

ART, METAPHYSICS AND CIVILISATION: READING “THE WHITE
PEACOCK” AS THE FIRST PHILOSOPHICAL WORK OF D. H.
LAWRENCE

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Abstract. D. H. Lawrence claims that art comes into being through the emergence of metaphysics. He evinces a deep anxiety about metaphysics deteriorating because of the scientific and societal developments in early 20th-century Europe. This paper demonstrates that his attempt to realise his ideal art — art that is completely dependent on metaphysics — is seen in his first novel, *The White Peacock*, which is not generally regarded as a philosophical work. First, the paper defines the close relationship between Lawrence’s art creation and modern European civilisation and conducts a philosophical analysis of the narrative discourse with reference to the ideas of Arthur Schopenhauer — a considerable influence for Lawrence at the time of writing. Second, it verifies the idea that metaphysics is a substantial motive in Lawrence’s novel, one that enables him to approach the problems of modern European civilisation through the medium of literature.

Keywords: D. H. Lawrence, Arthur Schopenhauer, art, metaphysics, civilisation

The idea that D. H. Lawrence (1885–1930) “sees it as his business (...), to put the wordless into words,” (Becket 1997, 2) raises the question of *what* he is representing in his works through language. A possible answer is “metaphysics.” Lawrence asserts, in the *Foreword* of *Fantasia of the Unconscious* (1921), that the creation of art inevitably presupposes metaphysics:

(...) it seems to me that even art is utterly dependent on philosophy: or if you prefer it, on a metaphysic. The metaphysic or philosophy may not be anywhere very accurately stated, and may be quite unconscious in the artist, yet it is a metaphysic that governs men at the time, and is by all men more or

less comprehended, and lived. Men live and see according to some gradually developing and gradually withering visions. This vision exists also as a dynamic idea or metaphysic—exists first as such. Then it is unfolded into life and art. (65)

Lawrence maintains that metaphysics “is wearing woefully thin, and the art is wearing absolutely threadbare” (65). The main cause of this was the rapidly developing civilisation in European society in his time. While *Fantasia* is generally recognized as arguing against Freudian psychoanalysis¹, “Foreword” concerns the author’s own view of civilisation.

Lawrence calls the science that enabled European civilisation to develop, “a science of the dead world” (62). He refutes “evolution”, but for “the strangeness and rainbow-change of ever-renewed creative civilisations” (64). For Lawrence, what is vital to this civilisation is “a science in terms of life” that once prevailed over the world from the beginning of history to the age of ancient Greece (63). This science is inseparable from “the intense potency of symbols” (63) beyond the differences between languages, ideas, and races, which is deeply involved with the existence of “creative civilisations.” This symbolic power makes it possible for Lawrence’s personal philosophy² to be deduced from his own literary works but “not the reverse” (65). His works of art are never deduced from his personal philosophy.

Lawrence’s concept of the term “metaphysic” should not be recognized as a subtle and abstract idea of his own, but as “the ultimate science of Being”³ which has been traditionally explored since the beginning of human history. In “Foreword”, Lawrence argues that the ideal creation of art is to realize works into which “a metaphysic” or a question of Being unfolds. Furthermore, the formulation of his theory of art is closely related to his own view of civilisation and is caused by his recognition of modern Europe as reducing and eroding the value of metaphysics and art.

This paper contends that Lawrence’s first attempt to realize his ideal art is seen at the beginning of his literary career. It then

examines the validity of the theory through a philosophical analysis of his earliest novel, *The White Peacock* (1911). In this study, we will discuss how crucial the analysis of Lawrence's earliest novel is in order to show the significance of pursuing the essence of his art in relation to metaphysics and civilisation. In the following section, we analyse the background of *The White Peacock*.

SCHOPENHAUER: A DEFINITE MOTIVE FOR *THE WHITE PEACOCK*

During the period of writing *The White Peacock* — especially in his years at college, between 1906 and 1908 — as Worthen observes, “a most complex and far-reaching change” (179) dominated Lawrence's thought. During this period, he showed concerns with modern science and materialism which were closely related to European civilisation in the early 20th century such as the theory of evolution (Spencer, Darwin), materialistic monism (Haeckel), and pragmatism (James). However, they were “never satisfying” for him (179). In 1908, Lawrence wrote a letter to a friend of his to show the great disappointment he felt when he found that “half the pro's [professors] in college were not superior to me in intellect or character” (1979, 72). Frustrated by the intellectuals, who were unaware of the “real problems of the twentieth century,” Lawrence turned to Arthur Schopenhauer's metaphysics, as a means to achieve his own perspective to approach these problems of modern European civilisation⁴.

