

(BIO)POLITICS & (BIO)POWER:  
RECONFIGURING MICHEL FOUCAULT’S “DISPOSITIFS” FOR  
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH

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**Abstract:** The term “biopolitics” exemplifies the fluidity of scientific concepts when granted epistemic autonomy, adapting to diverse academic and public discourses. It has been widely—often imprecisely—employed across disciplines such as philosophy, political science, sociology, history, medicine, and gender studies, leading to a fragmented and highly contested conceptual landscape. This paper seeks to recover Michel Foucault’s original articulation of biopolitics, focusing on his dispersed and indirect treatment of the term. Foucault’s work serves as the foundation for applying the prefix “bio” to notions of politics and power, though his archaeological and genealogical approach has since been appropriated across various fields. The interdisciplinary expansion of biopolitics has necessitated a hermeneutical reassessment of its role within Foucault’s broader theoretical project, particularly in relation to biopower. This study aims to clarify these concepts and their epistemic significance.

**Keywords:** biopolitics, biopower, control, Foucault, normalization, population

## INTRODUCTION

In *Histoire de la sexualité: La volonté de savoir* (1976), Michel Foucault approached, for the first time, “biopolitics”<sup>1</sup> as a technique of power. In the premodern era, the main privilege of the sovereign was the right to decide between the life and the death of its subjects, although this privilege was restricted to the instances where the

sovereign itself (or its power) was under threat. As Rabinow and Rose (2006, 196) suggest, “This was the juridical form of sovereign power—the right of a ruler to seize things, time, bodies, ultimately the life of subjects”. This modality of power remained mainly unchanged when the object of sovereignty shifted from the head of state (usually the monarch or a similar title) to the state as an institution. However, Foucault also argued that this specific exercise of power became merely one among various mechanisms and techniques to discipline, control, monitor, organise, and optimise the social body underneath the sovereign entity. As wars (especially external wars) became more common and bloody, they were no longer waged in the name of the sovereign, but in the name of the social body and its survival:

Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilised for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival.<sup>2</sup> (Foucault, 1976)

For Foucault, power is now being exercised at the level of life under a bipolar technology. One pole of (bio)power<sup>3</sup> mainly focuses on the anatomo-politics of human life (especially the body), intending to maximise its productivity and enhance the efficiency of the body. The other pole is composed of regulatory controls focused on a human body imbued with the mechanisms of life such as birth, mortality and longevity (Rabinow & Rose 2006).

The concept of “biopolitics” acquired a fluid character that forces any research carried out under its label to encompass a varied range of topics in different scientific areas. Foucault himself is somewhat vague and imprecise in the employment of the term. Foucault first introduced the term in *Il faut défendre la société* (1975-6),

where he addresses issues such as birth rate and the policies which intervene upon it, the illnesses that are prevalent in a given population (which require measures and intervention to minimise their consequences), the problems of old age, among other issues. As such, “biopolitics” is usually understood as an umbrella-term to identify all strategies and technologies over the problematizations of collective human life, types of knowledge and regimes of authority, while also addressing their desirability, legitimacy and efficiency.

As a new form of government composed of a novel set of power relations, biopolitics expresses dynamics of forces that are far different from those encountered in the premodern era. Foucault described this specific dynamic as the surfacing of multiple and heterogeneous powers of resistance and creation that question all exogenous regulatory mechanisms, technologies and institutions (Lazaratto 2002, 3). The new biopolitical *dispositifs*<sup>4</sup> are created once we begin asking ourselves:

What is the correct manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family (which a good father is expected to do in relation to his wife, children and servants) and of making the family fortunes prosper? How are we to introduce this meticulous attention of the father towards his family into the management of the State? (Foucault 1991, 92)

## BIOPOLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH

Authors such as Rabinow and Rose (2006) propose that any discourse on biopolitics must address three main elements. Firstly, there must be at least one truth discourse about the vital character of the human body and an authority considered competent enough to create that discourse. These discourses are not necessarily biological *stricto sensu*, as they may hybridise with fields such as demographics and sociology. Secondly, it is necessary to portray different strategies for intervention upon the collective body (usually in the name of “health”), addressed to the population and, most times, with specific technologies that subdivide the population

into categories of gender, ethnicity, sex, among other criteria. Finally, biopolitics should approach modalities of subjectification, where the individual body (as a part of a collective entity) is brought to work on himself, scrutinised by authority and truth-discourses. This work is usually implemented with practices that focus on the “self”, in the name of self-improvement, or in the name of collective health and survivability.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that Foucault’s analysis is mainly historical. He approached the creation of new forms of power in the eighteenth century, how they transformed in the nineteenth century, and how different contemporary socio-political structures and institutions began to take shape at the end of the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, strategies, technologies and rationalities of (bio)power deeply changed, as collective life (and its management) became the main focus of the state, leading to different configurations of power and truth regarding welfare, security and health (Donzelot 1979; Ewald 1986).

In research focused on historical-social issues, biopolitics has been used as an epistemic framework for the principles and methods of management of the human population in areas such as public health and hygiene, sexuality, gender, birth and death rates, etc. (Rose, 2007). In political science and analysis, the concept provided experts with another tool to grasp how power has been reconceptualised as the *de facto* form of control over bodies in contemporary societies, something which can be seen in the works of Hardt and Negri (2000, 2009). In (bio)life and (bio)medical sciences, biopolitics has frequently been praised for its potential to unshackle bioethical discourses from their decision-oriented essence and contextualise them under a larger historical, contingent, and epistemological *milieu* (Lenke 2011). Finally, in the field of philosophy, Foucauldian biopolitics has exponentiated the possibilities for new discourses and analyses on the human condition, especially the ones that address the questions of sociality, human agency, morality and behaviour regarding the physical and mental vulnerability of the human being, as well as its bodily

constitution, which one can observe in Agamben's works (1998, 2005).

There are legitimate questions that one can ask regarding the potential over- stretching of the use of "biopolitics" as an epistemic approach, undermining its descriptive, analytical and explanatory abilities. It is not far-fetched to argue that, when a given concept is presented under varying (and, occasionally, somewhat contradictory) meanings, its instrumental use as a powerful analytical tool diminishes. In the instance of the use of the term "biopolitics", the vast appeal for an interdisciplinary use can overextend the epistemic value of the concept, leading to an emptying of its meaning. In Esposito's book *Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy* (2008, 13-14), he argued that (biopolitics) "has opened a completely new phase in contemporary thought (...) and [made] the entire frame political philosophy emerge as profoundly modified", but also warned that "Far from having acquired a definitive order, the concept of biopolitics appears to be traversed by an uncertainty, by an uneasiness that impedes every stable connotation".

But how should one react to the warnings posed by Esposito? First of all, it is important to take note that most academic debates on the subject of biopolitics can trace back its origins to the Foucauldian project (even though the term was originally coined in 1905, but under a very different use<sup>5</sup>). However, Foucault's importance mainly lies in the influence that his historically contingent approach had on current biopolitical theories and approaches, where (radical) contingency and ahistoricism became commonplace in biopolitically inclined academics.

Beyond merely considering the Foucauldian project as a sort of unquestioned authority over the subject, one should face Foucault's project as a heuristic gateway to demonstrate how historically informed research, within which biopolitical analyses can be used, should be employed as an epistemic approach to reinterpret and reconstruct a given phenomenon. The Foucauldian approach proposes more than a standardised definition of the "biopolitical"; it has the potential to present how the concept of "biopolitics" can

be drawn upon in academic discourse (while avoiding loose and/or extrapolated meanings) and be instrumentalised as a fundamental part of a multiscopic analysis under the framework of a genealogically-focused problematization of current phenomena.

#### BIOPOLITICS AND BIOPOWER APPLIED

The subject of biopolitics emerged during Foucault's more genealogically-oriented work in the 1970s as a complementary analytical tool for theoretical and historical analysis, particularly on topics such as power relations and social power. Foucault's research, however, only indirectly approaches a definitive description of biopolitics.

Power grasps human life as the object of its manifestations; as such, Foucault focuses on determining how life resists it. If life can resist (bio)power, then it can also create modes of subjectification and practices/technologies in order to escape from its control (Lazzarato 2002, 1). Consequently, Foucault proposes a new ontology based on the introduction of the role of life in history, one that focuses on the body and how it can be controlled, shaped and improved. This proposal portrays the political subject as a deeply ethical one, in sharp contrast with Western tradition that portrays it as a subject of law and as a citizen.

