CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS' METHODOLOGICAL RIGOUR: THE SCOPE OF HIS STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY

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Abstract. Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–2009) introduced structural anthropology, a framework for identifying the deep structures underlying human thought and culture. However, since the 1950s, structuralism has faced considerable criticism.

This article contributes to the methodological debate by examining seven key aspects of Lévi-Strauss's structural anthropology: (i) the meaning of "structures", (ii) its objectives, (iii) governing principles, (iv) research objects, (v) limitations, (vi) potential contributions, and (vii) the intellectual disposition required of a Lévi-Straussian scholar.

Lévi-Strauss maintained that structural anthropology must adhere to strict methodological principles to achieve a holistic and objective understanding of human societies across time and space. His approach rested on three core demands: objectivity, totality, and meaningfulness. Structural anthropologists, working within this framework, sought to reduce the particular experiences of indigenous communities into universal codes comprehensible to all possible observers.

To preserve analytical rigour, Lévi-Strauss deliberately selected a limited number of societies for study—those he considered "authentic" or possessing some degree of authenticity within the modern world. By systematically analysing these societies, he argued that a deeper understanding of humanity could emerge.

Keywords: philosophical methodology, structuralism, structural anthropology, Claude Levi-Strauss, nonliterature societies

INTRODUCTION

During the second half of the twentieth century—that is, after two World Wars had challenged the meaning of Western tradition—

European intellectuals needed to reconstruct its philosophical foundations. Among them, Claude Levi-Strauss was worth consideration. He was identified with structuralism, a philosophical and theoretical movement that inspired European intellectual life in the 1950s and 1960s (Dosse 1997, 10). Structuralism, Levi-Strauss admitted, was "the principles and methods that have never ceased to guide me" (1983, xi). The official inception of Levi-Straussian structuralism was in 1958 when he published the collection of essays *Structural Anthropology*. About one year later, he was the first professor of Social Anthropology at the College de France, which legalised Anthropology research in France. 1958, to Gilles-Gaston Granger (1993), was also the crucial innovation moment of social sciences and humanities. Jean Pouillon argued the meaning of Levi-Strauss structuralism, or structural anthropology, as he preferred: it was the first time in the history of Western sciences and philosophy that a person intensively analysed the structural dimension of the world and then tried to reach the end of that approach's scope (Levi-Strauss 1963, vii).

As Levi-Strauss (2013b, 9) claimed, structural anthropology continued the ancient curiosity to consider human phenomena comprehensively. He, therefore, tried to place it as the ultimate human science. Thus, his challenge caused long-term criticism from empirical scholars, theorists, philosophers, and broader, intellectuals. A book published in 1977 contained a bibliography of critical studies of his approach from the 1940s to the 1970s (Lapointe 1977). This controversy is still ongoing (Doji 2006).

This paper contributes to the discussions on Levi-Straussian structuralism by treating it as a subject of philosophical methodology. Our proposal, to some degree, agrees with the classification of his student, Maurice Godelier (2018), who considered his thinking consists of five components: i) kinship studies, ii) myths and mythical thought, iii) arts, iv) reflections on the future of humanity, and v) "the principles and methods of structural analysis, as well as the relations entertained by structural anthropology with linguistics, history, philosophy, mathematics, but

also with Marx, Freud, Rousseau, Gobineau, etc". These five elements are tied, complementing each other in Levi-Strauss' work. Therefore, a comprehensive study of his philosophical methodology needs to regard these parts simultaneously. The author, thus, argued the above requirement might be satisfied by studying Levi-Strauss' methodological rigour, that is his implicit or explicit remark on the scope of his structural anthropology.

THE MEANING OF "STRUCTURE"

From 1935 to 1939, Claude Levi-Strauss—a former French high school philosophy teacher who left his job and, together with his wife, moved to Brazil—taught sociology while conducting ethnographic fieldwork among four indigenous societies. He intended to write a national doctoral thesis on kinship from this data. Still, he was unable to begin due to World War II and certain theoretical uncertainties, which persisted until his 1942 meeting in exile in New York with the linguist Roman Jakobson, with whom he formed a lifelong friendship (Debaene 2010, 46). He saw in the structuralist linguistics of Jakobson an intuition he had had in the fieldwork (Levi-Strauss 1985, 139). Thus, he attempted to extend and transform the structural analysis of linguistics to the study of kinship. Modern linguistics, indeed, had transformed itself to become, among other social sciences and humanities, the only mature scientific discipline. The achievement of linguistics lies in its simultaneous formulation of an empirical method and an understanding of the nature of the data it analyses. Modern linguistics, therefore, has the "noble duty" to lead other disciplines toward a truly scientific empiricist understanding of social phenomena, including anthropology (Levi-Strauss 1963, 31).

