

A FAITH OR BELIEF IN MOVEMENT. THE INFLUENCE OF
SØREN KIERKEGAARD'S REPETITIONAL FAITH ON GILLES
DELEUZE'S CINEMA VOLUMES

Roel Wolters

Radboud University, Nijmegen,
THE NETHERLANDS

roel.wolters@ru.nl

Abstract. This article explores Gilles Deleuze's evolving interpretation of Søren Kierkegaard's notions of repetition and faith, highlighting a significant shift from his initial scepticism to a later acknowledgement. Deleuze at first critiqued Kierkegaard's notion of repetition as a singular, transformative event — one that entails a “leap of faith”. However, 15 years later, Deleuze revised this view suggesting that Kierkegaard's repetition entails a continuous, enduring engagement. This revaluation coincides with his metaphysical exploration of movement in cinema, which also focuses on the disconnect between humanity and the world, as it diminishes human's ability to produce movements that significantly impact life. Deleuze posits that reestablishing this connection requires a form of faith or belief, subtly echoing Kierkegaard's ideas of repetition and faith — referred to in this article as “repetitional faith”. Moreover, this paper sets out to cover a reading of Kierkegaard involving repetition and faith as requiring a continuous engagement, and examines how Deleuze extends this reading into the concept of cinematic faith or belief.

Keywords: metaphysics, movement, Kierkegaard, Deleuze, repetition, faith, belief, cinema

INTRODUCTION

In his early works, Gilles Deleuze is notably dismissive of Søren Kierkegaard. This is especially the case concerning Kierkegaard's works *Repetition* (1843) and *Fear and Trembling* (1843), which underlie his writings on movement. Deleuze's later works, *Cinema I: The Movement-Image* (1983) and *Cinema II: The Time-Image* (1985), represent a significant change. These texts, delving into cinematic

movement, shift away from his earlier criticisms and highlight a newfound appreciation for Kierkegaard. As Deleuze remarked in an interview in 1986:

I liked those authors who demanded that we introduce movement to thought, ‘real’ movement. (...) How could I not discover the cinema, which introduces ‘real’ movement into the image? (...) Something bizarre about the cinema struck me: its unexpected ability to show not only behaviour but spiritual life [*la vie spirituelle*] as well. (Flaxman 2000, 366)

Deleuze began to see Kierkegaard as a forerunner to cinema since he had the ability to understand the fundamental imperceptibility of movement, and how nevertheless to touch upon it — productively, rather than conceptually (Deleuze 2005, 281). This entails a shift from observable movement defined by our behaviour or actions to a movement particular to spiritual life or the mind. Deleuze, examining the transition from “classic” to “modern” cinema — rooted in his firsthand experiences with cinema before and after World War Two — concluded that post-war emerged a doubt in our naturally assumed connection with the world. I argue that this issue is fundamentally about our failure to generate significant movements that reflect their impact on our lives. Post-war cinema shows us that what we are in need of is a movement-imbued faith or belief — what I will call a “repetitional faith”

With this in mind, I will investigate the perspectives of Kierkegaard and Deleuze on movement. To delve into this subject, it is crucial to first examine Kierkegaard's contemplations on movement, particularly through his notions of repetition and faith. This revolves around the question: what does Deleuze's reappraisal of Kierkegaard's repetition and faith entail? Following this, I will investigate how Deleuze, in his *Cinema* volumes, echoes Kierkegaard's exploration by examining cinema's capacity to mobilize thought. This exploration will reveal how Deleuze's analysis of cinema, and thereby philosophy, engages with and extends Kierkegaard's inquiries. In doing so, it highlights a form of existentialism pivotal to understanding cinema's power to

animate the mind. Ultimately, this discussion will lead us to consider why such an engagement necessitates the notions of repetition and faith, and how Deleuze extends this reading into a concept of cinematic faith or belief.

This article has two parts. Part I concerns Deleuze's reappraisal of Kierkegaard and, therefore, delves into Kierkegaard's exploration of movement through an analysis of *Repetition*, discussing its implications against the backdrop of ancient Greek and modern metaphysics. Further, I examine a lesser-known work, *De Omnibus Dubitandum Est* [*Everything Must Be Doubted*] (1842-1843), to deepen our understanding of movement, peculiarly in relation to doubt. This analysis of doubt leads us into a nuanced discussion of Kierkegaard's epistemology of faith. This is examined through the works *Philosophical Fragments* (1844) and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments* (1846), which stand in a pseudonymous connection with *De Omnibus Dubitandum Est*.

Part II addresses how Deleuze extends the previous discussion towards a cinematic faith or belief. The focus shifts to Deleuze's thoughts on movement in cinema as presented in *Cinema I: The Movement-Image* and *Cinema II: The Time-Image*. This inquiry starts by analysing Deleuze's interpretation of Bergsonian metaphysics, partaking in *Matter and Memory* (1896) and *Creative Evolution* (1907). These works significantly influenced Deleuze's writings on cinema. This will further involve contrasting *Cinema I* with *Cinema II*, the *movement-image* with the *time-image*, to uncover insights into a movement peculiar to the mind. A particular chapter in *Cinema II* that discusses the relationship between cinema and thought will pave the way to understanding our need for faith or belief. Ultimately, I will let these discussions inform each other to conclude on the implications of faith or belief in movement, and the transformative power of cinematic experiences in shaping philosophical thought.