Instead of starting from the ramifications of obedience and its legitimating structures, institutions and practices, Foucault approaches the question of power through its relationship with freedom and possibilities of transformation within every exercise of power. Powered by a new ontology, Foucault is able to provide a project which protects the subject's freedom to establish a deep connection with itself and others – something that, for him, constitutes the elemental feature of ethics (Lazzarato 2002, 2).

In *Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison* (1975), Foucault approached the reorganisation of the mechanisms and institutions of imprisonment in the modern age. But more than simply

providing a socio-historical theoretical analysis of the massive changes that occurred in penal systems throughout Europe, Foucault focused on illustrating how the significant rational and cultural shifts initiated the rise of the prison as the paradigmatic institution of imprisonment. This rise was, as Foucault pointed out, catalysed by the shifting nature of the relationship between power and the human body (Takács 2017). Prisons, as the quintessential institutions of the penal system, were the representatives of a new technology of power, with the explicit aim of disciplining and “correcting” the mental and physical behaviour of “deviant” subjects, under a new organisation of rationality and power that had the human body as its main locus. Foucault then traced parallelisms between prisons and other places: “Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?”<sup>6</sup> (Foucault 1975). The major conclusion of his research was to address the emergence of “discipline” as the fundamental form of power and subjectification in modern societies.

One should note, however, that this analysis of a new manifestation of power does not necessarily address the topics of domination, oppression or political rule enacted via legislation, coercion or manipulation. For Foucault, there is more to power than for it to be a simple instrument of the ruling class in a given society. Power manifests itself “(...) in terms of normalisation, rationalisation, institutionalisation, control, subjectivation and embodiment connected to the social life of concrete individuals and communities. (Takácsn2017, 6). As such, Foucault approached power as a way of rationalising, shaping and, more importantly, he identified its use as a powerful tool to discipline the human body and mind, which find themselves deeply entrenched in the socio-political relations of production, administration and organisation, family ties and their structure, sexual and emotional relations, etc. The Foucauldian concept of power goes beyond what is understood as the orthodox sphere of the political; power is, instead, fluid, institutionalized and socialised.

Under this Foucauldian framework, the concept of biopolitics is intrinsically related to that of “biopower” – a specific setup for power relations. In *Sécurité, territoire, population* (1978), Foucault defined the concept as:

(...) the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from the eighteenth century, modern Western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species. This is roughly what I have called bio-power<sup>7</sup>.

The implementation of new forms of power and knowledge was not, however, a mere consequence of an unprompted historical reconfiguration, nor something that merely happened in a given society. Biopower was a product of society itself, not just an unguided social process. For Foucault (2003, 2007), “biopower” addresses a new type of rationality – composed of different calculations, conceptualisations, and decisions – which target the biological aspects of a given society. The primacy of this type of power in eighteenth-century Europe led to a substantial shift in how knowledge was constituted and operated. To Foucault (1976):

Western man was gradually learning what it meant to be a living species in a living world, to have a body, conditions of existence, probabilities of life, an individual and collective welfare, forces that could be modified, and a space in which they could be distributed in an optimal manner. For the first time in history, no doubt, biological existence was reflected in political existence<sup>8</sup>.

Authors such as Tákacs (2017) identify three main scopes of problematisation in Foucault’s approach to biopolitics: strategy, social rationality and political practice in modern societies. The first scope – strategy – pertains to a new type of body in which power operates. Starting in the premodern period, “*the anatomy politics of the human body*”<sup>9</sup> (Foucault 1976) shaped the nature of power over the biological in most societies. This type of politics had the explicit aim of disciplining, training and perfecting individual bodies to their maximum potential:



(...) [anatomy politics] centred on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimisation of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls, all this was ensured by the procedures of power that characterised the disciplines<sup>10</sup>. (Foucault 1976, 187)

More often than not, bodily potential was equated to maximising productivity in various systems of social, cultural, economic and political control. In the modern era, another type of strategic power rose – the “*biopolitics of the population*”<sup>11</sup> (Foucault, 1976). Biopolitics abandoned the focus on the individual body as a living being; instead, it focused on incorporating the individual body as a member of a collective known as human society. Bodies became political subjects in a collective entity impacted by bio- social conditions of living, namely “(...) propagation, birth and mortality, level of health, life expectation and longevity, along with all the conditions that can cause these to vary.”<sup>12</sup> (Foucault 1976). By analysing the specific conditions in which human societies exist, biopolitics conceived the (collective) human body as a *locus* of power relations that ought to be optimised.

