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HOW THE LEGACY OF LENINISM STILL STRUCTURES THE  
INTELLECTUAL DEBATE IN FRANCE

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**Abstract.** It should be interesting to study here the moment when Louis Althusser, just before the “sixty-eight” period, poses the doctrinal return to Lenin as a precondition towards “theoretical anti-humanism”. This concept opens the way to ideas such as the “death of Man”, the ideological underpinning of trans-humanism, borderless, and transgender movements. It is necessary, therefore, to draw the theoretical path of this return, as happened to the detriment of this other model of theoretical explanation of history’s grammar, such as “social interaction” (which thinks the morphology of complex societies as a dynamic movement dialectically generated by the permanence of the so-called “social conflict”), and that it is possible institutional resolution, at least in a democratic regime.

**Keywords:** Lenin, Althusser, Bataille, Blanchot, Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze, Nietzsche

The interest in Nietzsche and Bataille was not a way to distance ourselves from Marxism or Communism. It was the only way to get to what we expected from Communism  
(Foucault 1966, 50)

We shall first establish the normative filiation, in apologetic shape, to Lenin, operated in France by Althusser in 1968 with *Lenin and Philosophy*<sup>1</sup>, and especially in *Marx & Lenin before Hegel*<sup>2</sup>. Derrida confirmed this in 1971, in *Positions*<sup>3</sup>. There will be also seen the vicissitudes of this affiliation in Bataille, Blanchot, Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard. It is a question of empirically showing, through some texts, how this filiation could have been practised there.

The French filiation is very different, even opposed in some ways to the German one, operating from Adorno to Honneth via Habermas. These critical and interactionist positions are different from the hypercritical negativist ones, like those belonging to the first. The French concept of “domination”<sup>4</sup>, for instance, is perceived by Honneth and Habermas as “behaviorist”<sup>5</sup> style in contrast with “social interaction”<sup>6</sup> (as the root of “social conflict” in that it establishes in permanence new practices favourable to the greatest number of people, since these one fight for this and not just stays in a passive way, as suggested by the French direction. According to the German filiation, the social struggle is reminiscent - in addition to the question of the permanence of structural problems in order to build a society, as Leo Strauss states (Strauss 1988, 39) - the Simmelian definition of the permanent conflict as a vector of all social forms; without forgotten that of Machiavelli's (conceived in the same line as Aristotle when it comes to speak about the very notion of *politeia* or belongings), when he states in his *Speeches on the first decade of Titus-Livius* that “the disunion of the Senate and the people has made the Roman Republic powerful and free” (Machiavelli 1980, 44).

The althuserian filiation to Lenin can be seen as a return to the frame genuine of 17 October (Althusser, *Thesis 7*), observed already in 1963 within the PCF (*French Communists Party*) elite, for example in the French theorist journal *Pensée*, where Roger Garaudy is accused by Althusser as fomenting a “humanist deviation from Marxism”<sup>7</sup>.

This is also established in the context opened by the *Khrushchev Report* (1956), exclusively charging Stalin, as well as the creation of the Berlin Wall (1961) and the beginning of the so-called Maoist cultural revolution (1966), without to forget the strengthening of Castroism and Sovietism (or “scientific socialism”) in Africa (in Algeria, for example, with Ben Bella and Boumediene) and finally the Eurocommunism of the PCI (the so call *aggiornamento*, in 1972). A whole environment, which Garaudy also relates it in a note to the PCF's PO, in 1965, stating that Althusser and his filiation refuse any

“historical compromise” embodied precisely in the “aggiornamento” of Eurocommunism (also affecting the PCE (Spanish), animated by Semprun and criticized by Garaudy, in his 1965’s *Note*).

Lenin was “a proletarian leader”, Althusser said (Althusser 1982, 15), confided this way during the meeting with the Executive Committee of the Third International (June 19, 1920), according to Frossard’s report:

There are profound differences between us on the conception of proletarian dictatorship. It is the most advanced fraction of the proletariat that becomes the state itself, against the bourgeoisie and against the least advanced part of the working class, including the reformists whom we treat as bourgeois ». (Verdier 1981, 36-37)

This debate is a permanent one. It is, for example, one of the keys to understand the split of 1920 within the French Section of the Workers International (SFIO), between the Blum-style legitimists and the pro-Bolshevik followers of the acceptance of the “21 conditions” dictated by the so-called “Third International”, in the sense that it is not a question of opposing the notion of “dictatorship of the proletariat”, as one might think, but of opposing the very idea of *taking power*. Is it a question of perfecting a morphological continuity - as defined by historical materialism, namely that the bourgeois stage should be over-passed, being unable in itself to overcome the objective contradictions of class clashes? Or is it a question of just taking power in order to replace just like that the “bourgeois class” (as Claude Lefort explains so well in *Complications: Communism and the Dilemmas of Democracy*, 1998<sup>8</sup>), by the so-called “proletarian class” (the Lenin “professional revolutionaries”, the “metaphysical race” in Nietzschean way)? But for what purpose, if the structural conditions are not reached to do so (as the Bolsheviks have well seen), and force the return to the market via the NEP, a return that Lenin slowly admitted to having to prolong? This is what Leon Blum deduced from it, as Robert Verdier reports in his book on the Congress of Tours<sup>9</sup>.

The problem of “replacement” remains relevant today for the *up to date* adepts of the French filiation, who are seeking to constitute a kind of “metaphysical race”. The notion of “race” coupled with that of “strength” is fundamental to Nietzsche (on which Foucault relies in the *exergue*). He writes this way:

(...) our desire, our very will of knowledge, is a symptom of monstrous decadence... We aspire, on the contrary, to what strong races, strong natures want - understanding is the end of something (...). (Nietzsche 1977, 167)

The notion of “race” next to that of “strong” must then be read in a political way. Heidegger sees also its metaphysical side:

Nor is the Will of Power biologically conceived, whereas it is much more ontologically conceived, the Nietzschean notion of race has no biological significance, but metaphysical significance. (Ibidem, 247)

And what is it to become an element of the “strong race”, in the metaphysical and political sense, concrete, practically, if not a god human becoming a “professional revolutionary” or the passage from “theory to practice”, as for Althusser when he tells, in his *Memoirs*, how he “governed” Ulm?

Hence the fact that it is not surprising to observe an Althusser reconnecting with Lenin (who knows his way around) and thus with the idea of the a priori separation between “revolutionaries” and “reactionaries”, which Althusser summarizes in his testamentary book (*The Future Lasts Long...*) when he analyses the function of the “Red Guards”:

The Marxist-Leninist *Cahiers*<sup>10</sup>, after a difficult start, were selling very well. I had given them, from the first issue, dedicated to the Cultural Revolution, which had just broken out, an unsigned article (whose authenticity I recognize here, after Rancière,) where I implemented a simple and false theory based on the principle: there are three forms of class struggle, the economic, the political and the ideological. They, therefore, require three separate organizations to conduct it. We know two of them: the union and the Party. The Chinese have just invented the third one: The Red Guards. It was a little simple, but it was pleasing (...).

The note published by Roger Garaudy (*supra*) in June 1965 on Althusser thus sheds light on the latter's strict affiliation with Lenin (*Thesis 7*) in the name of a “scientific” approach distinct from that advocated by the first, accused - according to him - of “humanist deviation from Marxism”. In this note, Garaudy observes that Althusser's relationship with “science” is very rigid and simplistic, referring to various discussions with Italians and Chinese. In fact, the “science” of which Althusser speaks is only framed by the Leninist-Marxist standard, as Garaudy indicates in his note.

It turns out that in the 1960s and 1970s, to *get out of phenomenology* (as Foucault points out<sup>11</sup>) was somehow *strategic*, especially in the midst of the Maoist cultural revolution which, to resume, claimed to be not only Lenin who died too soon, but also the purest and hard Leninist traces (following Marx and Engels) in the entire history of Western thought; a “break” between “idealists and materialists” (whereas they are only “moments” of the conceptual movement, as Hegel has repeatedly indicated). Why indeed Althusser relies this way on Lenin if not to find a theoretical model capable of self-generation, emancipating himself from the relationship both with reality and with the inter-subjectivity of scientists. Thus, Althusser relies in his lecture both on Lenin's *Materialism and Empirical Criticism*, as has been said on Dietzgen also, who keeps to distance “the philosophers” treated as “graduate minions”.

However (let's start with Derrida), it is precisely this “margin” (as in the title of Derrida's book) that holds the lines, in the sense that it allows the latter to rely on Althusser (an Althusser who considers Derrida a “giant” (Foucault 1994: 170, 174). This one indeed followed not only Althusser's return to Lenin, which *practised* philosophy politically (Althusser 1982: 18, 19) but tried, with *Tel Quel's* team (Hourmant 1996: 112-128) (including the Maoists Philippe Sollers, Julia Kristeva, Alain Badiou, etc.) to go even *further* than Lenin. This is what he states in *Positions* (Derrida 1972: 86-89). Derrida considers that absolute negativity must go so far as to deny this need for accountability. He even sees this lack of negativity in Lenin (*Ibided*, 86). Derrida, therefore, claims not only to follow

Lenin's "strategy" but to amplify it, by "reworking" the "rules". In what sense? That of the targeted negation for itself, which would extend to the whole of reality and to the very depths of the intimacy of language, even in its intimate and secret traces:

So the destruction of the discourse is not a simple neutralization of erasure. It multiplies words, precipitates them against each other, engulfs them also in an endless and bottomless substitution whose only rule is the sovereign affirmation of the meaningless game. Not the reserve or the withdrawal, the infinite murmur of a white word erasing the traces of the classical discourse but a kind of potlatch of signs, burning, consuming, wasting words in the gay affirmation of death: a sacrifice and a challenge.

*Note 1:* Play is nothing but an open and unreserved challenge to what opposes play" (Note on the margins of this unpublished Theory of Religion that Bataille planned to call "Dying with laughter and laughing with death. (Derrida 1967, 403)

This "position" is strategic. Because, at the same time, it is destroyed, it makes possible to be replaced by one which destroys it (as Lenin has shown); for instance, in the same movement, Derrida "deconstructs" but escapes the ruins of this absolute negativity, and becomes, at the same time, the positive reference framework for any sketch of negativity while saying the opposite, of course. It's not too far of Lenin's way:

The unity (coincidence, identity, equivalence) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle between mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, as is the development and movement." (Lenin 1973, 344).

What is preserved or denied as positive is therefore not a given determination, set aside, suspended or elevated in a synthesis, as in Hegel or Marx, but only the need to bind oneself to the opposite, it is the moment of "unity" in order to struggle then with it, to exclude it absolutely; it is precisely this struggle for life in a pure state (criticized by Horkheimer as a bourgeois moment, techniques of science, positivism reducing reason to instrumental logic (Horkheimer 1974), which is also defended by Nietzsche. What is

then preserved is only the “moment of the connection”: it serves only to trigger the movement in view of self-movement, since Lenin says it is the “negativity which is the internal pulsation of self-movement and life” (Lenin 1973, 135). And this is done in a concrete way. In Lenin, every concrete being is placed as a potential void if its mass contains a direction or density that does not correspond to the desired measure. This is indeed absolute subjectivism (“above the Begriff is the Idea”<sup>12</sup>), which tactically avoids “pure negation” because Lenin wants something real, sovereign power (but not as Derrida wants just spiritual power). Lenin wants to be the living principle that decides the appropriate reality. Without the sacred garment, however, which Stalin hastened to put on. Derrida will thus undermine this claim to extend negativity by extending her domain towards language (take a look on John R.Searle/Derrida controversy about Austin’s legacy<sup>13</sup> and the letter against Derrida's Honorary Degree in *The Times* (London) (Saturday, May 9, 1992<sup>14</sup>), towards also reason and social order in *itself*, and not this or that kind of rationality and social order.

Lenin, then. But not Stalin. While the last continues this first (Ellenstein 1984: 162, 171, 189), as Bataille pointed out (Bataille 1949: 183, 186, 198-199, 222):

The resolute disregard for individual interest, thought, convenience and personal rights was from the very beginning the result of the Bolshevik revolution. In this respect, Stalin's politics accuse the features of Lenin's but do not innovate it. The “Bolshevik firmness” is opposed to “rotten liberalism”. (...) In truth, marvellous mental chaos results from the action of Bolshevism in the world, and from the passivity, the moral non-existence, that it has encountered. But history may be the only one likely to put an end to it, by some military decision. We can only propose to look for the nature of this action, which disturbs the established order before our eyes, much more deeply than Hitler could have done. (...) If we are exhausted, only terror and exaltation allow us to escape the slackness. Without a violent stimulus, Russia could not get back on track. (...) It is cruel to desire the extension of a regime based on a secret police, the gagging of thought and many concentration camps. But there would be no Soviet camps in the world if a huge movement of human masses had not responded to an urgent need.

The same framework can be seen in Maurice Blanchot:

I would like to quote this text by Alexander Blok, the great poet of the Twelve, whom the October Revolution, however, frightened: “The Bolsheviks do not prevent us from writing verses, but they prevent us from feeling like a master; the one who carries within himself the pole of his inspiration, his creation and holds the rhythm is a master. (Blanchot 1971, 113-114)

And Blanchot, on whom Derrida (in *Parages, Spectres de Marx*) relies first and foremost, also writes this about “negation”:

He who stays with negation cannot use it. Who belongs to him, in this belonging can no longer leave him, because he belongs to the neutrality of absence where he is already no longer himself. This situation is, perhaps, despair, not what Kierkegaard calls "disease to death", but this disease where dying does not lead to death, where one no longer hopes in death, where death is no longer to come but is that who no longer comes” (Blanchot 1955, 125).

It is also in this sense that Gilles Deleuze uses the term “differential”. In its meaning, order, unity, self, or integrative support, exists only as “variation” (Deleuze 1968, 224) (roaming, random) of the permanent drift, the only accepted constant, the only “Idea” (in the sense of Lenin, *supra*) whose contortions then create “varieties” (of human being, for instance, such as various “queer” with “care values” in Foucault’s system, which is very near from Deleuze matrix, as Foucault often said). And these only exist for themselves in so far as they express the un(limited) in(defined)finite aspect of the mother matrix, that of permanent drift without ending, even the Dead, since we must (*sollen*) be already dead (according to Blanchot). This is also observed by Lyotard:

Where do you make your criticism from? Don't you see that criticizing is still knowing, knowing better? That the critical relationship is still inscribed in the sphere of knowledge, of “awareness” and therefore of empowerment? We must drift out of criticism. Much more: the drift is by itself the end of criticism. (Lyotard 1972, 15)

The *drift* is carried out by acting on it, by putting it in condition, such as the wave which needs an obstacle to refract because it is unable

to do so internally since there is no impetus or external-internal differentiation in Deleuze. There is no orientation, no hierarchy, no priority, no better or worse, there is only one thing, only one, the drift, knowing that there are no more shores, except that of dissolving - the supreme "Idea". For example, it is a question of posing at the beginning of any emotional series that exists an idea acting as a "pure element of potentiality" (Deleuze 1968, 227) without past or future, such as a matrix with frames without inside or outside, except the instant, and which possess the "first coefficient or first derivative", which will then determine "the other derivatives and consequently all the terms of the series resulting from the same operations" (*Ibidem*). This means, moreover, that it is not pleasure but the random triggering of desire in what it brings as a plane, form, click of clicks in (de)finite and repeated allowing the unlimited drift of the dissolved self in the generalized hallucination or the "I cracked" and the "dissolved self" (Deleuze 1968: 223, 332).

This is why Deleuze prefers Artaud to Carroll. What matters is, above all, the drift alone, and not what can trigger it as a primary element, as Lyotard said anyway (*supra*).

Thus, in a Sado-Maso experience (also highly prized by Foucault) at the borders of a strong opiate intake, apparently necessary to anaesthetize oneself, especially when it comes to seams and burns:

What is this masochist doing? He seems to imitate the horse, *Equus Eroticus*, but that's not it. The horse, and the master trainer, the mistress, are no more images of mother or father. It is a completely different question, an animal becoming essential to masochism, a question of forces. The masochist presents it this way: training axiom - destroy instinctive forces to replace them with transmitted forces (...). The renunciation of external pleasure, or its delay, its infinite distance, on the contrary, testifies to a conquered state where desire no longer lacks anything, fills itself with itself and builds its field of immanence. Pleasure is the affection of a person or a subject, it is the only way for a person to "find his way around" in the process of desire that overflows him; pleasures, even the most artificial, are reterritorializations. But precisely, is it necessary to meet again? (Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 191-194)

This is typically the very economy of what can be called "neo-Leninism". Because we do not see in this name that this process

would not enter into general equivalence with the rest, with what is transmitted at the same time by the blow: a way of being in the world, of being submissive, ordered, to go and haunt the *Château of masters* in “negation” (especially if they boast of being from the 1807’s vintage version of Blanchot), selling themselves as voluntary victims who believe they also command the process. Since they are already consenting, to what? To integrate the becoming “red guard” (as Blacks Blocs) in the Althusser way. How? By wishing to “libidinally” address boots and then gradually “destroy instinctive forces to replace them with transmitted forces” which, in the long run, make increasingly illusory to find one’s way around when it comes to politically fight these boots that we so psychophysically desire (as Blacks Blocs). Thus, for Foucault, Deleuze’s book *The Anti-Oedipus* is “the book” *par excellence* of the destruction of the self, reduced to a conjunctural and conjectural cluster of polarization of intensities. It is considered as a book of ethics, the “only book of ethics written for a long time” - Foucault wrote<sup>15</sup>. Do thus see that the Bolsheviks correspond perfectly to it, putting in shape this “new barbarity” of which Blanchot speaks, adds Bataille, their “marvellous mental chaos” (Bataille 1949, 186) and their “resolute disregard for self-interest, though, convenience and personal rights” (Ibidem, 183)?

In the end, it is a question of destroying oneself in order to prevent the body from using its power to organize itself in the world.

This is the artist’s last work: Brutus, who can become Orpheus if he knows how to handle the dagger of negation reduced to itself:

He who recognizes for his essential task the effective action within history, cannot prefer artistic action. Art acts badly and acts little. It is clear that if Marx had followed his childhood dreams and written the most beautiful novels in the world, he would have enchanted the world, but would not have shaken it. We must, therefore, write *Le Capital* and not *War and Peace*. We must not paint Caesar’s murder, we must be Brutus. These connections, these comparisons will seem absurd to the viewers. But, as soon as art is measured against action, immediate and urgent action can only prove it wrong, and art can only prove itself wrong. (Blanchot 1955, 284)

This is therefore where the Blanchotien-Bataillian (and therefore Foucault-Deleuziano-Lyotardo-Derridian) “communism” is located. Thus, a Brutus - the Blanchotian artist - is in the search of an “end” that would have “the heaviness of a new beginning” (*L’espace littéraire*, 330) like a knife wound which, unceasingly falls down and repeats itself. Since that which kills something unreal, unimportant, simple, anonymous real material of inspiration in order to exhale, to suck in endlessly, like a voracious spectrum whose image perceived in the eyes of the Eurydice is the only possible sceptre:

The basis of failure is the restarting of the experiment, not the fact that it is not successful. Everything always starts all over again - yes, once again, again, again, again. (Blanchot 1955: 331-332)

Or, how to scatter its melodies and other members in order, Blanchot said, to “repudiate also the principle of which the god is only the support and try to leave the circle where, since always, under his guard as under the guard of humanism, we remain locked in the fascination of unity” (Blanchot 1971, 85).