The structuralist approach of modern linguistics was first reduced to four basic operations by Nikolai Trubetzkoy's *Principles of Phonology*. Levi-Strauss elaborated on them in the collection *Structural Anthropology*. First, as an integral part of modern linguistics,

phonology shifted from the study of conscious linguistic phenomena to the unconscious substructure underlying them. Second, this discipline did not treat terms as isolated entities but focused on the correlations between words. Third, it introduced the notion of a system, asserting that modern phonology not only established that phonemes are always part of a system; it also identified specific phonemic systems and clarified their structure. Fourth, the discipline sought to uncover general laws through intuition and logical deduction. Trubetzkoy's four basic operations in phonology were the first to establish rigorous connections between the social sciences and humanities, as found in the natural sciences (Levi-Strauss 1963, 33-4). This development encouraged Levi-Strauss to examine the consequences of these operations and their potential applications in his structural anthropology.

Starting from modifying Trubetzkoy's work in phonology, Levi-Strauss extended and developed the structural approach to analyse the empirical data of anthropology. His outline might be found in the essay "Social Structure," first published as a paper presented at the international conference of the Wenner-Gren Foundation in New York, USA, in 1952, and later reprinted in *Structural Anthropology* (1958). His thus marked an epistemological distinction between "model" and "structure."

"Model" is a concept formed by scientists, whose function is to describe and explain a group of social phenomena. Depending on their scale, there are two types of models: "mechanical models" and "statistical models". The first one consists of elements whose composition coincides with the scale of actual phenomena. In contrast, the second type is composed of constituent elements which differ whose scale from the phenomenon itself (Levi-Strauss 1963, 283). "Structure", according to Levi-Strauss, is a notable model that could only be formed under four strict epistemological conditions. First, a structure must be systematic so that any transformation of one element entails transformations in all other elements. Second, structures will belong to all models of the same group of transformations, each corresponding to a model of the

same type. Therefore, the whole of these transformations will form a group of specific models. Third, the above two conditions allow Levi-Straussian researchers to predict the responses of models. Fourth, structures must be models constructed so that their operation enables scholars to perceive all observed events (Levi-Strauss 1963, 279-80).

Models and structures are concepts constructed by the researcher's abstract operationalisation. These two notions, however, have sparked debate among later scholars regarding whether they can simultaneously have epistemological and ontological value (Knuppova 2018, 36-7). In the 1958 collection, Levi-Strauss asserted that his structure concept holds epistemological value. He argued that the demand for structural analysis of social phenomena can be pushed further to become a unique mental attitude in which an individual focuses on structural features.

The mental attitude toward structural features is not an intellectual achievement unique to Levi-Strauss but rather "one of the most universal [human mental] attitudes toward the world" (Balcerzan & Rajewska 2022, 174). Levi-Strauss confirmed this assessment in a series of lectures in Korea in 1981, arguing that the attitude toward structures is not a Western invention. Instead, he asserted that it is a gift to Western people from non-Western communities. He further said that structuralism is a mental attitude that has contributed to forming a common feature of human thinking in many societies since ancient times. This mental attitude "is a mindset that we have received from the communities we study. When we try to do a structural analysis, what we are really doing is borrowing the thinking of the people we study, whether in the distant past or the present, and using it to understand those communities better, as if in this kind of thinking there is a common denominator, a common ground that extends across all of humanity—including both ancient and contemporary indigenous thinkers—and is a way of thought that is best at helping us translate from one way of thinking to another" (Levi-Strauss 2021b, 9).

The mental attitude toward the structural dimension of the world, thus universal to humans in many societies since ancient times, was later borrowed by Westerners and evolved through tortuous stages to become the basis of Levi-Straussian structuralism. He acknowledged this position in the 1958 preface to *Structural Anthropology*, quoting Jean Pouillon: "Lévi-Strauss is certainly not the first nor the only one to have emphasised the structural character of social phenomena, but his originality consists in taking that character seriously and in serenely deriving all the consequences from it" (Levi-Strauss 1963, vii).