I. THE REAPPRECIATION OF KIERKEGAARD'S REPETITIONAL FAITH

Deleuze explores Kierkegaard's category of repetition in various works, making it a shared focus¹. Deleuze's engagement with Kierkegaard's repetition is initially scrutinized in his works *Difference and Repetition* (1968), and *The Logic of Sense* (1969), contrasting sharply with his later analyses in *Cinema I* and *II*. This is remarked upon by José Miranda Justo in "Gilles Deleuze: Kierkegaard's Presence in His Writings" (2012), and by Andrew Jampol-Petzinger in *Deleuze Kierkegaard and the Ethics of Selfhood* (2023) (Justo 2012, 98; Jampol-Petzinger 2023, 68-71). Initially, Deleuze criticizes Kierkegaard by interpreting repetition as a singular, definitive event, a "leap of faith" during an encounter with God. For example, Deleuze writes in *Difference and Repetition*: "[Kierkegaard] entrusted this ... repetition, ... to faith. ... However, faith invites us to rediscover *once and for all* God ... a repetition which, paradoxically, takes place once and for all. ... [is that not] comical?" (Deleuze 2006, 95). And in *The Logic of Sense*: "For what the Christian repetition brings back, it brings back once, and only once: ..." (Deleuze 2015, 300-301)². However, 15 years later, in *Cinema I*, Deleuze surprisingly states that Kierkegaard's repetition is something that one takes up "for all times" (Deleuze 1986, 115). The objective is to advocate for this specific reading of Kierkegaard. Part I of this thesis will first elucidate the category of repetition by examining the problems it addresses. Second, it will explore the close relationship between repetition and faith. Third, it will argue that repetition and faith must be seen as requiring a continual renewal, in contrast to a singular act or leap of faith.

Greek metaphysics

Kierkegaard, writing under the pseudonym Constantin Constantius, begins *Repetition* with the following passage:

When the Eleatics denied motion, Diogenes, as everyone knows, came forward as an opponent. He literally did come forward, because he did not say

a word but merely paced back and forth a few times, thereby assuming that he had sufficiently refuted them. (Kierkegaard 1983, 131)

This anecdote introduces the discussion on movement in ancient Greek metaphysics. The Eleatics, who valued logic-based knowledge, debated the possibility of movement and change, highlighting their logical contradictions. In contrast, Diogenes embodies a type of unquestioning faith or belief in movement, unburdened by any conceptual considerations or representational limitations. Here, actual movement emerges as triumphant, underscoring its significance in abstract philosophical discussions. The rest of the book merely complicates this notion further, but nevertheless, let us follow Constantius' line of thinking.

While Diogenes is no longer mentioned, Constantius clarifies that the real opposition lies between the Eleatics and Heraclitus (Kierkegaard 1983, 148). The Eleatics rejected the notions of movement and change, advocating for a static reality. In contrast, Heraclitus rejected the notion of stable individual entities, emphasizing the constant flux of the universe. This sets the stage for Plato, who, like Heraclitus, recognized that the world is continually changing, thereby considering it an unreliable source of knowledge. However, Plato posited, much like the Eleatics, the existence of a stable and comprehensible world, which he termed the realm of Ideas (Carlisle 2005, 10). One's orientation towards this realm, which imbues us with knowledge, is *via* recollection or *anamnesis*. The realm of Ideas provides the individual with knowledge that is universally valid and timeless (Carlisle 2005, 71). Plato aimed to subdue the flux of existence under the domain of logic-imbued Ideas. This led Constantius to introduce the category of repetition to compete with Plato's theory of recollection (Kierkegaard 1983, 148-149). While recollection regains an already existing and universal knowledge, Constantius emphasized repetition concerns a truth that is the subjectivity of an individual continually coming into being (Kierkegaard 1983, 149). Thus, recollection is focused on acquiring permanent knowledge, whereas

repetition concerns the emergence of a truth subject to change through movement — a process that, as we will see later, necessitates a form of faith or belief (Carlisle 2005, 68; Kierkegaard 1983, 173).

To conclude, the discussion has shifted from the possibility of physical movement to the possibility of attaining knowledge or truth. While this shift might initially seem confusing, it becomes clearer when we consider that repetition is also a response to mediation (*vermittlung*, *vermittlung*), a key element in the dialectic of Hegelian philosophy (Kierkegaard 1983, 186). Mediation, with its circular and dialectical movement (of thesis, antithesis, synthesis), aimed to explain how knowledge emerges throughout history and in the world. It therefore attempted to reconcile Plato's realm of Ideas with the physical world of movement. Here, temporality starts to play a crucial role, with knowledge changing and progressing through time. Still, Constantius critiques Hegel for having erroneously applied logic to movement, a mistake similar to that made by the Eleatics (Kierkegaard 1983, 321-322). Movement, according to Constantius, is something that logic simply cannot support (Kierkegaard 1983, 308). Thus, Kierkegaard, through the pseudonym Constantius, sought a movement that fit modern philosophy. Nevertheless, he maintained a focus on temporality (Kierkegaard 1983, 131). Constantius emphasized subjective and interior truth as opposed to objective and exterior knowledge (changing or static). To support this, he paradoxically turned back to the Greeks, stating: "One should rather seek to think through mediation and then give a little credit to the Greeks. The Greek explanation of the theory of being and nothing, the explanation of 'the moment', 'non-being', etc. trumps Hegel" (Kierkegaard 1983, 148). These concepts, originating from Plato's *Parmenides*, appear to align more closely with Kierkegaard's thoughts than with Plato's, especially when considering their role in freedom (Plato 2009, 931-948). For example, consider the moment of choice as a coming into being from non-being, in *The Concept of Anxiety* (Kierkegaard 1980, 83). Constantius, by distancing himself from the aforementioned

debates, discovered a movement that increasingly focused on the interior. This movement retains a temporal character yet highlights freedom found outside any logical conception of movement or the world. This, however, raises the question of how Constantius reconciles the tension between a world characterized by movement and the realm of our ideas. The next section will aim to answer this question.

