle's case, as well as the bribery referred to in Paheer's prison experience are both important symptoms of the law enforcement and prosecution machinery in Sri Lanka. I identify them as overarching, long-term negative outcomes resulting from a state of exception which has been practiced and perpetuated in Sri Lanka through the conflict years: a deployment which, in turn, fostered a complex environment in which the law enforcement actors and officers of the judiciary have been implicated within a system predominated, monitored, and even subverted by the sovereign. Effected through extraordinary laws, acts of indemnity and impunity, and mass prosecutions, this state of exception has been enacted by the state to maneuver and control ground conditions, to curb opposition, and to execute swift operations against dissidents within and outside zones of political conflict. By graying the boundary between what is legal and what is not – by making the limits of the law fluid and permeable – it also provided the state with leverage to cultivate and maintain sites such as secret safe-houses and torture camps: facilities that exist outside the reach of ordinary law, but which can be justified and rationalized under "exceptional circumstances".

Introduced at first in the late-1970s, Sri Lanka's Prevention of Terrorism Act (of 1979), its subsequent amendments, and other emergency regulations were in place for the greater part of the three decades from 1979 to 2009. They were admittedly used in curbing rebellion in the majority-Sinhalese districts by the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) between 1987 and 1990, and in the northern and eastern districts where the conflict against Tamil liberation fighters took place (1983-2009). The state also curbed dissent, mass protest, trade union and student activism during this thirty year period by using clauses of these extraordinary laws. The exceptional circumstances these laws helped to foster made searches and arrests without warrants, the swift disposal of bodies, and prolonged detention both feasible and efficient. A country in which emergency regulations and counter-terrorism laws overreached the ordinary law for three decades develops its own symptoms. These post-1970s deployments of exceptional laws were concurrent with the rise of the Sri Lankan state's use of terror which human rights activist Basil Fernando asserts went to "primitive and abominable proportions" (Fernando 2005, 161).

The perpetuation of a state of exception results in law enforcement and the judicial space being absorbed and redefined as a full or partial extension of the exception in practice. Reflecting on the state of exception as a prerogative of sovereignty, Giorgio Agamben, identifies as sovereignty the capacity to declare exception to established rule of law: a situation where the sovereign, by being outside the law, declares that "there is nothing outside the law" (Agamben 1998, 15). This, in turn, blurs the line between violence and law, as it enables a corridor where "violence passes over into law, and law passes over into violence" (Agamben 1998, 32). I argue that the politico-legal and juridical system in which Sellapulle and Paheer were victimized is a chronic condition that demonstrates the state of exception becoming the rule; where, resonant of Agamben's characterization of the birth of the camp, exception becomes "a permanent spatial arrangement" which "remains outside the normal order" (Agamben 2005, 168-169).

The juxtaposition of the properties that define a state of exception and the juridical-legal apparatus of a society built on democratic values is an alarming realization. Then, on the other hand, the fostering of conditions necessary to encourage the politico-legal machine under probe is an improbable task if not for the willful and systematic erosion of norms of democratic rule. In the Sri Lankan case, the experiment for an absolute rule within the superficial frame of a democratic atmosphere – a system where the distribution of powers between the judiciary and the legislative, through the establishment of an executive presidency, was revised and curtailed – was tried out in 1978. Using an invincible 5/6 majority in parliament which he won in the 1977 general election, President Junius Jayewardene engineered a constitution which placed him – as a presidential executive – superior to both the legislative and the judiciary: a model in which "every aspect of rational government will be killed by the one authority at the helm" (Fernando 2005, 178). Between 1978 and 1984, Jayewardene used his unlikely mandate to amend the constitution to the benefit of his office and that of his government led by the United National Party (UNP). The powers were used to neutralize political opposition and, in 1982, to bring laws that prolonged the life of the house without holding elections that were due that year. In 1983, following the anti-Tamil riots in July and August Jayewardene proscribed three Left political parties under a false charge of their being involved in the violence. While the ban was subsequently lifted for two parties, the proscription of the JVP – which, by then, was emerging as the most prominent among Marxist parties and a frontline critic of Jayewardene's government – was kept in place indefinitely, forcing them underground. The JVP unsuccessfully attempted to have its ban revoked on numerous occasions. The insurrection they launched in July 1987 capitalized on the unpopularity of the Jayewradene government, while it seized on the mass discontentment over growing Indian influence in Sri Lanka's political sphere. In 1990, when the state finally crushed the rebellion, it resulted in the deaths of 60,000 including the JVP's rank and file (Senaratne 1997, 103; Wickremeretna 2016, 15). The events of these turbulent two and a half years strengthened the state of exception taking root in Sri Lanka, thereby adding to the political centralization initiated by Jayewardene's regime a crucial legal and military arm. The closing years of the 1980s offer a demonstration of what Agamben terms as the "growing disassociation of birth (bare life) and the nation-state" (Agamben 2005, 175) which, in turn, resulted in a state-engineered and maintained legal and moral vacuum.

The 1978 constitution in Sri Lanka gave birth to the separation of powers along three parallel pillars – the executive presidency, the legislative parliament, and the judiciary – while it wrested on the executive exceptional provisions to overreach the other spheres. This can be identified as provisional grounds for the executive to step outside the law and undermine the constitution and the integrity of the judiciary. An example for this can be found in the president's office being conferred with provisions to pardon a person convicted and sentenced by a court of law. As recently as 2019, the president of Sri Lanka handed over a "special presidential pardon" to a Buddhist monk serving a six year sentence for contempt of court (Dissanayake 2019) and to a person serving a death sentence for a murder committed in 2005 (BBC 2019). In 2020, a "presidential pardon" was given to Sunil Rathnayake, an army officer, who was on death row after being convicted of the murder of eight Tamil civilians 2000, which included a five year old child (Vidarshana 2020). The sentencing of Ratnayake was a rare instance in Sri Lankan judicial history where an army soldier was convicted for the killing of Tamil civilians during the war.

Within the first decade of the 1978 constitution, indemnity laws were set in place which, during the state's crackdown of JVP rebels in 1988 and 1989, resulted in thousands of disappearances of youth in the Sinhalese-majority districts of the country (Bush 1990, 41-42; Thomson-Senanayake 2014, 116-129). While dead bodies were kept on display in public places, after having been tortured in safe-houses run by the military, police, and private armies, others were burnt or disposed into rivers or the sea (Amnesty International 1990, 3). In the Southern Province – where rebel activity was high – human rights lawyer Prins Gunasekara opened a Center for Human Rights in the Galle district (Gunasekara 1998, 667-668). Gunasekara and his junior associates represented the families of hundreds of "missing persons" and filed habeas corpus applications in court. In his *A Lost Generation: Sri Lanka in Crisis: The Untold Story* (1998), Gunasekara attempts to locate the post-JVP insurrection violence of 1987-90 within the larger political and constitutional crisis in the country which he traces back to the 1978 constitution. Key to his analysis, Gunasekara investigates the state's deployment of police and paramilitary agents who, while acting as an organ of the government, undermined the legal establishment and the judiciary. This included the threatening and killing of lawyers (Wickremeretna 2016, 804-806) including the murder of Wijedasa Liyanarachchi who was abducted by the police on 25 August 1988 outside the Colombo courts (Fernando 2015, 5). Liyanarachchi was known as a young lawyer who represented the families of "disappeared" persons in court. On 3 September, Liyanarachchi's lifeless body was delivered to the hospital (Gunasekara 1998, 629). A post-mortem revealed 96 injuries in Liyanarachchi's body (Fernando 2015, 19-31). In 1989, "unidentified gunmen" shot and killed Charitha Lankapura (Gunasekara 1998, 643-47) and Kanchana Abeypala (Gunasekara 1998, 630), who acted in litigation on behalf of families of "disappeared" men and women. By March 1990, with the exclusion of the Northern and Eastern provinces, 2000 habeas corpus cases had been filed in courts (Wickremeretna 2016, 804), while fifteen lawyers – out of which eight were known to represent the "disappeared" – had been killed by "unknown gunmen" (Wickremeretna 2016, 805-17). These killings can be characterized as intimidations of the law and attempts by the sovereign to appropriate the legal establishment within its overreaching agenda of power and control.

Sellapulle's arrest and conviction takes place five years after the aforementioned killing of 15 lawyers. In a different war – one against "Tamil Tigers" – the state had already harmonized the judiciary as an organ of its "legal battle". Reminiscent of Joseph K. in Franz Kafka's *The Trial*, Sellapulle is already implicated of the crime he is accused of even before the trial has commenced. Both Sellapulle and Kumaran realized "the very concepts of subjective right and juridical protection no longer made any sense" (Agamben 2005, 170) and that "fact and law [had become] completely confused" (170). For them, the court room had morphed and shared with the camp the coinciding of sovereign and bio-power; where, as a site, the room they occupied as defendants had become a junction between the juridical-institutional and bio-political model of power. Writing from the position of law being "a site of political struggle" in its formulation and its interpretation and application, Derek Gregory reinforces Agamben's notion that exception is a "vacant space limned by the 'emptiness of law'" (Agamben 2005, 6, 86; Gregory 2010, 63): where the law has been adopted by the state as an ally to an act of power – an act within which torture, incarceration, and forced and /or fabricated "confessions" are known to occur, tolerated, and enforced.

The cases of Kumaran and Paheer provoke discussion of the theoretical intersection between the captive body and torture as an act of power. Foundational thinkers in Trauma Studies such as Elaine Scarry, who reflect on torture as its being an act of inflicting physical pain to its being a "translation of the attributes (of pain) into the insignia of the regime" (Scarry 1985, 19), attempt to map the implications of torture as power. In particular, Scarry's assessment of torture as a symbolic "translation" of the regime's power from the sovereign to the person informs my reading of the judiciary and the law enforcement process in the narratives of Sellapulle, Kumaran, and Paheer. In these instances, in its designated "role", it is not in the judiciary's interest to have knowledge of torture and coercion that was commonplace in the police as leverage to force out "confessions". It is a process that "attacks personhood, suspends the rules" and "unmakes the world of the victim by turning it into a strange and terrifying place" (Taylor 2007, 710). It undermines the limits and conventions of what Taylor terms as "enlightenment distinctions between the human and inhuman" and "agreements differentiating between the legitimate and illegitimate use of force" (Taylor 2007, 711). While giving purchase to this proposition, the singular conversation between Paheer – a refugee who, for a dangerous crossing, left behind the family he loved – and human rights activist Chandrasekaram brings to conference two ends of a spectrum which, at first glance, seems distant and far removed from each other: the trajectory set off by a president's desire to exercise sovereignty through the concentration of power in an executive office, his banal use of exception and its normalization over ordinary law and – as a corollary – the juridical-legal warp caused by exception as a long-term implement.

In May 2019, Sri Lanka marked the tenth year since the end of the Civil War. In spite of numerous programmes designed and launched in the hope of post-war reconciliation – which, in 2010, included a Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) – the question of Tamil political prisoners remained neglected and insufficiently addressed. As a means of maintaining its electorate, post-war Sinhalese nationalism often promoted the idea of a possible "LTTE resurgence" which turned popular opinion against discussions of freeing Tamil prisoners who had been detained during the war-years. Based on interviews covering 1786 households in Sri Lanka's Tamil-dominated Northern, Eastern and Central provinces, a survey from 2012 indicated that 385 respondents claimed to have had a member of their family arrested by the army or the police (The Social Architects 2013). Of these already socially and politically marginalized families, 65% of the arrestees had been indicated as being the main income generator. Only 5% of the families of arrestees had been compensated by the state. 3.5% of them had received livelihood assistance (The Social Architects 2013). An alarming 43.5% of the arrestees were forced to give "confessions" under duress of which 53.5% had not received legal assistance (The Social Architects 2013).

In October 2015, 223 prisoners who had been detained as "LTTE suspects" launched a hunger strike in four prisons in Colombo, Anuradhapura, Jaffna, and Kandy. They had been detained under counter-terrorism laws of whom 144 were pending trial. 60 of these prisoners were yet to be charged while some were in detention from as early as 1997 (BBC 2015). The prisoners on strike demanded their trials to be held, or for them to be given freedom. The United Nations Council for Human Rights claimed that Sri Lanka held 258 such political prisoners of whom only 54 have been convicted (Iyengar 2015). In spite of strong opposition from Sinhalese nationalist platforms, human rights activists in Sri Lanka have lobbied for the rights of political prisoners who, after a decade since the defeat of the LTTE, are wasting away in prisons with no hope for their futures. For instance, the National Movement for the Release of Political Prisoners organized a petition in 2016 to effect the release of prisoners held under "false charges and without trial" (Perera 2016).

In a groundbreaking report issued in September 2018, Heleen Touquet documented sexual abuse and rape of male Tamil political prisoners in detention: a practice which Touquet claimed as "massive and widespread" and had occurred "throughout the conflict and the post-conflict period" (Touquet 2018, 46). Touquet concluded that genital mutilation, rape, and gang rape were common and sexual abuse was widely used in obtaining confessions and interrogation (46). Touquet's study is fresh in its approach to the issue of male Tamil political prisoners from a perspective of gender and gendered violence; and in drawing attention to ongoing violence on political prisoners in spite of the prospects of peace which the Sri Lankan state has declared after the end of the war. More than it being a matter of national security, the release of these political prisoners is a question of electoral politics and of maintaining the electorate along ethno-nationalist lines. For the politician who seeks favour in the country's majority Sinhalese, the detention of Tamil political prisoners offers leverage and rhetoric in a bid for a further term.

Endnotes:

1. Shobasakthi often uses an experimental frame that brings together elements of biography, fiction, journalistic tropes, embellishments and pseudo-academic flair (which includes playful use of footnotes). His writing is a textbook example for what Michael Rothberg terms the use of "traumatic realism": where, in the conveying of trauma, the narrative is built on a model that transcends conventional "realist" or "anti-realist" frames.
2. Chandrasekaram's inquiry problematizes the "mass prosecution" strategy of the state. The high volume of confessionary evidence gathered by the police casts suspicions over the credibility, fairness, and legality in recording them. Chandrasekaram demands the rationale of the purported "voluntary confessions" by the suspects which amount to willing self-incrimination in court.
3. Sexual abuse and rape of male political prisoners in Sri Lanka is an under-represented scholarship. See, Heleen Touquet's *Unsilenced: Male Survivors Speak of Conflict Related Sexual Violence in Sri Lanka* (2018) and Daya Somasundaram's *Scarred Minds: The Psychological Impact of War on Sri Lankan Tamils* (1998). Perhaps, the most powerful biographical representation of rape of male prisoners is found in Rohitha Munasinghe's *Eliyakandha Wadha Kandhawura* (Eliyakandha Torture Camp) set against the JVP Insurrection of 1987-90 (p. 23, 99).

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Memory, Nature, and the Futility of War in Alice Oswald's *Memorial*

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Abstract:

Although Alice Oswald's 2011 *Memorial d*erives its source material from Homer's epic poem, it does not move with the same energy as the great epic. Rather, it commemorates the dead with a more muted sense of grief. A memorial operates as a retrospective poem, drawing from memory: the community or the individual who remembers is the impetus for the memorial. In Oswald's *Memorial*, we serve as that impetus – we, the readers, are the conveyors of memory. Oswald's *Memorial* is a written poem, more similar in some ways to a physical war monument than an oral epic, and her style and form must engage the reader in an active manner. This memorial offers a meditative rather than an enraged response to the solders' deaths; it commemorates each soldier, from both sides of the conflict, in rhythmic, meditative pacing, with an eye to the future, and a cautionary tale for the present. Oswald's poem offers this space for collective memorialization that includes this "active reciprocity" of simultaneously honoring the dead and admonishing the living. We may grieve for those we've never met, but in the end, we remember the dead for the sake of the living.