THREE METHODOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS OF STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY

The first requirement is objectivity. Objectivity, Levi-Strauss (2013b, 22) said in the first Tokyo lectures in 1986, "characterises all the social sciences; otherwise, they could not lay claim to the name of science." He made it clear in the "Anthropology" entry of *Enciclopedia Italiana*, setting the objectivity of his studies apart from that of all sciences in the way Levi-Straussian anthropologists face his research object: forced to stand at a distance. This position requires a special objectification from the anthropologist. He must give up a mass of things that are taken for granted in him, including 1) beliefs, 2) favouritism, 3) prejudices, 4) and especially his methods of thinking (Levi-Strauss 1975, 1-2).

The second requirement of his anthropology is totality. The anthropologist does not consider phenomena as independent and closed entities but perceives them in the context of their social life, "all of whose aspects are organically linked" (Levi-Strauss 2013b, 23). Therefore, he admitted that the second requirement has the premise of considering several aspects of social life in the work of economists, demographers, political scientists, etc. These scholars, however, deal with specific data in an isolational situation, and then propose different knowledge on humans. Anthropologists, by

contrast, attempt similarities between these data, then seek general formulas and invariants that manifest behind the most diverse forms of social life.

The last and most challenging requirement is meaningfulness. Because Levi-Strauss placed his anthropology in semiotics, which took the active principle of "meaning". This requirement, in the above essay, still needs to be clarified. He did more in his first Tokyo lecture in 1986. The anthropologist's attempt towards objectivity and totality "can be situated only at a level where phenomena retain meaning for an individual consciousness" (Levi-Strauss 2013b, 26). This rigour is the most basic distinction between the methodology of his anthropology and that of the sciences to which it was inspired. For example, economic or demographic studies aim at objectivity by treating their research objects as abstract notions, such as "value", "profitability", "marginal productivity", and "maximum population." They, nonetheless, were formed outside of direct and concrete relationships between individuals and had no meaning in the consciousness of individuals belonging to the societies in question.

In this challenging situation, bound by these three requirements, the anthropologist needs to be familiar with new categories in unfamiliar societies. From there, he would invent new mental categories compared to the community in which he was born and then contribute to introducing them to the Western philosophical and scientific tradition. To do so demands that anthropologists formulate their problems and conclusions in a particular mode. This mode of thinking enables the anthropologist's findings to be rational to him and every possible observer (Levi-Strauss 1975, 2). In other words, he needs to "achieve formulations valid not only for an honest and objective observer but for all observers possible" (Levi-Strauss 2013b, 22). The essential task of structuralist researchers, thus, is to produce intelligible codes able to translate particular experiences of the society in question, which "can be understood in the context of some other social experience" (Levi-Strauss 1975, 2).

NONLITERATURE SOCIETIES: LEVI-STRAUSSIAN STRUCTURALISM'S PRIVILEGED RESEARCH OBJECT

The anthropologist confronts his research object, as the ancient astronomer faced the stars with "the view from afar". His traditional study objects were indeed far from him and, for centuries, from the Renaissance, were considered primitive. Levi-Strauss, in a brief article written for *UNESCO Courier* (1954, 5-6), explained the confusing meaning of the word "primitive", and then renewed his research object. The term "primitive" is a 19th-century European concept that has been inconsistently used to describe at least three types of societies: (i) those living close to nature, particularly in forests, (ii) those considered industrially less developed than Europeans of that era, and (iii) those perceived as preserving humanity's original, untouched state. None of these interpretations are satisfactory.

The first interpretation referred to societies that lived close to nature, especially in the forest. The Eskimos, one of the most famous examples of primitive peoples, did not live in the woods. However, the nineteenth and twentieth-century French peasants were closely connected with nature. If so, were the Eskimos not primitive, while the French peasants two centuries earlier were primitive? The first interpretation of the "primitive" notion is, therefore, not correct. The second interpretation pointed to societies possessing an industrial level more backward than nineteenth-century Europeans. The actual comparison would reveal opposition. The industrial stage of a Melanesian village is the same as the 2nd century BC of Roma and Amsterdam about 1750 and the mid-19th century of the ancient city Timbuktu in Mali, Africa. However, all three of these societies cannot be classified as the same social type as "primitive". Thus, the second interpretation of that notion is incorrect (Levi-Strauss 1954, 5-6).