The rise of Lawrence's awareness of European civilisation and metaphysics is directly connected to writing *The White Peacock*. However, it is likely that the idea will arouse opposition: critics have regarded Lawrence in the early days of his literary career as immature both as a writer and as a thinker. According to various scholars, the novel has a literary youth or immaturity, far from being connected with metaphysics⁵. Moreover, it does not seem that other critics with deep insight into the relationship between Lawrence's literature and metaphysics place *The White Peacock* in his

“philosophical works”⁶. As Montgomery observes, the novel presents expressions, reflective of ideas proposed in the works of the scientists and philosophers that Lawrence was reading at the time, “on almost every page,” and among all the allusions, “those to Schopenhauer predominate and are clearly most central to the novel’s themes” (44). Hough considers these expressions or allusions to signify different themes and motives just “stirring vaguely” in the novel (26). This may lead us to think of Lawrence’s immaturity as a literary writer or, more precisely, the one-directional influence of modern scientific ideas and philosophy on him during his writing of the narrative of *The White Peacock*.

Lawrence’s shifting intellectual concern - from modern science and materialism to Schopenhauer’s metaphysics - at the time of starting his career as an artist is the first manifestation of his rejection of material civilisation in early 20th-century Europe⁷. It is also the first motive for him in his pursuit or questioning of the essence of life or Being. Given this question of Being leads to his own concept of “creative civilisation,” we may suppose, like Schneider, that Schopenhauer is more important than Spencer, Haeckel, and James in their influence on Lawrence (27). However, as Schneider states, this does not mean that the influence of Schopenhauer alienated Lawrence from scientists, but that their ideas “converged to reinforce Lawrence’s conviction that life is the manifestation of the inhuman will or force that remains unknown” (27). Therefore, Schopenhauer’s metaphysics is one of the *definite* motives that formulate Lawrence’s views within *The White Peacock*.

THE INTEREST OF SPECIES/INDIVIDUALS: SCHOPENHAUER’S VIEW OF THE WORLD AS WILL / REPRESENTATION

According to Chambers, as a second-year student at college, Lawrence read Schopenhauer’s essay *The Metaphysics of Love*. Chambers suggests that the essay “made a deep impression upon him”, and that Schopenhauer’s idea “seemed to fit in with his

mood” (111). During this period, a significant revision was made to the first draft of *The White Peacock*: the figure Annable was created in the revising process. Many common features are present within Annable’s and Schopenhauer’s discourse. The full title of Schopenhauer’s essay mentioned above is “The Metaphysics of Sexual Love”. The concept of *sexual* love is the crucial key to a philosophical analysis of the novel. The following is an outline of Schopenhauer’s view of the world in relation to “sexual love”, referring to this essay and *The World as Will and Representation*, one of his most notable works.

Schopenhauer asserts that “all amorousness is rooted in the sexual impulse alone” whose ultimate aim is “the *composition of the next generation*” (2: 533, 534). For those involved in matters outside of sexual love, the question is whether these matters consist of their own personal interests, such as fortune, social position, and honour of one’s own. This is the question of “the weal and woe of the individual”. For those in love affairs, the question is “the existence and special constitution of the human race in times to come” (2: 534). This is the question of “the weal and woe of the species”, or the question about sexual love which sways all individuals to its purpose of the existence of the human race (2: 534–35). Schopenhauer declares that the interest of the species “is infinitely superior to any interest of mere individuals” (2: 552). The relationship of the interests corresponds with the relationship between “will” and “representation”.

“The world is my representation: this is a truth valid with reference to every living and knowing being” (Schopenhauer 1: 3). The knowing “I” (the subject) is the essential prerequisite for all objects (the world); “for whatever exists, exists only for the subject” (1: 5). Yet our cognition is only connected with the phenomena (appearances) of the objects. This means we are unable to perceive the “inner nature”, or the ultimate cause of the existence of things, “from without” (1: 99). Schopenhauer calls this cause “will”. “The will alone is; it is the thing-in-itself, the source of all those phenomena” (1: 184). He suggests that the “will” is another

prerequisite for all objects, and he defines the world of representation as coming into being in the process of “the objectification of the will” in which the essence of the will emerges or unfolds into the representation (appearance) and becomes visible to the knowing subject.