It would also seem that, when Bataille uses the notions of “acephalus” *i.e.* “not knowing” (as Nietzsche said, *supra*) and when Blanchot talks about Eurydice and Brutus, it seems that Bataille and Blanchot were trying to make France, after Russia, the permanent acephalon.

More generally, what appears in the French *intelligentsia* under fascist and Leninist influence is a kind of psychological and aesthetic preparation (well seen by Walter Benjamin (Hollier 1979, 586) when he observes Bataille and his group) to flight forward within the destruction of internal and external reason by justifying it by the anti-capitalist struggle. For Bataille et Blanchot, it is, therefore, necessary to have the strength to say no to the man of work, to his reason and needs, and, at the same time, yes, to force whatever comes forth.

Look now at Foucault. Let us start, for example, from Foucault’s fascination for Pierre Rivière’s speech, who explains, calmly,

without a wrinkle or a word underlined, not what he has done but what he has already written in the heart of reality, the a posteriori speech only reflecting on it to erase it:

We have here, however, a phenomenon of which I do not see any equivalents in the history of both crime and discourse: that is, a crime accompanied by such a strong and strange discourse that the crime ends up no longer existing, escaping, by the very fact of this discourse which is held on it by the person who committed it. (Foucault 1994, T. III, 98)

To imitate this, Foucault uses Borges' work, whose presence occupies the book *Les mots et les choses* (1966) from the first line of the *Pre/face* (before/face):

This book was born in a text by Borges. (...). This text quotes “a certain Chinese encyclopedia” where it is written that “animals are divided into: a) belonging to the Emperor, b) embalmed, c) tamed, d) suckling pigs, e) sirens, f) fabulous, g) dogs in freedom, h) included in this classification, i) which agitate like madmen, j) countless, k) drawn with a very fine brush of camel hair, l) and cætera, m) which break the crust, n) which from afar seem to be flies.

In the wonder of this taxonomy, what we reach with a leap, what, thanks to the apologist, is indicated to us as the exotic charm of another thought, is the limit of ours: the naked impossibility of thinking that. (...) This text by Borges made me laugh for a long time, not without certain unease and difficult to overcome. (Foucault 1966, 7)

Let us also observe that this text, which so amazes Foucault and which “made him laugh for a long time” is nevertheless, in the beginning, that of a Borges who, it seems, works as a literary writer and not as a sociologist or historian of the human sciences. In other words, this writer, Borges, seeks to bring together, even to the absurd (in the pataphysical sense of an Ionesco), the distance between words and things in various syntactic spins. This implies that “the naked impossibility of thinking” is not a naked impossibility if one thinks of its possibility in the context of poetics. What is surprising, however, is Foucault's astonishment.

As if he was wondering, at heart, whether it would be possible or not to think of this “naked impossibility” in a dressed, disguised way.

Indeed, if there is “the naked impossibility of thinking”, in the scientific framework where the book *Les mots et les choses* is located, it is possible to dress this nudity, there, with a *trompe l'oeil* scientific - here History - precisely to make the absurd real and the real absurd. Under these conditions, the result achieved allows the construction of a custom-made covering that gives the appearance of rigorous research but which has been made only to shape things (in Foucault’s words) and not in the real history of the sciences that he addresses in his book.

The habit, therefore, not only acts as a monk but, above all, becomes the only form of reality. Like these ghost ships which, seen from the distance, seem to be inhabited, there is even a man at the helm (inside, in fact), only one skeleton (that of a Borges-style classification) who remains the last work on the canvas of meaning. Thus, in *Les mots et les choses* Foucault seems like taking the word Borges: building a classification that, for example, artificially opposes the categories of representation and meaning or who so meticulously perceives, in the presence of an “organization” (Foucault 1966, 243) of science, a place in which “death prowls around” (*Ibidem*, p. 395). In short, Foucault transvestite in Borges will have to create a story, a fiction, in order to put it as a framework for “atopy”, “aphasia” (*Ibidem*, 10). What does this mean? Foucault, although he like Pierre Rivière (*supra*), writes beforehand what he will accomplish (like Lenin).

Indeed, the Foucauldian discourse seizes (as a Nietzschean member of the “metaphysical race”) upon the “fundamental codes of a culture” (Foucault 1966, 11) in order not to explain but to emerge as this culture itself (*Ibidem*, 396-397):

Thus, the last man is both older and younger than the death of God; since he has killed God, it is he himself who must answer for his own finiteness; but since it is in the death of God that he speaks, thinks and exists, his murder

himself is doomed to die; new, the same gods are already swelling the future Ocean; man will disappear. More than the death of God, -or rather in the wake of that death and according to a deep correlation with it, what Nietzsche's thought announces is the end of his murderer; it is the bursting of man's face in laughter, and the return of masks; it is the dispersion of the deep flow of time by which he felt carried and of which he suspected the pressure in the very being of things; it is the identity of the Return of the Same and the absolute dispersion of man.

Foucault thus floats like these “new gods” who “already inflate the future Ocean” by accomplishing this so-called “absolute dispersion of man” previously thought of by Althusser (who also quotes Foucault on this point in his testament book, *L'avenir dure longtemps*).

Let us also look at this other extract<sup>16</sup>, which will allow us to see how Foucault produces some too obvious traces of his *History of Madness*:

I was told that madness did not exist, whereas the problem was absolutely the opposite: it was a question of how madness, under the different definitions that could be given to it at one time, could be integrated into an institutional field that constituted it as a mental illness with a certain place alongside other diseases.

Thus, the question was how madness “could be integrated into an institutional field that constituted it as a mental illness”. It was, therefore, according to Foucault, “an institutional field” that “constituted” it as “mental illness”.

In other words, without this “institutional field”, madness would not be constituted as a mental illness. What would madness have been constituted as? Has “madness” thus constituted itself? Could madness think of itself? Foucault said: “I was told that madness did not exist, whereas the problem was absolutely the opposite”. If the problem is the other way around, could it mean that what exists as madness is not madness? If the problem is “absolutely opposed” to the fact that madness does not exist, therefore something exists, whose word is not madness in the sense of “mental illness”. Or does

Foucault presuppose that what is called “madness” is not, in fact, as such, so beyond the “constitutional field” that constituted it?

This is what he will say next since he will advance, and rather in retrospect, that for him it is rather a status, but he has not studied its medical aspect. Nevertheless, he pronounces himself on it both implicitly and quite explicitly by presupposing that the institution, the word, constitutes the thing, madness, as a mental illness whereas it is, for Foucault, quite another thing.

In short, under the pretext, in fact, that certain medical practices may have hastily categorized certain people as “crazy” when they were rather weakened, out of phase, etc., it does not follow that we must deny the morphological problems of personality dislocation beyond the word that claims to subsume the thing.

Unless an a priori arbitrary posit that this dislocation is as valid as a deepening of its unity and, even better, is preferable because it can thus perceive multiplicity as “acephalic” (Bataille) and thus avoid bourgeois accumulation, a premise of the liberal order is a question of drying up at its source. Now, this domination is what Foucault wants to fight against, at least if we want to eradicate the “General who is in us”, according to Deleuze’s words in *L’anti-Oedipe II* (Deleuze & Guattari 1980, 36).

At least that is what Foucault believes, whereas the consequences are frightening, including for others, since in the horizon of this “end of man” it is not certain that the “alternatives” envisaged by him will best suit this “end”:

It is often said that the definitions of the Islamic government are imprecise. On the contrary, they seemed very familiarly clear to me, but I must say, rather uncomfortable. These are the basic formulas of democracy, bourgeois or revolutionary, I said; we have not stopped repeating them since the 18th century, and you know what they have led to. But I was immediately answered: The Koran had stated them long before your philosophers and if the Christian and industrial West have lost their meaning, Islam will be able to preserve their value and effectiveness<sup>17</sup>.

Thus, what would not be very “reassuring” does not come from the much more totalitarian than communitarian essence of this so-called

“Islamic government” which claims, through “Islam”, to find “meaning”, but from the fact that “the definitions of the Islamic government” are “the basic formulas of democracy, bourgeois or revolutionary (...) we have not stopped repeating them since the 18th century, and you know what they have led to”.

What does this mean? Where did they “lead”? Undoubtedly towards the most “confinement”, “order”, in the official version of the Foucauldian word. While in Iran everyone is immersed in the joy of rediscovering the “meaning”.

Thus, this “destruction” resulting from Leninism and (vulgar) Nietzscheism and produced by the French filiation is, in fact, a kind of new totalitarianism, *i.e.* it is theoretically rectified in the sense that it is no longer a question of killing a race or a class but everything that in the human race would be similar to self-development, the supposed source of evil, and whose (“theoretical”) killing would be a proof of the work to be done to rise to the rank of the superhuman killer of God.

In this case, it is a question of an unlimited absolutism which nevertheless wants to be authentic, originating in its theoretical revolt, whereas in practice it is a question of the renewed yoke of this new “metaphysical race” resulting from the “professional revolutionaries” (appointed by the State as “organic intellectuals” such as Althusser at Ulm street in Paris, inside the famous Latin Quarter etc. etc.) for whom it is no longer a question of biology but of applying the “class struggle in theory”. The important thing is to know for which “class” this “struggle” is being carried out.

All depends on which step we have come. Like Blanchot said, Brutus killing Caesar, Orpheus killing Eurydice; is it better to write *War and Peace*, as Tolstoi? And this until a repetition without difference: Republic, language, thought, sex, everything must wander, error, (t)error. That of an empty, emptied, lifeless, bloodless, and high-speed “différance” (or permanent voluntary random) while remaining in a tremendous way, waiting maybe the new God (the very death of Man and his Freedom Right) in secret excitement. The postmodern deconstructivist way of life seems

opening up, more and more, mind and arms, at the pre-democratic, tyranny regime, while hypocritically denouncing it on the media network mainstream.

Leninism, in fact, never ends to “move away” from us only if we refuse this; who “we”?

#### NOTES

1. “Communication Presented to the French Society of Philosophy on 24-2-1968 and Reproduced with the Approval of its President, Mr Jean Wahl”, Small Maspero Collection (PCM), 1975 (2nd edition: 15,000 to 25,000 copies).
2. *Ibidem* (PCM 1975, 75-77, *Theses 1 to 7*). For example, *Thesis 7*, where Althusser not only explicitly refers to *Materialism and Empirical Criticism* but considers Lenin's work (1908, with the subtitle “Critical note on a reactionary philosophy.” Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1948) as containing “all” the theses counted on this subject (*Idem*, 76): “7 - The Marxist-Leninist revolution in philosophy consists in refusing the idealistic conception of philosophy (philosophy as “interpretation of the world”) which, as it always does, denies that philosophy expresses a class position, and in adopting in philosophy the position of proletarian class, which is materialist, thus establishing a new practice of philosophy, materialist and revolutionary, causing the effects of class division in theory. All these theses are contained, either explicitly or implicitly in *Materialism and Empirical Criticism*. I have done nothing but begin to explain them”. See also Louis Althusser, Etienne Balibar in *Lire le Capital*, editions FM, Small Collection Maspero, 1968, Book II, p. 80: “in the expression ‘historical materialism’, ‘materialism’ means nothing other than science, and the expression is strictly synonymous with ‘science of history’”.
3. “Interview with Jean-Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta”, published in *Promesse*, no. 30-31 (automne et hiver), 1971 (reprinted in 1972 as a collection – Paris: Midnight Editions), in particular pp. 86-88 (see also below for an analysis of this explicit affiliation to Althusser and Lenin).
4. “If, like Foucault, we only tolerate as a model the one provided (...) by the processes that lead to domination (...), then there is no chance that we can explain how continuous local struggles must be able to consolidate into institutional power. This is a problem from which Axel Honneth has energetically identified the ins and outs” (Habermas 1985, 340).
5. “Foucault’s argument, finally, contains certain elements that, coming from the opposite side, carry a raw behaviorism. Yet it is precisely they who will

- abound in the direction of a fundamentally mechanistic conception (...) The behaviour of human beings and, in particular, the physical manifestations of their lives are reduced to being only the matter to which the strategies of power at work are supposed to give form” (Honneth 2016, 231) (*see also p. 236.*
6. “If, however, Foucault had followed more consistently the path of his initial model of action, considering the existing forms of social domination as products of social confrontations (...), he could not have avoided giving social actors needs and convictions, these reasons therefore which, in general, are the only ones capable of triggering political resistance and thus social struggles” (Honneth 2016, 231-232). *See also p. 238.* Note also that Nicos Poulantzas defined “the State” as “the material condensation of a balance of power between classes and fractions of classes”, particularly in his latest book, *The State, Power and Socialism* (Paris: Les Prairies Ordinaires, 2013, p. 141). *See an interesting review in this regard:*  
<https://www.contretemps.eu/bonnes-feuilles-letat-pouvoir-socialisme-nicos-poulantzas>.
  7. *On Althusser. Additional Note of 01-06-1965 to the PCF Political Bureau on Certain Althusser theses*, p.1. <http://fr.calameo.com/read/001043762fd95f666d9a6>.
  8. <https://cup.columbia.edu/book/complications/9780231133005>.
  9. “(...) the distinction between a political revolution, whose sole purpose is the conquest of power, and a socialist revolution whose purpose is the radical transformation of society - methods of conquering power, universal suffrage and parliamentarism, dictatorship of the proletariat” (Verdier 1981, 23). Verdier’s *Note 1*: “this notion appears in the 1919 programme (...) relations between reforms and revolution”.
  10. <http://adlc.hypotheses.org/archives-du-seminaire-marx/cahiers-marxistes-leninistes/cahiers-marxistes-leninistes-n1>.
  11. “I know very well why I read Nietzsche: I read Nietzsche because of Bataille and I read Bataille because of Blanchot. So, it is not at all true that Nietzsche appeared in 1972; it appeared in 1972 in the speeches of people who were Marxists in the 1960s and who left Marxism through Nietzsche; but the first people who turned to Nietzsche did not seek to leave Marxism: they were not Marxists. They were looking for a way out of phenomenology” (Foucault 1994, 436-437).
  12. “The Begriff is not yet the highest notion; even higher is the Idea = the unity of the Begriff and the real (...)” (Lénine 1973, 159).
  13. <https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/rida-searle-deconstruction-and-ordinary-language>.
  14. <https://digressionsnimpresions.typepad.com/digressionsnimpresions/2016/03/the-letter-against-derridas-honorary-degree.html>.

15. *Preface* to the American edition of Deleuze-Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*. In *Dits et écrits* (F.1). Paris: Gallimard, 1977: 134 and following.
16. "L'éthique du souci de soi comme pratique de la liberté", entretien avec H. Becker, R. Fornet-Betancourt, A. Gomez-Müller in Foucault 1994, T. IV, 726.
17. "À quoi rêvent les Iraniens?" Paris, *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 1978, No. 727, repris in Foucault 1994, T. III, 692.

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## THE NEW MODES AND ORDERS OF DISRUPTION: WEB 3.0 AND REPUBLICAN RESILIENCE

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**Abstract.** The 2016 US Presidential election highlighted certain negative manifestations of Web 3.0 that points to sustained efforts at disruption as a political tool and a new kind of arbitrary interference aimed at undermining the prevailing culture and traditions of modern democratic nation-states. The growing importance of social media and the weaponization of big data and fake news signal that new forms of domination will be a significant challenge to democratic practices going forward. This paper explores these developments through the lens of republicanism and asks if this approach can offer an attractive way to address these threats. In particular, I argue that republicanism's focus on minimizing domination through its alternative conception of liberty contains a certain resilient form of antipower that serves to counter some of the arbitrary interferences that have emerged in the shift from Web 2.0 to 3.0.

**Keywords:** modern republicanism, Web 3.0, disruption, resilience, non-domination, social media

The plan of this paper is straightforward. First, I briefly sketch out the main tenants of modern republican political theory, highlighting its alternative conception of liberty. I then explore some of the aforementioned disruptive interferences facing modern nation-states. Finally, I return to the idea of modern republican liberty as non-domination arguing that the stress it places on resilience and control offers a way forward in combatting arbitrary interference.

### I. REPUBLICAN LIBERTY AS NON-DOMINATION

It has been argued that republican liberty as non-domination features a resilient form of liberty (Pettit 1997 and 2001; Skinner

1997 and 2002). This way of thinking about liberty points to an ideal of assurance that liberty as non-domination is entrenched in the institutional structure of the republic. Furthermore, because this resilience is entrenched in this manner, the thought is that republican liberty can respond to the changing needs of the citizenry and, combined with properly constituted republican institutions, facilitate the active and contestatory nature of republican politics. Republican theorists argue that freedom consists neither in the non-interference of others, as in negative liberty, nor is it equated with self-mastery, as in positive liberty. Instead, individuals are free to the extent that they are not subject to any interference that arises apart from their own arbitrium or will. Seen in this manner, individuals are free to the extent that they live under the conditions where they count as “a ‘freeman’ rather than a ‘bondsman’, a liber rather than a servus” (Pettit 2006, 134 and 2008, 106-8). Thus, for republicans, individuals are considered to be at liberty when they are free from any interference that is not forced to track their common avowed interests. For Pettit (2008, 106-8), republican liberty is defined as the absence of alien or alienating control on the part of other persons that negatively affects an individual’s freedom of choice.

An attractive aspect of the republican approach is that it identifies arbitrary power as the nemesis of freedom, whether that power arises from the state or among the people. An agent (or agency) dominates another agent when the first is able to exercise arbitrary power over the other (Pettit 1996, 578). Seen in this way, republican liberty as non-domination can be thought of as a form of antipower, one that is obtained when institutions and practices actively eliminate dominating power hierarchies. For Pettit (1996, 589), antipower represents “a form of control that a person enjoys in relation to his own destiny - and such control represents one familiar type of power: the power of the agent who can make things happen.” Antipower in this sense resiliently serves to protect individuals against potential dominators by minimizing the capacity of others from exercising domination over them. When seen in this manner, modern republican antipower stops domination before it

emerges by removing the capability of the dominator to act with arbitrary interference. This is a crucial point, especially in light of Web 3.0's new modes and orders of disruption, one to which I will come back to in Section III to further explore.

For republicans, for antipower to be present there must be a constitutive relationship between non-domination and the citizenry, institutions, laws and values of the state. Lena Halldenius (2010, 12-3) argues that “republican freedom makes sense only in an institutional setting; it is institution-dependent”. Moreover, republicans think of freedom as a kind of status, one that is recognized by others and receives institutional support, which shields or immunizes individuals from arbitrary interference (Pettit 2006, 133; Honohan 2002, 184). Thus, republican institutional design, the rule of law, and the political virtues that support them, all point to a more robust form of liberty that seeks to secure citizens from arbitrary interference.

Similarly, Christian List (2006, 218) has argued that the modern republican approach has a built-in “rule-of-law” component that highlights the definitional relationship between liberty as non-domination, democracy, the institutional and legal structures that support it and the common good. Understood this way, an individual is free in the modern republican sense only if he is recognized by others as enjoying a kind of status that resiliently serves to protect him from any interference that does not track his interests and promotes his equal status as a citizen (Laborde and Maynor 2008, 9).

However, at first glance, relying on institutions and on constitutionalism may, in the shift from Web 2.0 to 3.0, present republicans a significant challenge. Namely, that this shift has weakened the very institutions and mechanisms republicans rely on to minimize domination. For Cécile Laborde, the modern nation-state is facing “complex new forms of unchecked arbitrary power” that flow across national borders and are exercised by distant and usually anonymous agents and agencies against vulnerable individuals who have little capacity to counter this kind of arbitrary

interference. Moreover, “instead of relationships of cooperation or interdependence, which would imply reciprocity and mutual benefit, the current international order is marked by one-sided and largely coerced domination and dependency” (Laborde 2010, 50).