Repetition as a Temporal Category

The previous section outlined various philosophical discourses on the metaphysics of movement, opposed by the pseudonym Constantius. Ultimately, the central problem addressed in *Repetition* is the everyday experience lacks significant movement (Kierkegaard 1983, 309). Constantius' goal becomes: "that of saving one's personality from being volatilized and, so to speak, in pawn to events" (Kierkegaard 1983, 315). This brings the question of movement and truth into an existential context. What does it mean for one's personality to be volatilized and in pawn to events? Repetition opposes any repetitive behaviour or thinking that follows a cyclical and logical pattern (Kierkegaard 1983, 301-302). Constantius also notes: "If one does not have the category of ... repetition, all life dissolves into an empty, meaningless noise" (Kierkegaard 1983, 149)³. This auditory metaphor, increasingly visual in a modern context, describes life as a chaotic flux of movement. The experience of life as pure noise contrasts with the experience of logical and repetitive continuity. Neither experience appears to facilitate the emergence of significant movements. This raises the question: how does repetition position itself between these two conceptions of experience?

This is best elucidated in Climacus's work *De Omnibus Dubitandum Est*. Here, it becomes clear that repetition finds its expression solely within our consciousness, as it does not exist in reality per se (Kierkegaard 2013, 171). What does this mean? For Climacus, movement is a non-concept since real movement only exists in non-being and cannot be grasped conceptually or representationally. We

typically perceive movement through change, recognizing that an object has moved by comparing its past state with its present state. Reality itself is not concerned with change, as change relies on consciousness for its perception. Therefore, repetition reveals itself as an interior movement (Kierkegaard 2013, 168; Kierkegaard 1983, 221). How do we then conceive of this movement? The movement of repetition is characterized by an acknowledgement of a type of “renewal”, a “continually coming into being” which inherently involves a perception of change. So, while repetition entails recognizing change, it remains an immediate and temporal category, existing solely “in the moment” (Kierkegaard 2013, 171). This suggests that repetition views the past and present as a false dichotomy. In other words, repetition does not seek to perceive change from past to present states, but rather to capture change as it occurs instantaneously. How do we conceive of this change? In *Philosophical Fragments*, the moment is explained as merely a “passing by”, yet it also contains the “fullness of time” (Kierkegaard 2013, 18). Climacus emphasizes that the moment is more than just the finite present, as it also has the characteristic of the infinite. Viewing the moment merely as the present, situated between past and future, renders it finite. This conception gives it a logical continuity, where the past informs the present, and the present shapes the future. The crux of this discussion is that while perceiving change is straightforward, capturing the continual process of change is much harder. In attempting to grasp this process, we can simultaneously glimpse the infinite through a collision between the flux of existence and our own idealist thoughts. Thus, when we strive to perceive the flux of existence, a perception of change automatically comes in from higher mental and idealist faculties. In this moment, one renews, embracing new meanings — not through a repetitive act, but by opening up to various new possibilities. This originary experience of time allows for moments of freedom to move away from a logical and repetitive conception of movement and time.

In short, this abstract discussion reveals that repetition involves an originary movement of the mind, distinct from the logical and

repetitive movements of daily behaviour. It is in the decisive “moment” that repetition occurs. Here, the inherent flux of existence collides with ideas purely rooted in consciousness. Repetition does not merely involve capturing change, it involves capturing the continual process of change. This perspective challenges the traditional view of time and movement, emphasizing the infinite potential within each moment. It also allows for moments of freedom to go beyond the constraints of logical continuity. At first, Climacus, in *De Omnibus Dubitandum Est*, engages exclusively in a logically progressing thought. He undergoes the Cartesian task of doubting everything, yet he ends up stuck, being able to bring about no movement at all (Kierkegaard 2013, 119)⁴. Climacus does not consider until the very end that, besides logic, there is also freedom. He turns to repetition and faith, as these in contrast to doubt cannot be assimilated by logic, and thus form a turning point in Climacus’ journey towards freedom. This section has provided an in-depth exploration of repetition. The following section will elucidate the close relationship between repetition and faith through an analysis of doubt.

Immanence and Transcendence in Faith

The previous section showed that repetition enables one to break free from logical cycles through an act of freedom, which gains significance in the moment. This opposition, between logic and freedom, is mirrored in *De Omnibus Dubitandum Est* by examining doubt, which in turn invokes faith. Kierkegaard notes: “if someone were to discourse on doubt in order to arouse doubt in another, he could precisely thereby evoke faith, just as faith, conversely, could evoke doubt” (Kierkegaard 2013, 166)⁵. He concludes that doubt and faith share a paradoxical dialectic. Although faith is arguably inseparable from God, it is not merely about belief in the religious sense. Faith, like doubt, is an inherent part of basic human experience. As Climacus writes in *Philosophical Fragments*: “Belief [*tro*] is a sense for coming into existence, and doubt is a protest against any conclusion that wants to go beyond immediate sensation and

immediate knowledge” (Kierkegaard 2013, 84). Faith or belief — in Danish, the word ‘tro’ encompasses both — relates to transcendence, while doubt refuses to go beyond immanence. Kierkegaard views immanence as a world purely confined within logic, whereas transcendence involves surpassing these logical limitations. This dynamic is explored in the works of both Climacus and Constantius.