Keywords: Memorial, poetry, death, Alice Oswald, retrospection, grief, cautionary tale

Rage is the impetus throughout Homer's epic poem *The Iliad*. Rage holds Achilles back from battle and then pushes him to fight again; rage drives the Achaeans to attack the Trojans; rage colors the soldiers' grieving as they hear of their comrades' deaths or find their fallen comrades in the field. In fact, in his work *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Characte*r, Jonathan Shay points out that "*Rage* is properly the title of Homer's poem, and his audience may have known it by that name, not *Iliad*" (Shay 1995, 20). This rage, this energized grief manifests itself vividly in the way in which Achilles dishonors the fallen Hector, for example; in the way the other soldiers mutilate the enemies' bodies; in the way the women wail and tear their hair in ritualistic lamentation and mourning for their dead. Not so much in Alice Oswald's 2011 poem *Memorial*. This *Memorial* derives its source material from Homer's epic poem, but it does not move with the same energy as the great epic. Rather, it commemorates the dead with a more muted sense of grief. For how do we grieve for someone we've never met? Alice Oswald's *Memorial* engages our emotions using familiar imagery, offering us an emotional bridge to the dead of Homer's *Iliad*.

Alice Oswald prefaces her poem with her philosophy of translation, describing her attempt to preserve the ancient Greek epic's energeia in her own minimalist, reflective poem. Although it evokes strong reactions in readers, *Memorial* is an entirely new poem, with a modern audience, and thus it connects to its readers through different means and with different effects than the *Iliad*. Oswald must incite some response in us: some emotional, visceral connection to names of men who have been dead for thousands of years. At the beginning of the 21st century, we are not stirred to rage at the thought of soldiers' deaths from the battle of Troy. We are, however, moved by memories of our more recent dead, whether immediate family, our nation's fallen military, or even global losses. We respond emotionally to images or ideas that relate to our immediate concerns and relationships, or to those of our recent past. As members of a community, we engage in shared memories as well as individual memories, and then we preserve these communal memories in ways that are accessible to all members of that community.

Sometimes, these communal memorials are physical monuments such as the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington, D. C., or the various Tombs of the Unknown Soldier across the globe. Sometimes, these are memorial ceremonies, held in a church or at a Fourth of July picnic. And sometimes, these are written memorials, such as Oswald's. Katharine Derderian explores the shift between oral and written mourning genres in her book *Leaving Words to Remember: Greek Mourning and the Advent of Literacy*. She explains how we adapt our mourning rituals not only according to religious or cultural customs, but also according to the closeness of the relationship with the fallen, and the distance in time after the event of death. Carolin Hahnemann explores the similarity between architectural and written memorial in her review of Oswald's poem, "Book of Paper, Book of Stone: An Exploration of Alice Oswald's Memorial." As Hahnemann points out, the oral effect of the poem is impressive, but the visual effect equally significant, with its lists of names, repeated similes, and effective use of white space – not to mention the carefully designed book cover (Hahnemann 2014, 5). In his article "History's Remains: Of Memory, Mourning, and the Event," Michael Naas likewise considers the role of mourning and the effect of communal memorialization, in particular the Vietnam Memorial, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, and the 9/11 memorial at Ground Zero. Naas explores how memorials built by communal memory can influence communal stances on war, for good or for ill; but we will consider Naas's admonition towards the end of this paper.

Whatever their genre, these memorials operate as a social unifier, a vehicle for individual and collected memories, that allows both the individual and the community to connect through a shared loss – a shared emotion. Derderian explores the genres of mourning in ancient Greece in her book *Leaving Words to Remember*, explaining how mourning is represented differently in oral genres than in written genres. As she explains, "gesture, ritual activity, iconographic representations, and material monuments or artifacts add different levels of meaning to the exchange between the mourners and the dead and among the community of survivors" (Derderian 2001, 189). In addition, "the temporal and spatial distance of each medium from the immediacy of death determines its varying function as communication with the dead or as dialogue among the living." (Derderian 2001, 191-2).

Given the distance of three thousand years, any attempt on our part to mourn the dead of Troy will inevitably lack the intensity and exigence of Homer's work, even at it too is distanced by some 300 years. Oswald has been careful not to address the dead in her poem, as Homer does (and as she notes that he does); the "temporal and spatial distance" of her poem from the dead is further than Homer's, and thus her *Memorial* engages with them at a different emotional tenor. By definition, a written memorial is not a funeral, not a lamentation, not an elegy, not a eulogy. These are each, in themselves, different forms of mourning that are demonstrated in the *Iliad*. However, if we consider the etymology, a memorial is based on memory: something intangible, distanced from the immediacy of grief, and from its physical and ritualistic manifestations. A memorial operates as a retrospective poem, drawing from memory: the community or the individual who remembers is the impetus for the memorial. In Oswald's *Memorial*, we serve as that impetus – we, the readers, are the conveyors of memory. In Homer's oral tradition, the bard served as that conveyor, bringing memories of the dead to the audience through performed oral poetry. We still have modern oral traditions, but Oswald's *Memorial* is a written poem, more similar in some ways to a physical war monument than an oral epic, and her style and form must engage the reader in an active manner. This memorial offers a meditative rather than an enraged response to the solders' deaths; it commemorates each soldier, from both sides of the conflict, in rhythmic, meditative pacing, with an eye to the future, and a cautionary tale for the present.

We will discuss this forward-looking aspect of the poem in a moment, but first, *how* do our memories engage with the Iliad's dead? Oswald offers three kinds of memories or experiences that we can connect with, evoking a sense of grief for these long-forgotten dead: she offers images of contemporary war, familial scenes, and nature similes. Each soldier's death is given its own few lines in the poem, with reference to his character or, as often as not, to his family. Each death is followed by a repeated simile that offers scenes of nature: animals, the weather, the elements. Oswald is tying their deaths to different kinds of memories that we already possess, that we can already draw from. As readers, we receive these images of familiar collective memories, whether contemporary war, familial scenes, or nature similes, that we relate back to the story. In this way, Oswald offers us sensory imagery, whether the form of the poem itself or relatable similes, and we are invited to reflect or project our personal experiences and emotions onto those images. As Mark Freeman suggests in his book chapter "Memory and Narrative," sensory aids such as a photograph "allow a different kind of relationship to the past, one that is more concrete, more sensuous" (Freeman 2010, 271). Through these different forms of imagery, Oswald offers us a specific, sensory connection to the dead from a war that took place thousands of years ago. We fill in these emotional gaps, but we are filling them in with different emotions than rage; once again; the distance between us and the fallen soldiers of Troy is considerably more than from Homer's audience, so Oswald must appeal to our sense of grief through different channels.

Oswald engages many poetic resources in evoking an emotional response from her audience, including the form of the poem itself. The list of names at the opening of the poem, the repeated similes, even the blank space on paper 52 (which I will discuss further on) engage our sensibilities. The way Oswald introduces contemporary war imagery is beautiful, and her references to the soldiers' families are poignant, but in this paper, I will focus on only the nature similes.

Although this poem is ostensibly about the dead of the Trojan War, nature serves as the overarching theme. Each soldier is commemorated with a few lines, but they always end in the soldier's death. Oswald reminds us that even though "they took a ship to Troy their story / Finishes here in darkness" (Oswald 2011, 20). There is no hope for continuation or renewal of their lives, as they die "in a daze of loneliness / Their conversation unfinished" (Oswald 2011, 23). There is only the finality of death. Each soldier in the poem is introduced, described, and killed. These men were the focus of Homer's epic, with each battle scene and each death scene gorier and more glorious than the last. In *Memorial*, however, it is nature that drives the motion of the poem, and, perhaps more significantly, the emotional tenor. The "darkness" and "loneliness" depicted in these lines do not evoke vengeful rage. The soldiers' deaths punctuate nature, but they cannot affect nature; nature is constant, and an individual death is hardly a momentary interruption. Oswald cleverly weaves the names of the dead with nature similes: she starts with the lists of names, weaves in the antiphonal similes of nature, then ends with a list of just nature similes. The names of the dead pass us by – or do we pass them by? And are absorbed in time. Homer's epic works as a continuity of war, beginning and ending *in media res*, without resolution. *Memorial's* lack of resolution comes from the continuity of nature and the futility of war, almost in direct contrast to the epic.

Consider the first nature simile that Oswald offers us, following the death of the first soldier: "Like a wind-murmur / Begins a rumour of waves / One long note getting louder / The water breathes a deep sigh / Like a land-ripple / When the west wind runs through a field / Wishing and searching / Nothing to be found / The corn-stalks shake their green heads" (Oswald 2011, 9). We have hardly begun the poem, and already the fear of unescapable doom sounds in our ears. Nature herself gives warning; this death will serve as a "land-ripple," creating a domino effect: it will lead to another death, and another, as war is wont to do. Oswald engages our attention and emotion through her stunning sensory imagery. We hear the effect of the soldier's death: the "wind-murmur," the "rumour of waves," the "one note getting louder." We see the effect: "the corn-stalks [shaking] their green heads." We feel the effect the "rumour of waves ... wishing and searching / Nothing to be found." Oswald's language is not difficult; it is, in fact, fairly commonplace. It does not take great concentration to enter the "mind-space" of the poem; instead, it draws us in, gently, easily, while simultaneously gaining access to our own memories. The emotional door opens in both directions. We engage easily with the imagery, while the poem engages our sympathy. This creates an open-door effect for the poem, which then helps us connect to the other aspects of the poem as well – including, and more significantly, the soldiers' deaths. Once we are emotionally connected to the sensory imagery, it becomes easier to connect emotionally to those parts and people we are less familiar with as well.

One of Oswald's most beautiful similes demonstrates this unstoppable force of nature and the futility of our own actions:

> "Like in Autumn under the dripping wind / The earth's clothes grow heavy she can hardly stand / God rains on the roof hammering his fists down / He has had enough of violent smiling men / Now every one of us is being looked at / Under the rain's lens / Now the rivers are filling they are overfilling / There are streams sawing through the hills / Cutting up the grass into islands / Everything is clattering to the sea / This is water's world / And the works of men are vanishing" (Oswald 2011, 41).

Unlike Homer's epic that emphasizes the continuity of "the works of men" (war especially), this poem demonstrates the continuity of nature. If war is futile and nature continuous, though, how does this affect our approach to memorializing the war dead? We cannot still feel rage at their deaths. We don't feel the immediate force of their soldiers' deaths, as each narrative ending works like a flashback, caught between similes and scenes of nature. Nature, the constancy of nature, and the continuation of nature despite war and death, is the unifying theme of the poem; in a sense, death serves only as a place marker for an individual.

Sometimes Oswald offers imagery that connects nature similes with contemporary war imagery as well as parental scenes, linking our memories more firmly to the poem. It is worth noting that it is always the soldiers' parents who hold memories of them, and never their children; for example, the reference to Hector's death mentions his wife Andromache, but not their son. With war, their lineage ceases and memory ends. Moreover, there is a finality to their deaths beyond the parent-child bond; there is a social and cultural gap: a lost generation. Oswald sometimes mixes her similes with these parental figures or contemporary war imagery; for example, in her simile for Gorgythion's death: "As if it was June / A poppy being hammered by the rain / Sinks its head down / It's exactly like that / When a man's neck gives in / And the bronze calyx of his helmet / Sinks his head down" (Oswald 2011, 29). I don't think I will ever be able to separate the image of poppies from war. Just as we associate World War II with a tiny paper flower, so Oswald gives us this magnificent juxtaposition: the brilliant, fragile red poppy being "hammered by the rain," just as the warrior's neck is broken under his bronze helmet. We can see the poppy with its gauzy red petals; we can see its crisp green stem being snapped, and it's a short leap of imagination to picture the same for the soldier.

Now, let's consider the death scene of Patroclus in both the *Iliad* and *Memorial*, comparing Homer's energetic similes with Oswald's more melancholy imagery. Oswald is able to evoke a sense of grief for these men by relating their death scenes to images and emotions that are familiar to us today. First, we have Homer's simile:

> "As when some lion overpowers a tireless wild boar / up on a mountain summit, battling in all their fury / over a little spring of water, both beasts craving / to slake their thirst, but the lion beats him down / with sheer brute force as the boar fights for breath / so now with a close thrust Hector the son of Priam / tore the life from the fighting son of Menoetius, from Patroclus who had killed so many men in war, and gloried over him" (Homer 1990, 959-967).

This simile is full of the energy and rage of glorious war. The animals fighting are strong and powerful; the water, the prize from the fight, is simply a "little spring." This image of the "little spring" is not the focus of the simile, but it serves as a quiet reminder of the causes of war and the futility of the struggle. This is, of course, only one reading of that moment in Homer's epic poem, but Oswald adopts and adapts similar moments to emphasize nature's power and endurance over even powerful creatures such as the lion and the boar.

Her simile for Patroclus' death in *Memorial* is gentle and nostalgic: "Like moonlight / Or the light of a bonfire / Burning on the cliffs / When sailors get blown along / Homesick over the sea / They notice that far-off fire / And think of their wives" (Oswald 2011, 61). There is no violence in this metaphor, no combat; the struggle is homesickness. How is homesickness the proper emotion to evoke at Patroclus' death? It is a gentler emotion and perhaps a keener emotion than rage; it is an enduring emotion that does not flare up and cool down at whim. There is a gnawing constancy to homesickness that invites us to enter that emotion and to feel the pangs, which are perhaps more relatable to most than vengeful rage. Again, we are not stirred to revenge for the deaths of men from three centuries ago; but Oswald taps into other emotions, such as homesickness and the grief from more recent wars, to help us empathize with the characters in her poem and understand the effects of war – whether recent or long gone – on our community.

There is, moreover, the underlying reminder of the futility of war. Oswald's 21st century *Memorial* helps us bridge the gap of thousands of years to remember and connect with men who are long dead and gone, but it is not simply for the sake of their honor and glory that we remember them. They say that those who don't know history are doomed to repeat it, and Oswald invites us to remember our history in order to learn the consequences of war. She tells us of Iphidamas: "Far from his wife all that money wasted / A hundred cattle he gave her / A thousand sheep and goats / All that hard work feeding them wasted" (Oswald 2011, 35). We can feel the emphasis of the "waste" through her repetition of the word. On page 52, she leaves a wide gap of space, taking up half the page: we can fill that space with any memories that we might want to preserve in connection with these men, but it also reminds us of the emptiness: what other names might be filling that space? This blankness offers a void, a reminder of possibility as well as futility. This is not a space for rage, but a space for contemplation and reflection. If the similes serve to evoke our own memory-related emotions for the soldiers who are unknown to us, this blank space offers a vehicle for those emotions.

Even for moments other than a soldier's death, Oswald offers similes that help us connect our memories to the ancient dead. For example, she borrows directly from Homer's depiction of Achilles chasing Hector: "Like a man running in a dream / Can never approach a man escaping / Who can never escape a man approaching" (Oswald 2011, 55). Again, we see that cyclical simile, reminding us of the constancy of nature and time, and the futility of our own actions. Oswald reminds us that, despite his best efforts, "HECTOR died like everyone else" (Oswald 2011, 68). Our most brilliant, manly, virtuous, heroic warriors face the same death as the naïve youth who jumps off the ship when it first lands, and is cut down instantly. Hector's death in *Memorial* is followed by a flashback scene and not a nature simile, but Oswald does offer us a contemporary image linked to Hector: "Like a man rushing in leaving his motorbike running" (Oswald 2011, 69). We know this feeling, this expectancy, this moment where we pause time to accomplish a task before continuing our journey – but Hector's journey ends at that pause, an unfinished work.

I mentioned before that the list of names is woven between similes of nature. Although we begin with the names, by the end of the poem, all we have is nature, and Oswald ends by repeating her last simile: "Like when god throws a star / And everyone looks up / To see that whip of sparks / And then it's gone" (Oswald 2011, 81). What kind of mourning ritual ends with something other than the dead? This is the forward-looking impetus of the memorial that emphasizes the living and warns of nature's continuity without us. Hahnemann reminds us too that "Memorial portrays war not as a conflict waged for the attainment of a goal, but as a catalyst of death that affects both sides without distinction" (Hahnemann 2014, 21). This poem is not about the war, but about the effects of the war; it is not about the glorious deaths of the soldiers, but about the consequences of their deaths for those who survive them.