The second scope of problematization – social rationality – portrays the “invention” of the notion of population as the object of political technologies that resulted in a brand-new way of exercising power over bodies. While the individual body was targeted by discipline, biopolitics targeted collective bodies at the social level through technologies of control. This “control” was not, however, necessarily oppressive. Foucault (2003) argued that the population, as a socio-political collective entity, was fundamentally incapable of being organised through disciplinary means, taking into consideration that conditions such as public hygiene, fertility or mortality depend on long- term policies enacted by political authorities or are mainly outside the scope of government (epidemics, famine, among others). Biopolitical control over a population requires the use of mechanisms “such as classification, regulation, prevention, provision, and maintenance of security” (Takács 2017, 8). However, these mechanisms are quite distinct

from the coercive policies used in the premodern era. Consequently, sovereign power was abandoned in favour of a new liberal form of “governmentality”.

Lastly, the third scope of problematization – political practices – pertains to the constitution of knowledge under the framework of biopolitics. If the refocus on a new concept of “population” required tools to control it, then biopolitics, as a socio-political strategy, became dependent on novel techniques of social classification, calculation and organisation (Foucault 2007). It is important to note that the “population” only became a political issue once the techniques necessary to measure, calculate and control it were developed. This way, new knowledge - social, political, cultural and economic – emerged, with fields such as demography, statistics and political economy becoming commonplace in a government’s efforts to control and manage their population (Takács 2017, 9). In order to prevent epidemics and famines, the fields of medicine and biomedical sciences experienced vast improvements, leading to an increase in the quality of life of the population. Nonetheless, contrary to the premodern era, where medicine was mainly focused on the individual body, the medical sciences of the modern biopolitical era focused mainly on the collective population, using techniques such as vaccination and birth control to become a vital modality of socio-political intervention.

#### BIOPOLITICAL NORMALISATION

The modern (and contemporary) status of biopolitics applied to the (collective) body is inseparable from the different manifestations of power within a given society. Integrative and symbiotic epistemic tendencies have become commonplace in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, aiming at normalising collective social subjects and the structures and institutions which surround and shape their lives. Rabinow and Rose (2006) argued that the tendencies associated with the contemporary understanding of biopower have manifested themselves in

normative mental and physical standards, backed up by the implementation of governmental policies addressing health, family affairs, gender, and consumption habits, among others. There is an argument to be made that the contemporary understanding of biopolitics and biopower is intrinsically connected to the role of power as a protective force for the population (Esposito 2011). The effects of biopower are also present in the various ways by which (political) authority, agency and legitimacy are intertwined in the current socio-political landscape (Agamben 1998).

For Lazaratto (2002), biopolitics can be understood as a trinity between government, population and political economy that refers to a novel dynamic of forces which creates a new dynamic between ontology and politics. This new political economy shares similarities with Marx's approach to the problem of how we should coordinate the relationships between men (since they are living beings), while also taking into consideration that this issue, more than a simple economic problem, is mainly an ontological one. Nonetheless, Foucault also clearly distances himself from Marx by faulting Marx and his political economy for reducing all relations between forces to mere relations between capital and labour (making them the source of all social dynamics and power relations), while also making these relations binary and symmetrical. In Foucauldian terms, political economy is:

(...) the whole of a complex material field where not only are natural resources, the products of labour, their circulation and the scope of commerce engaged, but where the management of towns and routes, the conditions of life (habitat, diet, etc.), the number of inhabitants, their life span, their ability and fitness for work also come into play. (Lazaratto 2002, 4)

As such, political economy – as the syntagma of biopolitics – is composed of power *dispositifs* that catalyse the power relations between the forces that permeate the social body, as an opposition to the Marxist perspective of a relationship between capital and labour.