Constantius increasingly reminds the reader that what true repetition is about is transcendence, while simultaneously and paradoxically also stating it remains within immanence (Kierkegaard 1983, 133 and 186). He writes that immanence emerges as transcendence in the sphere of freedom (Kierkegaard 1983, 309-310). Again, freedom has to do with transcending the immanent world of logic. Thus, repetition attempts a transcendent movement, yet stays within immanence and, in this attempt, there must be the possibility for moments of freedom. Later in the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, this time through the pseudonym Climacus, Kierkegaard notes the reverse. Climacus notes that repetition firmly remains within immanence (Kierkegaard 1992, 263). So, while for Constantius repetition is increasingly seen as pertaining to transcendence, later in Climacus’ writings repetition again is increasingly seen as pertaining to immanence⁶. One possible explanation for this could be, as theorized by translators Howard and Edna Hong, that Kierkegaard simply used faith in the works of Climacus as a synonym for repetition (Kierkegaard 1983, XXXIII). The pseudonym Climacus no longer endorsed repetition as pertaining to transcendence, as faith took its place — a repetitional faith. Since repetition and faith are not synonyms, at the very least, repetition served as the philosophical grounds for Climacus’ concept of faith. Climacus’ faith, like repetition, is grasped in the moment, as it is only in the moment that a finite subject can perceive a semblance of the infinite, *i.e.* God. However, this too does not hold, as it continuously folds into itself (Kierkegaard 2013, 63-64).

To conclude, a repetitional faith is characterized by the paradox of immanence and transcendence. This evolves into a form of

borderless immanence centred on freedom and potentiality, necessitating faith or belief. Since, residing solely in doubt confines one to the logical realm of immanence, thereby unable to produce significant movements. Constantius and Climacus provide the same analogy to explain their respective positions, namely that of love, another notion that logic cannot assimilate. In *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, Climacus calls the act of giving marriage vows of secondary importance (Kierkegaard 1992, 456). In this example, one's relationship with a loved one can be compared to their relationship with God. It is neither defined by marriage nor, for example, by being baptized. These entail one-off occurrences. Yet, certainly, they do not solidify one's love for or faith in either their spouse or God. This is shared by Constantius when he writes: "Repetition's love is in truth the only happy love. ... It has the blissful security of the moment" (Kierkegaard 1983, 132). Constantius aims to say that one does not love once and for all, one does not marry and then concede that love is something that one has to take up again and again. This is a happy love, a repetitional love. Through this analogy of love, we gain an idea of what a repetitional faith entails. Since reality is always in movement and change, the only way one can keep the object is paradoxically through constant renewal (Kierkegaard 1983, 149). This constant effort to surpass, yet never permanently grasp, is the essence of repetitional faith. It never achieves the object "once and for all", but continually engages it as if "for all times". Similarly, when it comes to love, this is the desired mode of existence. The reappraisal of Kierkegaard's repetitional faith, as found in Deleuze's *Cinema* volumes, necessitates such reading to prepare.

II. THE NEED FOR A CINEMATIC FAITH OR BELIEF

In *Cinema I* and *II*, Deleuze analyzes the disconnect between humanity and the world as depicted in post-1945 cinema (Deleuze 1989, xi-xiii)⁷. This disconnect emphasizes the loss of ability to

pragmatically adjust reactions to the situations encountered in the aftermath of World War Two. Deleuze perceived this rift through cinema's emphasis on contemplative characters immersed in what he repeatedly calls "pure optical and sound situations" – essentially rendering them passive observers, engaged only visually and aurally with the world (Deleuze 1989, 9-15). He proclaims that the only way to reconnect mankind and the world is through faith or belief. Paola Marrati in *Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy*, and Joe Hughes in "Believing in the World", have proposed to look at Deleuze's other works to answer the question as to what type of faith or belief this entails (Marrati 2012, 89; Hughes 2011, 66). Yet, such an approach would lead us away from the *Cinema* volumes and consequently from the topic of movement. In this part, the article will show the "similar movements" in Kierkegaard's work on repetition and faith and Deleuze's *Cinema* volumes. Additionally, it will examine how Deleuze extends this reading into a cinematic faith or belief. To begin, the article will clarify the focus and content of *Cinema I* and *II*.

Bergsonian Metaphysics

Deleuze opens *Cinema I* with a reading of Bergson's *Creative Evolution* and *Matter and Memory*. He notes in the preface:

Bergson was writing *Matter and Memory* in 1896: it was the diagnosis of a crisis in psychology. Movement, as physical reality in the external world, and the image, as psychic reality in consciousness, could no longer be opposed. The Bergsonian discovery of a movement-image, and more profoundly, of a time-image, still retains such richness today that it is not certain that all its consequences have been drawn. Despite the rather overhasty critique of the cinema that Bergson produced shortly afterwards, nothing can prevent an encounter between the movement-image, as he considers it, and the cinematographic image. (Deleuze 1986, xiv).