What, then, are those consequences? Naas analyzes the consequences in connection with the use of war monuments as military promotion and considers the ceremony behind the burial of the Unknown Soldier: "These remains remain to claim us, I thought, in some very powerful way, reminding us that the separation of the dead from everything that remains for us the living, and so the separation of the dead from their very name and history, remains for us more palpable here, the absence more present and more pressing" (Naas 2003, 88-9). Naas questions the usual forms of memorial as propaganda pieces, inciting further war by promising heroes glory and honor, without a thought as to further consequences. As Derderian reminds us, "with the increasing relevance and permanence of the written memorial within the public domain, death adopts an additional significance as a civic act and as a collectively accessible historical fact; accordingly, mourning becomes associated with active reciprocity as well as the artistic and ritual activities of establishing a memorial" (Derderian 2001, 192). Oswald's poem offers this space for collective memorialization that includes this "active reciprocity" of simultaneously honoring the dead and admonishing the living. Jonathan Shay offers this admonition as well, demonstrating the effects of war and the importance of memorializing the dead for the sake of the living: in his work *Achilles in Vietnam*, he places a huge emphasis on veterans' need for closure after the deaths of their comrades-in-arms, usually through proper burial rites and memorialization. These rites were complicated in Vietnam when dead soldiers were shipped home without their friends' knowledge, or when soldiers went missing and were never found again. For those who die, the consequences of death are (typically) honor and mourning, even though they are not alive to receive it; the consequences for the living, however, are significantly more dire: continued war, continued rage, continued death. The "whip of sparks" is extinguished through "the works of men," through our own choices and actions. The memorial serves as a reminder that, although absent physically, the dead can still offer lessons for the living.

Ultimately, although we see how Oswald perpetuates the memory of the dead through these repetitive but moving images of nature, we still ask why. Why *should* our memories engage with the Iliad's dead? T. S. Eliot has already answered this question for us. In the *Four Quartets*, he tells us: "This is the use of memory: / For liberation – not less of love but expanding / Of love beyond desire, and so liberation / From the future as well as the past" ("Little Gidding"). We do not remember the dead for their sakes, but for our own. Oswald shows us nature's continuity, how the same "little spring" in Homer's simile will endure the fight between the lion and the boar, and remain unaffected. We may grieve for those we've never met, but in the end, we remember the dead for the sake of the living.

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Objective Values in the Information Age: Preserving Humanity with C.S. Lewis' *Abolition of Man*

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Abstract:

This essay examines C.S. Lewis's call for objective values in *The Abolition of Man*. It also contextualizes Lewis's argument with the technological advancements that were occurring in his time. Writing at the cusp of modern technology, Lewis was aware and concerned with the potential repercussions of where technological research was headed and what effect it was having on the world's value system. Specifically, he was concerned with the move toward subjective values and feared it would lead to humanity's ruin. If the world does not observe and agree upon objective values, then there is no standard that would prevent its dehumanization by technology. Lewis begins with the Christian premise that because humans are flawed, it cannot be left up to the individual to determine right and wrong. Instead, there must be objective values based on God's nature that guide the morals of society, and it is these values that should help society navigate decisions concerning technology. This is all the more relevant today, as technology is advancing faster than people can anticipate, and it is affecting everyday life. At the same time, it is becoming increasingly common, as people try to right past injustices and respect varying cultural traditions, for people to end up standing for nothing, claiming that there is no absolute truth, and that morality is relative. This is the crux of the issue with which society should concern itself: protecting people from losing their humanity.

Keywords: Lewis, technology, Abolition of Man, dehumanization, objective values

At the forefront of society's technological concerns today is transhumanism, what the World Transhumanist Association defines as "improving the human condition . . . by developing and making widely available technologies to eliminate aging and to greatly enhance human intellectual, physical, and psychological capacities" (Allenby and Sarewitz 2011, 5). Yet if this path of technological advancement continues, at what point are people no longer human? According to Allenby and Sarewitz in their work *The Techno-Human Condition*, "A significant part of the ambiguity [of the word transhuman] arises from one's notions about what it means to be human. . . . This definitional ambiguity suggests to us that defining 'transhumanism' more precisely is less important than understanding the implications of that ambiguity" (Allenby and Sarewitz 2011, 5). While it may be troubling that this blend of technology and humanity has already begun, it is even more so because of the difficulty in pinpointing where the line is sometimes between what is human and inhuman. Therefore, George Annas, a bioethicist, claims, "It's not transhumanism we should worry about; it's dehumanization" (Garreau 2004, 230). This is the crux of the issue with which society should concern itself: protecting people from losing their humanity. C.S. Lewis addresses what the key defense should be in *Abolition of Man*. Colin Duriez writes that *The Abolition of Man* "is concerned to defend the objectivity of values such as goodness and beauty against the modern view that they are merely in the mind of the beholder" (Duriez 1990, 13). It is only with objective values that humanity can protect itself against dehumanization.

When putting forth what value system the world should be upholding in *The Abolition of Man*, Lewis uses the example of the Tao. He explains, "While we speak from within the *Tao* we can speak of Man having power over himself in a sense truly analogous to an individual's self-control. But the moment we step outside and regard the *Tao* as a mere subjective product, this possibility has disappeared" (Lewis 1974, 75). To Lewis, this is key to maintaining control over oneself: objective values. If these values are not observed, he warns, "When all that says 'it is good' has been debunked, what says 'I want' remains" (Lewis 1974, 65). Because people are inherently flawed, society has to rely on a value system outside of the individual or else be subjected to personal, selfish whims. Lewis points out that not adhering to objective values signifies something deficient in the human, not in the teaching itself. He is trying desperately through his writings to prove, "The future of man cannot be left to those who are inadequate and damaged human beings themselves, people morally incomplete, their best human traits undeveloped or stunted" (Chapman 1976, 15). Therefore, he begins with the premise that because humans are flawed, it cannot be left up to the individual to determine right and wrong. In his essay, "God and Objective Moral Values, Robert Gascoigne agrees, saying, "The question 'Why be moral?' need not be oriented towards discovering non-moral reasons for moral action, but rather towards elucidating what general description of the human condition is most compatible with the fundamental character of morality" (Gascoigne 1985, 531). People should not have to make a case for morality, but it simply should be evident as part of natural law and what logically makes sense for human flourishing. Lewis knew that most people did not consciously consider what he was proposing but inherently would agree because its correctness was founded in logic. It is not a theological position to which he is trying to convert people; it was a rational conclusion he thought anyone could draw. Similarly, Peter Kreeft explains how this used to not be a question that was contested, as he says, "Before Hegel, nearly everyone agreed that Truth, could we but know it, must be unchanging--at least truths about human nature and the laws of good and evil" (Kreeft 1994). As such, Lewis finds himself arguing for a position that was to him common sense in the hopes of prioritizing society toward the good.

Writing at the beginning of modern technology, Lewis was aware and concerned with the potential repercussions of where technological research was headed and what effect it was having on the world's value system. Bloom explains, "Lewis argued that [the Tao] was no longer taken for granted, and he pointed to an increasing belief in relativist or subjective values, which he suggested, amounted to a rejection of the Tao. But if the Tao, the sole source of all value judgement, was rejected, all value would be rejected, he claimed, and the abolition of man as a moral being would have been achieved" (Bloom 1993, 116). This movement toward relative values is what Lewis feared would lead to humanity's ruin. Duriez continues, explaining, "Abandonment of the *Tao*, so much a characteristic of modern thought, spells disaster for the human race. Specifically human values like freedom and dignity become meaningless: the human being is merely part of nature" (Duriez 1990, 13). Rejection of objective values is a slippery slope of losing truth altogether. Instead, there must be objective values that guide the morals of society, and it is these values that should help society navigate decisions concerning technology.

Furthermore, rather than simply concur there are objective values, one must also recognize the problems that arise from the idea of subjective values, or moral relativism. One scholar, James Rachels, traces this idea back to Ancient Greece to one of Socrates' opponents for further context, noting,

> Throughout history, there have always been groups of people who, like Thrasymachus, believe that ethics is just a matter of opinion; and there have always been groups of people who, like Socrates, believe that ethics has an objective basis. But with the rise of modern science, skepticism about ethics became even more attractive. Modern science sees the world as a cold, indifferent place that cares nothing for us or our projects; the universe is a realm of facts that know nothing of right or wrong. (Rachels 2012, 140)

This certainly seems understandable; as society tries to right its bias and injustice of the past and make society more equal, it is tempting to let every individual choose what is right for him or herself, not wanting to push opinion on someone else. The difference, however, is that a value system should not be viewed as opinion, but rather as fact. Rachels explains further, "On the surface, [belief in moral relativism] seems enlightened. Tolerance is important, and many cultural tactics are nothing more than social customs—standards of dress, the details of household arrangements, the methods of greeting, and so on. But fundamental matters of justice are different" (Rachels 2012, 140-141). Rachels is pointing out that social customs are subjective: how people dress, raise their kids, what is considered polite or rude, for example. However, what is just and unjust is not up to each individual society to determine: slavery, domestic violence, and racism (Rachels 2012, 140-141) are just a few examples of practices that are unequivocally wrong, no matter the traditions of the people practicing them. If society prescribes to moral relativism, it is a downslide into chaos. If everyone's opinion in every situation can be truth, who is to say in what way a person should or should not act? Subjectivity allows for anyone to say something is not true if it does not agree with his or her opinion. If people are unwilling to stand up for right in the face of wrong, Timothy Demy explains how Lewis believed that could be catastrophic to a society: "For Lewis . . . the acceptance of moral relativism resulted in the denigration of men and women on both an individual and corporate level. The personal dignity and worth of human beings as those who were created in the image of God were severely eroded and there was also a cumulative effect of this eradication in society and culture" (Demy 2004, 220). Therefore, with questions about technology, one must look to objective values in order to determine in what direction society should go. If not, moral relativism will assuredly lead humankind to its own dehumanization.

Moreover, when it came to technology, Lewis's main worry seemed to be about the potential abuse of power. Demy explains, "For Lewis, technology was neutral, but its use for repression, especially by governments or other groups, was a major concern for him" (Demy 2004, 214). C.S. Lewis saw several advancements in technology during his lifetime, such as the radio and airplane, and these, he knew, were not in and of themselves evil. Yet what he saw through the World Wars was enough to make him fear the misuse of technology. This concern was rooted in Lewis's Christian faith: "Lewis believed that the propensity for using technology in a destructive manner was a result of universal pride and greed in humanity. . . . He did not believe in the inevitability of progress and he feared the abuse of technology and science by small groups of individuals as well as governments" (Demy 2004, iii). For Lewis, it is much more likely that humanity would bring about its own end by concerning themselves single-mindedly with the pursuit of technology without looking outside this scope to ethical concerns. Even worse, some could intentionally take these scientific developments to use them for their own personal advancement or manipulation of the public to ensure they maintain their position. Demy continues: "Lewis detested cruelty and tyranny and believed that there was a moral perspective underlying them that failed to distinguish between goodness and power, merit and success" (Demy 2004, 237). This distinction is important because it is one of the foundational reasons Lewis called himself a Christian. To him, "God should be loved and obeyed not because He is omnipotent, but because He is loving and good. To worship power for its own sake, whether human or divine is to blur the moral distinction between good and evil" (Demy 2004, 237). Therefore, as society chooses rulers in the Information Age, it is more important than ever to keep in mind that people should choose leaders who are objectively good, and not be naive to the ambitious who could be using technology for their own selfish gain.

Therefore, objective values are also the answer when protecting against corruption of government. Lewis explains, "A dogmatic belief in objective value is necessary to the very idea of a rule which is not tyranny or an obedience which is not slavery" (Lewis 1974, 73). If people are to maintain their freedom, then unwavering conviction about good and evil is required. Demy discusses why this was part of Lewis's motivation for writing *The Abolition of Man*; he believed that educating students in the difference of good and evil was the most assured method of preserving freedom. Otherwise, Demy notes, "The alternative, according to Lewis was education that determined values based on impulse or sentiment. Such an educational process lacked reliable authority for making value judgments and left individuals open to control by the state or other groups" (Demy 2004, 245). This education based on sentiment is seen more frequently, even working its way into the foundation of the English language, as the phrase "I feel" is increasingly replacing "I think." Logic and emotion do not have to be at odds with each other, but it is also the case that emotion or sentiment should not replace rational thinking. Additionally, Francis Fukuyama maintains that morality should still be the barometer of the power of the people, claiming, "True freedom means the freedom of political communities to protect the values they hold most dear, and it is that freedom that we need to exercise with regard to the biotechnology revolution today" (Fukuyama 2002, 218). Societies are only able to pride themselves in being free if they are all united in the same value system and standing against corruption.

Furthermore, objective values are not only key to protecting society's freedom against a corrupt government; they are also crucial to protect the individual from technology taking over and denigrating humankind. It is by having objective values that people can ensure they maintain control over technology as a tool, rather than having tunnel vision for what technology could accomplish. Lewis warns, "We have no instinctive urge to keep promises or to respect individual life: that is why scruples of justice and humanity--in fact the *Tao*--can be properly swept away when they conflict with our real end, the preservation of the species" (Lewis 1974, 33). If the world's only focus is ensuring its continued existence, then people will begin to disregard what veritably should be its focus, and that is its value system. Lewis does not believe that the preservation of mankind should be sought without justification (Lewis 1974, 36). In one essay, he states, "Progress, for me, means increasing goodness and happiness of individual lives" (Lewis 1970, 311). If the objective good was not increasing, then it would not matter to Lewis that humans were living longer. Lewis foresaw what could happen to a world where people are not standing firm in right and wrong: "But once our souls, that is, ourselves, have been given up, the power thus conferred will not belong to us. We shall in fact be the slaves and puppets of that to which we have given our souls" (Lewis 1974, 72). If people do not value and seek the good, then they will be that much easier to be overpowered. Without proper conviction, people will become instruments themselves. Lewis continues, "Either we are rational spirit obliged for ever to obey the absolute values of the *Tao*, or else we are mere nature to be kneaded and cut into new shapes for the pleasures of masters who must, by hypothesis, have no motive but their own 'natural' impulses" (Lewis 1974, 73). Therefore, honoring these values becomes of utmost importance in order to protect themselves against unintentional transhumanism.

Consequently, one of the main ways to go about this is by being intentional with one's use of technology. Part of the responsibility of technology is the recognition that it is not permanent. Demy discusses how Lewis looked to the Middle Ages as an example:

> He saw in the medieval model an approach that permitted the use of technology in a way that balanced the temporal and the eternal. As individuals used technology to assist in daily life and as societies used it to benefit larger groups of individuals or citizens, technology was always used with the understanding that any benefits derived from its use were temporary. Technology might provide a better quality of life but it was never more than a tool. (Demy 2004, 198)

Keeping its temporary nature in mind will help people maintain perspective. If society becomes wholly dependent on technology, then they stop viewing it as a tool of convenience that helps make life easier. When it is completely relied upon, that is when society becomes vulnerable. Lewis was aware of how technology was changing the world, and even today, few people are naive enough to advocate for the removal of all technology. However, it is more necessary than ever to hold objective values in mind to prevent the abuse that comes with overuse. Demy explains, "While

Lewis admitted this change, he did not approve of its pervasiveness in life. But more troubling to him than technology's presence was the psychological effect it had on individuals who placed false hope in it as a solution for personal and social problems. Lewis also saw in technology a psychological seductiveness or unhealthy desire for the next generation of technology" (Demy 2004, 188). Lewis believed no one should look to technology to answer life's problems. This has dire adverse effects that are seen through people's psychological well-being. For example, the more relationships interact online, the more it becomes evident that these are not as fulfilling as face-to-face relationships, and people are statistically unhappier the more this progresses (Gámez-Guadix 2014, 714). The best way to put values into practice is by trying one's best to live virtuously, especially when it comes to the use of technology. This means striving for wisdom as to what technology is beneficial and what is short-changing the human experience. It also means practicing self-control to moderate the amount of technology used to keep from being addicted. These objective values will keep people from unwittingly becoming enslaved to technology, thus losing their humanity.