In contemporaneity, the main political problem is the decentralisation of sovereign power. Forces now create and repress each other, stemming from different sources and are constantly fighting for supremacy in an arena full of contestants. Every relation between human beings (master-student, employer-worker, doctor-patient, among others) is a relation between different forces that always involves a power relation. For Foucault, power is constituted from the bottom; as such, if we aim to understand the constitution of power *dispositifs*, then we must employ an ascending analysis of power. Biopolitics becomes, then, “(...) *strategic coordination of these power relations in order to extract a surplus of power from living beings.*” (Lazaratto 2002, 5). It becomes a strategic relation, much more than the simple act of legislating and legitimating sovereignty. Concurrently, biopower, as soon as it begins operating on the grounds of control and coordination, is not truly the source of power, but merely its manager.

Biopower targets a power that does not belong to it, taking into consideration that it is an externality. However, we should not interpret Foucault’s analysis of power as a succession of different power *dispositifs*: the biopolitical approach is not a replacement for sovereignty; it merely displaces the function of the *dispositif* and questions its foundations:

Accordingly, we need to see things not in terms of the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a disciplinary society and the subsequent replacement of a disciplinary society by a society of government; in reality, one has a triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism, the apparatuses of security. (Foucault 1991, 102)

Normalization of bodies and the protection of (human) life propagated through the use of biopower, creating a separate element of its presence, which spreads through whole society, However, contrary to the disciplinary society, where the exercise of power usually had an exogenous origin, in biopolitical contemporaneity, power is exercised endogenously, with subjects

adopting behaviours of self-control and adherence to “normal” standards. The main element of the socio-political effect of current biopower is the predominance of the “self” as its primary target of control techniques (Rose, 2007). Some results of these new strategic exercises of power can be recognised, for example, by the growth of obsessions over the “healthy” body, the individualisation of mental issues encompassing non-normative subjects and the dissemination of biomedical inputs in socialised bodies and lives.

The “self” is presented as the *locus* where (bio)power acts, emanating a power from the body which is in a relationship with itself, leading to a specific interpretation of a way of living that must adhere to normatively established standards. Failing to comply with these standards leads to a self-modification of body and mind in order to return to the fold of the “normal”. Nonetheless, the “self” does not act alone, as it is still necessary to deploy the socio-political strategies and techniques aimed at catalysing the change within the “self” (Takács 2017). More than simply reinforcing the dichotomy between “normal” and “abnormal”, the operation of biopower - by making the “self” dependent on the evaluation of what it means to be “normal”- also interplays with the need for self-expression and self-repression.

It is important to note that bodies are now necessarily trapped in *dispositifs* of power; (bio)power is not a unilateral relation, nor the apex of domination over the body – it is a strategic relation. Every single actor in a given society exercises power, some of which courses through the living body, not because of its omnipotence, but because every force is constituted by a power within the body. Since power comes from below, then the forces that constitute it must be various and heterogeneous. Biopower is not coercion or oppression, but a coordination between a multitude of forces. But how can a body resist such a complex operation of power?

Under the restraints of this modality of power, the only way a subject can be said to be free is if there always exists the possibility of changing the situation. (Bio)Power relations do not mean that the subject is always trapped, but that he is always free, since the

possibility for change is ever-present. According to Foucault (1997, 167):

(...) if there were no resistance, there would be no power relations. Because it would simply be a matter of obedience. You have to use power relations to refer to the situation where you're not doing what you want. So resistance comes first, and resistance remains superior to the forces of the process; power relations are obliged to change with the resistance. So I think that resistance is the main word, the key word, in this dynamic.

Concordantly, the subject who aims to resist (Foucault frequently labelled these subjects as minorities), to whom the relation between resistance and creation is a matter of political survival, must not only defend himself, but, more importantly, affirm himself by creating new forms of life, culture and political tools.