Before unpacking this dense quotation, let's first note that the theme again revolves around the metaphysical distinction between movement and the image. Here, the "image" can be read as Plato's

Idea, the Idea as a purely mental representation. Later on, Deleuze phrases it as the opposition between: “one wishing to reconstitute the order of consciousness with pure material movements, the other the order of the universe with pure images in consciousness” (Deleuze 1986, 56). This opposition is no longer tenable. Bergson sought to overthrow this distinction as well. However, he did not look for a solution within cinema.

Deleuze emphasizes two conceptions of movement that he extracts from Bergson. The first is a logical understanding of movement. In this view, movement is seen as occurring within an abstract concept of time that is divided into distinct, separate instants, much like space can be divided. According to Bergson, this perception mistakenly equates movement with the series of points in space that are crossed during the motion. Essentially, movement is understood by breaking down time into a sequence of static, immobile moments (Deleuze 1986, 7). The second is a concept of real, imperceptible movement, where time is experienced as concrete duration (*durée*). Unlike abstract time, which divides movement into separate, static instants, duration represents a continuous, indivisible flow of time. This conception emphasizes that movement is not a sequence of fixed points but a fluid and dynamic process. Deleuze remarks that Bergson, in *Creative Evolution* in 1907, gives the first a name: “The cinematographic illusion” (Deleuze 1986, 1). Bergson argued that cinema is created by taking a series of static images of successive positions. As the filmstrip rolls through the camera, these images are animated, projecting the illusion of movement (Marrati 2012, 9; Deleuze 1986, 2; Bergson 1911, 322). Bergson essentially used cinema as an analogy for the false movement that defines both Greek and modern metaphysics.

In contrast, through controversially connecting various of Bergson’s theses, Deleuze argues cinema has qualities that effectively emancipate movement. He writes: “cinema does not give us an image to which movement is added, it immediately gives us a movement-image” (Deleuze 1989, 2). In cinema, it is the endless continuity of movement that describes the image, not the other way

around. Deleuze names various developments and techniques to argue for this position. For example, the advent of the mobile camera, the ability to synthesize disparate shots via montage, or cinema's ability to capture any given moment (against a privileged series of divided instants). To consider cinema only as a series of successive shots is an overly simplistic perspective. In cinema, through these various techniques movement is no longer subordinate to anything except the camera itself. In contrast, in the theatre, movement is still subordinate to various bodies (of the actors or set pieces) (Deleuze 1989, 178). The camera uniquely allows the artwork itself - rather than the spectator - to move around a stationary body. This capability becomes even more interesting when we examine scenes where the camera moves fluidly through barriers like windows or walls, or offers an elevated viewpoint, presenting perspectives generally unavailable to the human eye. Cinema thus gives us the dynamic flow of movement, and later also of time, which we will see in the time-image. The difference between movement-image and time-image depends on different ways in which time is expressed, indirect or direct, as the following section will explain.

Metaphors of Time vs. Metaphors of Movement

The last section touched upon cinema producing real movement. Through subtracting forms of movement, by use of various vehicles and techniques, cinema's essence has truly become movement. This is not an abstraction, it is movement emancipated. Movement here refers to change, interactions, and disruptions, as opposed to a closed set of traversed space, where all is given (Deleuze 1986, 8-10). For example, cinema has the ability to highlight a particular scene while simultaneously suggesting the existence of multiple unseen spaces, what in cinema is known as the "out-of-field" (Deleuze 1986, 16). This stands in contrast to conceptions of movement whereby all the factors are accounted for. Nevertheless, despite the emancipatory nature of the movement-image, a dominant feature of overarching logic persists. Pre-war cinema

largely conformed to traditional narrative structures. The cinema of the movement-image shows us time in a very condensed form. Events often transpire over days, months or even decades, and we perceive all this in a 2-hour runtime. Deleuze attributes our ability to experience this false sense of time to the “sensory-motor schema”, which coordinates our perceptions and actions, ensuring events are selected and coordinated into functional sequences (Deleuze 1989, 40). This schema guides our interaction with cinema, leading us to interpret narratives through a moral framework and logical common sense (Deleuze 1989, 2-3). Classical narrative structures follow a set pattern: (1) establishing the situation; (2) a crisis occurring; and (3) a decisive response restoring the *status quo* (Deleuze 1989, 127-128). This renders objects and settings subordinate to a functional reality, strictly determined by the demands of the situation. It also makes the passing of time subordinate to the characters and actions their movement through space. Objects and time never appear directly, on their own terms.

In contrast, the time-image provides a direct representation of objects and time. Post-war cinema, for example, depicted city backgrounds ravaged by bombing, losing their functional purpose and thus authentically representing objects and settings. Deleuze noted that pre-war cinema, through the movement-image, served as an ideological apparatus in the events that led up to the Second World War (Deleuze 1989, 164). Again, this ideological function could only exist because of how objects and settings were put into a subordinate relation to a narrative. In post-war cinema, action makes way for waiting and exhaustion, thus introducing a new dimension of time as duration (concrete duration rather than abstract time). This affected the mind’s movements instead of extending movements into space, *i.e.* call for action. The logic of pre-war cinema collapsed under the reality of the Second World War, leading to a self-consciousness rooted in an awareness of its own clichés (Deleuze 1989, 4). The failure of a once-coherent logical conception gave rise to doubt, leading to the misery of experiencing a lack of significant movement. As a result, spatial metaphors of

movement ceased to make sense, leaving only temporal metaphors relevant. Time now appearing in its pure state, in a pure optical and sound situation, gave rise to movements of the mind and new spiritual depths. This became the “cinema of the seer, and no longer of the agent [*de voyant, non plus d’actant*]” (Deleuze 1989, 126).