Throughout the discussion, it is crucial to keep in mind that while objective values should temper technology, religion and technology are not at odds with one another. Peter Kreeft explains, "Astonishingly, few modern minds see the simple and obvious point that an unchanging standard, far from being the enemy of moral progress, is the necessary condition for it" (Kreeft 1994). Simply because many religious people advocate for objective values does not mean that it is solely a religious claim. Gascoigne further states, "Implying that people need religion to ascribe to an objective morality implies that someone cannot come to an understanding of objective morality logically, that there need be a divine revelation in order for someone to understand" (Gascoigne 1985, 531). The fact that several different religions hold to this standard should show this is something that precedes organized religion. C.S. Lewis, a staunch Christian, made it a point in his lectures and writings to assure people that his caution toward science did not make him anti-science. He explains, "Though I myself am a Theist, and indeed a Christian, I am not here attempting any indirect argument for Theism. I am simply arguing that if we are to have values at all we must accept the ultimate platitudes of Practical Reason as having absolute validity: that any attempt, having become sceptical about these, to reintroduce value lower down on some supposedly more 'realistic' basis, is doomed" (Lewis 1974, 49). Thus Lewis's argument is a plea of accord: that people from all backgrounds, cultures, and religions could come together and agree on a system of logical values to ensure the freedom of society.

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Invoking the Studio Art & Design Spirit in Writing Instruction

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Abstract:

This article will address pedagogical and theoretical conversations on the subjects of arts-based pedagogies and similar methods that oppose traditional writing instruction as evidenced in the studio environment. The goal here is to open these spaces to include compositional practices to establish new commonplaces that take students' individual creative and analytical identities into consideration in writing instruction. "The studio" is a commonly invoked metaphor for writing instruction generally, but first-year writing specifically, for the potential of its pedagogies; however, in order to consider how these classrooms might employ (or do employ) some of these processes and practices, I will focus on pedagogical approaches such as constructivism and improvisation that are, in the studio environment, centered on students making artifacts in various media. The purpose of this examination is not only to examine what these disciplines privilege and why, but to find the spaces in our writing instruction that can benefit from a close examination of these beliefs and values.

Keywords: writing instruction, studio pedagogy, first-year writing, arts-based pedagogy

Introduction

The artist's studio has been an area of interest for educators, historians, and art lovers for quite some time. Take for example the MOMA exhibit "A World of Its Own: Photographic Practices in the Studio" which highlighted the photography studio's various roles as "a haven, a stage, a laboratory, or a playground." A year later at the Gagosian, a gallery was unveiled entitled "In the Studio" which provided a survey on a similar theme. An art studio can be used for a variety of purposes or goals, but it is generally a space where artists work. In higher education, studio art classes are a shared creative community workspace where students have the opportunity to not only work beside each other, but also, to work with one another in a space that can also be considered "a haven, a stage, a laboratory, or a playground." However, despite the possibilities latent in the postsecondary studio environment, as scholar Stacey McKenna Salazar has claimed, the postsecondary studio environment "remains under-researched and under-theorized" (2014, 33).

These are especially interesting ideas for theorists of writing studies, a field which Geoffrey Sirc claims "really lacks . . . a truly broad definition of artistry" (2002, 117). This article will address the commonplaces typically associated with writing instruction in the humanities, and more specifically first-year writing, which I argue shares a similar spirit of experimentation and pluralism as undergraduate art and design studios. My focus is to examine measures that draw on progressive pedagogies to destabilize the expectations that derive from first-year writing classrooms (and that can be applied more generally in writing instruction) by engaging in pedagogical and theoretical conversations on the subjects of arts-based pedagogies and similar methods that oppose traditional writing instruction. The goal here is to open these spaces to include compositional practices to establish new commonplaces that take students' individual creative and analytical identities into consideration.

"The studio" is a commonly invoked metaphor in writing studies for the potential of its pedagogies; however, in order to consider how writing-intensive classrooms might employ (or do employ) some of these processes and practices, I will focus on pedagogical approaches such as constructivism and improvisation that are, in the studio environment, centered on students making artifacts in various media. The purpose of this examination is not only to examine what these disciplines privilege and why, but to find the spaces in our writing instruction that can benefit from a close examination of these beliefs and values. Again, in higher education, studio art classes are a shared creative community workspace embodying students working individually on their own projects while receiving feedback on their work; the instructor enacts the role of *facilitator*, not imparter of knowledge. The crux of this particular argument is the pedagogical spirit one finds in the art studio and how that spirit can be replicated in first-year writing and writing instruction more generally: the theories, values, and student dispositions that develop in these spaces. The studio art workshop has a unique nature, and it can offer ideas that can be transferred to the writing classroom—even though, as I discuss later, writing classrooms are bare empty rooms whereas studio art spaces tend to have materials (i.e. tools, sinks, big tables or easels, kilns, etc) for students to work their magic. I believe if we examine studio-based pedagogies closely, we may be able to expand the space for variety in teaching and learning methods that encompasses the encouragement of exploration in materials, media, and forms to move multimodality from theory into practice.

Cognitive constructivism and arts education

Constructivist pedagogies and practices connect easily with art education that values choice and student agency. Although there are a range of perspectives and practices associated with constructivism—approximately 18 different variations, according to Kaya Yilmaz, a professor of social sciences—constructivist perspectives share a common assumption that knowledge is constructed in each individual mind. Along the vein of cognitive constructivism, individual learners construct meaning around experiences, and this knowledge becomes formal knowledge when shared and agreed upon. Building deep understandings in subject matters of interest and habits of mind (Yilmaz 2008) are central to learning which is seen predominantly in the studio classroom. Although theories of constructivism may vary in applied method, they share a common belief that learning situations should "connect new information to the student's base of experience" (Simspon 1996, 54) in as many ways as possible. Research within a cognitive constructivist frame seeks to understand the way meaning is constructed from a student perspective through a series of experiences. The origins of constructivism can be credited to educational theorist and psychologist Jean Piaget, who believed that children build knowledge through play and other experiences, psychologist Lev Vygotsky and his understanding that learning is a social activity, and philosopher John Dewey and his belief that students learn best when they are engaged in tasks that reflect their own interests and experiences.

Unlike other educational theories such as objectivism, which posits that truth and meaning are absolute and inherent in objects, constructivism theorizes that knowledge exists within our minds. So, knowledge is not passively received from the world but actively created through experience. Learning is viewed as an active, adaptive activity (Yilmaz 2008). This activity is adaptive because as individuals engage in new experiences, they must reflect upon those experiences and connect the pieces between old and new knowledge. Constructivism in arts education highlights how learners create knowledge from their own observations and interactions. Constructivist pedagogy is one that makes the student and her experiences central to classroom learning. Art classrooms offer students opportunities to link ideas and to get actively involved in not only the process of discovery, but also in the interpretation of new information (Simspon 1996). The art classroom is a space to link meaning in art to students' own worlds as well as their other academic subjects. This shows a sense of respect for the student's experiences but also helps the student transfer ideas from one context to another. Through this perspective, students become involved in their education and learn to see (or resee) connections between different areas of their lives. A constructivist curriculum is ideally student-centered, advocating for active participation and exploration among students. In the art classroom, this may help students to not only respond to art from a place of emotion but to understand art as a "deliberate result of the desire to express or communicate an idea" (Simspon 1996, 55). Some basic assumptions that arise from these realms of thought include: learning is an active, adaptive process; learning is a situated activity; all knowledge is personal; experience and prior knowledge, as well as social interaction, play a role in learning. Teaching then requires one to:

> Recognize and respect students' backgrounds, beliefs, assumptions, and prior knowledge; provide abundant opportunities for group dialogue aimed at fostering shared understanding of the topic under study; establish a learning environment that encourages students to examine, change, and even challenge their existing beliefs and understandings . . . and introduce the formal domain of knowledge or subject matter into the conversation through a sort of loosely structured instruction. (Yilmaz 2008, 170)

The classroom is centered around the students and their experiences as well as their shared construction of knowledge, while also a balance or negotiation for the instructor between crafting and improvising in the classroom. Content is important in the constructivist classroom, but instead of instructors delivering the information, students are discovering and reflecting upon it through their own work. Through their process of discovery, students are developing multiple processes such as inquiry, analysis, and critical thinking.

Undergraduate art classes introduce students to an array of directions for them to explore. While certain schools require students to choose a specific discipline within art and design, other schools encourage students to step outside their usual medium and explore new options or media within the studio space. Basic skills are taught in some programs in mediums such as studio drawing, studio sculpting and studio photography, but these classes may be more general in nature to inspire students, give them a firm foundation, or teach them refinement techniques. College art studios are often social spaces inhabited by clusters of diverse works, showcasing the diversity of artistic endeavors. Studio-based pedagogies are not easily quantified when we consider the different elements of and approaches to studio-based teaching. Studio art practices may operate according to conventions or traditions, as a system of communication, or through a system of critical reflection depending on the program or instructor's goals for the course.

The studio classroom norms, or what is endorsed (or rejected) as conventions and behaviors within the classroom environment maintain a level of the following, according to Elliot Eisner:

> Looking at fellow students' work is not only permitted, but encouraged; it's a way to learn. Furthermore, student work is not only looked at, but discussed by both students and teachers. In this setting classroom norms encourage cooperation, autonomy, and community—students can look at the work of their peers and at the same time become increasingly independent . . . if students need something, they are expected to get it . . . It is expected that students will come to the classroom to work, that they will have the materials they need to work with, that they will initiate their work as they enter the classroom. (2002, 73-4)

Eisner highlights the aspects of the studio environment where students are given the freedom to explore, work alongside one another, and engage in dialogue, critique, and collaboration. Although students may engage in collaborative projects or discussions, they still become "increasingly independent" because they are given the tools to think creatively and critically in an autonomous environment where they are stakeholders in their own learning. The pedagogy of the studio is evidence through focus on the conditions of the studio, which are conducive to freedom to learn in a relatively low risk, open setting that fosters learning, making, and experimentation amongst individual learners. Art education naturally takes these concerns into consideration by fostering a tolerance for ambiguity, a process approach to complicated projects, an eye for aesthetics, and allowing for the creation of personally meaningful work.

Students are capable of doing more than consuming the knowledge given to them by their instructors; seeing students as producers can give them agency in their learning experiences and allow them to work through their own processes. The teacher acts as a mentor rather than as a lecturer by sharing their knowledge and guiding the class in their exploration. The facilitators may display and discuss their own processes, share other forms of doing, and inculcate students into the vocabulary and culture of the studio allowing students to take control of their learning experiences and create their own forms of knowledge with involvement where necessary (Cennamo and Brandt 2012). This is not the same as minimally guided discovery as the instructor mentors students and offers extensive instructional guidance, but at the right moments when it is needed. Constructivist pedagogy prioritizes experiences over products; the issue of choice remains central to constructivist pedagogy.

According to Rosanne Somerson, president of the Rhode Island School of Design, the student's initial studio experience is a foundational place for him or her to become introduced to the professional life of an artist. Somerson writes of the student's first encounter:

> The first-year experience for freshmen . . . is about learning how to reset expectations, to find new ways to begin, and to develop the conceptual and making tools necessary to create works that are significant in composition, presentation, function, or solution. The first-year is about devising individual systems for making and breaking one's own rules . . . it is also about learning to live comfortably in uncertainty so as to take new risks and forge new directions, and to push harder through personal limitations than ever imagined. These fundamental and formative experiences contribute to building the experience and bodies of knowledge that shape an artist or designer. (2013, 22)

These indispensable experiences may help the students create "bodies of knowledge" for their future careers but with a level of independence and exploration in their initial practice. According to Somerson, the groundwork set by the first-year experience allows students to uncondition themselves out of their previously held notions of creating to explore new methods and reimagine their process, play with different materials, and create quality work. The scholars who advertently or inadvertently allude to constructivist pedagogies in their classroom practice discuss the combination of autonomy, collaboration, ambiguity, and loose structure within the studio classroom.

Collaboration through dialogue and critique

Tom Anderson, a professor and former chair of art education, argues in his article "Toward a Socially Defined Studio Curriculum" that schools should implement a socially defined studio curriculum to showcase learning as an action, allow students to start the making of art from a place of personal interest, help students become familiar with the ambiguous nature of "question-asking rather than an information-imparting process," develop a sense of the human condition to help them expand and test their own perspectives and experiences, and lastly to help students connect to the society they live in (1985, 16). According to Anderson, these philosophical bases impart a balance between the social and the personal. Again, this is not necessarily a hands-off model but rather a curriculum developed through a sense of both personal insights and connection to society. Anderson puts it succinctly when he claims:

> The central concept of the studio curriculum is that personal perceptions, experiences, and propensities are the causal phenomena that support making, perceiving, and appreciating art. The key to student motivation, then, is to foster an experiential, personally meaningful element within each studio problem confronted. (1985, 17)

Anderson places himself in an interesting position between the social and the personal, the self-interested and the critical. If the self is social, then Anderson seems to think that what occurs in the studio should reflect students' real life situations; however, "the process of getting from mere impulse to the aesthetic manifestation of that impulse requires active perceptual, conceptual, technical, and design-oriented problem solving," explains Anderson (1985, 17). Through this struggle, students will discover if their selected problems are truly meaningful or only "peripherally related" to their real lives (1985, 17). Through an exploration of their own interests, they will learn the connections between content, style, and media as well as technical skills when navigating those media and selecting the medium of expression. As Anderson continues, the teacher does serve as the "technical facilitator" by providing students with guidance on a variety of topics, but the teacher is also the questioner: "questioning motivations, concepts, techniques, expressive needs, drawing from the student the most that student has to give" (1985, 17). His emphasis on creative interaction between the student and her work as stimulated by the teacher reflects the social nature of the studio classroom in the upper levels of arts education. Anderson argues that instead of teaching students techniques and having them apply those techniques to a predetermined problem, students are developing their techniques in relation to their own interests. To avoid the sort of "chaos" instructors may feel in relation to the constructivist classroom, Anderson explains realistic limitations should be set in terms of "space, time, and materials" (1985, 17). He concludes, "If values are socially-defined, then that should also be reflected in a socially defined art curriculum" (1985, 18).

As one art instructor explained, "What I noticed during my first year of teaching art was that my students seemed highly dependent upon me for ideas. I asked myself how I could facilitate artistic behavior and create a classroom experience that closely resembles that of a community arts studio" (Leysath 2015, 144). This, in a sense, seems like a balancing act that may haunt many classroom instructors: how do we balance expert instruction with student independence? Individuals harness their enormous potential for creativity through both solitary and collaborative production. In the studio environment, because students may be self-directed for much of the time, it is important for students to engage in group discussion, critique, and other forms of collaboration with their peers rather than relying on the instructor's guidance as the sole mechanism for their work. Collaborations occur when students actively work together. This is done during the process of individual production through discussion and critique, but it can also be done through group experiences. Collaboration in its various forms in the studio environment is an advantageous endeavor for both artists and student artists. Collaboration can fuel creativity and exploration because when artists work together, they can support and strengthen each other's work by offering fresh perspectives and inspiration.

Artmaking can be a solitary experience, but ideally, group discussions and critiques can help students practice critical thinking developed out of making and defending choices or suggestions. The incorporation of studio-based pedagogies in the classroom can engage with students' openness to critique, asking them to work with and against suggestions, broadening their choices and defending them in a social environment. Ian Heywood, artist and art educator, similarly claims that an important takeaway from a studio education is "taking responsibility for one's activity, exercising judgement and, as far as possible, being prepared to explain and defend one's reasoning and actions"

(2009, 197). Although the student is setting forth in her own direction, and there is a sense of freedom in that, there are also choices for which she needs to be responsible for explaining and defending. Brian O'Doherty, an Irish art critic, writer, artist, and academic writes of the importance of the studio visitor, "The studio visitor is the preface to the public gaze" (2007, 37). Those who exchange ideas about a piece within the studio help reconsider and reconstruct the artwork before it reaches a more public venue of consumption.