Schopenhauer claims that the will “expresses itself most strongly in the sexual impulse” (1: 330). This impulse reveals itself through the medium of the “body” as “the objectivity of the will”. Furthermore, he maintains that the sexual impulse “is proved to be the decided and strongest affirmation of life by the fact that for man in the natural state, as for the animal, it is his life’s final end and highest goal” (1: 329). Schneider observes that “the general Schopenhauerian vision of life as the objectification of the will and the Schopenhauerian distinction between will and idea [representation]” was important to Lawrence (32).

THE EMERGENCE OF THE WORLD AS “OBJECTIFICATION OF THE WILL” IN NETHERMERE

In the first part of *The White Peacock*, we are invited to Nethermere, the centre of the narrative world, and deeply impressed by the description of a pastoral landscape isolated from real society. “Everyday problems and realities”, as Worthen indicates, “are evaded almost completely” (225) in Nethermere. At the beginning of the narrative, Cyril considers the place “old, brooding over its past” (1). People live there enfolded within the peaceful valley “like an apple that falls in a secluded orchard” (59). Cyril feels as if he seems “to have lost my [his] substance, to have become detached from concrete things and the firm trodden pavement of everyday life” (83). However, other residents believe that life in Nethermere is “right” and “proper” because they feel “as if the world were old and good, not old and bad” (108). They are already “missing the poignancy of an actual today” in “a gap between today and tomorrow” (122).

In the second part of the narrative, Annable's peculiar behaviour and language are evident. His unique characteristics are clearly understood in the conversation he has with Cyril and other characters in the forest (*Ch. 1*). Annable has many children, but never exhibits an interest in them. He believes that his children should be as "natural" as animals. Given Cyril's advice that they will "get nicely trapped" unless he disciplines them, Annable retorts that they are "natural—they can fend for themselves like wild beasts do". When Leslie criticizes him, following Cyril, for neglecting his "duty" of a parent, Annable objects that "[w]hen a man's more than nature he's a devil" (131–32).

Referring to Schopenhauer's theory, we can interpret their conversation as a confrontation between two incompatible interests: "the interest of the species" and "the interest of individuals". Both the "trap" - a difficult situation into which the ignorant and the uneducated tend to fall - and "duty" or parents' education of their children to make them acquire social knowledge and common sense, can be counted as "the interest of individuals." Annable, in contrast, never cares about the interest of this kind. He lives his life with a motto, "Be a good animal, true to your animal instinct" (147); he is proud of having as many as nine children driven by the great force of sexual impulse, saying "I was a good animal before everything" (151). These words suggest that Annable lives as an "animal" or a "man in the natural state" in search of "the interest of the species" coming into being through the body as "the objectivity of the will". "What is looked for in marriage", as Schopenhauer states, "is not intellectual entertainment, but the procreation of children" (2: 545). However, even when the individual is to be dedicated to the continued existence of the species, the importance of the matter cannot be understandable to his/her intellect. "Therefore, in such a case", as Schopenhauer argues, "nature can attain her end only by implanting in the individual a certain *delusion* (...)". "This *delusion* is *instinct*", he goes on to declare, and "[we] observe the external phenomenon of instinct best in animals, where its role is most important" (2: 538). Schopenhauer's term "nature" is connected to

the meaning of the “essence” of things, not the phenomena of the physical world. This connection is seen in the corresponding word Annable uses in his conversation with Cyril and Leslie.

There is a significant change between the first and the second part of the narrative. The dreamlike, unreal world of Nethermere - the cause or source of whose existence is uncertain - has been transformed with the entrance of Annable, into the world as the objectification of the will.

ANNABLE’S DEATH AND CYRIL’S PAINTINGS: THE WORLD AS WILL-LESS REPRESENTATION

Annable’s influence on Nethermere is significant to the examination of the philosophical value of *The White Peacock*. It is unlikely that Annable awakes in Cyril (and other characters) an animal or natural instinct. Rather, the existence of the characters, including Annable, is gradually separated from the will as the essence of things after their encounter and interaction.