To sum up, the movement-image is not inherently inferior to the time-image. Although cinema adhering to the movement-image still achieves significant success today, Deleuze argues it no longer represents the forefront of cinematic progression, which now resides in the time-image⁸. Furthermore, modern cinema confronts us with modern problems, making the movement-image less equipped. One such issue, as Deleuze notes, is the loss of faith or belief in the world after the Second World War (Deleuze 1989, XI). The movement-image, presenting a distinct good-versus-evil conflict, subtly encourages viewers to align with the good as the only morally right decision. Furthermore, the movement-image presumes a natural connection between man and the world, wherein our actions take primacy and therefore mesh fluently with our surroundings. These approaches provide a clear sense of meaning to our lives. However, after World War Two, these meanings were recognized as illusions. Deleuze notes: “The nature of the cinematographic illusion has often been considered. Restoring our belief in the world — this is the power of modern cinema (when it stops being bad)” (Deleuze 1989, 172). He suggests that the world has increasingly come to be seen as a bad film, composed of many *clichés*. This entails a network of conceptual reflexes, in which there is continually the risk of falling back into a prevailing overarching logic (Deleuze 1989, 180-188). In the cinema of the time-image (when good), questions about what is the right thing to do, as well as questions as to the meaning of things, remain ambiguous. In this context, there is no risk of reverting to repetitive behaviour or logical continuity. The question remains: how, through the time-image, do we restore our faith or belief in the world and again create significant movements?

Faith or Belief in Cinema

The previous section showed that the cinema of the time-image enabled new spiritual depths whereby the focus shifted from enacting movements in the world to creating movements in the mind. Herein, logic gives way to ambiguity. However, we are left questioning what kind of faith or belief cinema shows us we are in need of. In *Cinema I*, Deleuze speaks of “the repetition of faith” as “undoing the cycles of time”, “by virtue of a creative instant of time” (Deleuze 1986, 132-133). This mirrors Kierkegaard’s writings on the moment, containing the capacity to show a semblance of the infinite as opposed to a logical finiteness. It is through Deleuze’s later remarks with which we are able to encounter time-images. He describes this as a shift from horizontal to vertical (Deleuze 2020, seminar 22)⁹. The movement-image follows events linearly and relies on logical, common-sense connections, while the time-image captures the intensity of a singular event and emphasizes difference and ambiguity (Deleuze 2020, seminar 21). When events cannot be connected easily, they are ordered by subjective perspectives, reflecting various modes of existence (Deleuze 2020, seminar 21). Morally, the movement-image judges actions and persons based on universal values of right and wrong. In contrast, the time-image trusts that persons or actions judge themselves (Deleuze 2020, seminar 22). For example, instead of judging a Nazi collaborator or the act of collaboration based on its inherent wrongness, we assess it by the full weight of their mode of existence. This approach immerses us in the event itself rather than merely passing by. The time-image shifts the focus from knowledge to points of view entailing modes of existence. This leads to a thinking and choosing that opposes universal knowledge. It involves rediscovering a deeper ground of faith or belief that precedes it (Deleuze 2020, seminar 22)¹⁰. This prompts the question: what are the implications of this form of thinking and choosing?

Deleuze praises that cinema is sometimes negatively viewed as merely a passive engagement, as he argues it confronts us with perceptions, affects, and sensations that are not our own. The

cinema of the time-image goes even further, revealing what cannot be thought: the spiritually problematic, the impossibility and powerlessness of thought and choice (Deleuze 1989, 166). Deleuze argues that true thinking begins when we start to think the unthinkable, noting: “As Kierkegaard says, ‘the profound movements of the soul disarm psychology [the psyche]’, precisely because they do not come from within” (Deleuze 1989, 175)¹¹. Encountering the unknown, the unthinkable prompts us to think, which requires faith or belief in the incommensurable, in that which cannot simply be measured or compared (Deleuze 1989, 175,178). Furthermore, cinema, similar to Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonyms, presents various modes of existence (Deleuze 1989, 77). Deleuze, however, sees a more fundamental mode of existence: that of choosing to choose. He notes: “As Kierkegaard says, again in a formula all his own: ‘There is never a solution, there are only decisions [*Il n’y a jamais de solution, il n’y a que des décisions*]’” (Deleuze 2020, seminar 21)¹². The cinema of the time-image does not provide solutions, it only leaves us with ambiguities. Yet, it offers something more, by presenting choices where before there were seen none. Deleuze advocates choosing “for all times” rather than “once and for all”. Hereby, one does not merely repeat a particular mode of existence but looks to enable a mode of existence that allows choice to remain open. In both thinking and choosing, the goal becomes to see, to be watchful of, the continual process of change (outside of any logical continuity). This opens up the possibility - by virtue of a creative instant of time - of a significant movement to occur.