The third, perhaps the best interpretation, is directed to communities that have kept humanity's original nature. Levi-Strauss, however, raised two questions. Firstly, scholars need to

learn more about the true beginnings of humanity. The best available archaeological findings are the earliest traces of artificial tools dating back 400,000 to 500,000 years and found in many parts of the globe. These suggest two conclusions: 1) those tools were not the first products of humanity, and 2) people need to interact and influence each other so that the tool-making techniques spread and become homogeneous. The first conclusion found no justification. Regarding the second one, the artefacts of the so-called primitive people are very advanced compared to the above archaeological tools. Thus, technical developments must happen. The means of so-called primitive societies could not be the product of the dawn of humanity (Levi-Strauss 1954, 6).

Levi-Strauss summarised: all three 19th-century European interpretations of the notion "primitive" are inaccurate. "The idea of a primitive society is a delusion. On the other hand, the idea of a society with no form of writing makes us aware of an essential side of humanity's development" (Levi-Strauss 1954, 7). The absence of a form of writing is, indeed, the critical feature of those societies in contrast to modern Western ones, which spread out their mode of being and thinking to every community on the Earth. Levi-Strauss, therefore, proposed the most privileged research object of his anthropology: nonliterature societies. Thirty-two years after the important article in *UNESCO Courier*, Levi-Strauss (2013b, 4-5), in his first Tokyo lecture in 1986, outlined these social types as "perfectly viable so long as they are not threatened from the outside". Therefore, he clarified the defining features of that social type, which were revealed to structuralist anthropologists and could then be analyzed objectively and comprehensively.

First, there are societies with small populations, ranging from a few dozen to several hundred, and at most, several thousand people. Second, such communities could form small groups, each consisting of a few dozen to several hundred people, within maximum walking distance of at most two or three days. Their populational density is 0.1 person/square kilometre. Third, to keep the population low, their birth rate is also limited, only 1% of the population, just

enough to balance the number of deaths, making the population almost unchanged. Fourth, the low population size is associated with unconscious rules of sexual abstinence after birth, mainly to prolong the duration of lactation to recover the sexual ability in the body of women slowly (Levi-Strauss 2013b, 15-6). Claude Levi-Strauss (1961, 273), in *Tristes Tropiques*, described the abortion techniques of Nambikwaran women in central Brazil in the late 1930s to maintain a low population. "The Nambikwara have few children; childless couples are not uncommon, though one or two children constitute the norm (…). Sexual relations between parents are forbidden while their child remains unweaned: often, that is to say, until it is three years old (…). Living a nomadic life in a very poor environment, the natives have to be careful; women do not hesitate to resort to abortion of one kind or other medicinal plants, or some mechanical device in case of need".

Fifth, if population growth occurs, it does not destroy these groups to reorganise themselves on new foundations. As the population of a group becomes more extensive, the group splits itself into two smaller societies, keeping the old social organisation. Sixth, this social type could often spontaneously eliminate infectious diseases. According to epidemiologists, the virus of epidemics would only live in the human body for a duration and then must pass to other bodies to survive. The virus would work ideally in societies with populations ranging from a few hundred thousand to several million, where interpersonal interaction is dense, such as in our modern cities. Seventh, non-communicable diseases, such as obesity, high blood pressure, and blood circulation disorders, are also less likely to appear because these individuals are physically active and eat more varied foods than farmers or people who live in modern cities, with hundreds of different types of animals and plants, which have low fat, high fibre, and mineral salts to provide the body with enough protein and calories (Levi-Strauss 2013b, 15).

However, the most distinctive characteristic of maintaining this social type's relatively isolated inner life, visible to anthropologists from the outside, is establishing relationships among members

according to kinship. "Everyone is a brother, sister, cousin, uncle, aunt, or other kin to everyone else" (Levi-Strauss 2013b, 13). Individuals who do not belong to a kinship system of concrete society could only be from another society or another world. They would be seen as strangers, a threat to the whole community. Levi-Strauss faced this difficult situation while researching the Caduveo tribe, in Brazil, in the late 1930s. "The Caduveo were very distrustful, fearful of any encroachments on their territory" (Levi-Strauss 2013a, 72).