Schopenhauer repeatedly emphasizes that the formulation of his theory of “the world as will and representation” presupposes the metaphysics of “the two greatest philosophers of the West” (1: 170), Plato and Immanuel Kant. He identifies the will as Kant’s “thing-in-itself”, and the direct objectivity of the will, or unchangeable and original form (*eidōs*) of all things, with Plato’s *Idea*. In emerging into the phenomenal world, as Schopenhauer states, the will as *thing-in-itself* presents itself in innumerable “individuals”. The plurality of such individuals is recognized through the forms of time, space, and causality as “the different aspects of the principle of sufficient reason” (1: 169). When humans seek the knowledge of the *Idea* as the original form of mere individuals (appearances) with their higher cognitive faculty, just as “the soul attain truth” when “the mind is gathered into herself (...) when she has as little as possible to do with the body, and (...) [she] is aspiring after being [in itself]” (Plato 42),

a change takes place in the knowing subject and in the world present before it.

Schopenhauer states that, as long as the will is the essential prerequisite for all objects, “knowledge is completely the servant of the will” (1: 176). In contrast, the *Idea* as the prototype of all things (individuals) is beyond the constraint of time, space, and causality. Therefore, if the subject enhances itself from knowledge of mere representations to that of the *Idea*, it is “no longer individual” (1: 176) whose knowledge is “given entirely through the medium of a body” (1: 99). Consequently, knowledge “tears itself free from the service of the will precisely by the subject’s ceasing to be merely individual and being now a pure will-less subject of knowledge” (1: 178). For Schopenhauer, it is only knowledge that can abolish the will itself (1: 400); and if that is the case, “the *world as representation* then stands out whole and pure” (1: 179). However, this does not mean that the subject comprehensively holds both the will and the representation within its knowledge but, as Simmel argues, that the will remains “beyond the limits of pure contemplation, for which things exist only as imagination [representation]” (77). Although the *Idea* is free from the constraint of space, time, and causality, as Schopenhauer claims, it is “necessarily object, something known, a representation, and precisely, but only, in this respect is it different from the thing-in-itself” (1:175).

Schopenhauer considers the knowing *Idea* as having an inseparable relation with art: “Its only source [the only source of art] is knowledge of the Ideas; its sole aim is communication of this knowledge” (1: 184–85). Schopenhauer declares that it is easier for the *Idea* to arise from the work of art than from nature and from reality, just because “the artist, who knew only the Idea and not reality, clearly repeated in his work only the Idea, separated it out from reality, and omitted all disturbing contingencies” (1: 195).

By interweaving the narrative discourse of *The White Peacock* with Schopenhauer’s discourse, it is possible to clearly understand the second change in the narrative. We will subsequently analyze the

events of particular significance for the philosophical analysis of the narrative: the death of Annable and Cyril's drawing paintings.

While walking over clumps of snowdrops, Lettie repeatedly asks her brother Cyril: "What do they [snowdrops] mean, do you think?" "What do you think they say - what do they make you think, Cyril?" (129) Then, Annable appears before them, argues with Cyril and Leslie, and advises Leslie to tell Lettie "not to come in a wood till she can look at natural things" (132). In Schopenhauer's terms, Lettie thinks of the snowdrops as the object of her knowing subject, that is, she recognizes them as the individuals presenting here and now in relation to her knowing subject in time and space as the *principium individuationis*; while Annable recognizes the "inner nature" of the flowers, the *Idea* as the object of real knowledge. He does not understand when, where, and how they are, but *what* they are *in themselves*. From the above, the scene represents - to borrow the title of the chapter in which it is described - "Strange Blossoms [emerging as the *Idea*], and Strange New Budding [of the world as representation]".

Following their encounter in the clumps of snowdrops, Annable encounters a peacock. He gets upset and shouts with hatred and contempt: "It's the devil" (148). The word "devil" immediately reminds us of his own phrase addressed to Cyril and Leslie: "When a man's more than nature he's a devil". If the word implies human intellect or knowledge "more than nature", then the word or signifier is connected to the meaning or signified of "pure will-less subject of knowledge". A few days later, Annable is killed in an accident.