To conclude, the cinema of the time-image does not claim to show us a true world. Instead, it is defined by ambiguities, irrationalities, and uncertainties, representing a radical openness rather than a given world (Deleuze 1989, 179-180)¹³. This aligns with Deleuze’s statement in *Cinema II*: “The question is no longer: does cinema give us the illusion of the world? But: how does cinema restore our belief in the world?” (Deleuze 1989, 181-182). Cinematic faith or belief involves renouncing an illusory world in favour of believing in one’s inner movements. While we easily accept that

objects extend beyond our body and our perception of them, we struggle to make the same conclusion when it comes to states that exist beyond our consciousness (Deleuze 2020, seminar 22). This highlights the opposition between movement-image and time-image. It underscores the transition from the inherent logic and common sense, with which we perceive external physical movements, to the illogic ambiguous movements often associated with the mind. The cinema of the time-image reveals “higher determinations of thought and choice, deeper than any link with the world” (Deleuze 1989, 178). The time-image confronts us with characters whose problems are too big to solve through reason or logic. Here, the erasure of the unity of man and the world is desired in favour of a break which now leaves us with only a faith or belief. We do not retake the world for itself, for a new illusion to take its place, but for us. Paradoxically, this leads to a way of being in the world more true to reality. From the beginning, Deleuze shows us the importance of looking at movements, increasingly seen as movements of the mind or spirit. This entails a faith or belief in the ability of movements in our mind to significantly impact our lives. Deleuze thus mirrors Kierkegaard’s writings on creating significant movements, while also expanding on it by underscoring the significant role that cinema can have in facilitating these.

FINAL REMARKS

Part I showed various positions on the metaphysics of movement concerning its physical possibility and its relation to knowledge or truth of the world. Here, Kierkegaard increasingly emphasized a movement of the interior or the mind. This entailed a shift towards personal freedom, away from logical conceptions of exterior movement and behaviour. We have furthermore established that repetition occurs in “the moment”, and therefore entails grasping the continual process of change. Doubt and faith, in turn, reflected the dialectical relationship between immanence and transcendence. Both repetition and faith involve attempts at obtaining

transcendence, thereby enabling moments of freedom that go beyond the purely logical and immanent understanding of the world, as seen within doubt. As clarified through the analogy of love, repetition and faith require a continual renewal to keep the object. It is through this reading we find a reappraisal of Kierkegaard in Deleuze's *Cinema* volumes. Repetition and faith are no longer seen as occurring "once and for all", but only have meaning precisely when interpreted, as occurring "for all times".

Part II demonstrated that Kierkegaard's repetition and faith have become vital elements for Deleuze to confront the pre-war cinema, that of the movement-image. This cinema, through various techniques, entails an emancipation from Greek and modern metaphysics on movement, yet is still burdened by a logical conception of the world. In the movement-image, time, objects and setting are made subordinate to a functional reality that prioritizes action. The time-image, in contrast, shows inaction and, therefore, provides us with time, objects and settings existing on their own terms. Here, we see cinema reaching new spiritual depths not seen before. This shift marks the transition to a cinema of the seer. It refrains from providing solutions, instead fostering a mode of thinking and choosing that reveals new possibilities where before there were seen none. It thus engages with a more originary approach to existential questions. The cinema of the time-image highlights our need for faith or belief in these interior movements, contrasting with the illusory coherence observed in the movement-image. This, in turn, prompts us to create movements of the mind that could ultimately impact our lives.

In summary, the theme of movement has served as a unifying thread in this article, proving to be highly productive. Kierkegaard's repetitional faith provides a means for individuals to transcend their inherent limitations, moving beyond themselves towards a movement truer to reality. Both Kierkegaard and Deleuze stress that repetitional faith involves an affirmation and inhabitation of the world for themselves, rather than succumbing to conceptual or representational illusions. The post-war disillusionment and the

centuries-old dichotomy between movement and image or Idea are not seen as problems but as developments that have led to a truer relation with the world. This article highlighted Kierkegaard's significance in Deleuze's *Cinema* volumes, raising important questions about the role of transcendence in Deleuze's primarily immanent philosophy and the potential for freedom in our actions.

NOTES

1. Kierkegaard uses the term “category” to emphasize that repetition is not a mere abstract, intellectual idea, but a fundamental category of human experience. It pertains to how individuals experience and interpret their lives. For more on this see Eriksen (2012, 11).
2. The reading of repetition as occurring “once and for all” can be given weight through Abraham killing Isaac in fear and trembling, the thunderstorm and job in repetition, or even the conversion of Saul/Paul on his road to Damascus in concluding unscientific postscript. In these a one-off occurrence on first sight does seem to occur, bringing back a stable object, *i.e.* God. However, Kierkegaard emphasizes the importance of the ordeal in and of itself over the attainability of anything stable. See for example: “Job's greatness, ... is not ... that he said: The Lord gave, and the Lord took away; ... something he ... did not repeat later. Rather, Job's significance is that the disputes at the boundaries of faith are fought out in him, that the colossal revolt of the wild and aggressive powers of passion is presented here” (Kierkegaard 1983, 210-211). Adding to that: “ordeal is a temporary category” (Kierkegaard 1983, 212). Repetition likewise, entails a temporary (and temporal) category.
3. Omitted from this quotation is the fact that Constantius initially places recollection on an equal footing with repetition. However, for various reasons, recollection is no longer sufficient for modern people. For example, consider the following quote: “The Greek mentality was in one sense happy, but if this happiness ceased, recollection manifested itself as freedom's consolation; only in recollection and by moving backwards into it did freedom possess its eternal life. The modern view, on the other hand, must seek freedom forward, so that here eternity opens up for him as the true repetition forward” (Kierkegaard 1983, 317). To achieve happiness, modern individuals must take the risk of moving forward and seek happiness in this way.
4. This task, the student Climacus in *De Omnibus Dubitandum Est* sets out as reminiscent of René Descartes' *Principles of Philosophy* and particularly Hegel's

reading of said text. Further discussion on this topic can be found in Kupś (2022).