Nonliterature societies, the most privileged research object of Claude Levi-Strauss's anthropology, are indeed societies with a population small enough that their social organisation is based on concrete interactions between individuals, in which kinship is the most fundamental relationship (Levi-Strauss 1975, 3). The nonliterature societies were theoretically classified, for the first time in his essay *The Place of Anthropology in the Social Sciences*, as societies of authenticity, or authentic societies. The structural anthropology of Levi-Strauss is indeed "essentially concerned with those forms of social life—of which the so-called primitive societies are merely the most readily identifiable and most developed examples—whose degree of authenticity is estimated according to the scope and variety of the concrete relations between individuals" (Levi-Strauss 1963, 369). In this respect, this social type is the opposition of "unauthentic societies", which are modern. Our unauthentic societies are maintained through indirect interaction, forcing individuals to pass through various indirect forms of communication (books, photographs, press, radio, etc.), where its central aspect is written documents (Levi-Strauss 1963, 366). The relationships between individuals of such societies, thus, were necessarily loose and lack of autonomy. The modern media were forced to appear to produce the fake gap between these unauthentic contacts (Levi-Strauss 2013, 27).

However, the development of anthropology in the 20th century, in which Claude Levi-Strauss's methodology stressed a fundamental aspect, overlapped with the disappearance of these authentic

societies and their most distinctive features. This threat has been raised since 1908 when James Frazer gave the world's first lecture on social anthropology. From 1900 to 1950, nearly 90 tribes disappeared from the Brazilian border. In the same 50 years, 15 languages vanished in South America. In the 1960s, only 30 isolated tribes existed in Brazil. These societies were becoming increasingly similar to unauthentic Western societies. Before such communities disappeared, scholars needed to document aspects of their social life. Written documents, however, still need to be included. He numbered 4.000 to 5.000 such societies that have existed and are recorded (Levi-Strauss 1975, 125-26)

The structural anthropology, or structuralism of Claude Levi-Strauss faced this difficulty and, therefore, would extend its research object to the degrees of authenticity within modern societies. "Modern societies are, of course, not completely 'unauthentic'" (Levi-Strauss 1963, 367). Structuralist anthropologists could carefully identify levels of authenticity in some specific domains. These new objects allow them to rediscover their familiar realm when studying a village or an isolated neighbourhood in a rural area or a town, especially in non-Western nations, where everyone knows each other. It is, however, opposed to authentic society in its fundamental mode of organisation. The second is traditional and pure, based on kinship systems, while the first is a relatively recent invention of the modern world, "islands strewn across the surface of a vaster entity" (Levi-Strauss 2013, 29).

Case Study of His Formation of Five Elementary Structures of Kinship

On this foundation, Levi-Strauss posited that structuralist anthropologists could place themselves on the same footing as modern linguists. When studying kinship terms, for example, the anthropologist identifies phenomena analogous to phonemes, applying the same methodological approach. A kinship term, therefore, cannot be considered in isolation but must be understood

as a meaningful element within the broader system of kinship terms. This perspective illuminates the analysis of kinship structures as a distinctive social phenomenon within Levi-Strauss's anthropology.

He methodologically narrowed the structural analysis of kinship to the basic form of kinship in authentic societies, as distinguished in his 1986 lectures. These societies typically aim to maintain a simple organisation by reproducing a small population, living in a small area, lacking writing, and forming relationships through marriage. The position of society is determined within the interwoven kinship system. The researcher suggests that this system can be strictly and directly observed from the outside. From the ethnographic data, the Levi-Straussian anthropologist can abstract the phenomenon of kinship in such societies into a mechanical model, where the elements constituting the abstract model correspond to the scale of actual phenomena. Moreover, they have the advantage of observing these phenomena from the outside, as they are fundamentally opposed to similar phenomena in modern societies. The fundamental relationship between individuals in primitive societies is direct and concrete, while in modern societies, individuals are maintained in a myriad of indirect, mediated, and loose ways. Writing is the central factor mediating interpersonal relations in modern societies, as opposed to the non-writing status maintained in these other types (Levi-Strauss 2013, 14).