Now we can identify the cause of Annable's death. Annable, who has originally lived in search of "the interest of the species," executes the faculty of knowing the essence of things. This consequently causes him to cease to be an individual and tear his knowing subject away from the will. Annable's pure knowing "nature" of things forces him into death, the loss of his body as the objectivity of the will. His death is considered the beginning of the second change in

Nethermere: from the world as representation of the will to that as will-less representation.

Cyril is the first person who is directly influenced by the change. Following Annable's death, perceiving different things and phenomena around him (such as flowers, birds, wind, etc.), Cyril asks himself, "What did I want, that I turned thus from one thing to another?" (220). This passage suggests Cyril's doubt about the knowledge of things as individuals (or appearances of the thing-in-itself). This doubt is subsequently communicated and transmitted to George.

Like Annable, George originally lives his life bound by sexual impulse. Cyril regards the men as having common physical characteristics: while watching "the noble, white fruitfulness of his [George's] form", Cyril "remembered the story of Annable" (222). George is driven by the sexual impulse within him to love Lettie. Although wishing she were free like wild animals, Lettie rejects his love and claims that they "have to consider things" (208). In addition, Lettie asks him: "You, for instance—fancy *your* sacrificing yourself—for the next generation—that reminds you of Schopenhauer, doesn't it? — for the next generation, or love, or anything" (210). This implies that she counts sexual love necessary for the existence of the species as just a "sacrifice", and Schopenhauer's metaphysics of sexual love as a mere "fancy." Lettie eventually leaves George, with her words addressed to him: "Look (...) how we are netted down—boughs with knots of green buds. If we were free on the winds. But I'm glad we're not" (214). This is a paraphrase of her claim that they "have to consider things", instead of loving each other at the mercy of their instinct.

Initially, George misunderstands what Lettie says, but Cyril's (and perhaps Lettie's) influence on him causes Nethermere to be recognizable to him as the world of pure will-less representation. George says to Cyril: "I have nothing definite to shape my life to (...) you and Lettie have made me conscious, and now I'm at a dead loss" (238). This remark indicates his anxiety and confusion when

he is made to be “conscious”, or to have knowledge, and thrown into the unknown world by Cyril and Lettie.

George marries another woman - Meg - and Cyril, subsequently, creates several paintings of landscapes of Nethermere and presents them to him as a wedding present. When George sees the drawings, “[a]ll the glamour of our [their] yesterdays” comes over him “like an intoxicant”, and he realizes that “the wonderful beauty of life”, which has been “weaving him into the large magic of the years”, is “the splendour of the pageant” (239). From this statement, we can suppose the following: Cyril’s drawing of water-colours implies that the world they used to live in is *re-presented* as works of art⁸; and Cyril’s act of giving the paintings to George suggests, in Schopenhauer’s term, “communication” of pure knowledge through the medium of the works of art. That is, Cyril’s works of art cause George to recognize his life in Nethermere - that he has believed to be the reality - as a semblance, an illusion, or an appearance. Cyril feels “a sense of loss, and of change” (237) everywhere in the place. George anticipates the loss and the change with great fear: “I dread (...) this slow crumbling away from my foundations by which I free myself at last” (237). This is how Nethermere, the world as representation of the will, disappears, and the pure world (as representation) reveals itself to them. Now that Nethermere is no longer real for Cyril, George, and other characters, they direct their interests outward: “It was time for us all to go” (237).

“A NEW START IN LIFE”: ENTERING INTO MODERN CIVILISATION

In the third part of the narrative, the main characters leave Nethermere for “A New Start in Life”⁹.

According to Squires, one of the reasons for its provoking different and opposing interpretations is that “the novel mixes lyrical, elegiac, and harshly realistic elements” (178). Squires particularly emphasizes a critical problem that the novel manifests

“two strong but opposing tendencies: a tendency toward romanticism and a tendency toward naturalism” (178). This argument implies Lawrence’s intention to depict a conflict of opposing ideas or ways of creating art in the novel: one resisting capitalism - and by extension material civilisation - with emphasizing the great power of creativity; the other attempting to acquire scientific knowledge of the physical world through creation of art. Squires indicates that harsh realism manifests itself outside the idyllic and nostalgic Nethermere in the third part and that such realism “is concentrated in the [character’s] walking trips outside the valley of Nethermere” (177, 194). Squire’s analysis is significant because it enables us to regard the characters of the narrative as representations of Europeans entering into modern civilised society from the old romantic life. It is life in pursuit of “the interest of individuals” in civil society that is awaiting the characters after leaving Nethermere.