In a design studio, the teacher will pose a problem and the student will work to find their own answers with the teacher acting as a coach or mentor through the design process. The teacher may encourage students to learn by doing, ask questions, and try methods that don't work, all activities which require the students' full participation. Then, students reflect on their learning process and discuss their work with other students (Eigbeonan 2013, 7). Collaboration unfolds in a number of interesting and productive ways in the design studio and is central component of constructivist theories. However, the design studio advocates for both individual and team work (Eigbeonan 2013, 8). Based on the studio design classes they observed, Katherine Cennamo, chair of the Faculty of Learning Sciences and Technologies and Carol Brandt, professor of educational thought and sociocultural studies claim of the design studio:

> Students and faculty practiced . . . intentional participation, design knowledge was conveyed through modeling and meta-discussions, and focused assignments and in-progress critiques enhanced opportunities for the individual and group processes through which design knowledge was co-constructed. (2012, 839)

By participating 'intentionally' with both the assignments given and the critiques discussed, students listen and respond to their instructor or peers with meaningful feedback to create a sense of community and foster open dialogue. In turn, these elements create a culture that forms a definition of artistic knowledge in the classroom. Even though students may be self-directed, it is equally important to have professional guidance, as outlined by constructivist theorists. Cennamo and Brandt also found that engaging in critique with peers allowed for "students' reflection on and discovery of their developing design knowledge through project reviews and student questioning" (2012, 842). In the design studio, projects are followed up by time for both public presentations of work and active reflection on one's own work.

Dialogue, specifically as advanced through critique, improved students' ability to "explain process . . . prioritize information . . . use design language . . . and listen" (Cennamo and Brandt 2012, 843). This allows students to think in complex and reflective ways with the help of their peers and instructors. Cennamo and Brandt argue, ultimately, "Project critiques were most valuable when students presented their work as in-progress, narrating their thinking, rather than demonstrating their final products" (2012, 852). Therefore, when students see themselves as novice learners in the process stages of their work, they are more open to objective, constructive criticism of their work. In his chapter titled "Research Group in Interdisciplinary Improvisation - Goals, Perspectives, and

Practice," James Andean, professor of sound art, discusses his experience working with The Research Group in Interdisciplinary Improvisation as they explored improvisation in cross-disciplinary practices. He explains about the importance of recognizing oneself as a novice: "While one is certainly more competent, and importantly, more confident, in one's own practice, there is also the risk of falling into established routines, habits picked up over the years, embodied patterns" (Andean 2014, 178). By viewing oneself as a novice, an individual is more likely to learn new routines, habits, or patterns. Thiessen explains of her own experience with critique:

> The educational critique is optimized to provide a critical environment and platform for students to present and test their design arguments/propositions . . . this implies dialogues (and vocabularies) must be based around serious consideration of the work in relation to the audience, context of use and intent, and that formal and aesthetic features of the work are responses to how these criteria are defined. (2014, 149)

Student engagement in critique may add to the social, collaborative studio culture because students gain a common vocabulary and demeanor for analyzing, discussing, and critiquing projects that set them up for the studio environment outside of the classroom. The value of design education is that it is not only interdisciplinary within a confined system of education, but according to scholars such as Thiessen, it also transferable and necessary to approaching everyday existence because it asks us to engage with ideas about who we are and our responsibilities to others. Through creating and receiving criticism, students can learn to see themselves as developing artists and apply these strategies and skills to other areas of their lives, as will be discussed further.

Development of studio "virtues" and assessment

What kinds of dispositions or values develop as a result of the studio experience, and how are these values or dispositions assessed? Elliot Eisner argues that there is more to the arts than learning concrete ways of creating; learning in and through the arts can help the development of a student's mind. Arts education assists cognitive development, informs thinking, "fosters flexibility, promotes a tolerance for ambiguity, encourages risktaking, and depends upon the exercise of judgement outside the sphere of rules" (Eisner 2012, 35). The arts seem to encourage an assortment of beneficial qualities and skills in students, building a culture through shared values and community practices. According to Rosanne Somerson, successful art and design students are imaginative, flexible thinkers with the ability to create in a variety of forms. Somerson explains of her own goals for design students:

> We are committed to fostering creative and critical thinkers who innovate with ease, who are not rattled by uncertainty, who move agilely from one form of output to another, and who can communicate in multiple ways with acuity and clarity. (2013, 20)

In design-oriented curricula, there is often an expectation that students are problem solvers, almost like creative engineers, even with their own creative practice. For example, sometimes the emphasis is on the student learning *more* about her creative practice and taking risks with that practice. Design studio environments may emphasize content, methods, and self-directed learning skills through collaborative problem solving, reflection, and inquiry. Rim Razzouk, an instructional designer, and Valerie Shute, a professor of educational psychology and learning systems, also discuss the goals of arts education; namely, the authors claim that by improving students' design thinking skills, they will be more ready to become artists and designers themselves. Razzouk and Shute believe when students engage in similar processes and methods as designers, students "will be more ready to face problems, think outside the box, and come up with innovative solutions" (2012, 343). The hope here is that when students engage in these similar processes and methods, they may begin to think and problem-solve like professional designers and move from the position of novice closer to expert.

When Razzouk and Shute discuss the transition from novice to expert they claim, "The major difference between experts and novices is that experts have accumulated a large number of examples of problems and solutions in a specific domain of interest" (338). Therefore, the acquisition of experience, over time, transforms students from novice to expert artists and designers. Razzouk and Shute turn to the disposition of creative thinkers to expand their point:

> Creative people tend to work in two different ways: either as finders or as makers. Finders demonstrate their creativity through discovery. They are driven to understand and to find explanations for phenomena not well understood. Makers are equally creative, but they are driven to synthesize what they know in new constructions, arrangements, patterns, compositions, and concepts. (333)

Students can operate anywhere on this spectrum, and they may shift their place on the spectrum depending on the context. These dispositions are beneficial as a framework as students learn to work with the materials they have and expand the limits of their boundaries. Salazar also examines the disposition of creative thinkers, the condition of the development of artistic disposition, and the way visual culture and contemporary art enhance creativity and cognition. According to her findings, the disposition of creative thinkers includes: "Taking risks, being passionate, having self-discipline, being open and flexible, and understanding multiple points of view," but in order to create these artistic dispositions, students should be allowed to engage in exploration, play, and dialogue (Salazar 2013, 66). Operating between and within the material details and the series of systems available for a creative work embodies the necessity of exploration, flexibility, attention to context, and dialogue. The goal is not necessarily originality but creativity. According to Andrew Eigbeonan, lecturer in architecture, "Originality is inventing out of nothing, while creativity is putting together pre-existing things to make order," and there is "rarely a pure spark in the dark," so most design ideas are "built on existing ideas and formal precedents" (2013, 10).

In another article by Stacey McKenna Salazar, she discusses the surprising lack of research in college studio art culture and art practice. She created a survey for 90 first-year art students which included experiences in foundational studio courses, how studio teachers appropriated class time, descriptions of what students learned, descriptions of teaching, and advice to the next year's freshman class (2014, 35). Based on the patterns in her survey findings, Salazar compiled five pedagogical ideals for the first-year studio experience. These ideals are not only interesting but immensely useful for this study. The first ideal is "Know Us," where Salazar concludes that students want their teachers to get to know them personally, to "take a personal interest in their individual artistic inclinations and abilities, their lives, and their futures" (2014, 35). The teachers who were most praised by their students were those who took time out of their schedules to chat with students individually, sent students personal recommendations on books or events, and attended off-campus events. Students valued experiences in the studio that exhibited "highly individualized personal interaction" between the instructor and the students (2014, 35). Perhaps when students are recognized for their personal interests they feel like fellow artists and equals. The second ideal is to "Help Us Make Personally Meaningful Artwork" where students praised teachers who taught them to develop their own ideas. Salazar explains that "an effective way to stimulate meaningful student learning is through an inquiry approach that includes strategies of exploration and play or existential questioning" (2014, 36). This has been explored in work on arts-based research as well as in discussions of the values and dispositions of art students. Dialogue and reflective thinking are, clearly, among some of the well-known ways to stimulate learning. The third ideal is to "Teach Us Skills (but not for their own sake)," which balances students wanting to make meaningful work with learning technical artmaking skills. Students expressed that their best instructors helped them develop skills as a way to help them find their "own voice," "gain confidence," or "feel empowered," but who also made connections between skills and bigger ideas (2014, 36). Learning refinement processes for their own sake rather than for furthering meaning seemed to be an area of contention for students, too (2014, 36). Students may want to learn skills in context and as they relate to other ideas they may have. As for the fourth ideal, students want instructors to "Create a Safe Community for Us." Salazar explains, "Students praised their best professors for creating a positive classroom environment by telling stories, facilitating interaction among peers in the classroom, and engaging students in meaningful dialogue" (2014, 36). This would seem especially important in relation to critiques and trying new techniques so that students feel safe and encouraged in a positive environment. The sense of community may help students to take "creative risk(s)" in the classroom (2014, 37). The fifth ideal, "Teach Us How to Live Creative Lives," is where students expressed the life lessons they learned from their first-year studio experience such as "balance life and art," "be a better person," and "live a creative life." Students preference traits rather than skills or concepts in their explanations of the most important thing they learned during their classwork. Three qualities in particular Salazar noted were "risk taking, confidence, and perseverance" (2014, 36). The majority of students said "risk taking" was the most important thing learned during their first year of art school, and they advised future students to take more risks (2014, 36).

Art and design education offers students opportunities for complex problem solving and critical making that transcend structured, preordained forms and methods, but they do offer some structure in other areas. Cennamo and Brandt derived five key guidelines for the classroom from their analysis of academic studios to help students cultivate particular dispositions or values. The first guideline is to: "Create assignments that require all students to design projects that are similar in terms of goals and context, yet offer opportunities for variation in the products created." In this way, students share similar project goals and context to help them stay organized, focus, and able to work alongside one another; however, there is enough room in these assignments for individuality and personal interest or diversity in form or subject. Cennamo and Brandt also encourage instructors to "provide opportunities for students to learn from each other through listening-in." Listening-in can happen through project critiques, classroom discussions, and presentations of work when individuals are speaking to one another about their work or ideas. Third, Cennamo and Brandt suggest for instructors to "include public critiques to provide opportunities for both students and instructors to model their design thinking." As discussed earlier, time for public critiques is integral to the studio experience, allowing students to participate in discussions of their work, defend their choices, make judgements, and help one another improve their work. Fourth, the authors advise instructors to "conduct meta-discussions about key ideas in response to student work," which echoes Salazar's survey. Finding the overarching patterns in student work and creating conversations about these subjects is immensely helpful for student learning. Cennamo and Brandt close with the notion that instructors should "encourage iteration and provide students with opportunities to have their work reviewed while in-progress," meaning instructors should be reflecting on their goals for their work and having their work discussed not only after it is 'completed,' but also during the process (856).

None of these solutions are extremely specific or straight forward because as many of these authors have mentioned, the diversity of goals, themes, and pedagogies abound in the studio environment, which is part of the beauty of studio pedagogy. What happens in a great many art studio environments is as varied and idiosyncratic as the faculty who teach such courses. There is an assumption that this is the same as minimally guided discovery; however, in the studio, although it is self-guided inquiry, mentors still provide extensive instructional guidance to facilitate student learning. Assignments are focused and scaffolded in a way where students continually discuss the assignment and receive feedback on their work from both peers and mentors. Mini-lessons or benchmark lessons are offered as one means for scaffolding information. In the studio environment, these are usually given on a "just-in-time basis and generally once students experience a need to know the information presented" (Hmelo-Silver et. al. 2006, 100). Teachers play an important role in this respect as they guide students through the learning process, scaffolding information, and therefore decreasing students' "cognitive load" (Hmelo-Silver et. al. 2006, 101). Scaffolding can exist in multiple forms. Cindy Hmelo-Silver, Ravit Duncan, and Clark Chinn, educational psychologists, offer some examples in their work such as "scaffolding that makes disciplinary thinking and methods explicit," "scaffolds that embed expert guidance," "scaffolds that structure complex tasks or reduce cognitive load" to name a few (2006, 101-2). These forms of scaffolding showcase a strongly guided form of instruction.

How writing scholars use studio pedagogies

For about half a century, writing studies has stressed collaboration in the writing classroom via dialogue and exchange; in the last few decades, it has become a truism that the teaching of writing is inherently a 'socially engaged activity,' where writers are never isolated thinkers but always interacting with others, their writing continually shaped by peer/community feedback. Clearly, there is already this very natural and logical pedagogical overlap between the art studio and the writing classroom. So, what studio pedagogies do many writing instructors already invoke in their pedagogy?

In his work, Tom Meyer, Director of the Hudson Valley Writing Project, similarly claims an abundance of discourse in the classroom is an effective way to engage with and understand students' learning style and process (2013). By engaging in dialogue with students inside and outside the classroom and by encouraging their own ways of learning and meaning-making, we may help students find ways to gain confidence in themselves and their thought processes. In the same vein, to assist his students with the writing process, Peter Elbow, Professor of English Emeritus, advocates for the usage of what he calls "unplanned speech" in the classroom. According to Elbow, although speaking and freewriting leads to digression, it also helps lead students to summary and presence in writing assignments. Spoken language helps students to connect better with their audience, promotes more flexible syntax, and has more coherence than written language. Elbow continues, "We can enlist the language activity most people find easiest, speaking, for the language activity most people find hardest, writing" (2012, 139). In this way, his approach parallels studio approaches where students are expected to discuss their projects before, during, and after creation and provide feedback to one another through discussion. According to Elbow, it is through reading out loud that students can "own" or "inhabit their words" and sense how others will experience their words as well (Vernacular 2012, 237-8). This allows students to not only engage in dialogue and critique with others, but also reflectively with themselves. Hearing their thoughts aloud may give them a new perspective of their work while also offering opportunities for their classmates and instructor to participate in the creative process. Another scholar of writing, Mike Rose, an education scholar with a particular interest in writing, advocates for a more personal, invested involved approach from writing instructors in the classroom, but at the same time allowing for organic discussion and movement. For example, he discusses working with students individually on writing assignments to understand not only the student's writing style, but also to understand the student's intentions and composing processes, which is typical in the studio classroom (2006).

As earlier discussed, because students are self-directed throughout most of their time in the studio environment, it is important that they are offered opportunities to deepen skills in media use and discover mediums they may not have used or been acquainted with otherwise during the process stages. This has happened to a heightened degree more recently in writing studies as well Jason Palmeri, a scholar of writing studies with an interest in remix and multimodality, argues about the relationship between the visual and textual, "If we can teach students to understand how they make meaning with visual imagery in their minds, we may be able also to help them develop a more critical consciousness of how they make meaning on the page" (2012, 39). In this way, the anticipated outcome would be that students can develop a sense of design that marries both text and image based on their contexts and intentions, while the disposition is an openness to forms and an awareness of how form and content work together. According to Jody Shipka, also a scholar of writing studies with an interest in multimodality, communication becomes composition when we attend to the various modes of representation at our disposal. Discussing composition as communication may help instructors focus on the audience, the audience's response, the local context, the intentions of a piece, and the author's reflection on their practices or choices. It is the combination of the parts that lead to the whole Jody Shipka seeks in her writing pedagogy. According to Shipka, giving students access to alternative types of meaning-making strategies opens up their possibilities for communication and successful critical thinking rather than restricts them. Shipka's concern is with the "risk of overlooking the fundamentally multimodal aspects of all communicative practice" (2011, 13). In order to address this issue, Shipka offers a pedagogical solution: "An activity-based multimodal framework requires that students spend the semester attending to how language, combined with still other representational systems, mediates communicative practice" (2011, 15). Shipka's pedagogy suggests that student and teacher focus on mediation of writing as they work with different genres and modalities allowing students to maintain an open and flexible demeanor and to construct their own forms of knowledge. Shipka frames her work when she explains:

> In asking students to carefully consider the array of mediational means to which they have access, and to account for the choices they make while combining/recombining these means in purposeful (and sometimes in highly imaginative) ways, the framework supports reflective, rigorous-productive play. (2011, 86)

Shipka reaffirms her belief that students should explore and participate across different forms of media, which is *not* simply a free-for-all experience; it is an experience with real academic merit and difficult decision-making situations. Shipka and Palmeri focus on the mediation of text through various modalities and combinations of those modalities.