What we are left with is an image of seemingly powerless individuals who are subjected to real and sustained instances of disruptive arbitrary interference without any means of effectively countering it. These individuals live at the mercy of others – others who do not track their interests and who exercise their power at will and with impunity – all without any effective means of fighting back and regaining their status as a free person. What this points to is a legitimization deficit in certain decision-making processes in instances where individuals are exposed to certain actions or decisions in which they have no ability to influence through the existing networks and norms of democratic participation. It follows, then, that republican institutions and constitutional mechanisms may have a diminished ability to shield individuals from certain sources of domination. In the next section, I want to highlight some of these threats in greater detail.

## II. WEB 3.0 AND THE NEW MODES AND ORDERS OF DISRUPTION

In this section, I want to highlight some of the ways that disruptive interferences have impacted the recent US politics. There are at least five areas that I believe constitute the most disruptive interferences:

- foreign interference through online mediums
- social media bots
- fake news
- echo chambers and filter bubbles
- the weaponization of big data

While the points on this list are not exclusive or exhaustive, it is my belief that they represent the most disruptive threats from Web 3.0's new modes and orders.

By now, many will be familiar with Russian efforts to interfere in the 2016 US Presidential election. According to an indictment (USA vs. Internet Research Agency LLC et al) issued by a Washington, DC grand jury, the Russian government operated a three-year scheme, code-named the Translator Project, executed by the Internet Research Agency, to “spread distrust toward the candidates and the political system in general” (Shane and Mazzetti). A main goal of this campaign was to stoke controversy to foment discord and disrupt traditional democratic norms by exploiting social networks and media. Russian agents posed as American voters on social media sites like Twitter, Facebook and Reddit using trolls to rile up partisans by spreading false narratives and pitting sides against each other (Carabeno 2018).

Exploiting social networks and stoking controversy to foment discord and disrupt traditional democratic norms was perhaps the most effective aspect of this campaign. Russian agents posed as American voters on social media sites like Twitter, Facebook and Reddit spreading false narratives and pitting sides against each other. It is estimated that at least 126 million Americans were exposed to some aspect of this operation. Using trolls to rile up partisans became one of the most common tactics used by them. Planning and holding political rallies was another common tactic. The indictment, USA vs. Internet Research Agency LLC et al (2018), states that on August 16, 2016, a Facebook group known as “Being Patriotic” organized twenty rallies that took place simultaneously in Florida, including one that featured an imprisoned Hillary Clinton impersonator on the back of a flatbed truck (Cerabino 2018).

The IRC was also responsible for directing swarms of Twitter bots to push false narratives and fake news during this election. An example of one of the more prominent of these accounts was @TEN\_GOP. According to the Indictment (2018):

Defendants and their co-conspirators also created and controlled numerous Twitter accounts designed to appear as if US persons or groups controlled them. For example, the organization created and controlled the Twitter

account “Tennessee GOP”, which used the handle @TEN\_GOP. The @TEN\_GOP account falsely claimed to be controlled by a US state political party. Over time, the @TEN\_GOP account attracted more than 100,000 online followers.

These kinds of activities have continued. For example, in the wake of the Parkland school shooting on February 14, 2018, the top hashtags were #NRA, #guncontrolnow, #shooting, #teacher among others (Griffith 2018). Many of these hashtags were promoted by legitimate users focusing on the school shooting and the many complex issues surrounding gun control. There were, however, thousands of Twitter bots using the tragedy for disruptive purposes.

Twitter bots are artificial intelligence (AI) software-controlled accounts that use algorithms to generate content and establish connections. In general, these kinds of social bots perform certain useful functions like the dissemination of news, publications and the coordination of volunteer activities. There are, however, other malicious uses of bots such as to “emulate human behavior to manufacture fake grassroots political support (Ratkiewicz et al. 2011), promote terrorist propaganda and recruitment (Berger and Morgan 2015; Abokhodair, Yoo, and McDonald 2015; Ferrara et al. 2016), and manipulate the stock market (Ferrara et al. 2016 and Varol et al. 2017, 1). Varol discovered that of, the 300 million Twitter users, somewhere in between nine and fifteen per cent were bots. Facebook, too, has a problem with fake accounts. According to their own data, around 60 million accounts are thought to be fake (Confessore et al. 2018). An example of how bots can take fake news and push it to the top of the trending charts can be seen in the attempt to discredit Emma Gonzales, an outspoken survivor of the Parkland school shooting. Along with some of her classmates, Gonzales was featured in a Teen Vogue (2018) image ripping up a paper gun target like those found in firing ranges. The image that went viral had been doctored to show Gonzales ripping up a copy of the US Constitution.

This brings us to the issue of fake news and the way they have been used to tear down both politicians and institutions. Facebook is not alone in being the main culprits in the spread and use of fake news. Both Google and YouTube have fake news problems that they have been forced to address forcefully (Renner 2017). Although the spreading of false information is not new, the explosion of online media combined with the popularity of social media sharing has raised serious questions about the vulnerabilities of the modern democratic state. According to a recent report by the Harvard University's Shorenstein Center for Media, Politics and Public Policy (Lazer 2018):

Current social media systems provide a fertile ground for the spread of misinformation that is particularly dangerous for political debate in a democratic society. Social media platforms provide a megaphone to anyone who can attract followers. This new power structure enables small numbers of individuals, armed with technical, social or political know-how, to distribute large volumes of disinformation, or "fake news." Misinformation on social media is particularly potent and dangerous for two reasons: an abundance of sources and the creation of echo chambers.

Many users' social networks seem to have a self-reinforcing function where like-minded individuals simply help each other solidify their fixed preferences by cutting themselves off from any meaningful critique of their own beliefs and values. In other words, individuals tend to follow only those whose beliefs are similar to theirs. Moreover, many maintain that they do not want to engage in critical kinds of exchanges online, but instead use social media to seek out and interact with like-minded individuals.

What is at stake here is the potential for groups polarizing and entrenching themselves into factions, something that has long troubled political theorists and practitioners from Machiavelli to Madison. Members of factions tend to place their own narrow self-interests above that of the common good and can have a destructive effect on the political community (Maynor 2007). If social networks simply serve as echo-chambers of this or that point of view, there is

a risk that positions and preferences will harden and become more entrenched (Adamic and Glance 2005). Moreover, the same technology that allows users to access an infinite number of debates and news-sources also allows them to ignore and filter out those that may be critical of their own viewpoints (Harmon 2004). Often referred to as filter-bubbles, a related danger is that the lack of conflicting information means that falsehoods are not suitably challenged, leading to what Benkler et al. (2017) describe as a lack of shared reality, something that may prove dangerous for societies.

These troubling developments are accompanied by the weaponization of information through the harvesting of big data and the micro-targeting of social media users. Micro-targeting is a strategy that uses demographics and consumer data gained from a range of sources including tracking users' internet browsing history, social media activities, shopping habits, etc. The ultimate goal is to identify the interests of preferences of like-minded individuals to influence their thoughts and actions through both traditional and online advertising. Although micro-targeting has long been a standard tool used by political campaigns, the shift from Web 2.0 to 3.0 has seen an increase in the sophistication of coding algorithms that has opened up new opportunities to influence and potentially manipulate voters.

A good example of this is the now infamous Cambridge Analytica (CA), who were able to covertly obtain personal information on somewhere around 50 million Facebook users. Although there is some confusion surrounding the extent of their influence on the US 2016 election, there are some basic facts known. Initially hired to promote the candidacy of Senator Ted Cruz, CA worked on behalf of the Trump campaign during the general election, once Cruz had dropped out. It is said that they were able to covertly obtain personal information through the acquisition of data from a researcher who had collected it using a seemingly benign personality test app. The goal was, according to Christopher Wylie, a data science contractor turned whistleblower, to build an algorithm based on the Facebook data to construct a psychological

profile that would target voters with personalized political advertisements (Greenfield 2018). While it may be impossible to know the impact, if any, these kinds of advertisements had, there is evidence to suggest that this kind of micro-targeting is especially effective with low-information voters, which helped to form the base of Trump's winning effort (Fording and Schram 2017).

Not surprisingly, as mentioned earlier, there is a thought that these kinds of disruptive interferences are one of the many grave threats facing the modern democratic nation-state. So what does republicanism have to offer in the face of, to borrow a phrase from David Remnick, this "stress test of liberal democracy?" In the next section, I want to return to an issue that I raised earlier, namely the concept of republican liberty as non-domination, as a form of resilient antipower.

### III. THE RESILIENCE OF NON-DOMINATION

Earlier, I argued that republicans understand liberty as non-domination as a kind of antipower. On the one hand, this approach tolerates certain kinds of interference – namely those that are not arbitrary and help to constitute it whereas, on the other hand, it seeks to eliminate interferences that are arbitrary. For republicans, certain interferences that help to secure liberty as non-domination such as the rule of law, properly constituted institutions and distinctive republican ideals serve to offer a kind of guarantee of being free in a particular kind of manner. What this points to is that republican liberty as non-domination has a resilient quality to it (Pettit 1997, 24). According to Brennan and Hamlin (2001, 47), the "idea of resilience is related to the idea of assurance - a resilient liberty is one that is assured in the sense that it is not contingent on circumstances, but rather is entrenched in the institutional structure". Thus, in this way, republican liberty should be understood as a resilient core of protection that allows individuals to determine which ends they will pursue within the context of non-

domination. It does this through two important strategies. The first can be found within a polity's institutions and policies as they aim to regulate potential instances of domination through the use of protective institutions and policies. The second aims to empower individuals by promoting their well-being and capability to enjoy their freedom. I now turn to these two strategies in turn.

#### INSTITUTIONAL ANTIPOWER

The first strategy to promote the kind of resilient antipower associated with republican liberty resides within a polity's institutions and policies and aims to regulate potential instances of domination through the use of protective institutions and policies. Republicans have long stressed the importance of constitutions and the rule of law as forms of protective institutions that help keep arbitrary power in check. Moreover, republicans also advocate aggressively regulating the resources of the powerful by utilizing traditional mechanisms like checks and balances; the dispersion of power across a range of legislative, administrative, and judicial levels; democratic contestation; and active civic engagement (Maynor 2003 and 2006). And, as mentioned above, it is important to note here the important role that democracy plays in republican political theory. In minimizing arbitrary interference, democratic institutional structures allow individuals to bring their interests out into political forums so they can be accounted for and tracked by others and the state.

Importantly, for republicans, what this points to is a specific kind of antipower that resides within democratic institutions and practices and transforms potentially dominating policies so they are not considered alien to the many individuals and groups that make up society (Maynor 2010). Moreover, what this also points to is that, for republicans, an individual's liberty is inherently linked to governing institutions that necessarily reside within their sphere of influence and which they control through democratic practices. To

minimize domination, citizens must know these institutions, how they work, and be able to engage with them in a positive manner to help shape the policies that emerge from them. In other words, it seems important that these institutions reside in close proximity to the citizenry – they need to be able to see them operate and, crucially, easily influence them to help minimize arbitrary interference. With respect to Web 3.0's disruptive interferences, there has to be a concerted state effort to force internet companies to adhere to certain best practices that increase individuals' control over how their online data is managed and utilized. But individuals, too, have a role to play. I turn to that next.

#### INDIVIDUAL ANTIPOWER

The second strategy to promote individuals' antipower can be seen in three advantages they enjoy when they are free from domination that is likely to boost their control over who or what interferes with them (Maynor 2003, 43-8). To be sure, in each of these there is an important individual responsibility that emerges. The first is that individuals are secured from any anxiety or uncertainty they may experience from those who seek to interfere arbitrarily with them. Maximizing freedom as non-domination will lower the degree to which individuals are subject to arbitrary interference and, because the interference that they experience tracks their interests and opinions, uncertainty and anxiety are reduced (Pettit 1997, 85). The second advantage is that it reduces the degree to which individuals have to be prepared to defend themselves against arbitrary interference. It follows, then, that the degree that individuals have to plan strategically to cope with arbitrary interference is reduced the more non-domination is maximized. In many instances, like those that may occur online, individuals lose this battle with arbitrary interference. However, increasing the range of options open to individuals to control their online data and presence will likely reduce their efforts to protect themselves from the arbitrary

interference of others. Finally, individuals who experience a decrease in their vulnerability to arbitrary interference may also experience subjective and inter-subjective benefits since they will be more or less on equal footing with others. This benefits both the way they view others and the way in which they view themselves. Measures like reducing the anonymity of many internet users may help level the playing field so that others can look at each other in the eye.

The upshot from both the institutional and individual forms of antipower is that agents retain a fair degree of control over what interferes with them and whether or not that interference is arbitrary. This is the key to resilience – the more control individuals have the more resilient their liberty is, the less control they have, the more their liberty is at risk. The key, then, to addressing Web 3.0's disruptive interferences turns on increasing individuals' control over them.

## CONCLUSION

It is my contention that the most effective way to combat arbitrary interference is to vest republican liberty as non-domination within the current governmental technology of the modern democratic state. As Kymlicka (2001) has pointed out, at the moment the “only forum in which genuine democracy occurs is within national boundaries”. It follows, then, as the first line of defence against the disruptive interferences of Web 3.0, a nation-state's political institutions and ideals should reflect republican priorities so that citizens have more power and control. Nation-states are going to have to better guard themselves against outside meddling through online mediums. They are going to have to regulate social media companies to ensure that users data is secured and not being used for malicious purposes; and they are going to have to work to develop and promote critical thinking and information literacy. As a second line of defence, social media companies have a role to play

addressing these kinds of interferences. They are going to have to make it easier for users to manage their personal data; they are going to have to be more transparent in how they use this data; they are going to have to do a better job working to identify and weed out social bots; and they are going to have to work harder to filter out fake news from their networks. Finally, as a third line of defence, individuals are going to have to up their game, too. They are going to have to work to seize control of their online data; they are going to have to do a better job critically engaging with online content; they are going to have to reduce their reliance on anonymity; and they are going to have to interact on social media in a non-dominating manner. For modern republicans, it comes down to control. The more control over interference an agent has, the less arbitrary these interferences are. So with respect to Web 3.0's disruptive interferences, the more control individuals have over them, the more resilient their enjoyment of republican liberty will be.

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REWRITING THE DOMESTIC SPHERE: MODERN NOTIONS OF  
NARRATIVITY IN “TENDER BUTTONS” AND “THE ALICE B. TOKLAS  
COOKBOOK”

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**Abstract.** This paper explores the relationship between imagined narrative and recipe writing, largely through the lens of an “embedded discourse”, a term first coined by Susan J. Leonardi, in which she accounts for the social and cultural contexts that a recipe was born out of, and thus possesses. The author examines Gertrude Stein’s “Tender Buttons” and “The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas” to demonstrate that when both texts interact with each other, a new hybrid literary style is achieved. When put in conversation with one another, these modernist works bridge the gap between past and present, between public and private spheres of authorship, and between women’s lives as they wrote them and our interpretations of the documents they left behind. Moreover, this paper will prove that recipe writing was not merely used as a mechanism for sustenance, but also as a space to depict marginalized images of love and sexuality through the practice of cooking and cookbook writing.

**Keywords:** recipe writing, gender, modernism, food studies, domesticity

Since the late eighteenth century, American recipe books have illustrated the gendered division of labour as inherent and desirable, and femininity and masculinity as two symbiotic precepts - two halves that complete each other to constitute a whole. Changes like the urbanization and atomization of families, the emancipation of slaves, and a fear of the growing numbers of women in the labour force (Vester 2015,137) only solidified this notion that cooking, as an act of feminine performativity, was symbolic of a woman’s love for a man. Food advertisements, household manuals, and women’s journals have long proclaimed that cooking is a vital part of being a

woman. Books like *The Joy of Cooking* not only imply that cooking should be a satisfying act, but also that women should cook for their men as an act of love. However, for the last hundred years, there has been an insurgence of texts that disavow the heteronormativity of cookbooks by repurposing the genre as a space to depict marginalized images of love and sexuality into the practice of cooking and cookbook writing.

In her experimental book of poems titled *Tender Buttons*, the modernist writer Gertrude Stein implemented aspects of the structural and linguistic components of cookbooks to confront medical and scientific discourses that characterized same-sex relationships as perverted and unnatural (Vester 2015, 139). This radical text also calls attention to the arbitrariness of the kind of feminine performativity that is so closely associated with cooking and domesticity; instead of a mere reversal of gendered hierarchies, Stein works with a feminine medium to make visible the constructedness of such roles. Stein's partner, Alice B. Toklas, similarly appropriated the cookbook form, but her methods and motivations were different. Like Stein yet in her own unique style, Toklas's cookbook resists traditional notions of gendered identity by rewriting the domestic sphere as a site of expression for same-sex love and desire; and in doing so, fosters and maintains nonconformist notions of family, marriage, and community. I will begin this paper with an overview of relevant postulations regarding the history of power relations pertinent to domestic and canonical categories, followed by an analysis of what others have termed as the 'literary' cookbook; an idea that I will return to later on. The close reading that follows will prove that when the structural and linguistic elements in both pieces interact with each other, a new language that radicalizes certain modern notions of narrativity is created. Scholarship in this period has extensively addressed Stein's work in modernist writing. And yet, I contend that *Tender Buttons* and *The Alice B. Toklas Cookbook* are inextricably linked and that, by taking their association into further consideration, a unique reading of the interconnection between the two will come to fruition and

our understanding of the field of food studies within the modernist canon will be deepened.

#### HISTORY OF POWER RELATIONS

Food consumption is not merely attached to biological needs but serves to represent identity markers such as culture, social status, geographical locations, genders, religions, customs, traditions, and life events. Jean Anthelme Brillat-Savarin's well-known phrase "Tell me what you eat: I will tell you what you are" speaks to this notion that physiologically it makes no difference whether a person eats caviar or crickets; our bodies take in the protein and calories to process both foods generally in the same manner. However, the way certain groups culturally construct the different, and often conflicting narratives regarding the consumption of one food item in comparison to the other subsequently alters the way food and identity interact. In other words, while food products may stay the same over time, the meaning and knowledge generated by food choices constantly changes depending on the power relations within food discourses. It is now essential to turn to the essay *Subject and Power*, in which Michel Foucault asserts that power does not exist without relationships, which is based on a set of actions upon other actions (*i.e.* the nature of power). Foucault is concerned with human beings as subjects, and with his use of the word "subject" it is important to note that this means: subject to someone else's control, or one who is tied to his own identity by conscience or self-knowledge. The self is not singular (in and of itself), it is not the singular object of knowledge, nor is it a "free agent" prior to coming into, or submitting oneself into society. His essay outlines three struggles of domination: ethnic, social, and religious; these struggles can be isolated from each other or mixed together (Foucault 1982, 781). He writes, "[f]or, if it is true that at the heart of power relations and as a permanent condition of their existence there is an insubordination and a certain essential obstinacy on the part of the principles of freedom, then there is no relationship of power

without the means of escape or possible flight” (Foucault 1982, 794). This suggests that the way members of modern democratic Western societies create forms of knowledge in terms of the self and power is only a set of processes in which everything is subject to something else. More specifically, Foucault defines power as:

(...) the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies. (Foucault 1980, 92-3)

While this excerpt mainly focuses on power relations as not stable, but a network of discourses that constantly shift and change, it also suggests that some organizations may crystallize to assume a pattern of administering systems that produce the subject. In accordance with this, Katharina Vester writes that such institutions and experts “have the authority to establish, maintain, and even—within limits—change the rules of the discourse, that is, of what can be said and what cannot be said, or what statements are considered to be reasonable or unreasonable, true or false” (Vester 2015, 7). This Foucauldian reading contributes to this discussion of recipes as a form of knowledge because, historically speaking, food belonged to the private realm and therefore was not treated with “scholarly interest; it was a topic slightly too mundane, too feminine, and (within the context of affluent societies) insufficiently political” (Vester 2015, 3). Food advice from cookbooks has traditionally instructed readers to not only eat well, but also how to be good citizens, and how to conform to conventional gendered performances of heterosexual men and women. Food discourses, like the scholarly discourses that Foucault analyzes, are also authoritative and systematizing (Vester 2015, 8).