Lettie marries Leslie, who “serves social systems rather than himself”, and embraces “motherhood as her vocation in a social rather than a ‘vital’ sense” (Becket 2002, 41); while George struggles to compensate for his aimless life with an undemanding marriage, cynical involvement in politics, and sloppy management (Worthen 224). When he encounters Cyril again in London, they “scorned the faded procession of old years, and made mock of the vast pilgrimage of by-gone romances travelling farther into the dim distance” (Lawrence 1983, 281). George’s life is originally influenced by “the interest of the species”. When Nethermere is transformed into the world of pure or *will-less* representation, his knowing subject is emancipated from the will. Unlike Annable, he does not die but becomes aware of “the interest of individuals”. George desperately struggles to pursue this interest, confused and not knowing exactly what to do in the strange world. Despite this, everything he engages in as a social role and vocation – husband, politician, and business manager – does not go well. His vital body, as closely connected with “the interest of the species”, is now useless. At the end of the narrative, Cyril feels “choked” to see how thin George’s body has

become, even though he is in “the prime of his life” (321). As the narrative suggests, George undertakes the “ruining of his constitution” (314).

EQUILIBRIUM OF “BALANCE”: BETWEEN METAPHYSICS AND CIVILISATION

This study supports the notion that Lawrence’s first attempt to create his ideal works of art - into which “a metaphysic” is unfolded - is evident within his first novel, *The White Peacock*.

Judging from the development of the plot, in which the will or the essence of beings unfolded into the narrative eventually remains beyond the limits of pure knowledge, it can be asserted that Lawrence’s question of Being through the creation of this novel ends in failure. Indeed, this is quite relevant¹⁰. However, the emphasis on Lawrence’s purpose of making the figure Annable appear in the narrative entails an idea that the failure might be *intentional*.

Chambers felt “horrified”, as she herself admits, when she read Annable’s first appearance in the second draft of the narrative, and reproached Lawrence. But he “shook his head decisively” and said: “He [Annable] *has* to be there (...). He makes a sort of balance. Otherwise it’s too much one thing, too much *me*” (117).

Persisting the idea that all civilisation is “the painted fungus of rotteness” and having a deep hatred for “any sign of culture” (146), Annable boasts with great pride to Cyril about living at the mercy of sexual impulse as a direct manifestation of the will itself. However, he is represented as an exemplary person in civilised society: he is such a man of intellect that he is admitted to Cambridge and becomes a person (149). He is acknowledged to be “a character” and “a fine fellow” by Cyril and Leslie (132). Viewing these apparently incompatible characters of Annable with the perspective of “balance”, Lawrence’s intentions are detectable.

Lawrence could have chosen the way of representing the figure of Annable as defying modern European civilisation or “a science

of the dead world” armed with the question of Being. However, it would be “too much *me*” - for him. Lawrence provided the figure with knowledge free from the influence of the will as the essence of being to maintain the equilibrium state of the *balance*. In other words, he did so to prevent the balance from tilting toward his personal preference. Here we can suppose that the other characters’ absorption into a “bourgeois world of surface values” (Hough 28) - because of their being “communicated” pure and will-less knowledge from Annable in the last part of the narrative - implies Lawrence’s intention to avoid an ideal or unreal ending for him, or the advent of the “creative civilisation.” It also presents the fact that metaphysics “is wearing woefully thin” in his time. It is possible for us to recognize the death of Annable, the evaporation of the world of representation of the will, as a reflection of his intention above. Lawrence’s writing enables us to understand his readiness to explore his own art creation (dependent on metaphysics) and tackle the problems caused by modern European civilisation.

We do not intend to emphasize Lawrence’s debt to scientists and philosophers who had a huge impact on him for his writing *The White Peacock*, or the extent to which the scientific and philosophical languages are borrowed in the novel—the extent of the one-directional or diachronic influence from science and philosophy to literature. Rather, we aim to emphasize how their languages and Lawrence’s literary style complementarily overlap, resonate, and correspond with each other throughout the narrative. Metaphysics, or the question of Being, is certainly embedded within Lawrence’s first novel.

This study observes Lawrence’s own philosophy being deduced or derived from the literary text in which multiple languages or “symbols” are creating dialogues, echoing, and contesting each other. This is revealed through the examination of the writing process, and the narrative discourse of the novel in relation to metaphysics and modern civilisation.