These flexible strategies come with a whole assortment of awareness and choices students may not regularly encounter in their classes, but they will certainly encounter in the real world, ensuring they have a flexible disposition and an awareness of the connection between form and purpose. To preserve individuality and identity in writing spaces, instructors can, in the spirit of studio art pedagogy, take more of a facilitator approach to the composing process. The following examples utilize pedagogical approaches associated with constructivism and improvisation in the studio environment. Terry Blackhawk, teacher of poetry, allows her students to enter the assignments independently. She writes of her own role during the process of writing, "As a teacher I try to intrude as little as possible . . . but when they need help I may suggest that they simply describe, reflect upon, or directly address the work" (2002, 7). Blackhawk mentors her students through her assignments without being too invasive, giving instructions or guidance only when she deems absolutely necessary. Gary Hawkins, a poet, teacher, and artist takes his class on a journey to the museum with a loose plan of what he wants his students to 'see,' but allows for flexible changes to his plan. He reflects on his own role during the process of his assignment:

> I have my plan for what I want to show them, but I also stay attuned to the mood of the tour and to their reactions to what they see . . . I don't set goals for what they should produce in these galleries. Instead, I orchestrate repeating collisions between the students and their expectations of art, the kinds of encounters that will change their ways of seeing even after they leave the place. (2002, 16)

Hawkins' pedagogical approach seems to allow students to construct their own knowledge organically through their experiences with art and he leaves room for spontaneous, improvisational changes to his plans. Hawkins writes honestly, "I am not always successful. All my prodding sometimes only takes a young writer up to the brink . . . and shows him the rewards on the other side. Ultimately, the leap is one that he must make himself" (19). With these sorts of loosely compiled approaches comes an obvious ability to 'miss the mark,' but the benefits greatly outweigh the possible costs according to these instructors. Most importantly, the projects begin as a creative process with no answers, and instead, fascinating things begin to happen through a combination of the students taking risks, exploring options, and finding a personally meaningful way into their work.

Other instructors have taken even more innovative pathways toward writing by having students engage with and produce physical objects in their classrooms. Susan Karwoska, a writer, teacher, and editor asked each student in her class to contribute a piece of fabric to a quilt and a piece of writing to a word-quilt. She writes of her expectations beforehand:

> I hoped that the quilt itself—made of all our scraps—would provide inspiration for the students' writing on memories, and that watching the quilt come together would help them to understand how a finished product—a quilt or a piece of writing—that seems all-of-a-piece is actually made up of many smaller elements. (2002, 43)

Here, Karwoska uses image and word alongside one another to emphasize process. Rosalind Pace and Marcia Simon, writers, artists, and teachers use creative book making as a means to stimulate creativity and confidence. Through a series of visual and verbal activities, the students eventually produce a book of their own. Students are introduced to a brief history of the book form, the alphabet, and printing, each accompanied by a project (e.g. creating prints out of found objects to explore printed image, repetition, space, etc). Pace and Simon explain their pedagogical method for the creative book making project:

> We give simple instructions that allow students to work directly with the materials . . . The two of us each after the fact, as opposed to the conventional practice that begins with the goal (or rationale) followed

> by examples . . . Only after work is done do we respond to it. Our responses are always based on finding the uniqueness in each work—not what we think it ought to be, but what is there. (2002, 75)

The authors attempt to measure student work based on a notion of composing to learn like Jason Palmeri rather than focusing solely on quantity or even quality. They allow students to engage with their assignment independently before offering constructive criticism or critique based on their work. Pace and Simon write further, "What we look for in our students' work is evidence that a discovery has been made, that they have gone beyond the expected and the previously known" (2002, 76). In this case, the authors measure what the students have produced and learned, not how the students have produced work according to their requirements or expectations. These approaches are deeply constructivist and improvisational, working with the knowledge students bring to the classroom and allowing them to follow their own line of inquiry.

A challenge for writing instruction: the importance of physical space in studio environments

Art and design educators argue that the layout of the studio classroom facilitates teaching and learning. The physical space of the studio showcases the flexible nature of studio pedagogy. Maarit Mäkelä, professor of design and Teija Löytönen, senior specialist for art and creative practices explain the importance of physical environments: “Physical environments, spaces and relations, then, have affordances to learning processes: they not only create inclusions or exclusions but also open or limit the possibilities for new practices, knowledge(s), networks and relationships to emerge” (2017, 251). Although these can arise spontaneously, they can also be crafted. Cennamo and Brandt found that one of the benefits of the physical space of the studio was that “students are assigned individual desks that are available to them outside of class hours as well as during class” (2012, 840). Assigning students their own space that will be available to them both within and without class time may help students to see themselves as both individuals working towards unique goals and up-and-coming professionals with their own dedicated workspace. Cennamo and Brandt also found that “flexible furniture groupings and technology” foster discussion among students and encourage active learning (2012, 841). Access to the studio outside of class time lead to unplanned interactions, opportunities for collaboration, and availability of resources (2012, 841). The space can promote active learning through furniture that can be rearranged or redesigned, open access, and collaboration because of the teacher-student or student-student interactions and resources available. Outside of the studio model, Christina Bain, a professor of fine arts and editor of an arts journal, Connie Newton, an artist, Deborah Kuster, artist and art educator, and Melody Milbrandt, professor of art and design found through their study that:

> Short class periods presented limitations for both the content to be taught and the way it was presented . . . a small amount of time for children to make art . . . No time was available for looking at art or talking or writing about it. (2010, 240)

The studio class itself uses larger blocks of time for instruction rather than smaller, more frequent amounts of class time. This, the authors agree, builds elements such as a sense of community, self-study skills, and workshop culture. In regard to the studio model, the arrangement, allotted time, and designated workstations are an important part of both the teaching and learning process.

Unfortunately, faculty in the humanities seldom (or never) get the opportunity to work in studios or even choose their own classrooms. Since most writing-based courses do not have access to the structural means of a studio classroom, with all its tools, tables, stations, and materials, we can still learn and take away from arts-based teaching that is informed by the nature and physicality of the physical studio environment by integrating the pedagogy and working with the spaces we do have—moving desks, managing space, relocating when possible—as many of us already do, or we can begin to write more literature on the subject from both the fields of arts education and writing studies on the importance of this physical space, and its effect on pedagogy and learning. The work is still rather limited. The physical space of the studio can still be seen as a useful metaphor for creating a sense of openness and flexibility in our pedagogies that will need further research. For Rhonda Grego and Nancy Thompson, authors of *Teaching/Writing in Thirdspaces: The Studio Approach*, the writing studio is not all that different from an art studio. The writing studio is "a writing program model that provides a highly adaptable approach. It is not limited to a course per se but is a configuration of relationships that can emerge from different contexts" (2008, 7). The writing studio, as proposed by Grego and Thompson, attaches to an existing course as a workshop. In their workshop, "Students bring their work . . . often to present the work and obtain feedback . . . [as] a space for reflective communication" (2008, 8). Students in writing classrooms may benefit from studio pedagogies by raising their awareness of how writing itself is visual and symbolic, showing them how they consistently engage with material objects and the way those material objects appear to audiences, and allowing opportunities for them to experience where they must write for a specific purpose. This concept of a writing studio has infiltrated many universities and changed the paradigms of writing spaces. For some universities like the Fashion Institute of Technology, Duke University, and Vanderbilt University, the writing studio is another term used for the writing center, with more of an emphasis on multiple forms of writing, personal or professional, rather than only academic modes. For other universities, like Colorado State University, it takes the form of an open access site filled with resources for writers. This is an area that requires further research altogether in order to be implemented at the university level.

Conclusions

Constructivist pedagogies share a common assumption that knowledge is constructed around experience. The art classroom, generally, is described as a space to link experiences with work to create meaning. Through the constructivist perspective in the arts, teaching requires one to recognize and respect the student's experiences. This was also further emphasized by Salazar in her survey of the first-year studio experience. Group dialogue is one way constructivism is manifested in the studio as it is encouraged and fostered through different avenues to create a sense of community and shared knowledge. With this, trust must be developed and interactions modelled and guided by instructors. Trust must occur for both the instructor and the student, as the instructor must trust the students to take responsibility in their learning experiences and the students must trust the instructor to model professional behavior and skills. In constructivist studios, students are responsible for their own learning and their behavior, but instructors act as a guide and mentor through the process of making. The instructor will find opportunities to negotiate between crafting knowledge or improvising, too.

Improvisation is not limited to the study of music. It finds a strong foundation in the arts as well. Improvisation is a balance between technique and spontaneity, meaning it is not necessarily a free-for-fall experience. Even improvisation requires a layering of traditional and refining techniques. This happens for both the instructor and the student in the studio through risk taking and collaborative experiences. Improvisation fits nicely with constructivist pedagogies as they can easily feed one another. Constructivism, as a student-centered, experience-based way of teaching and learning, thrives off of improvisational techniques, dialogue, collaboration, and critique for revision, reflection, and expansion of knowledge. Improvisation also occurs because an artist or designer may take alternate directions during the course of their process that were unplanned but perhaps more natural or client-driven.

Dialogue and critique are absolutely vital to college studios. These forms of collaboration happen in a number of different ways with instructors and students. When students are self-directed, collaborative opportunities like discussion and critique can benefit their practice. From objective observations to judgements, positive environments tend to be more productive because as MaggieAnn Leysath, artist and art educator, and others suggest, building trust in the classroom helps students listen-in and participate. Critique and dialogue, along with arts-based research, can fuel creative practice by adding to or expanding one's ideas. These opportunities also require students to carefully consider their choices, defend them to others, and reflect upon them in different contexts or to different degrees. Discussion also opens the floor to instructor modelling of professional practice, vocabulary, and instances of concrete learning. Critique and dialogue can also encourage students to experiment, ask questions, and try things that do not work in a relatively safe environment (contingent on the instructor and classroom environment). When students recognize themselves as novices in this environment, they can be more open to learning and receiving criticism.

The arts cultivate more than just skills in making; they also help cultivate or refine certain values and dispositions such as being flexible, remaining open to ambiguity, learning to be critical, and engaging in reflection. According to Salazar and others, students desire for their professors to get to know them personally, help them make meaningful but skillful art, help them feel safe to try new things and speak honestly, and learn to be creative in other aspects of their lives. Students also have said that some of the most valuable things they learned in their first-year studio experiences were not skills but traits such as risk taking, confidence, and perseverance. Although a fair amount of what happens in the studio may be improvisational, there are ways to help students understand the values of the studio environment. For example, as Cennamo and Brandt suggest, assignments can have similar goals but allow for a variety of outcomes, students can learn from listening to one another, students can participate in giving and receiving criticism, and conducting discussions or miniature lessons can help build on knowledge or skills.

Writing studies scholars such as Jody Shipka, Jason Palmeri, and others utilize aspects of improvisational, constructivist, studio-based approaches to the writing classroom. For example, by allowing students to experiment with rhetorical choices and visual means of creation, they are fostering flexibility and critical thinking. The arts are a productive, contemporary pedagogy being increasingly more implemented in the writing classroom. As of recently, there is much interest in the specific value of artistic approaches to visual literacies in writing instruction. As the written and the visual, the handmade and the digital, the alphabetic and the multimedia continue to influence each other, we can expect to see further cross-disciplinary hybridization and curricular mutation manifesting in current disciplines as well as in transdisciplinary contexts. One of the most compelling parts o the comparison between writing courses and studio art courses is that they are both deeply student-centered and bound up in a shared process of creation and critique, with the student's engagement in creation—whether a visual or written construction—serving as the central focus of the course for the student to gain insight or self-knowledge about the way they work individually and with others. Both writing and studio art courses allude to the importance of process in the way students produce work and meaning, and in turn, how they share this work with others, discuss their judgements about work, and reflect upon both. Arts education seems to foster essential skills such as individuality, creativity, risk taking, observation, planning, collaboration, and making in different modalities, as do some contemporary composition scholars. There is an emphasis in studio-influenced environments on reflective thinking, tolerance for ambiguity, trust building, and personal interest.

Artmaking, like writing, can be an isolating experience for some students, but when students converse about their work with others before, during, and after the process of creation, they may be much more engaged, invested, and open to their project taking new shapes and forms. Access to and experimentation with multiple media is an improvisational, studio pedagogy that may help writing students gain the ability to think creatively and critically, both in the work they produce and the work that they study from historical and theoretical perspectives. Some writing scholars limited their students' thinking and communication to on the page in traditional forms. Engagement with traditional forms is necessary, but it not the only means for communication in the 21st century. Exploring modalities may also assist student development as they move from novice to more proficient makers and even in the workplace. The focus is not necessarily on the skills that develop, but the risk taking and exploration, encouragement, collaboration, and personal learning that comes along with learning new materials as seen through studio courses. Art and design education also seems to help students harvest their abilities to be curious and inquisitive observers, critical thinkers, and resourceful self-initiators.

Ultimately, in the humanities, students can follow their own line of inquiry and produce a more creative composition by working with others to create and critique work. Students as active creators can have the freedom to create their own research path, allowing them to develop their own inquiry and project. This style of learning not only helps students adapt to a variety of disciplinary domains, but also ensures a flexible disposition and an openness to self-reflection and critique. Playfulness and risk taking seem to be the central tenants of active questioning and inquiry in art and design classrooms. Spontaneity and intuition are important, but critical thinking and consistent reflection of choices are equally significant and integral to analytical decision-making.

Writing scholars have become increasingly more flexible and artful in their approach to writing instruction. However, there are still a few areas where writing scholars are still not drifting as closely to studio pedagogies as they perhaps could, especially in the first-year writing classroom. In writing studies, one main issue some may face is students' disengagement with writing exercises. When students are given a formulaic, fixed writing prompt, it leaves no room for creativity, no room for identity, and no room for actual critical thinking. Prompts of this variety reinforce the image of the student as simply a regurgitator of information. There is no individual thought involved because students are not the ones generating ideas or knowledge—they simply use the details the instructor has provided. Paul Morris, founding director of a Master of Liberal Studies program and professor of creative writing, literature, and other courses claims that students are disengaged with the "traditional academic essay" (2012, 85) because instructors overemphasize form, which is detrimental to the content students produce. Students can, instead, shift and maneuver between different forms in a writing classroom as they do in a studio classroom. By forms, I mean genres, manners of generating ideas, and manners of composing. Morris writes more specifically on the subject in regard to planning:

> This kind of misguided scaffolding is exemplified in five-paragraph themes that shoehorn ideas into generic structures, denying content and organization in any meaningful relationship. When form becomes formula, planning is stultified, losing much of its generative potential. (2012, 85)

Morris believes that form follows content. If students engage with generic forms, they may produce generic content without creativity or individuality. Students need to engage in their own processes to produce the forms most valuable for their endeavor. Morris writes further:

> Emphasizing planning as a process of problem-solving, it fosters the interplay of idea-generation and organization; it encourages students to mold their form according to their ideas, and to value form as a means of making sense of content. (2012, 85)

However, Morris is not advocating for cursory outlines or oversimplified approaches to planning or prewriting. The form of a project will take shape only after the student has developed his or her ideas and settled on a form in relation to those ideas. Prepackaged formulations suggest that students should "play it safe" rather than take risks, "And dead plans lead to dead compositions" (Morris 2012, 85). What Morris is implying here is that the design of a piece relies on the content and intentions of the author.