## LITERARY CANONS AND FOOD DISCOURSES

With regard to the creation of literary canons, it is important to consider the following questions: What are the elements that constitute a literary text? Perhaps more importantly, who determined the standards by which literary scholars assess such texts, and why are such standards in place? In his essay *Language, Narrative, and Anti-Narrative*, Robert Scholes claims that a narration contains:

(...) a selection of events for the telling. They must offer sufficient continuity of subject matter to make their chronological sequence significant... When the telling provides this sequence with a certain kind of shape and a certain level of human interest, we are in the presence not merely of narrative but of story. (1980, 206)

If, for a moment, we operate under the premise that Scholes and other structuralist narrative theorists have established for narrative properties, then it is sufficient to state that a literary text must have certain elements - temporality, cohesion, linearity, and “human interest,” or what other narrative theorists ascribe as the “moral voice” or “moral centre” - which is then also associated with the structure of narrative. Therefore, according to Scholes (and others like him), a story is only “fully narrative” if this connection between the narrative and “moral voice” exists.

In her article *Challenging Contemporary Narrative Theory: The Alternative Textual Strategies of Nineteenth-Century Manuscript Cookbooks*, Andrea Newlyn confronts narrative theories, like the one put forth by Scholes, by opening her essay with a quote from Marilyn Robinson Waldman: “[w]e cannot fully assume that a text...tells no story because it does not make its story explicit, formally organized, and finished (that is, fully narrative); we cannot even assume that explicitness is universally a sign of ‘full’ narrativity” (Newlyn 1999, 35). In other words, when our definition of what makes up a text’s “literariness” is dictated by rules related to its linear trajectory and moral compass, we leave no space for other textual strategies that

divest from “further privileged and reified canonical, and deeply patriarchal, notions of what is ‘great literature’” (Newlyn 1999, 36). If we return to the set of questions posed earlier in this chapter (of who determined the current prevailing specifications for categorizing a text as literary), then a feasible response might be proposed in light of Foucault’s framework - those who are privileged by the network of discourses within power relations in effect gain authority over knowledge, and thus dictate its structure. However, it is crucial to remember that questioning the expert’s authority and knowledge might eventually lead to different insights and conclusions.

While Foucault’s work *Subject and Power* is no doubt extensive and valuable, there are feminist scholars who have created an alternative body of work that criticizes Foucault’s “gender blindness” (Vester 2015, 7). The discourses Foucault examined in his own work were not concerned with how one’s class, race, or gender can also influence who belongs and is excluded. Foucault focused mainly on institutions that disciplined men: the prison, the military, the factory, the school—places that largely excluded women (Vester 2015, 8). Scholars like Susan Bordo and Elspeth Probyn have found a way to use Foucault’s theory as an analytical lens for feminist interpretations by analyzing food discourses that produce gender and identity categories, as Probyn contends: “As eating reactivates the force of identities, it also may enable modes of cultural analysis that are attentive to the categories with which we are now perhaps overly familiar: sex, ethnicity, wealth, poverty, geopolitical location, class, and gender. Eating... makes these categories matter again: it roots bodies within these relations” (Probyn 2015, 9). In order to account for those women who were left out, or marginalized, a reconsideration of the domestic realm, namely cookbooks and kitchens, will provide us with a better sense of how those excluded from a heteronormative economy rewrite themselves into food, and culinary discourses (*Ibidem* 2015, 15). Literary canons, as well as food discourses, are a product of human labour, and thus do not escape the influences of hegemonic power structures within society.

However, where there are sites of power relations and acts of dominance and oppression, there will also be the chance for, and moments of, acts of resistance. This chapter will look closely at how food and literary discourses intertwine to open a dialogue about the power relations at work when we eat, cook, or read about eating and cooking.

#### LITERARY COOKBOOKS

As previously mentioned, the term “literary cookbook” is a way to differentiate between the kind of collections that are used from the kind that are read. In her article *The Literary Cookbook*, Carrie Helms Tippen states: “Just as an experienced reader of fantasy novels can conjure an entire world by reading words on a page, a cookbook reader imagines a recipe like a narrative in which the reader is the protagonist, chopping, sauteeing, seeing, smelling, and tasting” (Tippen 2016, 1). The cookbook, as a literary genre, will have its own set of conventions in terms of the organization, tone, narrative, and language (*Ibidem*). Similarly, Theophano argues that literary cookbooks are “the closest we can come to another world. By its reading, we are momentarily transformed. Thus, for some, eating the words of a recipe book is a nourishing act” (Theophano 2002, 272). When a recipe is compared to a novel, for instance, the reader of the novel is not obviously addressed; whereas the reader of the recipe is addressed repeatedly through its unique blend of imperative structure, oral history, and yet still rooted in written tradition.

In cookbooks and other texts featuring recipes, recipes are often named after their “authors” (a person, a country, a region, or an ethnic group) to identify their (often mythical) “origin”. This can transform the writer of a cookbook into a compiler or archivist, and the cookbook into a communal project. As a reader is invited to participate, the recipe becomes a textual conversation over the metaphorical and actual breaking of bread. Recipes can pass on traditions, overcoming distances of time and space, as well as differences between

groups, taking part in the invention of traditions that can help establish the story of a nation, the boundaries of the masculine community, the sisterhood of non-hegemonic sexualities. (Vester 2015, 9)

This call to action (implied in the structure) marks recipes as a site for resistance that narrates the self as well as nationhood, and the home as well as community. More specifically, texts by lesbian authors (and made for a lesbian readership) on cooking directly challenged dominant ideals and norms pertaining to family structure, while also creating positive, nonconforming images of gender and sexuality.

In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, an increasing number of authors used the cookbook genre and its aesthetic characteristics to undermine its conventional usages as well as to make space for resistance against “gendered and sexual normativity when it comes to cooking and eating” (Vester 2015, 138). Prior to this, same-sex desire was termed as gender inversion by sexologists Richard von Krafft-Ebing (1840-1902) and Havelock Ellis (1859-1939), who believed homosexuality to be an inborn trait but also diagnosed it as a disease or degeneration (*Ibidem*, 147). Medical, scientific, and judicial discourses coalesced to attempt enforcement of “clear -cut categories and to prevent their subversion by criminalizing and pathologizing gender transgression by connecting it to prohibited sexual practices” (*Ibidem*, 147). Sexologists’ interest in women’s homosexuality, in particular, was activated at the beginning of the twentieth century, in part as a response to discredit the early women’s and suffrage movement (*Ibidem*, 148). At the same time, women modernist writers were finding ways to represent same-sex desire and lesbian identity through literary discourse. Djuna Barnes, in her roman à clef *The Ladies Almanack* (1928), creates alternative explanations for this desire, “some of them in deliberate contrast to dominant medical discourses” (*Ibidem*, 148). This work, and others, are a testament to the kind of restrained freedom that living as an expatriate in Paris gave to well-off and creatively inclined women.

Although the recognition of Gertrude Stein's impact on modernism was much delayed until after her death, the calibre of her work in relation to the canon is of exceptional quality. One might go as far to contend that even the male modernists do not surpass her level of influence on the modernist movement. The blend of high and low culture and experimentations with the mundane, as well as the intellectual, concepts so closely associated with Modernism might not have come to exist without Gertrude Stein, and arguably, Alice B. Toklas. Belinda Bruner's article *A Recipe for Modernism and the Somatic Intellect in The Alice B. Toklas Cookbook and Gertrude Stein's Tender Buttons* outlines three criteria for the development of Modernism as a literary genre: the privileging of the physical over the intellectual, the heightened attention towards the female experience, and questions regarding perspective and voice (Bruner 2009, 412). Furthermore, Bruner asserts that Toklas played a much larger role in forming Stein's position as genius, or the prevailing expert in modernism, than previously thought. She writes, "Stein, together with Toklas, built the foundation for modern and contemporary questioning of conventional authorship and voice; the two women are also responsible for increased attention to the physical in Modernist writing" (*Ibidem*). This reciprocal influence between the two women becomes apparent through a consideration of not only the domestic life they shared together at *Rue de Fleurus*, but also through the tender, and sensual physical side of their relationship.

#### STRUCTURAL AND LINGUISTIC ELEMENTS

The product of this closeness between Stein and Toklas is seen in the "domestic nesting (...) laid out in *Tender Buttons*" when "the mundane becomes beautiful to Stein as Toklas performs day to day necessities and nurtures Stein's talent" (Bruner 2009, 418). Moreover, allusions to Toklas are scattered throughout the poems, and manifest in signifiers, alliteration, and double entendres. As

stated by Bruner, “*Alas*, being one of Stein’s words for Toklas and a pun on Alice and a lass, is a special word used to demonstrate Stein’s dependence on Toklas” (*Ibidem*, 420), as in ‘cooking’: “*alas* pull the bell *alas* the coach in China, *alas* the little put in leaf *alas* the wedding butter meat, *alas* the receptacle, *alas* the back shape of mussle, mussle and soda” (Stein 1990, 492). *Tender Buttons*, written during a time when Stein and Toklas were in the process of establishing their respective roles within domestic life (Bruner 2009, 420), reflects these developments wherein - Toklas kept up with the typing and proofreading of Stein’s work, maintained the household, and handled food and cooking - Stein drove the car, mentored artists, writers, and other creatives and, most importantly, worked on her craft. Without Toklas as her collaborator, Stein might not have contemplated the mundane, or the little moments of the “everyday” with the same admiration or attentiveness as she does in *Tender Buttons*, thus, the experimental nature of Modernism, as we know it today, might not have come to exist. *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* is also indicative of the ways in which Stein and Toklas built Modernism together.

While Stein had long been captivated during her lifetime by psychology and the inner-workings of the human mind, it was not until the trip she took with Toklas to Granada, Spain, that her style and the inspiration for that style began to change. She “had been interested only in the insides of people, their character and what went on inside them, it was during that summer that she first felt a desire to express the rhythm of the visible world” (Stein 1961, 112). This trip with Toklas marks a turning point for not only Stein’s aptitude for blending high and low culture, but also sparked the onset of attention from young writers and columnists alike towards the first publication of “three manuscripts to make a book,” which came to be known as *Tender Buttons*:

Of these three manuscripts, two had been written during our first trip into Spain and Food, Rooms *etcetera*, immediately on our return. They were the beginning, as Gertrude Stein would say, of mixing the outside with the inside.

Hitherto she had been concerned with seriousness and the inside of things, in these studies, she began to describe the inside as seen from the outside. She was awfully pleased at the idea of these three things being published, and immediately consented, and suggested the title of *Tender Buttons*. (Stein 1961, 147)

*The Autobiography* documents the importance and scope of Toklas's influence over Stein's writing style, as well as the significance of Toklas's own capabilities as editor and cook; which eventually led to her role as a skilled cookbook writer. According to Janet Hobhouse, in the earlier days of their life together, "Stein wrote primarily for Toklas, who questioned and listened, and who proofread and typed everything" - citing this, Rebecca Mark also points out that "it is a story of relationship, not one voice, but voices — collaboration, dialogue, response, love" (*qtd.* in Bruner 2009, 432). In *The Autobiography*, Stein writes that "I always say that you cannot tell what a picture really is or what an object really is until you dust it every day and you cannot tell what a book is until you type it or proof-read it. It then does something to you that only reading it never can do" (Stein 1961, 106). It is the multiplicitous nature of their relationship that rewrites the domestic realm as a space that rejects patriarchal dualisms between the physical and intellectual, and emotional and rational. Therefore, if we examine Toklas's capabilities as a writer with these features in mind, then it becomes possible to understand how Stein's writing style evolved from an intellectual language to a "domestic and tactile aesthetic" (Bruner 2009, 412).

*The Alice B. Toklas Cookbook* attests to a style of writing that Paul Schmidt calls "Savarinist" in his article on how to interpret recipe collections. Schmidt affirms that Brillat-Savarin subscribes to the idea that there is a metaphysical element in cooking: "his transcendence is tempered throughout with the presence of the world... and an entire school of writing derives from it — anecdote stimulated by food, the memory of taste awakened by anecdote" (Schmidt 1974, 181). Toklas is skilful in this writing style, which also supports the notion that her creative influence went beyond acting

as muse and partner to Stein. In the chapter titled *Food in the United States in 1934 and 1935*, Toklas describes dessert as “(...) a postcard Virgil Thomson once sent us from the Côte d’Azur, delightfully situated within sight of the sea, pine woods, nightingales, all cooked in butter” (Toklas 1984, 126). Throughout the book, Toklas’s use of metaphor and wordplay in this, and other remembrances, illustrates the poetic congruity with which she writes.

Similarly, in *Tender Buttons*, Stein uses alliteration and rhyme to explore the interplay between the physical and intellectual through her description of a meal: “Lovely snipe and tender turn, excellent vapor and slender butter, all the splinter and the trunk, all the poisonous darkening drunk, all the joy in weak success, all the joyful tenderness, all the section and the tea, all the stouter symmetry” (Stein 1990, 35). As mentioned earlier, Bruner argues that “[w]ithout Toklas as a helpmate, Stein might have never looked so joyfully upon the physical and the mundane, and the blending of high and low culture and the contrasting of the physical and the intellectual, experimented with by the Modernists, might not have come to exist” (Bruner 2009, 421). Toklas’s *Cookbook* is a direct reflection of this boundary-crossing as she, too, experiments with the interplay between genre: namely her fusion of the cookbook with the memoir. The authorial persona throughout *The Cookbook* is witty, and at times sarcastic, with the cadence and timing of the repartee precise and well-placed. Toklas is even inclined to compare cookbooks with fiction writing, which blurs the lines between the two genres. She writes:

“Cookbooks have always intrigued and seduced me. When I was still a dilettante in the kitchen, they held my attention, even the dull ones, from cover to cover, the way crime and murder stories did Gertrude Stein. When we first read Dashiell Hammett, Gertrude Stein remarked that it was his modern note to have disposed of his victims before the story commenced. Goodness knows how many were required to follow as a result of the first crime. And so, it is in the kitchen. (Toklas 1984, xii)

For Toklas, it would seem that the act of writing was inextricably tied to Stein’s literary career; she was “wife” to Stein’s genius. In her

essay *The Alice B. Toklas Cookbook- Nameless Cookie?*, Carol Stone suggests that “[p]ublished in 1954, eight years after Gertrude Stein’s death, [*The Cookbook*] can be seen as a tribute and as a rebuke to Stein in which Toklas, at last, speaks in her own voice”. Regardless of whether or not it took the loss of Stein for Toklas to find the agency to express herself, the significance of her nonconformist style and voice remains.

In *The Alice. B Toklas Cookbook*, Toklas engages with recipe writing partly as a way to document her life with Stein. Her book is a prime archetype for what we might call a “literary cookbook” - a text that “merged recipes with memoirs, bending the conventions of the genre to present another form of family structure” (Vester 2015, 139). Written as a homage to the thirty-five years spent making a home and life with Stein, Toklas weaves together memories, recipes, and instructions to construct a piece that queers and subverts the conventions of autobiographical writing. Moreover, this particular text is also a testament to the claim that a literary narrative does not have to encompass a chronological and linear temporal sequence to be recognized as such. Janet Theophano writes that “[i]n evoking or re-creating the sensate, culinary world of the book, the writer transports a reader in time and space into her own lifeworld. The seasons of the writer’s life emerge in the foods that she cooked or dreamed about cooking, the poetry and prose she placed alongside her recipes” (Theophano 2002, 122-3).

In Toklas’ book, this disruption of linearity punctuates the stories told by unpredictably incorporating the recipes as “amuse-bouches” to supplement and emphasize certain memories (Vester 2015, 156). The recipes often feature eccentric titles such as “Mutton Chops in Dressing Gowns” (Toklas 1984, 101), “Omelette in an Overcoat” (*Ibidem*, 106), “Giant Squab in Pyjamas” (*Ibidem*, 111), “A Hen with Golden Eggs” (*Ibidem*, 109), and “Haschich Fudge (which anyone could whip up on a rainy day)” - this last title is labelled as “the food of paradise - of Baudelaire’s Artificial Paradises” (*Ibidem*, 259). Toklas not only displays these recipes within a literary context but also transcends the rules of the cookbook genre by incorporating

the cooking instructions as part of a literary discourse, as in the recipe for “Lobster, Breast of Chicken and Black Truffle Salad” (*Ibidem*, 216) which, she claims, is enjoyable to read but hopeless to recreate (Vester 2015, 157).

As previously mentioned, Toklas works with certain ingredients that call up significant memories of the past in a way that harkens back to this notion of the whole being greater than the sum of its parts. That is, looking at recipes as a kind of semiotic exercise implies that the space between description/language based rendering and experience/personal exchange with an idea or object is akin to seeing the recipe, and understanding that one may never make “real” the specific product the author describes. In other words, the meaning behind the text shifts away from a functional one and towards something else. What, then, is the purpose of Toklas’s cookbook? Is it to honour and remember an unconventional lifestyle through an unconventional structure? We will never know indefinitely, and to have the full answer is, perhaps, besides the point. What can be gleaned from the collection is that it frames “a fictional world as surely as novels do. Without ever preparing a dish, reading with one’s imagination is a satisfying act” (Theophano 2002, 272). Moreover, Toklas’s cookbook transmutes pieces of history, memoir, fiction, and travelogue. Food (and its accessibility) functions not only as a device to move the plot forward, but also transports the reader to another world - one that accounts for the experience of war.

Both Toklas and Stein had lived in Paris since 1907 and 1903 respectively, and witnessed the effects of both World Wars. Toklas’s account of them does not detail “political or military developments in France and the world, but strings of personal anecdotes revolving around food and the craving for it, describing the hardship of wartime (as experienced by two middle-class Americans far from the front lines)” (Vester 2015, 157). While some critics might discount the text for its lack of war writing conventions and depictions of suffering, others acknowledge Toklas’s ability to illustrate the banality of a war on the home front. She departs from

other male modernist writers, who fixate on the decline of civilization and increased globalization (caused by the horrific events of WWI), by writing from a place of domesticity — which is not to say that it is a lesser account. Vester suggests that in some ways the text could “also be understood as a statement against the war in general” (*Ibidem*, 158). Therefore, to dismiss this text primarily on the basis of Toklas’s class and status, or even patriotism, is not only indicative of the dominant power structures mentioned earlier, but also of a discrediting of women and women’s tasks.