He analysed ethnographic data on marriage from five actual matrilineal and patrilineal societies in his essay "Structural Analysis in Linguistics and Anthropology", first published in 1945 and later added to the 1958 collection. These five societies were: 1) the Trobriands, in the New Guinea archipelago, southwest Pacific; 2) the Cherkess, now part of Russia; 3) the Siuai, also in the New Guinea archipelago; 4) the Tonga, in Polynesia, South Pacific; and 5) the Lake Kubutu, also in New Guinea. Levi-Strauss (1969, xxiii) defined the notion of the elementary structures of kinship as "systems in which the nomenclature permits the immediate determination of the circle of kin and that of affines, that is, those systems which prescribe marriage with a certain type of relative, or

alternatively, those which, while defining all members of the society as relatives, divide them into two categories, *viz.* possible spouses and prohibited spouses". In the above essay, he limited the scope of his analysis to the rule of a possible marriage.

First, he abstracted from ethnographic data the essential elements of kinship that function as part of the most basic form that makes kinship possible (Levi-Strauss 1963, 46). These essential elements of kinship include four characters: wife, husband, brother or younger brother of the wife, and the child born from the marriage. Second, he sketched a mechanical model to describe the marriage organisation based on the four basic units mentioned above, including four basic relationships: i) between wife and husband, ii) between father and son, iii) between wife and her younger or older brothers, and iv) between child and his uncle. Third, he considered one aspect of the possible marriage structure: the system of attitudes between members based on the four basic relationships. Attitudes, according to him, are divided into two categories: positive and negative, denoted by "+" and "–". Fourth, this mechanical model met the stringent requirements to become a structure that would allow the Lévi-Straussian anthropologist to develop formulas with meaning not only for the community under study but also for every future observer (Levi-Strauss 1975, 2). Finally, he abstracted the rules of attitude related to possible marriages into a schema from which the reader can immediately understand the three invariant characteristics.

First, there is always a balance between negative and positive emotions among the four relations in the basic form of marriage. This balance in the distribution of feelings is not a conscious moral activity, but an unconscious rule operating in nonliterature society. In the basic structure of a viable marriage among the patriarchal Trobriands living in the Southwest Pacific, the relationship between husband and wife and father and child is positive. However, the relationship between the wife and her brother, and between the son and the mother's brother, is negative. The system of feelings in marriage among the patriarchal Cherkess people living in the

territory of Russia is quite different from that of the Trobriands. The father-mother and father-son relationships are negative and hostile, while the relationship between the mother and her brother, and between the mother's brother and the son, is very positive. From this, he introduces the second constant: there cannot be the same kind of attitude between i) husband—wife and wife—her brother, and ii) father—son and son—the mother's brother. Third, the above two rules are invariant and universal for all simple and feasible ways of organising marriage in primitive societies. In other words, they operate unconsciously and independently of the misclassification of societies as primitive based on matrilineal and patrilineal organisations (Levi-Strauss, 1963, 46-7).

Conclusion

From this outline, the methodological rigour and ambition of Levi-Straussian structural anthropology—or structuralism—become evident. Its ultimate goal is to establish formulas and codes that translate the specific experiences of societies into a framework comprehensible to all possible observers across different cultures. However, this ambition was constrained by the limited scope of empirical data it could accommodate, ultimately failing to capture the full richness and diversity of human experience (Lévi-Strauss & Massenzio 2001, 422).

His structural analysis of kinship, which I previously discussed as a case study, should have incorporated the extensive ethnographic material on economics and religion—both crucial in non-literate societies. Lévi-Strauss himself acknowledged these limitations, attributing them to the demands of methodological rigour. In a 1970s interview with younger theorists, he reflected:

> "My generation was basically concerned with introducing a bit of rigour into our disciplines; consequently, when studying phenomena, we tried to limit the number of variables to be considered (…). Following the teachings of Mauss and Malinowski, we knew that economics, kinship, and religion were related,

but we were unable to work out this relationship in detail" (Lévi-Strauss, Augé, Godelier 1976, 51).

Lévi-Strauss (1963, 378) often likened structural anthropologists, with their methodological rigour, to "astronomers of the social sciences." Their task, he explained, was to provide "an overall view—one reduced to a few schematic outlines, but which those indigenous to the culture would be incapable of attaining because they are located too close to it" (Lévi-Strauss 2013c, 7).

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