Instead of approaching process as a rigid, linear structure, Morris suggests something similar to the spirit of the studio, "Framing planning as a flexible, ongoing process, the exercise affirms the reciprocity of ideas and structure" (2012, 86). In this way, Morris believes students will focus on their ideas and then give those ideas shape. Jonathan Bush, a professor of English and Leah Zuidema, associate provost and dean for curriculum and instruction explain, "Just as an artist uses skills, rules, and the knowledge of when to break or bend rules for effect, so do writers have the ability to do the same with the text" (2011, 87). Of course, students may have to work within the conventions of their chosen medium or discipline, but there is some flexibility and dynamism to the process of engaging with conventions and fashioning a product. Students, now more than ever, can have the opportunity in their communicative experiences to practice artistry and experimentation in an environment that fosters creative thinking, allows for independence, and offers constructive and improvisational pedagogies. The studio environment invites students to engage with tasks in a relatively low risk but supportive atmosphere where they can both engage with composition on their own but also receive guidance and criticism from peers and faculty.

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Witnessing or re-imagining? Provincial ghetto in a lens of Gentile photographers

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Abstract:

This paper focuses on the collection of some pre-war pictures and Holocaust photographs from a provincial Polish town. Located in two photographic studios hundreds of pictures spanning several decades supply the token presence of discontinued life and coexisting communities: Jewish and Gentile. The Jewish past of the town just like that of many other Eastern European shtetls is often presented separately from that of other local communities. This creates the notion of 'theirs' and 'ours', with the latter extenuated by the absence of one of the parties. The pictures reflect everyday life, not as separated by cultural, religious or language variants but very much an intertwined. The likeness of people captured on a photographic film is one of the few pieces of proof that they existed, a silent reminder but also, a form of witnessing. The photographs can also be seen as a meeting space. This paper, therefore, will look at how visual evidence allows us to track traces of people, places and objects that are no longer there addressed from a perspective of a photographer, the witness and participant of the dreadful events. It will also ask the question of how the latter can helps us to 'materialise' memory, understand the past through visualisations and make us secondary witnesses.

Key words: Photography, Holocaust, memory, remembering, witnessing, Jewish history, ghettos, Second World War, Poland

Witnessing or re-imagining? Provincial ghetto in a lens of Gentile photographers.

Photography is a response to a multitude of social needs. It is used to, as Susan Sontag puts it 'furnish evidence', capture reality, create reality, memorise, survey, communicate and celebrate. It provides opportunity to project who we want to be seen as and how we want our world to be seen. In photography we can be both subjects and orchestrators of an experience, whether staged or spontaneous.

For a historian, photography can be a great source of inspiration and evidence. We analyse different forms of photographs with great curiosity. We look for little details in style, people and places captured on film, as well as examining the overall picture. We search for a story that can be used to research history. Photography can give us a sustainable image of events in which we are not directly involved (Keilbach 2009, 54). However, since its emergence in the 19th century photography has often been scrutinised for its relationship to reality. Its ability to reflect 'historical truth' has also been questioned. In recent years however, photography has moved to the centre of historical enquiry and philosophical disputes. The capacities and limitations of photography as a mean of historic narrative are explored in academia and beyond. Raphael Samuel (Samuel 1999, 342) argues that the 1970s brought a first subtle change in approach to photography as a meaningful source for history research. Although reluctant at first, historians started to turn to old photography. This could be linked to a realisation that visuals are not strictly product of the 20th century with its technical advancements but constituted part of culture and society a hundred years earlier. Perhaps, after all, pop culture of the 1960s and 1970s was not unique in its preoccupation with everyday objects, scenes and people? Samuel also argues that the 'visual turn' was dictated by the curiosity of the 'other', people from the past to whom we can compare ourselves (Samuel 1999, 350). Moreover, art historian David Freedberg (1991) argues that images engage us cognitively to produce both identification and emotions, which can make historians uncomfortable. This is particularly true when it comes to Holocaust photography which causes the majority of people avert their eyes, makes them see without seeing. However, it can be argued that precisely because of that historians play a pivotal role in giving Holocaust photography a context. By asking how the visuals were made, used, distributed and received historians awaken the true 'power of images' in furnishing evidence and extending witnessing.

Holocaust photography, although popularised by numerous exhibitions and museum displays have rarely been researched by historians. It is, indeed, a bit surprising considering that photography along with film have been used to document the war. Moreover, both played an evidential role in post-war trials and continue to be utilised as primary means of memorising the Holocaust (Schneer 2015, 38). This view is also shared by Michael Berkowitz in his latest book *Jews and Photography*.

Photography has played an important role in modern Jewish life. As Jeffrey Shandler notes, photography has provided many opportunities for the Jews to engage with the modern world. Although initially regarded as suspicious, especially by the ultra-orthodox Jews who often perceived photography as violating the non-image making laws (Shandler 2004, 8), it quickly became a popular medium. It also became apparent that photography could be a lucrative business which wouldn't require massive financial investment. Compared to other professions, there were very little restrictions as to Jewish involvement in a photography business (Berkowitz 2015, 30) also in the 19th century Poland. The wandering photographers were typical for cities and town not having regular photographic studios. The time of a temporary residence in a particular place was shaped by popular demand. Often while in residence, experienced photographers used to take on apprentices who, after the training period, would open their own establishments or, join the legions of travelling professionals. The logistic burdens which involved frequent transportation of heavy but fragile equipment were usually balanced out by a relatively quick and easy profit. The trade attracted Jews to whom the canvassing business model was not a novelty. After the initial period of mobility which allowed keeping business related costs to a minimum making savings much easier, many photographers would opt for permanent studios. It is very likely that the residents of Zarki would travel to Czestochowa, a nearby large industrial city to have their pictures taken. A handful of early family photographs bear the logos and signatures of studios therein.

However, Polish Jews did not just readily stand behind the camera but also as often, in front of it. So called cabinet portraits become very popular and fashionable in the second half of the 19th century. Photographs that were cheaper (although still pretty expensive) and more convenient than traditional painted portraits, gave the less wealthy and affluent a taste of luxury, a pinch of fantasy. Special artists were employed to create fanciful, often elaborate and realistic settings in which subjects would be planted to complete the scene. Their poses would usually be rather stiff and in some cases, somewhat unnatural. The photographed usually look serious with rather stern expression. They are dressed in their best attire, heavy cascading dresses for females, sharply ironed suits that were hoped to elevate their social position even if just temporarily. For many traditional small town Jews in Poland it would be one of the rare opportunities to engage with technology and through it, with the modern world. Some of these portraits capture important events for example, engagements or matrimonies, other depict religious or cultural activism but they all aim to commemorate, to freeze the moment.

During the latter part of the 19th century Polish Jews also become engaged in photojournalism and documentary photography. Michal Greim, who also worked as a travelling photographer was one of the first to document the life of the provincial Polish Jewry. Jewish photographers would become the story-tellers of the pre-war life of their community and in some cases, also the captors of its end. Photographic documentation of the pre-war Jewish life in Poland is dominated by the photographers who were more or less insiders. Amongst many Jews who professionally stood behind the camera several names deserve special attention.

In 1921 Alter Kacyzne, a Polish Jew from Vilna was commissioned by the New York based Yiddish newspaper to take pictures of the 'old word' (Kacyzne et al., 1999, 15). Similarly to Kacyzne in the 1920s and 1930's Ze'ev Wilhelm Aleksandrowicz started to work on a photographic series that took him not just around Poland but also Europe and beyond. He was particularly interested in capturing his fellow Jews on the streets of Poland and Palestine.

There were also Jewish photographers who documented the tragedy of the Holocaust and the lives in the ghettos. In 1940 'Foto-Forbert' studio was commissioned by the American Joint Distribution Committee, commonly known as 'Joint', to take pictures of the Warsaw ghetto. The aim was to document the terrible ordeals that the Jews of the biggest European ghetto were subjected to. 'Foto- Forbert' operated in the Warsaw ghetto taking photographs of well-known actors, Jewish elite and the Nazi occupiers (Struk 2011, 89). Similarly to its pre-war style, 'Foto- Forbert' photographers continued to capture large-format photographs, meticulously and orderly posing groups and individuals which appear in sheer contrast to the ghetto's despair. The visuals also largely juxtapose materials gathered by the Nazis. The majority of photographs taken by the perpetrators fall into two categories, documentation and sensation. For official purposes pictures were taken in ghettos and concentration camps to supply visual documentation and reports for the illustrated press (Keilbach 2009, 63). German press in particular showed camps as 'educational and corrective institutions' and ghettos, as necessary isolation measures that prevented spread of diseases, moral depravation, crime and essentially, sanitised the society.

The element of sensationalism came predominantly from amateur pictures taken by German soldiers and various ghetto tourists who, in a truly touristy way took snaps of the ghettoised world around them. Amongst these photographs one can find some reoccurring themes, for example, shots of the Warsaw ghetto tram marked with a Star of David, candid street photographs which often unveiled terrible living conditions and barb-wired walls. Private pictures also showed executions, shootings, beatings and other forms of violence. Sometimes Jews were asked to pose and smile for the camera, another time German soldiers lined up in front of a pile of bodies. An overwhelming majority of such photographs were taken for personal use, snapshots from a gory theme park, from a world that was physically, morally and emotionally detached from the reality. Frequently such snapshots were sent back home along with candid letters reporting on military life in the east. Unlike 'Foto-Forbert's' pictures, visuals taken by the perpetrators aim to dehumanise their subjects. Often shot for strictly documentary and statistic purposes visual reports like the Auschwitz album, which contains over 190 photographs, reveal systematic objectification of the Jews (Gutman et al. 2008, 43). Referred to in seemingly human terms as' deployable men/women' and 'non-deployable men/ women', similarly to many Warsaw ghetto Jews photographed by the Germans, newly arrived Hungarian Jews were photographed in a way that reinforced anti-Semitic stereotypes. Undignified, dishevelled, scared, hurled together, looking away from the camera or, looking shyly at a cameraman men, women and children of the Hungarian transport fulfilled visual biases created by the Nazi propaganda such as the Jews lacked hygiene, could not be trusted, had neither pride not honour and were essentially just vermin.

Meanwhile, Forbert's camera gives its audience a sense of order and peace far away from the chaos of the ghetto. An intentional symmetry of composition and poses evokes dignity and humanity instead of drama and horror of the ghetto. The latter seemed in congress with the reality and therefore, often dismissed as a depiction of life in a ghetto. This may also result from a generalised expectation for trauma to be shown through the prism of chaos and brutality. However, it can be argued that the tragedy of the Holocaust photography does not always come from what is shown, but mostly from the perpetual absence of those depicted.

In his 'Camera Lucida' Barthes remarks that photography is brutal. Its brutality, however, is not due to the horror depicted in pictures but because "it brutally enters one's gaze and nothing about it can be rejected nor changed" (Barthes 1988, 76). In his personalised philosophical debate Barthes once again refers to photography as immobilising subjects, making time stand still and therefore, depriving its audience of catharsis. At the same time, "in Photography [we] can never deny that the thing has been there that the image depicts something 'that-has been'... absolutely, irrefutably present" (Barthes 1988, 25).

As Andrea Liss puts is for a generation once removed (or even twice removed) from the real horror, such photographs (of the Holocaust) repel some of us and cause us to turn away. For others, Holocaust documentary photographs shock in the opposite direction, hypnotizing vision and luring the viewer in. (Liss 1998, 5). Holocaust photography does not always stun and shock with its violence. The latter does not have to be explicit. The averted gaze can be a result of incomprehension between a relatively harmful visual ('Foto-Forbert') and a historic context. The absurdity of clean, sharp lines and orderly poses is obvious for those, who are direct witnesses, survivors, Holocaust experts but also average spectators, museums and galleries visitors. However, with the passing of time and witnesses the unavoidable questions of photography's role as a testimony arise. The complexity of trauma and the expectations for trauma to be expressed through violence and brutality make matters even more challenging when analysing photography as testimony. Photography is unable to provide a multisensory impact, it is also incapable of existing without a degree of staging. At the same time photography is expected to fulfil a role of a history lesson (Liss 1998, 4).

When compared to other artistic media, photography have a much stronger attachment to reality and, in many cases mirrors it. This is not to say that sometimes photography does not aestheticise reality. It does, even documentary photography. However, as Pavel Buchler also explains, photographs "keep under constant tension the fragile links between the residue of lived moments and memory, between where we have been and who we are (what we are always becoming)" (Buchler 1999, 105). What is proposed here, is one of the first attempts to look at Holocaust photography which authors were neither victims nor perpetrators yet, very much privy to the life of a provincial ghetto. The starting point is a collection of recently found Holocaust pictures from a Jewish town in the Upper Silesia region. Uncovered in two photographic studios, hundreds of pictures spanning several decades are leftover tokens of family life, forgotten people and coexisting communities in rural Poland. Within those photographs evolves the story of Jewish life before its annihilation. For over 75 years the negatives sat unseen. First batch was located in the photographic studio of a local family. Hundreds of pictures spanning a couple of decades, supply the token presence of family life, forgotten people and coexisting communities. Mr Bozek, whose photographic studio was established in 1930 in Zarki, once a bustling Polish-Jewish town, was a passionate 'world collector'. His neighbourhood was not big in an urban sense. Before the Second World War, Zarki had around 4000 inhabitants, of whom 57% (1921 census) were of mosaic faith. Zarki have had a long history of the Jewish settlement. Zarki's Jewish history dates back to late mediaeval period. In the 17th century Zarki are already known as a provincial multicultural town inhabited by ethnic Poles, Russians, Germans and Jews. In 1827 there were over 700 Jews living in Zarki (27% of the population), in 1864 as much as 61% of residents were Jewish although separated from the Warsaw-Vienna train artery, the town continued to develop, mainly as a hub for local commerce and crafts. Christians and Jews flocked to Zarki to sell their goods at the weekly farmers' market taking place on Wednesdays. In the late 18th century there were already 2 synagogues in Zarki and the third, neo-romanesque synagogue was built in 1870. It is the only remaining synagogue in Zarki but also, one of the few standing and relatively unchanged synagogues in the region.

The second batch of negatives also originates from Zarki and was taken by a local gentile photographer Mr Bacior. Unlike Mr Bozek, Jozef Bacior was initially an amateur photographer. He was a factory worker from the nearby Myszkow who had learnt the trade from books. He did not have a stationary photographic studio until after the war. This had had an impact on the type of shots taken by Mr Bacior. An overwhelming majority of his photographs was taken outside, in various places in Zarki and depicts Jewish residents of the town.

The pre-war photographs show both Jews and Gentiles 'being there', living alongside, momentarily caught in their staged or seemingly casual poses. It is a small slice of their existence often arranged by the cameraman whose invisible presence is reflected in his subjects' behaviour. A middle-aged man, his wife and a small dog – all sat on a blanket - a summer Sunday picnic perhaps? The male tries to look casual, seemingly unaware of a camera lens, but his efforts are betrayed by an upside down newspaper. The newspaper might inform a spectator of his identity and political inclinations – Jewish and leftist. Another man and another park scene; he is sat in a deck chair in a stripy pyjamas, with Yiddish newspaper spread in front of his eyes.

I learnt that the park around Zarki used to be a popular destination for all locals. The dry and well-maintained woodland with a small, crystal clear stream running across provided much needed respite from the industrialised and polluted neighbourhoods of the Zaglebie and Upper Silesia region and the crammed settlements of Zarki. There, we also meet what seems to be a happy family. A little girl wears what seems to be folk-inspired clothes. I am pretty sure her blouse is embroiled with blue cornflowers. The little boy salutes in a Polish military manner. Suddenly the past is turned into an object of 'tender regard', sentimentality and reflection.