The stories she narrates do not pretend to be heroic or patriotic; instead, they are honest recollections of the challenges and changes that war brings (however trivial) even to those who are relatively safe from its dangers. Toklas allegorizes these experiences through wordplay like “piece-de-résistance”, with which she classifies her first illegally purchased food items (Toklas 1984, 204). Rather than relying on ration cards for their food source, Toklas and Stein resort to illegal food trades and eating well as a way to rebel against the occupation. What little resources they do have will not be consumed or squandered by the Germans, who are described as uncivilized and disorderly; which, for Toklas, then translates into a lack of taste (Vester 2015, 158). The following anecdote portrays the French (and by extension the Americans they host), in stark contrast, as the embodiment of sophisticated culture and refined tastes, thus delineating themselves apart from German vulgarities:

The German soldiers were interested in butter. It appeared that many of them had never tasted it. Had not Hitler asked them if they wanted butter or guns and had they not given the right answer? One day, marketing for whatever unrationed food might still be for sale, a German soldier came into the shop. He pointed at a huge mound of butter and said *one kilo*. One kilo, the clerk exclaimed. The German nodded his head impatiently. The butter was weighed and wrapped up. Unwrapping one end of the package the German walked out of the shop. From the open door where I was standing, I saw him bite off a piece of the butter. It evidently was not what he expected it to be for with a brusque movement he threw it violently over the garden wall of the house opposite. The story got about. People came to look at it. No one would touch it. There it stayed. (Toklas 1984, 203)

For Toklas, the greed and ignorance of the German soldier then become “a metaphor for the imperialist ambitions of his government” (Vester 2015, 159). The cookbook partially utilizes a chronological structure, but consistently disrupts it with a multitude of flashbacks into certain childhood memories or wartime stories. Now I would like to address what makes food such a powerful and expansive site for memory.

In order to consider food’s relationship to language and expression, it is necessary to examine the inextricable connection between food and memory. As Terry Eagleton famously wrote, “[i]f there is one sure thing about food, it is that it is never food.” Whether it be sex, death, identity, oppression, or displacement, food is often used as a proxy for something else. It is used not only for survival and sustenance, but also as a way of incorporating the world around us. During instances of loss or change, food memories can function as a “creative imaginative response” to this deprivation by working through the “mutual reinforcement of the cosmic and the mundane” (Sutton 2001, 159). In his anthropological essay *Food and Memory*, Jon D. Holtzman suggests that “the sensuality of eating transmits powerful mnemonic cues, principally through smells and tastes” (Holtzman 2006, 373). Through a diverse range of processes, both individual and social, memory “intrinsically destabilizes truth through a concern with the subjective ways that the past is recalled, memorialized, and used to construct the present” (*Ibidem*, 363).

However, aside from bodily experiences, food memories are also deeply symbolic of psychological and social meaning, and thus relates the everyday mundane to “broader cultural patterns, hegemonic structures, and political-economic processes” (*Ibidem*, 373). Therefore, one can suggest that food memories, for Toklas and Stein, are a dynamic way to record recollections that are deeply symbolic to produce a hybrid literary style that instructs, amuses, and captivates its readers. Furthermore, both pieces by Stein and Toklas challenge prevailing notions of authority and authorship.

Toklas gives credit to other cooks for certain recipes, thus subverting the idea that authorship is either autonomous or singular.

Similarly, *Tender Buttons* features language that pertains to household management, fashion, and cooking — which function as devices that challenge the norms of masculine authority associated with modernist writing. The book is broken down into passages preceded by such titles as *Roastbeef*, *A Chair*, *Sugar*, and *Piano*. The passage *Roast Beef* opens the *Food* section: “Please spice, please no name, place a whole weight, sink into a standard rising, raise a circle, choose a right around, make the resonance accounted and gather green any collar” (Stein 1990, 37). The grammatical tone shifts slowly from the subjunctive “please” into the imperative structure with “choose”, “make”, and “gather.” This variation between subjunctive and imperative structures seems to interrogate the constructedness of authority in language by deconstructing the normative logic and purpose of household and cooking literature. According to Katharina Vester, “she [Stein] questioned not only authority in general, but also the effects hegemonic knowledge had on regulating identity categories and the use of language (...) [by] shattering the linguistic and rhetorical rules of discourse [thus] render[ing] their effects unpredictable” (Vester 2015, 150).

Stein employs the imperative structure, which typically creates the expert persona customarily found in cookbooks; however, in sections like *Roast Beef*, it is apparent that the reader is not being informed of what to do. The structure rather provides the reader with a “blueprint for their imaginative interpretations” (Theophano 2002, 51). Additionally, the nonsensical “instructions” recode preconceived meanings connoted from the gendered division of labour to make space for new notions of authority and authorship — a kind of authorship that approaches women’s multiplicity as something to be celebrated and embraced. It is through an exploration of such boundary-crossings and contradictions that rework the politics of pleasure and desire.

Set upon the same path as Stein and Toklas, there are other lesbian authors of memoirs and cookbooks who used food and cooking as a trope for “difference” in female expression. According to Vester, “[a] small corpus of cookbooks and cooking blogs written

by self-identified lesbian authors published since the 1980s imagines lesbian cooks as their audience, thus often dealing with questions of identity: What is a lesbian cook? And how can a multitude of same-sex subjectivities form (...) communities without reverting to clichés?” (Vester 2015, 138). Texts like *The Butch Cookbook* (2008) or *The Lesbian Erotic Cookbook* (1998) reveal the struggle between gaining control over one’s own subjectivity and falling prey to patriarchal definitions of what it means to be a lesbian both in and outside the domestic sphere. While these tensions still reverberate in writing today, Stein and Toklas’s works demonstrate that there were other twentieth-century texts that not only interrogate culturally constructed gender and sexuality in more nuanced and inconspicuous ways, but also influenced the creation of the modernist canon as we know it.

While this kind of textual production (of domestic labour) may seem insignificant in comparison to other literary modes of writing, the manuscript sources addressed in this essay are certainly influential to “unthinking assumptions about women and authorship” (Wall 2016, 115). The domestic sphere, and literary cookbooks, need to be revisited as a way to take into account various linguistic shadings in order to broaden the scene of literary traditions. *Tender Buttons* and *The Alice B. Toklas Cookbook*, in particular, allow for the kind of materialist methodology that will expose patterns as well as differences, uncover connections, and expand our understanding of women’s literary history and production within the Modernist canon. Terry Eagleton writes: “Modernist art was born at much the same time as mass culture, and one reason for its obscurity is to resist being sucked in as easily as tabloid print. By fragmenting its forms, thickening its textures and garbling its narratives, the modernist text hopes to escape the indignities of instant consumption” (Griffiths et al. 1998, 206). Instead, a slow consumption of fragmentary methods of narration, through the most minimal and meticulously dissected pieces of history and literature, carries with it the potential to provide the most telling details.

Postulations about authority and authorship regarding the experimental forms and literariness of the recipe genre are conveyed throughout *Tender Buttons* and *The Alice B. Toklas Cookbook*. Foucault's theory on power relations reframes our understanding of how those left out of a heteronormative economy rewrite themselves into food discourses. The cookbook genre and its aesthetic characteristics were utilized to subvert its conventional usages as well as to make space for transgressions against the gendered and sexual normativity associated with the act of eating and cooking. The structural and linguistic elements from both texts explore the crossing of boundaries while simultaneously reworking the politics of pleasure and desire. The work of both Stein and Toklas show that food memories are a compelling way to record recollections that emanate from experiences of war, love and companionship, domesticity, patriarchal structures, and intellectual freedom. The field of food studies in modernist literature is made more substantial by contemplating the relationship between literature and the recipe genre. This close reading of *Tender Buttons* and *The Alice B. Toklas Cookbook* has illustrated the complexities of the modernist view of same-sex love and self-expression, and how the domestic realm served as a space for heightened attention towards the female experience. Furthermore, the food paradigm has provided an unconventional reading of both texts when they are put in conversation with each other. This is a call to revitalize the trope of recipe writing in modernist works and to apply analytical lens to food studies in order to cultivate our understanding of how modernist authors experimented with fragmented forms, and did so by seeking out the poetic potential of cookbooks.

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J.D. SALINGER'S "HAPWORTH 16, 1924" REPUBLICATION  
CONUNDRUM: THAT "SHIELDS-SALERNO" CRYPTORCHISM  
SPECULATION

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**Abstract.** Announced as of 1996 was the obscure Orchises Press's impending republication in book-form of the 1965 novella "Hapworth 16, 1924". That novella's progenitor was America's reclusive yet renowned novelist and short story-author Jerome David Salinger (1919-2010). Debate erupted immediately concerning Salinger's impulse to republish. His aims, and Salinger's subsequent withdrawal from his republication project, plus the selection of so improbable an outlet, all have seemed baffling. The original "Hapworth" publication remained his final item published during Salinger's lifetime. His 2013 biography by David Shields and Shane Salerno disclosed Salinger's birth with an undescended testicle. This, they opine, poisoned his life psychologically. A fresh review of the republication misadventure in light of this Shields-Salerno congenital physiology-assertion tends toward a contingent vindication of their psychological speculation.

**Keywords:** cryptorchidism, J.D. Salinger, Hapworth, monorchid, Orchises

#### INTRODUCTION

During 2013, David Shields and Shane Salerno released their biography of the American novelist and short-story writer J. D. Salinger (1919-2010). Therein they declared that Jerome David "Sonny" Salinger had been born with only one descended testicle. They list this congenital anatomical-characteristic as foremost (Shields and Salerno 2013, 562), chronologically at least, among ten conditions (*Ibidem*, 562-571) rendering his life "a slow-motion suicide mission" (*Ibidem*, 562). These biographers' claim constitutes the background to the investigation, pursued in the following pages,

into a peculiar incident in the professional life of a personally eccentric artist.

For as of 1996, Salinger had agreed to republication in book-form of his last-published work, the novella “Hapworth 16, 1924”. The republication itself, as well as the unlikely outlet, were surprises sparking controversy. For the publisher was to be a modest literary press owned by an academic. But the endeavour soon sputtered. Its proposed resurrection, about a decade subsequently, openly was abandoned altogether. The once-promising (or twice-promising) effort’s rise-and-fall seemed a conundrum. At least one principal (not Salinger) stepped-up to assume blame for the fiasco.

However, thanks to the Shields-Salerno congenital affliction-reportage, a preliminary explanation of this frustrated- republication history emerges: J.D. Salinger well might never have aimed at republication at all. With a famed writer’s practised, icy cynicism, he callously could have exploited an ambitious, small press. *Ex hypothesi*, his motivation was spun from the impact of his secret congenital affliction. Its impact impelled Salinger to tantalize his readers with a grim inside-joke. A gulled globe could not guess the depth of its own (yet not the knowing Salinger’s) ignorance. Readers remained uncomprehending the message of facts arranged overtly by Salinger to stare the world in its face.

#### SALINGER’S “HAPWORTH” MYSTERY I: THAT WITHDRAWAL

In 1996, word arrived that the “eccentric author” (Vinciguerra 2016, 173), reclusive J.D. Salinger, would release his novella “Hapworth 16, 1924” in hardback (Alexander 1999, 295; Slawenski 2010: 395). It originally had run in *The New Yorker* of June 19, 1965 (Alexander 1999, 297-299). “Hapworth 16, 1924” was the last item Salinger ever published (Shields and Salerno 2013, 389). The short-lived - roughly half-year (Shapira 2010) - republication endeavour disintegrated (Alexander 1999, 297-299; Slawenski 2010, 394-395). A parallel hardcover-republication effort emergent during 2007 (Slawenski

2010, 395n.) regarding the identical work and prospective publisher likewise fizzled (Slawenski 2010, 396).

Questions arose about the impulse behind Salinger's withdrawal from his spontaneous (Shields and Salerno 2013, 517-518) undertaking. Hence, Salinger's "Hapworth" Mystery I. Supposedly, the aforementioned parallel project's twenty-first-century withdrawal-trigger was premature revelations in the media concerning the enterprise, infuriating Salinger (Slawenski 2010, 396). Premature exposure of his enterprise might mark, partially anyway, one resolution of withdrawal conundrum Mystery I.

Professor Roger Lathbury was the owner of Orchises Press (Slawenski 2010, 396), based in his home (Shapira 2010). The professor expressed his anguish over this republication disappointment (Shields and Salerno 2013, 520) and personally shouldered the blame (Slawenski 2010, 396). Opines Salinger biographer Kenneth Slawenski:

However, the extent of Lathbury's resulting self-recrimination may have been undeserved. It is possible that Salinger's interest in releasing "Hapworth" was rooted in a desire for control rather than a concern for literature. In 1997, Salinger legally owned complete rights to every story and book he had ever published, with the notable exception of "Hapworth 16, 1924," the rights to which he continued to share with *The New Yorker*. Had he published "Hapworth" in book form as intended, the work would have been considered new and benefited from stricter copyright laws than it did as a 1965 story (Slawenski 2010, 396).

Slawenski's musings might mark, in part at least, a second stab at the resolution of withdrawal mystery. Insofar as evidence substantiates wrestling over rights to Salinger's novella, said submerged struggle (distinguished from premature republication-revelations in the media) somehow could have caused the "Hapworth" republication project to falter.

Moreover, voices have been raised to the effect that the February 20, 1997, devastating review of "Hapworth 16, 1924" by Michiko Kakutani elicited Salinger's response (Slawenski 2010, 395;

Alexander 1999, 298-299): “In the end it was Kakutani’s article in the *New York Times* that made Salinger change his mind about publishing the book *Hapworth*, says Jonathan Schwartz, the radio personality who closely followed Salinger for many years” (*Ibidem*, 298). As late as 2014 Tulane University’s Professor Thomas Beller, the scholar of Salinger, posed a query which Beller fancied anyone reading “*Hapworth 16, 1924* might have spoken aloud to the page as they read: ‘What is this supposed to be?’” (Beller 2014, 9n.1). Schwartz’s interpretation of the evidence means an authorial reaction to Kakutani abortive of what (to reiterate) Kenneth Slawenski sees as a “Hapworth” publication in book format as intended by Salinger. Such a speculatively-supposed Salingerian recoil from Kakutani’s condemnation of this work affords, in any case in part, a third attempted resolution of the withdrawal mystery.

#### SALINGER’S “HAPWORTH” MYSTERY II: ORCHISES PRESS

Another prominent question emerged from this incident: “[T]he publishing event of the decade had apparently fallen to, as odd as it may have seemed, Orchises Press - a tiny press in Alexandria, Virginia, run by a fifty-one-year-old George Mason University professor named Roger Lathbury” (Alexander 1999, 296). Too, “in bestowing rights to the novella, he [Salinger] was said to have snubbed the major publishers by selecting an obscure publishing house in Alexandria, Virginia, named Orchises Press” (Slawenski 2010, 394). As recounted by major newspaper reporter David Streitfeld: “[I]n the literary coup of the decade, the book will be published by Orchises Press, a small press in Alexandria, Virginia, run by George Mason University professor Roger Lathbury” (Shields and Salerno 2013, 518). Ms Kakutani, a *Times* critic (Slawenski 2010, 395), marvelled in the *New York Times*: “[W]hy choose the obscure Orchises Press in Alexandria, Va., to publish it?” (Kakutani 1997). For according to the *Washington Post*’s Ian Shapira: “To his amazement, Lathbury’s tiny Orchises Press had itself a deal with the reclusive novelist” (Shapira 2010).

The instant question was pointed-up by John Blades in the *Chicago Tribune*: “Why Orchises? Salinger’s decision to let the Orchises Press reprint ‘Hapworth 16, 1924’, after 32 years in mothballs, seemed as much a surprise, and a puzzle, to Little, Brown, his venerable publisher, as it was to the rest of the publishing industry” (Blades 1997). Hence, Salinger’s “Hapworth” Mystery II.

Assuming that Orchises is as impoverished as most small presses, Salinger may have passed up the opportunity for a substantial cash advance from Little, Brown or almost any other commercial Manhattan publishing house.

If the manuscript had come into her hands, said Molly Friedrich, one of New York’s wiliest agents, she would have auctioned the book, although not necessarily to the highest bidder.

Somebody like Salinger wouldn’t just go for the money, obviously,” said Friedrich. “It would be a very careful presentation. (Blades 1997).

After Salinger’s death, in 2010, Professor Lathbury recalled his 1988 solicitation letter to J.D. to publish “Hapworth”. Salinger’s brief, improbable reply stated that he would mull the matter: “I had the idea that Salinger might find my company attractive for its smallness” (Lathbury 2010). Only in 1996 did Lathbury hear further, through Salinger’s representative Harold Ober Associates: “Why had he said yes? I think he chose me because I didn’t chase him. I had left him alone for eight years after receiving his letter; I wasn’t pushy in the commercial way he found offensive” (Lathbury 2010).

#### SALINGER MAKES MONKEYS OF HOMO SAPIENS: WHAT IS ORCHISES?

On the other hand, theories explanatory of Salinger’s outreach to the Orchises Press alternative to Lathbury’s conjoint attractive-smallness, and noncommercial-unpushiness theories, prove available. For the *Baltimore Sun*’s Arthur Hirsch reported on an interview with Professor Lathbury, and the unravelling Salinger-

Orchises republication partnership, on June 7, 1998: “Lathbury wasn’t and isn’t talking. On a recent unannounced visit by a reporter, he was cordial, happy to chat about books and Orchises (‘orchids’ in Greek) in his cinder-block cell of an office at George Mason” (Hirsch 1998). Hirsch’s language contains the key to the theory alternative to *e.g.* Lathbury’s two contributions. Now consider:

That most elegant of flowers, the orchid, is named not for its alluring blossom but for its twin bulbs that bear a rather unnerving resemblance to testicles. Its name derives from the ancient Greek word *orkitis*, which means “testicle.” Thus the name of the orchid is related to such words as *orchitis*, or “inflammation of a testicle,” as well as *cryptorchidism*, the condition of having an undescended or “hidden” testicle. (Barnette 2005, 134)

Professor of English at the University of Winnipeg, Mark Morton framed it thus:

The sensitivity of testicles to heat and cold is interesting considering that orchids, which derive their name from the Greek *orkhis*, meaning testicle, are also sensitive to temperature changes. That flower, however, takes its name not from the fact that it thrives or wilts as the mercury fluctuates, but from the resemblance of its tuberous roots to the human testis. The etymological connection between the plant and the gonad is evident in the medical term *monorchid*, used to describe a man with a single testicle. (Morton 2005, 186)

Neither has this etymological connection been only obscure, nor scholarly. Among the flowers of Shakespeare’s *Ophelia* are long purples. The long purple is Europe’s *Orchis mascula* (Lees 1860, 102; Vaughan 1907, 93): “Among the recorded names for the purple orchis are ‘priest-pintle’ (penis), ‘dog’s cullions’ (testicles), ‘goat’s cullions,’ and ‘fools’ ballochs’ [sic]” (Greenblatt 1997, 1740 n.1). Of course, the orchid boasts an entire cultural history of its own (Endersby 2016). The orchid’s testicles-resembling dual-bulbs were credited in the *Naturalis Historia* of Pliny the Elder (A.D. 23-79) with energizing sexual desire (Winkler 1990, 81).

Cryptorchidism “is also called cryptorchism, undescended testes, or undescended testicle”, a “disorder” (<http://www.britannica.com>

/science/cryptorchidism). To be sure, the tacit yet deliberate Salingerian association of cryptorchidism with Orchises (Salinger himself their incarnated link) might be impossible to prove. He, however, was seriously a student of, and an adherent of, homoeopathic medicine by 1973 (Shields and Salerno 2013, 440). He was involved with homoeopathy at least from the 1960s to 2000 (*Ibidem*, 532, 535); during his final two decades, the homoeopathic products-market sprouted robustly (Tozzi 2015, 30). In that discipline one can peruse the hefty text entitled *Orchids in Homeopathy* (Klein 2014).