#### CONCLUDING REMARKS

Conceptually, “biopolitics” is a particularly plastic term that has been applied to a number of different theoretical approaches. The biopolitical framework opened a gateway for ground-breaking analyses in the socio-political manifestations of what can be described as the biological and bodily aspects of human societies. Michel Foucault's work allowed a multiplication of philosophical, empirical, historical, social and political research methods, approaches and theories, as it developed new tools to understand the socio-political reality of the human body and life.

As early as the 1970s, Foucault pointed out that the human body would be the epicentre of novel political battles and economic strategies (Lazzarato 2002), with new *dispositifs* of power and knowledge starting to grasp life and the self, while enabling the possibility of controlling and shaping them. In order to provide a diagnosis of a historical *dispositif*, one should remember that three key elements serve as the epistemic framework: knowledge of life processes, the subjectification of human beings by endemic power-

relations and the technologies of subjectification through which the subjects self-control themselves. The works of Foucault should be continued by modern academics with special emphasis on the fragmented line between forces which create and forces which resists. The Foucauldian approach allows us to conceive the reversal of (bio)power and the art of governing as a field of production of new forms of life and resistance.

## NOTES

1. In French, *biopolitique*.
2. Original quote: “Les guerres ne se font plus au nom du souverain qu’il faut défendre; elles se font au nom de l’existence de tous; on dresse des populations entières à s’entre-tuer réciproquement au nom de la nécessité pour elles de vivre. Les massacres sont devenus vitaux C’est comme gestionnaire de la vie et de la survie, des corps et de la race que tant de régimes ont pu mener tant de guerres, en faisant tuer tant d’hommes. Et par un retournement qui permet de boucler le cercle, plus la technologie des guerres les a fait virer à la destruction exhaustive, plus en effet la décision qui les ouvre et celle qui vient les clore s’ordonnent à la question nue de la survie” (Foucault 1976, 180).
3. In French, *biopouvoir*.
4. To Foucault, a “*dispositif*” is defined by the multitude of institutional, administrative and knowledge structures which interact with the social body (presenting rules, norms and regulations) that should be followed by that social body.
5. The term biopolitics was first presented by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén in his two-volume work *The Great Powers* (Gunnelfo 2015). Under Kjellén, the term was used to study what he designated as “civil war between groups” (involving the state, which Kjellén considered to be a quasi- biological organism) from a biological perspective (Lenke 2011).
6. Original quote: “Quoi d’étonnant si la prison ressemble aux usines, aux écoles, aux casernes, aux hôpitaux, qui tous ressemblent aux prisons?” (Foucault 1975, 229).
7. Original quote: “(...) l’ensemble des mécanismes par lesquels ce qui, dans l’espèce humaine, constitue ses traits biologiques fondamentaux va pouvoir entrer à l’intérieur d’une politique, d’une stratégie politique, d’une stratégie

générale de pouvoir, autrement dit comment la société, les sociétés occidentales modernes, à partir du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, ont repris en compte le fait biologique fondamental que l'être humain constitue une espèce humaine. C'est en gros ça que j'appelle, que j'ai appelé, comme ça, le bio-pouvoir" (Foucault 1978, 1).

8. Original quote: "L'homme occidental apprend peu à peu ce que c'est que d'être une espèce vivante dans un monde vivant, d'avoir un corps, des conditions d'existence, des probabilités de vie, une santé individuelle et collective, des forces qu'on peut modifier et un espace où on peut les répartir de façon optimale. Pour la première fois sans doute dans l'histoire, le biologique se réfléchit dans le politique" (Foucault 1978, 187).
9. Original quote: "(...) anatomo-politique du corps humain" (Foucault 1976, 183).
10. Original quote: "(...) a été centré sur le corps comme machine: son dressage, la majoration de ses aptitudes, l'extorsion de ses forces, la croissance parallèle de son utilité et de sa docilité, son intégration à des systèmes de contrôle efficaces et économiques, tout cela a été assuré par des procédures de pouvoir qui caractérisent les disciplines" (Foucault 1976, 182-183).
11. Original quote: "(...) une bio-politique de la population" (Foucault 1976, 183).
12. Original quote: "(...) la prolifération, les naissances et la mortalité, le niveau de santé, la durée de vie, la longévité avec toutes les conditions qui peuvent les faire varier" (Foucault 1976, 183).

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