Yet photography is also, in Sontag's words, 'a reminder of death', the most violent end of an entire community. This is especially striking when we look at a ghetto photography. It is not the form nor the content of these photographs that is most haunting but our knowledge of the immanent end. Interestingly, the batch of pictures handed to me only contains a couple of photographs with violent undertones. Those were, however, not taken by a Polish photographer but a Nazi one. We do not know who took them. One can only assume that they were captured for a documentary purpose and developed in a local photographic studio. Mr Jan Bozek who was its owner recalled that German soldiers used to come to develop their snaps in his studio. They were equipped in great quality cameras, excellent film and photographic paper which they always used to bring with them. They did not initially oppose photographic activity in Zarki ghetto which was established in February 1940 in the central area of the town. It remained an open ghetto for the duration of its existence only marked by warning signs. Over 3000 Jews from Zarki and neighbouring villages had been ordered to reside within the marked area until October 1942 when the ghetto was liquidated. Almost all Zarki's Jews were subsequently sent to Treblinka. Around a 100 people remained in Zarki and were later transferred to Auschwitz. A selected few were sent to Radomsko and Czestochowa ghettos. The open status of the Zarki ghetto allowed both photographers to work in the area. Similarly to Warsaw's 'Foto-Forbert' Bozek and Bacior faired pretty well , especially in 1940 and 1941 when after the initial period of unsettlement , life seemed to go as normal. And it is this relative normality that the many pictures taken by Mr Bacior in particular capture.

However, archival documents reveal a different story. German troops arrived in the area almost immediately after the invasion of Poland on the morning of 1st September 1939. Three days later, on 4th September Nazis arrested over a hundred people, mostly Jews who were subsequently executed. Following Haydrich's Schnellebrif of 21st September 1939, like in many other townships of General Government, an official ghetto was swiftly established in Zark along with the Judenrat. The latter mainly consisted of the pre-war members of the Jewish council. As Trunk remarks, “the Germans found a reservoir of Jewish communal leaders already available in occupied Poland” (Trunk 1996, 43). Although in many cases, the outbreak of the war and sudden military occupation interfered with the functioning of the councils and their institutions, members of communal networks often remained active. In Zarki, the Council of Elders (Altenstetrat) was predominantly made of the pre-war activists initially led by Moszek Josek Zielonka, a former leader of the Jewish Council (sztetl.org.pl). A report from April 1940 reveals there had been 12 members of the Judenrat nominated by the town’s mayor who were divided into commissions. Initially, their main role was to provide relief for ever worsening situation of the Jews. The Altenstetrar received no financial support other than that derived from monthly collections (5zl 30gr per adult) but even these ‘continued to failed rapidly’ as many were too impoverished to contribute any more. Moreover, around 25% of Jewish homes in the town centre were destroyed by German bombs in the first few days of the war which subsequently, caused housing problem intensified by waves of voluntary and forced refugees. The Council was obliged to, “at least feed them and provide enough money so they could continue their journey if they wished to” ((JDC - Archives: Zarki) which added even more strain to an already small budget.

Restrictions on Jewish commerce intensified over time. Numerous reports sent to Jewish Distribution Centre in Warsaw indicate rapid expulsion of Jews from their businesses. In the spring of 1940 some Jewish grocery shops still existed in the area. Their functioning was, however, hinderer by numerous restrictive Nazi regulations, the lack of supplies, high prices (mainly black market prices) and the proximity of the border between General Government and the Reich (2 kilometres). The latter was particularly significant. The closest train station linking Zarki with the industrialised regions of Upper Silesia and Zaglebie was located in the nearby Myszkow incorporated into the Reich. Before the outbreak of the war, almost 80 % of Jewish income came from small trade and crafts, mainly shoemaking and tannery. The majority of products had been sold to large Silesian urban centres which became difficult to reach after new borders were drawn. As a result, many Jewish businesses in Zarki collapsed without direct German intervention leaving many with no source of earnings.

The report from 7th November 1940 clearly pictures progressively worsening situation of the community:

> We are helpless against continuing expulsion of the Jewish poverty. Moreover, we have not received any support since 13th May of this year (...) Each person is entitled to 100 grams of bread per day. Due to the lack of funding, the Jewish Council had to discontinue any social support and relief despite the large number of people requesting assistance. (JDC - Archives : Zarki)

The situation in the Zarki ghetto was neither unique nor particularly worse than elsewhere. The proximity of the countryside provided some albeit hugely disproportionate relief. Although there is no doubt smuggling did take place, it was incredibly risky for both gentile and Jewish counterparts. One of the few photographs depicting traumatic events from the Bozek collection shows what could be a strip search. A man and two boys, presumably Jewish smugglers stand with their trousers down in front of a military man leaning on the rifle. The presence of objects and clothes scattered around may suggest they have just been caught red handed. Their heads are shaven, most likely due to either existing or potential head lice infestation. It is also possible the trio was captured while hiding outside the ghetto and their pending nakedness is an obvious way to determine Jewishness. There is no clear indication of when exactly the photograph was taken. According to Jozef Bozek's son, also a photographer, the picture had been captured by the Nazis to document the event and subsequently developed in the studio. Its chronological ambiguity and the lack of identification opens it up, as presented above, to an extended interpretation. Our knowledge of the traumatic events of the Holocaust, often intimate familiarity with the Jewish suffering dictate audience's understanding of similar visuals. Because these terrible events of the WW2 remain beyond comprehension but at same time, make a crucial part of our historical and cultural education, we feel obliged to give such photographs a tangible meaning. The search for identification seems one of the focal tasks when dealing with Holocaust photography. Clément Chéroux, a historian of photography who organised "The Memory of the Camps: Photography of the Nazi Concentration and Extermination Camps" exhibit points out that although many Holocaust photographs have been widely published and reproduced since the end of the war, there is still an urgent need to approach them in a critical and documentary way (Farmer 2010, 117). It can be argued that by entering collective imagination and memory the visual sources of a genocide, Holocaust in particular, become iconographic but their documentary value is often forgotten. They become deeply buried under multiple assumptions, interpretations, symbolism and emotional responses which are less likely to be associated with textual sources. All above intensify the need for historians to undertake, what Cheroux calls, archaeology of the photographic document (Farmer 2010).

The compulsion to 'identify' is also part of what Marianne Hirsch calls 'postmemory', the relationship that the 'generation after' bears to the personal, collective, and cultural trauma of those who came before (Hirsch 2008, 106). The latter is often typical for the second or even third generation who would have been brought up in the shadows of their parents' or grandparents' memories, recollections, personal documentation including photography of the Shoah. The third generation seems particularly keen to explore the evidential and documentary value of their ancestral pictures. Interestingly, it is often not just a search for historical and family identity but also curiosity driven journey that aims to explore ordinary life before and during the Holocaust. It can be argued that 'choosing not to look' would be more common amongst the second generation of survivors, 'choosing to look' is more preferential for the third generation. Although there isn't one reason for it, one might want to consider cultural practices such as narrated Holocaust documentaries and fiction films as providing catharsis for emotions but also familiarising with the trauma in a way that might reduce the Shoah to a successfully packaged product. The still growing artistic media attention to the Holocaust visual representation can overshadow the need to understand Holocaust's photography documentary value.

Out of over 700 Bacior's photographs taken in Zarki, less than a half was captured during the war. An overwhelming majority was taken outside, mainly in a park or a woodland, at a riverside and in backyards. These images fall into the category of street photography, one of the most popular styles in the 1930s. One simply could not walk down a main street in any European city not to encounter street photographers or makeshift photo studios. Like many other photographers of the period, Jozef Bacior was of a working- class background and maintained a full-time factory job before the war. He simply could not afford to open a photographic atelier at this point so he continued to take candid snaps of his, often better established, subjects. Both pre-war and wartime images captured by Bacior continue a nineteenth century tradition of portrait photographs. His narrative is simple yet alluring, his photographs often strikingly detailed, measured and sharp. Nothing seems accidental because Bacior's relationship with his subjects is carefully constructed to be much like that in the 19th century studio portraits- sharply focused, static yet collaborative and consensual. Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer call such relationship 'affiliative' evoking 'affiliative postmemory' which is derived from the contemporarity and familiarity with the Holocaust as well as the connection with family photography (Hirsch and Spitzer 2009, 163).

In his 1972 essay John Berger discusses 'photographs of agony' (Berger 1980, 39), types of pictures that capture our attention exactly because the pain presented in them overwhelms the viewer. Through their display of extreme events and raw suffering they evoke compassion and lead to, what Berger calls, 'shared suffering'. The latter is profound, often sudden but also, generates a feeling of helplessness. There is nothing that a viewer can do to alleviate suffering and violence when confronted with the photographs of Henryk Ross from the Litzmanstadt ghetto, captures from the Nazi ghetto tourists or the Auschwitz album. The suffering extends beyond gazing. Some spectators may have a personal or family story directly, or indirectly attached to the photographs. Moreover, these photographs stand at a juncture of numerous spheres, for example, private and public, domestic and urban and therefore, are capable of bridging gaps in history and memory (Hirsch 2008). At the same time they are also capable of evoking and misshaping memories. However, this does not seem to be the case with the photographs taken by both Bacior and Bozek in Zarki.

A closer visual analysis seems justified to gain a better understanding of the collection in the context of 'photographs of agony'. The majority of Bacior's photographs adhere to some relatively unified and consistent aesthetic and pictorial rudiments regardless of the period (pre-war and wartime). His subjects are almost invariably well-dressed with immaculate hair and bright faces. This is not surprising as in those days people used to get dressed up to go to town, let alone to have their pictures taken. Whereas the latter does not seem that unusual for a contemporary observer of the pre-war images, the wartime photographs might strike as incongruous in a specific historical context – the immanent advent of the Holocaust in Zarki. And it is not just the fact that the street/ outdoor photography continued in Zarki while thousands of local Jews were ghettoised, persecuted and murdered, while the river of desperate refuges continued to flow through this town, but also the banality of images. The photographs captured by Bacior during the war in and outside Zarki ghetto are unashamedly vernacular, common in style. They reflect everyday life, not as detached from the fabric of the locality, but very much an integral part of it. It is clear that Bacior's subjects simply wanted to look good, not Jewish or Gentile, but handsome and pretty. Alive. These photographs show Zionist youth with their collars ironed sharply, while a young dark-haired smartly dressed woman steps into a vegetable garden looking directly at the cameraman. We meet a couple of boys casually standing by the riverside, leaning against a big tree, their gazes slightly averted. There is nothing particularly unusual about the photograph until we spot boys' armbands, the unmistakable sign of their situation. We then become instantly arrested by the image, arguably because of its banality which stands in such contrast to our knowledge of what is to come. When confronted with vernacular photographs taken in the ghettos, we almost instinctively ask "how and why could these people casually pose in the countryside; how could they just walk down the street looking seemingly free and unburdened?" Our own knowledge of the terrible destruction, the familiarity, historical and special proximity of the Holocaust makes it difficult to comprehend what Bacior's photographs contend – that life went on. Judging by the number of the wartime pictures that survived in Bacior's collection, snaps were taken eagerly and commonly, almost exclusively outdoors making Zarki and the Zarki ghetto Bacior's photographic studio. The subjects are very often in the centre of a picture perspective, surrounded by a partial view of the landscape (frequently gardens with particular preference for bushes and shrubs or, fields) or town's architecture. We see people posing, smiling, tilting their hats, walking confidently in the streets, the banality of life which elicit conflicting emotions. On one hand life went on as normal with people trying to get on with their daily activities as well as dipping into small pleasures and a bit of casual entertainment. On the other they had to cope with regular shootings, refugees, forced labour and the overall shortage of supplies. Despite everything that we know, the terrible retrospective knowledge we bear, Bacior's images support what some ghetto residents confirmed as well: it was not an entirely unhappy period and ghetto was not just gloom and doom (at least for the time-being). We also find no obvious signs of the Holocaust neither in the attitudes of the subjects nor in the way they are photographed, at least not until one spots the 'band of shame' and apply our knowledge of what is to follow. Upon closer inspection the contemporary observer notices that some people try to hide or even have already taken off the band. Amongst the unexpected normalcy of the setting their bands stand out both to the viewer and the photographed. It would be easy to jump to conclude it could be an act of defiance but the only thing that the observer can be sure of is that they (Zarki Jews) were once present or, as Barthes puts it "every photograph is a certificate of presence" (Barthers 1988, 87).

Unlike in other known collections of photographs that have already been mentioned in this article, Bacior's subjects choose to pose for the camera. There are no under obligation to fulfil a forceful narrative, to pretend. Moreover the intimate landscapes of deep suffering, dyeing and death are not presented either. Although undoubtedly posed and partially directed by the photographer, Bacior's pictures reveal culturally coded gestures that depend on decisions made by his subjects.

Finally, there is also the question of a photographer and his role as a witness. By his own admission, although not professionally qualified, Bacior had had a knack for photography and wanted to make it his career. He had taken pictures of the Jewish inhabitants of Zarki during the war just as he would capture them before. Similarly, photographs that depict non-Jewish residents before and during the war were taken predominantly to supply professional experience and financial means. Today they carry evidential force and are perceived as a form of witnessing but in 1940 they were mainly seen as candid photographs.

Perhaps both Bacior and Bozek could be defined as observers, *the flâneur,* whose aim was to derive *'l'éternel du transitoire'* ('the eternal from the transitory') (Butler 2007, 133). The latter has been analysed by Walter Benjamin in a context of a modern metropolis which is explored by an observer, a window- shopper in a search of elements that remain immune to the process of decay. Although incapable of showing how things really were, both photographers who once strolled the streets of Jewish Zarki bring up the world of the living, animate the past. Their lenses intently focus on observations while at the same time, they remain visitors in the ghettoised landscape. Moreover, their cameras create the dialogue between the past and present that establishes the usable version of history.

It'd be difficult to argue that both photographers were not witnesses in a cruel theatre of war. They were participants, also suffering but at the same time experiencing the torment of others through the interface between the eye and the camera. As such they were observers, looking for best poses, backgrounds and situations, slightly detached due to a physical barrier that both the camera and the peculiar space of the ghetto created. On the other hand, their relationship with their subjects involved witnessing, more than gazing. Even if only momentarily they were still experiencing the difficulties of life in the perimeter of an isolated and stigmatised space.

Photography provides an opportunity to renew the old world. The 'Jewish myth' of small Polish towns often overshadows the quest to get to know the 'real' people though some efforts are being made to give memory its rightful place. It can be argued that like in many other places in Poland, also in Zarki, the myth sometimes provides a convenient excuse not to explore the most painful part of history. The lack of Jewish presence during most of the year remains in gross disproportion to their overwhelming presence as symbols. The collective imagination of the locals is much more populated by Jews than the streets of Zarki. Those perceptions are like the shadows of the past, spirits revived and returning often in a fantasised form. While the Polish side is well defined, it is a Jewish entity that remains unclear, foggy, half real and half mythological. Not so much a set of specific people, a tangible demographic, social, economic or religious category, but rather a phenomenon living its own life as a product of symbolic culture. But the cameras of Bacior and Bozek testify to the past. The likeness of the Jewish residents captured on a photographic film proves that they existed, or that 'things happen'. In the collective memory of the locals, the multicultural past of their town indeed occupies some symbolic space which can be extended further by engaging with the photographs. Writing about 'postmemory', Mariane Hirsch highlights the role of photography in testifying and remembering even amongst more distant, uninvolved viewers (Hirsch and Spitzer 2009, 169). Subsequently, I believe that the collection of pictures from Zarki indeed plays an important role in the process of testifying, remembering as well as further contextualising Holocaust photography.

Pictures, as observed by Barthes, have evidential force. They allow us to track traces of people, places and objects that are no longer there. They can also 'materialise' memory (Zelizer 2001, 3), and help us understand the past through visualisations. Although it might not be possible to build a full understanding of the past from the snippets that photographs deliver, photographers can be seen as witnesses. The collection of visuals from Zarki does not show a re-imagined world, a historical landscape of suffering altered by those who captured. On the contrary, despite not showing any atrocities commonly associated with the WW2 and the Holocaust, they do testify of the world that once existed. It is, therefore, hoped that a further study of the collection can provide not only a better insight into the connected lives of the communities and Jewish history of the region, but also raise historical awareness.

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Photographs:

1. Author: Jan Bozek, Zarki. Exact date unknown, probably 1940.

2. Author: Jozef Bacior, Zarki. 1937. In the photograph: Samuel Bornstein with his grandmother.

3. Author: Jan Bozek, Zarki. 1940?

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