In Salinger's time, that discipline encompassed treating cryptorchidism. In 1974, the *British Homeopathic Journal* published this case report, as included in 1989's *The Complete Book of Homeopathy*:

A boy, aged 12, had his left testis normally descended but his right testis was in the inguinal canal. Operation had been advised. Aurum met. 30, 3 doses, was prescribed; 9 days later his mother phoned to say that the testis was now in the scrotum all the time. Follow-up, 1 year later, showed that the descent was permanent. (Weiner and Goss 1989, 223, citing Pratt, N. "Homeopathic Case Review." *British Homeopathic Journal*, 63:1 (1974): 15)

#### SALINGER AND JOHN BOLETUS

When his in-house concubine of 1972-1973, Joyce Maynard, suffered sexual incapacity, he escorted her to a naturopathic practitioner: "Jerry has made the appointment under the name of John Boletus and his friend Joyce" (Maynard 2013, 203). That lady was to recall of those days: "Often, when we go places out in the world, Jerry uses the name 'John Boletus' - 'boletus' being a Latin word for 'mushroom'" (Maynard 2013, 184). His daughter, Margaret "Peggy" Salinger, witnessed how her father already had mulled the boletus mushroom for years before bedmate Joyce would be welcomed into his Cornish, New Hampshire, home (Salinger 2000, 45). Rumour has it that "the mushroom undoubtedly symbolizes the

penis, there are mushrooms which derive their name from their unmistakable resemblance to that organ (*Phallus impudicus*)” (Freud 1952: 445, 511). Sure enough, the Phallus falls within the Fungi (Kingdom), including the Phallus’s Division (*Basidiomycota*), Class (*Agaricomycetes*) and Order (*Phallales*) ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phallus\\_\(fungus\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phallus_(fungus))). The Boletus mushroom so closely is related to the Phallus mushroom as to share the Phallus’s Kingdom/Division/Class systemizations ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boletus#cite\\_note-Liddell\\_1980-3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boletus#cite_note-Liddell_1980-3)).

Salinger might have exercised mastery in his native tongue. Nevertheless, only doubtfully would he dare to introduce himself as John Phallus. Instead, he introduced himself by the cryptic use of a phallic symbol: a mushroom, the Boletus. Simultaneously, J.D. (John Boletus) thereby self-denominated as a kind of ‘john’ - meaning, in some contexts, a prostitute’s customer. He already had invoked his alias-first name with inimical irony very much earlier. At Valley Forge Military Academy, the adolescent’s favoured phrase regarding someone Jerry disliked ran: “John, you really are a prince of a guy” (Hamilton 1988, 25).

To be sure, that first name he also assumed when travelling with his family generally, apparently as John (Salinger 2000, 188) Smith (*Ibidem*, 191). Every February there were family journeys to Florida (*Ibidem*, 188). Photographs shot approximately May 1953 display Jerry and his sister Doris at a beach resort in Florida (Slawenski 2010, 231n.). So perhaps adherence to that prostitution-coloured street-definition of his assumed first name too harshly hypothesizes that J.D. enjoyed implicitly emplacing a much younger woman who loved him (*e.g.*, his teenaged mistress of 1973, Joyce) into some covert prostitute-pictureframe (when abroad together to remedy naturopathically the teenager’s sexual malady).

On the other hand, anyone clutching anonymity (almost fanatically) seems, superficially, self-defeating in self-denominating as John Smith: “I’m using an alias”. If that were true, then underlying inclination toward the name ‘John’ grows credible. Said predispositions must prove potent enough to override practical

objections to that John Smith alias. If such tropisms were demonstrated, then perhaps deeper impetus underlying Salinger's propensity toward the (occasionally) prostitution-tied name could be sought.

Yet, surely, few scholars fix to fish Salinger's subconscious to net: (1) evidence - whether or not proof - both prominently sexual, and dark of his own ascription of prostitution to an undoubtable personal trauma, said trauma having evoked his undoubtable, manifest disgust; plus (2) nasty, bizarre, scatological, evidence clogged with sexual and dark overtones (not undertones), said evidence drawing a picture of the fantasy said trauma triggered.

Salinger's brother-in-law (Beller 2014, 151) Gavin Douglas was Claire Douglas Salinger's older brother (Salinger 2000, 5). Gavin asserted that Jerry once reluctantly visited his publisher and a representative of the firm in England handling the author, in New York City (Hamilton 1988, 159). Beller deems his tale as "one that stands out for being sexy and dark" (Beller 2014, 152):

[Salinger] told them he'd meet them at the Stork Club. When they got there, they sat down and started talking and then along came Claire and this friend of hers called Kay, slinking in acting like call girls. Jerry pointed them out to the publishers as examples of "that kind of woman" and asked if they would like a closer look. He asked the girls over to their table and for an hour or two they went on with it, talking tough and casting sly glances at the Englishman" (Hamilton 1988, 159, citing Gavin Douglas, "Interview with *Time* reporters" (1961) (*Time* archive))

Approximately a decade-and-a-half before, 22-year-old Salinger and playwright Eugene O'Neill's alluring daughter Oona O'Neill, over whom he was "crazy" (Slawenski 2010, 43 and 59, citing Salinger to Elizabeth Murray, October 31, 1941), had frolicked in New York City at the Stork Club (Slawenski 2010, 43). Oona, on June 16, 1943, married Charlie Chaplin (Alexander 1999, 86), her senior by 36 years (Slawenski 2010, 59). J.D. then acknowledged loathing her groom (*Ibidem*, 60, citing Salinger to Whit Burnett, ND (but July 1943)).

Of J.D.'s correspondence in the Library of Congress his sometime bedfellow Joyce Maynard records: "One of these letters

contains a bizarre passage in which Jerry describes his fantasy of a scene filled with dark sexual overtones between Oona, age eighteen, and the pathetically geriatric Charlie Chaplin, age fifty-three, whom she married, to Jerry’s obvious disgust” (Maynard 2010, 334). Salinger composed a letter in duplicate mocking the bride’s wedding-night (Slawenski 2010, 60n.). The Salinger investigator Ian Hamilton deemed it “nasty reading” (Hamilton 1988, 74). It was scatological (Scovell 1999: 124 and 322n.1, citing an interview with Arthur Gelb, January 19, 1998). Moreover, Harold Ober Associates, J.D.’s agent, holds a document with the date of April 10, 1945, listing Salinger stories; one plainly concerns Oona’s marriage, being identified as “Daughter of author gets [sic] Old Man” (Slawenski 2010, 127).

Gavin submits Salinger presenting (like a director presenting an actress) his masquerading spouse Claire to an Englishman in the Stork Club as a lady of easy virtue. Quere, whether Salinger’s parodic reenactment reified his prior Stork Club woman’s (Oona’s) status as harlot peddling herself to the famed, monied movie actor-director Englishman. Oona thereby denied her charms to her own Army’s mere enlisted-man, soldier Salinger. Hot-date Oona had been 16 when squired by Jerry at age 22; J.D. met Claire when he was 31 and Claire 16 (Slawenski 2010, 219; Salinger 2000, 7); each 16-year-old was still in her respective, tony high school (Salinger 2000, 7; Slawenski 2010, 43 and 256). Quere, whether Salinger subconsciously sensed them to be the same female, therefore equally to be symbolically (or worse than symbolically) denigrated in a sexual context.

In turn, Joyce Maynard tasted symbolic (or worse than symbolic) sexual context-degradation before a third-party. How degrading to Joyce was her Daytona Beach outing with John Boletus? After Joyce’s examination by the naturopath:

I felt exactly the same as before, only horribly humiliated.

Grim-faced, Jerry pays the bill. We hurry out the door. In the cab, I cry a little. I have never undergone a pelvic exam before. (Maynard 2010, 205)

Concededly, Gavin's recounting invites inquest. Exactly how did call girls act in the Eisenhower-era Stork Club? Would Stork Club-level call girls talk "tough" in the Stork Club? Could onetime Cambridge-Cliffie Claire credibly talk as tough as a New York City prostitute throughout a minimum of an hour? In true life, Kay exemplified "that kind of woman" who befriends former Radcliffe-senior wives of New Yorker-level authors generating trans-Atlantic attention. So could both Claire and Kay sustain pretence so long before a brace of publishers peculiarly-sensitive, professionally, to language? Could both perform for sixty minutes before breaking-up in laughter?

For how prim was Claire's biography? Claire had boarded at the Convent of the Holy Child in Suffern, New York, until the close of eighth grade (Salinger 2000, 6); it was in the eighth grade that the institution tried to woo her into taking the veil (*Ibidem*, 7). Claire thereafter entered the posh Shipley School in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania (*Ibidem*, 7), thereafter to matriculate at Radcliffe College. Just four months short of graduation she departed to live in Cornish with her husband (*Ibidem*, 84). He had requested Claire carry no Radcliffe-student baggage with her; Claire burned plays and additional fictions she had penned as a collegian, along with all of her other papers (*Ibidem*, 93). *Slinking in like call girls*. Like a girl first called by a convent and later called from Radcliffe College.

How conservative was Claire's biography? Hers was a background wherein J.D. and she had synthesized a proper female hostess as an excuse for Claire's long weekend absences from Radcliffe (Slawenski 2010, 251):

This being the fifties, a young lady had to obtain written permission from a respectable person to be away from college for the weekend. Claire and Jerry made up a certain "Mrs Trowbridge" and composed some very funny letters to Claire's mother and to those in loco parentis at Radcliffe, with lots of silly, patrician news about Claire's lovely visits. (Salinger 2000, 83).

Moreover, even had the Stork Club gag transpired, would Kay or either Mr or Mrs Salinger tell Gavin how cynical impresario-Salinger exhibited Gavin's younger sister as a prostitute? In the atmosphere

of 1961, would Gavin tell *Time* reporters the tale about his own sister that (even in the atmosphere of 2014) Beller judged “stands out for being sexy and dark”? Was Claire’s friend “called Kay” inaccessible, even by *Time* reporters? Did Gavin not know Kay’s real, full name? Did Kay exist?

SALINGER, JOHN BOLETUS AND BINT

In all events, Salinger (“John”) was an artist who could feel words were passed with ulterior motives: Before their sexual malady trip, Salinger had announced to his aforementioned mistress that their someday-daughter should be named Bint (Maynard 2013, 177 and 210). Only afterwards was she told by a British scholar: “It’s a word that means ‘whore,’ worse than ‘wench’; it’s a very ugly word for a woman” (Shields and Salerno 2013, 439). Employed toward objectification of women sexually, bint initially was utilized as a collective noun, perjoratively, during 1855 (Morton 2005, 96). That kind of woman. Whore. John.

The University of London’s distinguished Professor Marina Warner was producing a book during 2016 about Cairo in the 1950s. Her father had been employed in Cairo from 1947, and there Marina (b. 1946) resided into the 1950s (Warner 2016, 32). Hence the Professor more than most might have to feel uncommonly conscious of British slang linked with any common Arabic noun. Warner recounts concerning her father’s 1945 reunion with her mother in Southampton post-World War II, how “A childhood friend recently reminded me that when he brought her into the mess, an officer shouted: ‘What’s that bint doing in here?’ To which my father replied: ‘I’ll have you know, sir, this bint is Mrs Warner.’” (Warner 2016, 30).

The *Oxford English Dictionary* definition rings less luridly than that of Maynard’s informant: “A girl or woman (usu. derog.); girl-friend”. It cites a 1941 *New Statesman* listing of war slang with: “Bint—Girlfriend”. And it gives the noun’s source as Arabic for ‘daughter’

(*Oxford English Dictionary* 1989, 205). Between his January 29, 1944, debarkation at Liverpool (Slawenski 2010, 79) and June 6, 1944, deposit upon Utah Beach (*Ibidem*, 90), U.S. soldier Sonny Salinger could have absorbed some such slang (lurid or otherwise). All this plausibly suggests Salinger as mindful of implications in a name, e.g. Orchises. *Orchids. Testicles.*

By 1972 the Cornish, New Hampshire's squire Salinger might have lost touch with wartime British slang's nuances. He wholly innocently might have framed 'bint' in terms only of his own *New Statesman* "Girl friend" (Joyce Maynard) someday bearing their Arabic-accented daughter: little baby Bint. Suppose Salinger chivalrously daydreamed about boasting of Joyce herself: "This bint is Mrs Salinger!"

Nor proves it inconceivable that in personal life a wordsmith so sophisticated can think in language as generic as girlfriend/daughter. Margaret's recollection during 2000 about her parents J.D. and Claire Salinger ran: "He told me on a visit during the summer of 1997 that if it were not for Claire, 'I'd have given you guys [my brother and me] no names at all and let you name yourselves at about twelve years of age'. At present, he has three cats whose names are Kitty 1, Kitty 2, and Kitty 3" (Salinger 2000, 107).

#### SALINGER TRADUCES THE WORLD: WHO WAS J.D. SALINGER?

Peggy Salinger would remember visits as a little girl with her father from Cornish to her paternal grandparents' apartment at 1133 Park Avenue in New York City: "There was also something embarrassing about Granny's prints of the *Life of the Orchid* that hung over the living room couch; I could tell by the way he mentioned them, but I didn't get that either" (Salinger 2000, 145-146). For certain, orchids are deemed somehow sexy (Crump and Crump 2009, 108).

Orchids are fancied "seductive" within scientific circles, as really the "sex symbols of the plant world" (Wong 2011, 88). Psychologist Charlotte Davis Kasl assisted women to displace negative fantasy-

images by envisioning sexual, life-positive pictures: “To help with the process, I sometimes suggest a book with sensuously photographed orchids, some with dewdrops on the petals. The orchids provide a wonderful image women learn to pair with their genitals” (Davis 1990, 204). Nonetheless, even were J.D. cryptorchidism-alert since boyhood, some might wonder why he might be male-genitalia, orchids-conscious in 1996. For Salinger telephoned Roger Lathbury about publishing with Orchises Press on July 26, 1996 (Shields and Salerno 2013, 517).

Any male peculiarly aware of his enfleshed manhood might care that testicular cancer develops at a rate from 500% to 1,000% more heavily in an undescended testis, although that disorder is surgically corrected (<http://www.britannica.com/science/cryptorchidism>). Meanwhile, Orchid is the United Kingdom’s foremost charity dedicated to work for anyone affected by male cancer: penile, prostate or testicular. Orchid was founded by testicular cancer survivor Colin Osborne and the oncologist who saved Osborne’s life, Professor Tim Oliver. Perhaps coincidentally, Orchid was established in 1996 (Orchid - [www.orchid-cancer.org.uk/about-us](http://www.orchid-cancer.org.uk/about-us)). And how aware was J.D. of Britain? Following a seven weeks-long, 1951 holiday in England, Scotland, Ireland and the Scottish Hebrides (Slawenski 2010, 200-202), he could write about settling in Scotland (*Ibidem*, 202). Salinger long since had disclosed himself to his twelve-year-old Peggy, no less, as the kind of man to journey to Britain to meet a teenaged girl (Salinger 2000, 261-262; Maynard 2013, 339).

Recollect Slawenski’s proposition that Salinger intended an Orchises publication to extend Jerry’s control over his creation. Molly Friedrich pronounced: “Somebody like Salinger wouldn’t just go for the money, obviously”. In fact, Ian Shapira recorded: “Lathbury remembers that Salinger did not ask for an advance and that any money to be made would come from sales” (Shields and Salerno 2013, 518). A theory of the whole Orchises publication imbroglio alternative to Slawenski’s runs: The Orchises project unilaterally (if that term is tolerable) was conceived to miscarry. J.D.

was completely cognizant of its calculated outcome. Under that theory, there can be scant wonder why sly Salinger solicited no advance.

John Wenke, a scholar of Salingerian short fiction (Shields and Salerno 2013, 682), holds: “There’s no aesthetic reason that I can think of for why Salinger would want ‘Hapworth’ to be in print. The very fact that he’d had a deal with a small press in Virginia indicates that he was perfectly aware of the kinds of things likely to happen” (*Ibidem*, 520). No aesthetic rationale. Instead, J.D.’s betrayal of an unsuspecting Lathbury marked, maybe, a wiseguy’s one-sided (hypothesizing an author asymmetrical gonadally) joke upon the public, about orchids. For Salinger indeed “was perfectly aware of the kinds of things likely to happen”. He was perfectly aware of more things than are dreamed of in Wenke’s philosophy.

Salinger sealed-off from his guileless Alexandria, Virginia, victim a smug celebrity’s solitary, selfish, secret program. *Ex hypothesi*, his hidden agenda was simply to shout into the ears of all the planet his word ‘orchids’ over and over and over. An unsuspecting Orchises Press handed Salinger his bullhorn. For the widely-heeded conundrum concerning Orchises’ Salinger republication-program broadly heralded, simultaneously, a different noun (that was somehow the same noun) again and again and again: Testes. Testes. Testes. *Conundrum*. “1. A kind of riddle or puzzling question, of which the answer is a pun or involves a pun” (Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1948, 222).

Salinger’s biographer Kenneth Slawenski in 2010 thus discussed the 2007 assurance that Orchises would release “Hapworth” for Salinger’s birthday on January 1, 2009 (January 1, 1919, being the day, as Salinger knew, someone had counted his fingers and toes and suchlike): “Readers and critics justifiably met the announcement with scepticism. It did, however, generate renewed interest in Orchises Press (...)” (Slawenski 2010, 395n.). *Renewed interest in Orchises*. Quare, whether orchises/testes labelled something Salinger ceaselessly contemplated: That thing of which Jerry dare not speak the name, and that thing over which he failed to suppress

(or disdained to suppress) his fixation.

#### LATHBURY BETRAYING SALINGER

Professor Lathbury, on April 4, 2010, reviewed his history with Salinger, a retrospect entitled “Betraying Salinger” (Lathbury 2010). Lathbury says that after he met J.D.: “A series of letters followed. They were remarkably open, even garrulous, with notes on family life, social observations, gripes about train travel, little jokes about himself” (Lathbury 2010). *Remarkably open. Jokes about himself.* This clashes with the picture drawn by biographer Paul Alexander during 1999: “[H]e did not [in 1955] have, nor would he ever have, a keen sense of humour. Serious and aloof, Salinger was so wrapped up in his life, he was unusually unable to step back and laugh at himself, or at others” (Alexander 1999, 186). Can such seemingly inconsistent reports be reconciled?

In the year of Alexander’s biography of Salinger, the psychiatric literature declared that, among cryptorchids, some “subjects tend to sexualize their relationship with the external world in the form of an exhibited hypersexuality or seductiveness, or a sexual ambiguity” (Masi et al. 1999, 79). Consequently, consider how Professor Lathbury loyally concludes:

Some people, when they hear this story, blame Salinger for backing down after going this far, but I find this unfair. Such people want J.D. Salinger to be someone other than J.D. Salinger. Nor is the problem the *Washington Post*. I know where the blame lies. After thinking I could do right by a man I admired, I let him down.

In the end, I’m left with a box. It contains the buckram sample case and the die used to stamp the cockeyed spine printing. It also contains a stack of wonderful, kind letters from a man who has meant as much to readers as any writer ever can. I have not looked at those letters in years; to reread them would be too painful. Nor will I sell them. That, at least, I can do. (Lathbury 2010)

*Exhibited seductiveness. Wonderful, kind letters. To reread them would be too painful.* That year, Ian Shapira reported of Lathbury: “Though brief,

the relationship with Salinger still haunts and enchants the English professor, now 64” (Shapira 2010). *Haunts and enchants*.