Schopenhauer describes the will as striving for “life” or the “will-to-live” (1:275). In the final phase of the narrative of *The White*

Peacock, the emancipation of the world of representation from the will is the result of the “denial of the will-to-live” (1: 378). Therefore, it can be postulated that Lawrence represents the advent of the “creative civilisation” and provides the transition from the “denial” to the “affirmation of the will-to-live beyond the individual life” (1: 329) in his succeeding works. This concern will be dissected in another paper through an analysis of his works, such as *Sons and Lovers* and *The Rainbow*, which are generally considered Lawrence’s first philosophical works.

NOTES

1. *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious* (1921) and *Fantasia* are regarded as arguing against what Lawrence believed to be “profoundly mistaken ideas” in Freudian theory (Salgådo 86; Burden 52).
2. According to Becket, Lawrence’s attempt “to define his notion of unconscious functioning in contrast to Freud’s ideas of ‘the’ unconscious” (2002, 21) shows his commitment to “further imaginative explorations of his developing ‘metaphysic’, his personal philosophy” (2002, 22).
3. “Metaphysics,” def. 1a. *The Oxford English Dictionary*.
4. Lawrence’s disappointment reveals, according to Worthen, “how much . . . Lawrence had expected his teachers to be wise about what he was coming to think were the real problems of the twentieth century: questions of faith and belief, of nature and science” (168–69). He was shocked to realize “that he would have to go on breaking new ground for himself, as a man coming to terms with the modern world, . . . and as he was to do with Schopenhauer during his college career” (169).
5. Frequently referring to the “literary youth” and “immaturities” of *The White Peacock*, Hough points out that there are some episodes which can be “dismissed” as not effective in the narrative structure of the novel. But they are “something more,” or “attempts at saying or symbolising something that Lawrence knew to be important, whose bearing and relevance he cannot yet see” (29). The “attempts” are, in Hough’s words, based on “a singularly pure and untrammelled kind of discernment” (33–34). Lawrence abandons this pure insight after writing the novel “in pursuit of something more turbid and more difficult.” (34) In response to Hough’s argument above, Kermodé claims that the “attempts” are never found “after the development of a ‘Metaphysic’” (8).

6. See Black's view that the "Foreword to *Sons and Lovers*" (1913) is "the first of the philosophical works" of Lawrence (102); and Bell's argument that the development of Lawrence's "metaphysic" can be seen first in the "Foreword to *Sons and Lovers*" then in *Study of Thomas Hardy* (1914) and that this process of the development "has its first mature fictional expression" (5) in *The Rainbow* (1915).
7. According to Schneider, Lawrence "rejected a mechanistic materialism that denied the creative, religious impulse in man" by the time he wrote *Fantasia* (11–12). It may be easy to find the intimate connection between the term "creative impulse" and Lawrence's concept of "creative civilisation."
8. For Schopenhauer, art is "both effect and cause of the emancipation of pure intellect [knowing] from will" (Simmel 77). It should be noted that Cyril's drawings depict Nethermere's landscapes. Landscapes are the kind of paintings, as Schopenhauer expounds, in which "the subjective side of aesthetic pleasure is predominant, in other words, our delight does not reside mainly in the immediate apprehension of the manifested Ideas, but rather in the subjective correlative of this apprehension, in pure will-less knowing" (1: 218).
9. *The White Peacock*, title of ch. 1 in pt. 3.
10. Annable's death and the emancipation of the other characters' knowledge from the will are necessary consequences, for Schopenhauer's theories on the process in which the will emerges into the appearances or individuals closely follow those of Plato and Kant. Plato defines Being itself as *Idea* and phenomena as mere seeming and then separates them from each other despite the fact that Being inherently emerges and holds itself in appearance or has its essence *in* and *with* appearance (Heidegger 110–11). Kant declares that human knowledge is only concerned with phenomena and that the thing-in-itself (i.e., the will) is "entirely beyond our cognitive sphere" (Kant 305–06). As Heidegger points out, Schopenhauer's concept of the objectification of the will is regarded as the degeneration of Being "into a prototype for reproduction and copying"; therefore, Schopenhauer's "world eye," or pure cognition, is "only the optical" (66).

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