5. I write here “Kierkegaard”, as he wrote *De Omnibus Dubitandum Est* in the third person, rather than under the pseudonym of Climacus as in *Philosophical Fragments* and the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. This is similar to *Repetition*, where although there is in fact a pseudonym, the author is mainly concerned with a personage simply called: “Young Man” (actually *Menneske* in Danish, meaning “human being”). *De Omnibus Dubitandum Est* remained unpublished and therefore has no mention of any pseudonym author. Take note that where *Repetition* is essentially a book about a young man going through relationship difficulties (a theme not much touched upon in this article, except when it comes to a repetitional love, later on), *De Omnibus Dubitandum Est* is about a young man going through the difficulties of a stultifying academic milieu.
6. Note that the pseudonym Constantin Constantius, depicted as a man of science, contrasts with the character known as the Young Man in Kierkegaard's *Repetition*. The Young Man, despite striving for transcendence through reading the story of Job, achieves only poetic blissfulness. Both characters lack the authority to define true transcendence yet consider it essential for a genuine repetition to occur. Johannes Climacus, although a more religious figure, is also questionable as an authority in this debate due to his Socratic nature. He renounces his Christianity to discover what it truly means to be a Christian, emphasizing faith in God rather than merely adhering to the Church's teachings. However, he remains more of a humourist than a truly religious person.
7. Note that the shift from pre- to post-war cinema is not a clear historical break, as for Deleuze it rather emphasizes how certain periods have different methods of expression. Thus, we are talking here about two different understandings of how cinema is expressed, of which the Second World War was indeed a turning point.
8. In *Deleuze Reframed: A Guide for the Arts Students*, Damian Sutton and David Martin-Jones effectively elucidate the influence of the movement-image and time-image on 21st-century cinema. For instance, Chapter 6, “Time (and) Travel in Television” pages 107 to 127, demonstrates how Hollywood has since integrated the time-image, resulting in a hybrid form where the movement-image coexists with elements of the time-image. Despite this integration, cinema characterized exclusively by the time-image persists as a niche predominantly within the realm of minor cinema.
9. Deleuze emphasizes the significance of the intersection between the horizontal and vertical planes, aligning with Kierkegaard's idea of remaining within immanence while striving for transcendence.

10. Kierkegaard was a Christian, yet he never exclaimed Christianity was the true religion, merely that since he chose to become a Christian, it became the truth for him. The mode of existence is more important than the truth value of a propositional statement, that Christianity is the true religion. Ultimately, it is not a matter of whether God exists, it is a matter of which attitude or mode of existence one takes towards a deity (Kierkegaard 1992, 234). This is emphasized by Deleuze concerning his concept of faith or belief, in which it is no longer important if we are Christian or atheist, we are either under it or outside of it. The only thing relevant is the choice of the mode of existence one takes towards the existence of a deity (Deleuze 1989, 177).
11. Deleuze does not cite this passage in either the English or the original French print. Justo places it in the introduction of *The Concept of Anxiety*, “where sin completely escapes the scientific systematic approach of psychology”. In *Tome II*. One could perhaps also point to his journals, reading: “by being psychologically pursued so far that it vanishes for psychology as transcendent, as a religious movement by virtue of the absurd, which commences when a person has come to the border of the wondrous”. Underscored by “Your Const. Const.” (Constantin Constantius, the pseudonym author of *Repetition*) in Pap. IV B 120 n.d., 1843. Note that the 19th-century use of the word psychology, means something different from the modern use, it is more in line with what we today would call “psyche”.
12. The source of this quote from Kierkegaard remains unknown. It likely originates from *The Concept of Anxiety* or *Fear and trembling*.
13. Deleuze remarks: “It is a whole transformation of belief. It was already a great turning point in philosophy, from Pascal to Nietzsche: to replace the model of knowledge with belief. But belief replaces knowledge only when it becomes belief in this world, as it is” (Deleuze 1989, 172). Deleuze mentions the turn that authors such as Pascal, Nietzsche, and also Kierkegaard, were able to bring about to replace the model of knowledge with belief. One can derive the relevance of Kierkegaard from the accompanying footnote: “In the history of philosophy, the substitution of belief for knowledge takes place in authors of whom some are still believers, while others carry out an atheistic conversion. Hence the existence of real couples: Pascal-Hume, Kant-Fichte, Kierkegaard-Nietzsche, Le-Quier-Renouvier. But, even with the believers, belief is not now directed towards another world, it is directed to this world: faith according to Kierkegaard, or even Pascal, restores man and the world to us” (Deleuze 1989, 311). This model of knowledge refers back to Plato’s concept of recollection or *anamnesis*. This concerns a way of knowledge acquisition that Kierkegaard in *Repetition* tries to oppose. Recollection or *anamnesis*, is by Deleuze remarked upon by the terms “the ideal of knowledge” or “the Socratic ideal”. These terms concern a fixed

knowledge as opposed to a belief continually coming into being, and it is the latter that Deleuze describes as being able to ‘restore man and the world’ (Deleuze 1989, 172).

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