#### SALINGER BEWITCHING BY POST

##### *Oona O’Neill (17) and William Saroyan (33)*

Oona O’Neill (at ages 16 and 17) was squired by Jerry Salinger (at ages 21 and 22) (Scovell 1998, 86-87). At the Dalton School, Oona was a dancing classmate of Carol Marcus (*Ibidem*, 88). No earlier than December 1941, the 17-year-old Carol met the 33-year-old playwright, William Saroyan (*Ibidem*, 98). Saroyan wrote Carol numerous letters, to which Carol supposed herself ill-equipped to reply (*Ibidem*, 100). In those “early days of the courtship” (*Ibidem*, 99), Carol

... confided her fears to Oona, who straightaway concocted a plan. Jerry, one of Oona’s many ardent beaux, wrote brilliant letters; why not lift pithy passages from his notes and incorporate them into Carol’s letters to Bill Saroyan? Carol liked the idea and proceeded to take from Jerry and send to Bill. Thanks to Oona O’Neill, William Saroyan received letters from Carol Marcus with additional dialogue by the young J.D. Salinger. (*Ibidem*, 100)

Not earlier than the summer of 1942, Saroyan told Carol that (avowedly with his eye toward their marriage) he wanted her to meet his family (*Ibidem*, 98). Consider whether the letters of J.D. Salinger at age 21 and 22 could seduce an adult male expertly commanding English.

##### *Claire Douglas (16): Enchanted and Haunted*

The day after J.D. Salinger at age 31 met the 16-year-old Claire Douglas in the fall of 1950, he obtained her Shipley School address. The week following, he had his letter in her hands (Salinger 2000, 10):

She wrote a letter to him in return, agonizing over it, afraid she might not sound clever enough to a real writer. [Compare Carol Marcus and William

Saroyan.] He telephoned her off and on throughout the 1950-51 school year. She knew from his letters that he was hard at work finishing a novel. She thinks he changed the school that Holden’s best friend Jane Gallagher attended to Shipley [School] for her. “It was the sort of thing he’d do, but I was too in awe and on my best behaviour to ask”. (Salinger 2000, 10-11)

By early 1953, Jerry asked Claire to drop out of Radcliffe and live with him in Cornish, New Hampshire (*Ibidem*, 83). When she declined, he cut off contact. Claire collapsed and subsequently would inform her daughter: “The whole world was your father—everything he said, wrote and thought. I read the things he told me to read, not the college stuff nearly as much, looked on the world through his eyes, lived my life as if he were watching me” (*Ibidem*).

*Jean Miller (14): Enchanted and Haunted*

Compare Claire’s experience with that of Jean Miller. She met J.D. Salinger in January or February 1949 (Shields and Salerno 2013, 221), when Jean was 14 and Jerry was 30 (*Ibidem*, 223). They were exchanging missives by March (*Ibidem*, 228-229). After about five years (*Ibidem*, 220 and 241), he broke up with her (*Ibidem*, 240).

Breaking her silence of some six decades, Jean relates:

All through my life, there’s a part of me that asked, “Would Jerry Salinger approve of this?” I can go five years without giving him a thought, but if there’s a moral dilemma and I’m trying to figure out what the next right step is, Jerry Salinger might pop into my head. I think, “Well, I’d better not do it that way”. (Shields and Salerno 2013, 241)

*Looked upon the world through his eyes. Lived as though he were watching me.*

*Joyce Maynard (18): Enchanted and Haunted*

Salinger’s live-in mistress from Yale over 1972 and 1973, of eighteen and nineteen years of age, was Joyce Maynard. She published a book in 1998 encompassing their affair. Salinger had initiated a correspondence with her upon encountering her *New York Times Magazine* cover story of April 23, 1972 (Shields and Salinger 2013, 409). Her memoirs relate:

One set of letters that make up a crucial piece of my history are the forty or so pages of my correspondence with J.D. Salinger, from April 1972 to August 1973. Long before I met the author of the letters, I fell in love with his voice on the page. Sometimes funny, other moments tender, and frequently wise, knowing and scarily prescient, Jerry Salinger's words formed the basis of my powerful and enduring attachment to him and haunted me for years after he left my life (Maynard 2013, 349-350).

*Haunted me.*

The adult Maynard, then herself a professional writer, recounted of their correspondence prior to their first meeting:

There's only one other time in my life when I experienced the phenomenon of letters having an equivalent [to Salinger's letters to her as an 18-year-old] power of seduction, seduction by words. It was a man serving life in prison for double murder. He had only words to pull in a woman, and he did it very well. Salinger was a master at that. Getting a letter from J.D. Salinger was like getting a letter from Holden Caulfield, but written just to me—Holden Caulfield telling me how wonderful, lovable and brilliant I was (Shields and Salerno 2013, 424).

After her 1998 memoir was published, Maynard asserts:

Not wholly surprising to me were the letters I received from three other women telling me they had engaged in correspondences with J.D. Salinger eerily like my own, one within weeks of his dismissal of me. I have no doubt these women's stories were true. They quoted lines from Salinger's letters to them nearly identical to ones in his letters to me, whose contents had never been made public. Like me, these women had been approached by Salinger when they were eighteen years old. Like me, they once believed him to be the wisest man, their soul mate, their destiny (Shields and Salerno 2013, 525).

By 1997, Salinger had been married for years to Colleen O'Neill Salinger (Shields and Salerno 2013, 511; Alexander 1999, 293). Colleen O'Neill is not to be confused with Oona O'Neill. Their common last name doubtless was coincidental, at least to the extent Salinger moved in circles heavily Irish or heavily Roman Catholic. (Exactly how great was that extent?) That year, Joyce visited the Salingers' home (Shields and Salerno 2013, 522).

For in 1984, at a New York City publication party Maynard had met a woman who told Maynard of her former au pair’s possession of letters the girl had received from J.D. (*Ibidem*, 515):

She was young. She was beautiful. She had met Salinger by chance and they had started writing to one other. The writer was fascinated, of course, since the girl had ended up with a cache of letters from Salinger—letters, Maynard realized that night in Manhattan, not unlike the ones he had written to her. Over time, Maynard became obsessed with the girl. She found people who knew her. She even got hold of a picture of her.... [On November 4, 1997], Maynard had finally met her. She had opened the door when she knocked—Colleen (Alexander 1999, 309).

*Letters remarkably open. Wonderful. Kind.*

Roger Lathbury during 2010 retained his box of letters: “I have not looked at those letters in years; to reread them would be too painful.” Compare the Professor with the Joyce Maynard of circa 1997:

I went to the back of my closet, where there was a shoebox, (...). I hadn’t looked at the letters from Jerry Salinger in twenty-some years.

I took them out, laid them on my bed, and began to read them. They were letters I’d known very well. I could have recited some of them, I’d read them so carefully when I was young. I was reading them now as a forty-three-year-old woman, and the voice that moved me and melted my heart when I was eighteen struck me in a very different way at forty-three (Shields and Salerno 2013, 515).

*Marjorie Sheard (23): Enchanted and Haunted*

In 2019, novelist D.J. Taylor mused of fan letters: “In these frank admissions of esteem, or something approaching it, there lurk the beginnings of a relationship. But what kind of relationship, and with what end in view?” (Taylor 2019, 19). Indeed, “On rare occasions, the relationship becomes actual rather than paper-bound” (*Ibidem*).

Furthermore, Taylor had learned that: “Curiously, with titans of the trade known for their unapproachability or reluctance to reveal much about their deepest feelings, a fan letter very often acts as a kind of emotional trigger” (*Ibidem*, 19). No youthful literary

phenomenon, in 1941 Jerry Salinger marked but tomorrow's titan among American fictionalists. He was destined both to become known for disinclination to disclose a great deal concerning, *e.g.* innermost Salingerian sensibilities, and to become the national legend of unapproachability.

Beller grasps something noteworthy in the 22-year-old Sonny Salinger's correspondence with Marjorie Sheard. Their correspondence was initiated in September 1941 by that 23-year-old (Itzkoff 2013, C1) fan from Toronto (Beller 2014, 117):

Unless Salinger slaved over his letters, typing multiple drafts, what jumps out at you is the neatness of the page and the typing. Not one typo. And the fluidity of the warmth that flows from the lines. The mixture of the informal and the profound, even in this artificial exchange of writing to a fan, is remarkable. The correspondence is the first appearance of a major theme: Salinger writing to a young woman with advice and encouragement, with a nod to the edge of the map where there be dragons, and Vassar girls. (Beller 2014, 118)

Moreover, Beller judges:

One of the fascinating things about Salinger's epistolary style is the confidence with which he conducted himself, his graciousness and good manners enhancing the sense of being genuine as opposed to impeding it, as forms sometimes do.

There was something about the distance implicit in a letter that allowed him to come forth with genuine warmth. (Beller 2014, 175)

*Remarkable fluidity. Warmth.*

Salinger and Marjorie (d. 2013) never met (Pyne 2013). But until about 2007 (Itzkoff 2013, C1), Marjorie secretly stored his typewritten letters inside a shoebox (Ptashnick 2013) in a closet, then to put them into the hands of a relative when Marjorie entered a nursing home (Itzkoff 2013, C1). Perhaps Marjorie's story sounded familiar to Maynard with her shoebox, and to Lathbury left at the close with a box of his own. Determine whether, among women saving (through more than 70 years) typed letters from foreign men they never met, must number the enchanted and

haunted. Scant wonder is Beller’s belief that: “As communication, as metaphor, as talisman, as literary calisthenics, letters were central to J.D. Salinger’s life and imagination” (Beller 2014, 10).

A theory about Professor Lathbury’s “Hapworth 16, 1924” evidence alternative to Lathbury’s own theory, runs: contrary to proving remarkably open, a devious trickster coldbloodedly manipulated the man of letters trusting him. Far from opening-up through jocularity over himself, Jerry beguiled Lathbury across sheets of stationary as J.D. had mesmerized female after female after female, for generation after generation. Quære, whether Salinger toiled over drafts of his private correspondence to infuse his leaves with warmth glowing from between their lines. Wonder whether only the distance inherent in correspondence empowered pyrotechnics of genuine charm (because letters betokened but literary callisthenics). *Sexualize relationship with the external world, in the form of exhibited seductiveness or sexual ambiguity.*

#### CONCLUSION

The preceding, speculative discussion has reviewed the controversy over the turn-of-the-century’s abortive republication of Salinger’s 1965 novella, “Hapworth 16, 1924.” This preliminary reappraisal has been informed by the report in the 2013 biography of Salinger by David Shields and Shane Salerno, indicating that the infant “Sonny” Salinger had been born with an undescended testicle, the medical condition denominated cryptorchidism. That affliction they style a serious emotional burden he endured through the decades. The previously little-known outlet the monorchid-Salinger ostensibly selected for his proposed republication, Orchises Press, bears a name meaning ‘orchids’ in Greek. In turn, the Greek noun ‘orkhis’ means ‘testicle.’

The owner of Orchises Press, Professor Roger Lathbury, gallantly shouldered the blame for the collapse of the engagement to republish the novella created years-earlier by his erstwhile

publication-associate. Yet evidence enveloping that business failure bears another reading. For Lathbury recounts that he received and saved Salingerian correspondence constituting a stack of kind and wonderful missives from the man Lathbury admired. However, his apotheosized, sometime business partner had made a practice, decade after decade, of corresponding with strangers or near-strangers seduced on paper. Those recipients embraced his teenaged, future wife (Claire Douglas). She, years later, would divorce him (Alexanderb1999, 236-237). They embraced his teenaged, future mistress (Joyce Maynard). She would flail him decades later in a stinging reminiscence.

In this interpretation, the comparatively openhearted Lathbury was seduced and traduced like young Douglas and youthful Maynard. Each was a trusting correspondent with a callous counterpart long-sophisticated in people-puppeteering. You easily ken what flower both Claire and Joyce held that Jerry desired, because it proves the desire of heterosexual males in general. Whereas, what held George Mason University Professor Lathbury that Salinger could covet?

Even the middle-aged Sonny somewhat had appeared embarrassed, a bit mystifyingly, by his mother's *Life of the Orchid* prints hung in her home. In 1996, Lathbury's Orchises Press unknowingly offered elderly Salinger a ruse to relish a laugh at an anthill of stooges incompetent to distinguish between a chaste wife from a convent by way of Radcliffe, and a Stork Club-call girl: *Homo sapiens*. Out in the open, he would knot the names Salinger and Orchises to make the world mull the two in tandem. Simultaneously, Salinger savoured solely proving, among all mankind, conscious of what his conjunction cunningly conveyed.

Something else Salingerian happened the year of unsuspecting Lathbury's first of two "Hapworth 16, 1924" endeavour-debacles. On November 4, 1997 (Maynard 2013, 338), Joyce Maynard - no more 1972's sub-age of majority, unsuspecting, cohabiting mistress (Maynard 2013, 158) - arrived unannounced at the 78-year-old Salinger's Cornish doorstep (*Ibidem*, 341) for their final five minutes

together (Maynard 2013, xi):

He stands there for a moment. Then, taking a step backwards, he raises his long thin finger so it’s pointing directly at my heart.

“You, Joyce -” he says, finger still pointing. “You. You. *You*.” His whole body is quaking, and his eyes stare out at me as if he were beholding a sight of unspeakable horror.

“The problem with you, Joyce, is... *you-love-the-world*”. (Maynard 2013, 343-344 (ellipsis and italics in Maynard))

Unbeknown by Joyce from that day to this, between 1996 and 1997 the recluse already might have played their entire world for fools. Maybe Jerome David Salinger judged his jest justified. For their world, which Joyce loves still (Maynard 2017, 71), abandoned a boy to a natal curse he never dared name aloud but delivered disguised.

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THE ETHICAL JUSTINE AND THE VIOLENT JULIETTE IN ANGELA CARTER'S "THE SADEIAN WOMAN: AN EXERCISE IN CULTURAL HISTORY"

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**Abstract.** "The Sadeian Woman: An Exercise in Cultural History" is Angela Carter's non-fictional work<sup>1</sup>. It consists of a historical and cultural analysis of Le Marquis de Sade's *Justine or The Misfortunes of Virtue*, and *Juliette or The Prosperities of Vice*<sup>2</sup>. The book exhibits the lives of two antithetical sisters: the virtuous Justine *versus* the vicious Juliette.

The ethical Justine strives to preserve her virtue after the death of her parents. As a reward, she submits to violence, torture, rape, and accusations. Even though the law has been unjust to Justine, she refuses to commit a transgression. With regards to Juliette, she inflicts suffering and commits violence against humanity in order to make her own fortune. She is a libertine who follows her sexual and material gain at the expense of ethics.

Contrary to Justine, who is a martyred female, Juliette is the source of all criminal acts. She does not submit to the law. She is in dishonest complicity with the lawmakers, who provide her with unjustified lawful protection. Justine's attachment to her moral virtue ends with her death, while Juliette's corrupt mind provides her with a successful career within a discriminatory world in which violence supersedes ethics.

**Keywords:** ethics, violence, new woman, libertine, Justine, Juliette, heart, rationality

## INTRODUCTION

*The Sadeian Woman* is a cultural critique of Le Marquis de Sade's *Justine or The Misfortunes of Virtue* and *Juliette or The Prosperity of Vice*<sup>2</sup>. Both books tackle the different violent sexual relations which result in the victimization of females. Actually, Carter's work is a study of

de Sade's gender perspective and an interpretation of the different relations between males and females, virtue and vice. Carter's work proved to be an assessment of pornography, rather than a support of it, as it has been claimed by copious critics. Various feminists have condemned her ostensibly pornographic literary inclination without getting into depth with her anti-patriarchal endeavor:

He [de Sade] creates, not an artificial paradise of gratified sexuality but a model of hell, in which the gratification of sexuality involves the infliction and tolerance of extreme pain. He describes sexual relations in the context of an unfree society – the expression of pure tyranny, usually by men upon women, sometimes by women upon men and other women. The one constant to all Sade's monstrous orgies is that the whip hand is always the hand with the real political power and the victim is a person who has little or no power at all, or has had it stripped from him. In this schema, male means tyrannous and female means martyred, no matter what the official genders of the male and female beings are. (Carter 1979, 27)

The relationship between sexual violence and political tyranny is conspicuous in de Sade. His libertine characters are the most politically powerful ones. They deploy their sexual corruption to attain political refuge. In contradistinction, his virtuous heroine female, Justine, is denied any legal rights and undergoes all types of torture and humiliations.

Carter objects to de Sade's binary division of human attributes as entirely brutal or purely righteous. Her designed female character should escape de Sade's binarism<sup>3</sup> and the splitting of the culturally inscribed gender peculiarities. Through her cultural analysis, Carter aims to achieve a synthesis that matches human behaviour. She prepares the ground for a new person who should be neither a wholly tyrannical one, nor a long-suffering victim. Being a postmodern feminist writer, she stands against the principle of binary oppositions and the strict divisions of human characteristics, as are advanced by de Sade. The latter presents two antithetical sisters, each of them choosing a different path. After the death of their parents, the two sisters are forced to leave the convent where they spent their bourgeois childhood. They are obliged to face the

cruel outside world at an early age, poor, helpless and parentless. Neither Juliette nor Justine chooses the right path that can lead them to salvation and procure them with a decent life. Justine abides by her heart and emotions while Juliette clings to her rationality and overlooks morality.

### 1. THE ETHICAL JUSTINE

The innocent Justine complies with her ethical values and moral principles, while her sister Juliette sticks to vice, sexual and material pursuit. Both embark on two opposing ways that bring each of them to contrasting ends. Justine's moral pilgrimage and the preservation of her honour victimize her under the hands of violent libertines. Throughout the stages of her life, Justine has been at pains to preserve her virginity: the proof of her female virtue. This intent precipitates her torture and suffering.

Justine begins her miserable career with the idea she never quite rids herself of, that her beauty and virtue are in themselves qualities which demand respect. (...) She is compensated for her defencelessness by a convention of respect which is largely false. Herself mystified by herself, narcissistically enamoured of the idea of herself as a blessed virgin, she has no notion at all of who she is except in fantasy. (Carter 1979, 83)

Her false internalized convictions are no longer respected in a materialist and corrupted world that overlooks virtue and ethics to attain sexual and material gain. Justine embodies the character of a fairytale princess who embraces her morality and fair beauty as a safeguard against the violent and wicked outside world. However, she evades the fact that these very same qualities are the chief causes behind her desecration. Despite her good demeanour, Justine is usually recompensed by torture, false charges, beatings and sexual abuse. She is the incarnation of the traditional literary image of the virtuous female character that refuses to react in an immoral way, though she has undergone violence, immorality and torture.

After being arrested for the first time, Justine makes the acquaintance of the brigand chieftainess - La Dubois. The latter “suggests that the callousness of the rich justifies the crimes of the poor and asks Justine to join the robber band, but Justine, though almost persuaded by La Dubois’s arguments, decides she will never fall from virtue” (Carter 46).

Despite her poverty and unbearable sufferings, Justine adheres strongly to her moral standards and preserves her chastity, which she tightly relates to virtue and scruples. Despite the fact that she was raped by Saint Florent in the forest after she helped him to escape the robber band, Justine is strongly convinced of her chastity. Since she was violently raped, she repressed her human sensations in order to find moral justification for her picks of consciousness. She is assured of her intact virginity as long as she does not feel pleasure.

The question of her virtue is itself an interesting one. As the brigand, Coeur-de-fer, says to her; why does such an intelligent girl so persistently locate virtue in the region of her genitals? For Justine’s conception of virtue is a specifically feminine one in that sexual abstinence plays a large part in it. (Carter 1979, 54)

Her abstinence and complete denial of any sensual experience lead her to encounter all types of humiliation and vicious treatment, whether at the hands of the legal, social or religious sadist male members, who shroud their ravenous sexuality beneath their almighty political sovereignty.

She is conveyed as a martyred female with no place in the enlightenment rational world. Actually, she is the embodiment of the traditional literary female behaviour which symbolizes the heart and feelings, regardless of reason and rationality. “The moral of Justine, Carter asserts, is this: ‘to be the object of desire is to be defined in the passive case. To exist in the passive case is to die in the passive case-that is, to be killed’” (Carter qtd. in Tonkin 2012, 158). Her excessive morality conveys her to passivity and forbids her to react in a negative way, though she has the means to do so.

Justine's unreasonable devotion to her ethics brings about her unfortunate downfall since she is victimized, emotionally and physically abused by all males she has encountered during her dolorous pilgrimage. Even though she is falsely charged for murder and theft, the virtuous Justine refuses to react or commit any transgression against the law.

Within a rational world, conducted by profit and self-interest, Justine epitomizes the inert female object, on whom the active male subject exercises infinite physical abuse, sexual perversion and unjust legal, social and religious accusations. Besides, she symbolizes the unjust legal institutions that empower the victimizers and privilege the rich at the expense of the poor and victim.

[The] libertines are great aristocrats, landowners, bankers, judges, archbishops, popes and certain women who have become very rich through prostitution, speculation, murder and usury. They have the tragic style and the infernal loquacity of the damned; and they have no inner life, no introspection. Their actions sum them up completely. They are in exile from the world in their abominable privilege, at the same time as they control the world. (Carter 1979, 28-29)

The world of Justine is a cruel one, that overlooks morality and justice and champions violence and libertinage. For de Sade, Women's virtue is a myth that should be shuttered in order to assert their place within a violent and ruthless masculine world. Justine pertains to the passive category and wholeheartedly accepts her destiny as an inferior and acquiescent human being, without any attempt from her behalf to break the chains of any patriarchal inflicted myths.

The self and the other in Sade are, for Carter, mutually confirming opposites. Both sides, locked into a framework of rigid dualisms-reason and unreason, aggressor and victim, annihilator and annihilated-confirm egoism and a lack of humanity and communality. (Day 1998, 98)

Justine adheres to the passive category that can be defined only in relation to its powerful counterpart. She follows her heart but never

her reason, and lives a virtuous life without resorting to violence and vice. Her rigid attitude in the choice of her human behaviour guides her to a psychological disturbance and misunderstanding of the inner wickedness of the corrupt and libertine males that she has encountered during her miserable life.

Because she views the law with reverence, Justine finds no lawful protection as a reward. On the contrary, she is accused of numerous false indictments, of which she is totally innocent. The legal system preserves the rights of the rich and vicious without searching for justice and fairness. What is appealing, as far as the character of Justine is concerned, is her irrational defencelessness in front of the law. Her heart has overwhelmed her rationality, to the extent that she embraces her passive situation without any attempt to revolt against the sadist oppressors.

The poor righteous female finds it immoral to react in an unjust manner that can transgress the governmental regulations, though it is the sole way for her salvation and survival. Consequently, she becomes enslaved by her egocentric feelings that totally exclude rationality from her life.

Justine's organ of perception is the heart that forbids her to engage in certain activities she feels to be immoral and her autobiography illustrates the moral limitations of a life conducted solely according to the virtuous promptings of the heart (...). Through its own unreason, the heart finds itself in complicity with the morality of cruelty it abhors (...) The unreason of the heart, the false logic of feeling, forbid her to exert mastery for even one moment. (Carter 1979, 58-61)

Justine is the incarnation of moral values and ethic qualities. Her human feelings imprison her in an ideal world, dwelled only by her person and violently surpassed by the ruthless libertines. The moral that can be extracted from Justine's misfortunate fate is that virtue alone leads to a wretched life, misery and exploitation by the rational, cruel male world. Her submissiveness makes her accomplice with her oppressors since she excludes her reason and relies heavily on her heart which cripples her rational thoughts.

Through the analysis of Justine's character, Carter aims to criticize de Sade's binary division of human behaviour. Justine's shunning of rationality is the source of her unhappy end. She chooses a correct moral path, regardless of reason which precipitates her persecution and abuse. Carter criticizes the typical female model. She advances a new picture of femaleness, one that overcomes de Sade's division. She views female passivity as a cultural myth, created by the patriarchal realm to achieve gender inequality.

The repression of her instincts and violent side has not physically preserved her chastity and virtue. She has undergone all kinds of violence and sexual abuse without any attempt on her behalf to protect herself or take revenge. Notwithstanding the fact that de Sade clearly depicts Justine's morality and virtue, he does not present her as the perfect female model because he strongly believes in the violent side of the female power.

For de Sade, women can escape sacrificial lamb hood (The 'natural' condition of women, as exemplified by Justine and defined by men) only by adopting tigerhood (The role of the predatory aggressor, the 'natural' role of men, as exemplified by Juliette and also defined by men). (Atwood 1994, 119)

He stands against the weak female position, which is attached to women as a typical characteristic of femaleness and incites them to surpass their submissiveness by adopting the male aggressive conduct. For de Sade, there is no middle female position: women should either be aggressed or aggressors. He complies with the principle of binary oppositions and applies it to his characters. He overlooks the specificities of humanity, which evade the invariable classifications of binary opposites.

## 2. THE VIOLENT JULIETTE

Contrary to Justine, Juliette embodies all negative human characteristics. She is a thief, a liar, a libertine and a criminal. She initiates her sadist career by committing murder, which helps her to

get rid of any sense of humanity and indulge in criminality. She chooses to follow the track of the abbess - Delbéne, who teaches her sexual perversity and sadistic violence as the ultimate solution for her survival after the death of her parents.

Delbéne has had the means and the opportunity to cultivate her intellect; she reads Spinoza and lectures Juliette on the nature of justice and on the sexual autonomy of women. She has a cold heart, and she murders for pleasure. The voice of reason, always subversive, must issue from a monster; Sade must censor Delbéne, as he creates her. She is rational, therefore wicked. (Carter 1979, 94)

Juliette's natural predisposition to violence has prompted her loss sensitivity. Justine is defined in female and emotional terms while her antithetical sister embodies the traditional image of cruel masculinity and pure rationality. Juliette, with her vicious male behaviour, is considered as the adored female archetype of Le Marquis de Sade. He rejects female inferiority and encourages women to adopt the masculine mode of living to escape passivity.

This fact is critically analyzed by Carter, who searches for reciprocity and interchangeability of female conduct. For her, human beings should be both Justine and Juliette in order to attain balanced physical and psychological states. The story of Justine is narrated by the heroine herself on her way to be executed. Ironically enough, she reports her miserable life to a woman who proves to be her sister, Juliette. Being accomplice with the law-makers, Juliette saves her from execution and tries to help her forget her miseries.

After liberation, Justine lives together with Juliette, symbolizing the inseparable coexistence of heart and reason. Allegorically; Justine is saved only through vice and rationality, which she has excluded. The life of the virtuous Justine has been too short after her salvation. As it comes in the narrative, while she closes the windows to protect her sister from thunder, she is struck by a thunderbolt.

While Justine is undergoing torture and suffering, her antithesis, Juliette, is inflicting all kinds of pains. She looks for material profit

and sexual gratification. Juliette infringes the law without being punished, for she sleeps with the law-makers who provide her with unjust lawful protection. In this context, Carter describes her as:

(...) rationality personified [she] leaves no single cell of her brain unused. She will never obey the fallacious promptings of her heart. Her mind functions like a computer programmed to produce two results for herself-financial profit and libidinal gratification. By the use of her reason, an intellectual apparatus, women themselves are still inclined to undervalue, she rids herself of some of the more crippling aspects of femininity. (Carter 1979, 90)

Juliette typifies rational masculinity, precluding human feelings and heart. She is the opposite of her sister at all levels. As a matter of fact, she commits all the crimes of which her sister has been unjustly impeached. However, instead of being punished, she is rewarded by the government representatives, who wholeheartedly offer her “their mafia-like protection” (Carter 1979, 91). Virtue is innate in Justine as it is vice in Juliette, who dares even to kill her daughter without repentance or feelings of regret.

When she hurls her daughter into fire...she is, at last absolutely free from any lingering traces of the human responses that can only be learned through the society of others who are not accomplices, who are not aspects of the self that confirm the omnipotence of the self. She has indeed attained the lonely freedom of the libertine, which is the freedom of the outlaw. (Carter 1979, 99)

Her egocentric individualism blinds her to human relations and good feelings. Juliette embodies the masculine enlightenment thought which obscures the heart and emotional life. She follows only her reason with the denial of humanism. She is usually in the position of the powerful male subject who dominates the other inert acquiescent object.

In fact, she is the female idol of de Sade, who posits her as a model of the new woman. Besides, she allegorizes the enlightenment egocentric individualism and inhuman rationality. Juliette is modelled to abide by her reason and repress her emotions.

We are informed that she has acquired her life credo from the statesman Noirceuil.

[He] teaches her how nature made the weak to be the slaves of the strong. She learns her lesson at once; to escape slavery, she must embrace tyranny (...) in the cultivation and practice of egoism and self-interest alone may be found true happiness (Carter 1979, 84).

She has internalized Noirceuil's beliefs and acts in accordance with them in every aspect of her life. Juliette clings to self-interest and self-mastery, hence she never feels passive as it is the case with regards to her sister. Her greatest individual egoism bridles her feelings and moral obligations towards the other human beings. Her evil and wicked nature is the source of her immoral prosperity.

Through the character of Juliette, De Sade "digs deep to expose the erotic component of the will to power the link between the instinctual and the political and the power relationships that underpin eroticism. He is tireless in tearing down every romantic illusion, be it social, logocentric, or ethnocentric". (Mazur 1996, 183)

Juliette is de Sade's token to convey political injustice, libertinage and the most profound enlightenment individualism. Through her character, he criticizes the criminal social life, the corrupt political system and the vicious Catholic monks who hide their sexual perversity beneath their seemingly religious devotion. He presents two opposing female types, both of them negative since they adhere to the principle of binarism. Actually, Carter opposes both types of womanhood and looks for reciprocity between both of them, rather than their dualistic division. She also objects to Guillaume Apollinaire's view, who claims:

Justine is woman as she has been until now, enslaved miserable and less than human; her opposite, Juliette, represents the woman whose advent [is] anticipated, a figure of whom minds have as yet no conception, who is rising out of mankind who will have wings and will renew the world. (Carter, 96)

Carter is convinced that the heroine represents one type of womanhood but certainly not the perfect model of the new woman.

She underscores the character of Juliette in order to unveil its shortcomings and weaknesses. For Carter, Juliette is “a new woman in the mode of irony” (*Ibidem*, 90). Carter has been severely attacked by various feminists for embarking on the analysis of de Sade’s pornographic works. However, through her cultural critique, she aims to accomplish a synthesis of both heroines as the perfect prototype of the new woman.

Justine was originally conceived as a satire, attacking the corruption of contemporary institutions, including the judiciary, banking, the bourgeois-dominated world of finances in general and, above all, the Catholic Church with divine providence being the principal religious target. (Phillips 2001, 94)

Though she symbolizes the figure of the traditional martyred female, Justine has submitted to all types of injustice committed by the above-mentioned institutions. She finds no lawful and just protection. Even when she runs to Saint-Marie monastery in the woods, she faces all types of sexual perversion and violence, exercised on her, as well as the other imprisoned girls, by the monks.

The monastery of St. Mary-in-the-Wood is (...) a microcosm in which a small group of privileged men operate a system of government by terror upon a seraglio of kidnapped women. As in all the Sadeian places of confinement, intimidation alone prevails and the only reward of virtue is to escape punishment. (...) Brought here by force, their girls are released from the pavilion only by death. It is as if the place of terror and of privilege in a model of the world; we don’t ask to come here and may leave it only once. Our entrance and our exit are alike violent and involuntary. (...) The task of the girls is to minister to the pleasures of their masters, the monks. Complete submissiveness is their only lot. (...) The monks rule their little world with the whim of oligarchs, of fate or of God. (Carter 1979, 48-49)

The description of the monastery reveals the tyrannical religious authority with its unscrupulous and capricious monks who hide their sexual depravity underneath their claimed religious piety. In de Sade’s world, political corruption and religious deception are rigidly connected to sexual debauchery. As it is the case with Justine, the female is usually the victim who submits to all types of atrocity. De

Sade views femaleness in a negative point of view. His plain misogyny is critically undertaken by Carter, who repudiates his compliant female image and proffers her perception of the new woman.

### 3. CARTER'S MODEL OF THE NEW WOMAN

Carter condemns de Sade's binary division of human behaviour. She looks for a synthesis of both the virtuous Justine and the wicked Juliette. Though the latter succeeds to prosper, Carter protests about her deportment, for she lacks the human side. Besides, she opposes Justine's long-suffering and lack of rationality. She is "the holy virgin and Juliette the profane whore. The sisters embody de Sade's dialectic of the feminine: sexual victim and sexual terrorist, thesis and antithesis" (Tonkin 156).

At variance with de Sade, Carter's visionary new woman should be both ethical and violent, passive and active, aggressor and victim. She considers De Sade's work as:

(...) represented by 'a sort of Siamese twin, both halves entirely constructed by men: the traditional-role female victim, Justine, and de Sade's "new woman", Juliette, who is instead a victimiser' (...) what [Carter] is, in fact, searching for is a fusion of the two. (Gamble 2001, 121)

The reciprocity and flexibility of human behaviour is an essential feature for having a balanced human being. Justine brings about her torture because she has not acted in a violent and callous manner when it is necessary to do so. Juliette, as well, is not the utopian example of the new woman, for she excludes her heart and emotions. Carter calls for a mixture of both conducts to attain a successful new woman. Through her cultural analysis of the relations between males and females, Carter anticipates her following book of short stories: *The Bloody Chamber*. The latter work depicts Carter's ideal of the new woman, who is simultaneously ethical and violent, passive and active. Carter's new female can never

be a political, religious, social or sexual victim. In contradistinction, she is proportionate to the newly-female constructed masculinity.

Carter scorns all myths and particularly those related to females. The mythical internalized conviction of the woman as a weak creature, compared to the man, is surpassed by Carter's design of the strong new woman. She strongly challenges de Sade's strict classification of femaleness. She discloses his entrapment within the mythical passive vision of femaleness. For Carter, as a feminist postmodern writer, "myths deal in false universals, to dull the pain of particular circumstances. In no area is this more true than in that of relations between the sexes" (Carter qtd. in Schmid 1996, 145).

The myth of Justine as a static, vulnerable and overwhelmed creature and the myth of Juliette as a permanently libertine and violent should be deconstructed. For Carter, these myths are man-made rather than naturally-given; therefore, they imply some hidden male interests. The new woman should acquire the female characteristics, as well as the ones previously reserved for males.

In this respect, Carter's arrangements are much more subject to mutability than are de Sade's. He postulates the permanence and 'decreed' nature of virtue and vice: Juliette is born evil, Justine good, and so they remain. Carter, however, celebrates relativity and metamorphosis and 'the complexity of human relations'. (Gamble 2001, 122-123)

She unriddles de Sade's division of the nature of woman. For de Sade, in order to escape being martyred, women have to endorse Juliette's archetype. Carter opposes this dualistic division and offers, instead, a fusion of both. She denies the existence of a unique unchangeable demeanour to which women have to stick.

In this context, she asserts: "the notion of a universality of human experience (...) is a confidence trick and the notion of a universality of female experience is a clever confidence trick" (Carter qtd. in Gamble 2001, 123). Justine dies virtuous and ethical, while Juliette starts to feel regret and picks of consciousness after the death of her chaste and innocent sister. Actually, this is the suitable end, written by Carter instead of the one presented by de Sade. By submitting

the female character of Juliette to mutation, Carter triumphs to advance a woman who is both vicious and benign. Juliette's tears, which are the result of her sympathetic attitude towards Justine's fate, are proofs of her heart's revival after a long despotic reign of her rationality.

#### CONCLUSION

Through her cultural analysis of de Sade's works, the writer seeks to find a better end, together with solutions for his vile characters. Instead of being permanently libertine and vicious, Carter suggests for them to embrace the feeling of love as a solution to remedy their troubled psyches. The libertines repress their feelings; consequently, they become stone-hearted. By recuperating love, they would consider their human sides, similarly to rationality. Hence, they can attain a natural equilibrated state of being.

Justine is the thesis, Juliette the antithesis; both are without hope and neither pays any heed to a future in which might lie the possibility of a synthesis of their modes of being, neither submissive nor aggressive, capable of both thought and feeling (Carter 1979, 91).

This is Carter's objective, which is to have both ethics and violence, hoping to design the new woman who should endorse tigerhood and lambhood to assert her place within a male world guided by self-interest. Neither the heart nor rationality has to be denied; rather both of them should be present in order to have a better female world as distinct from the one constructed by de Sade, who plays the representative role of the patriarchal order.

#### NOTES

1. "Angela Carter, born Angela Stalker, published novels, short stories and essays, as well as a body of as yet uncollected journalism. She lived in Japan for two years, as well as in America and Australia, and finally settled in London, where she died in 1992. Carter took up Simone de Beauvoir's

axiom that women are made not born, and explored the way cultural norms inhibit women. Gender definitions are exposed as mere cultural prejudices imposed on obedient women and men. Carter described her surrealist, baroque, fantastic, grotesque and picaresque writing as ‘magic realism’” (Wheeler 207-208).

2. “Le Marquis de Sade was born in 1740, a real nobleman, and died in 1814 in a lunatic asylum, a poor man. His life spans the entire period of the French Revolution and he died the same year that Napoleon abdicated and the monarchy was restored to France. He stands on the threshold of the modern period, looking both backward and forwards, at a time when the nature of human nature and social institutions was debated as freely as it is in our own. Sade’s work concerns the nature of sexual freedom and is of particular significance to women because of his refusal to see female sexuality in relation to its reproductive function” (Carter 1979, 1).
3. Binarism/binary oppositions: “the term ‘binary’ denotes ‘composed of two’, ‘twofold’. (...) Language has countless binary oppositions: up/down; slow/fast; sense/nonsense; truth/falsehood; black/white; man/woman (...). As a structuralist concept it derives especially from Lévi-Strauss’s studies of mythology. Linguistics and structuralist analysis use the notion of binary opposition not only in terms of words or concepts but in terms of the conventions or codes of a text. (...) The very idea of a binary opposition implies a centering or imposition of order: such binary signification is stable and systematic to structuralists, and unstable and decentered to poststructuralists. Deconstructive practice seeks to undermine, loosen, such analogical oppositions” (Cuddon 1976, 82-83).

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FOSTERING COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT: ON THE INTERSECTION  
OF CLIMATE SCIENCE DENIALISM, POLITICS, AND EPISTEMIC  
CRITERIA OF ASSENT

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**Abstract.** This paper reviews and interrogates theories of climate science denialism, and climate science skepticism, from a Science and Technology Studies (STS) perspective, and proceeds as follows: (1) Compare work by Jasanoff & Simmet, and by Collins, Evans & Weinel, on post-truth rhetoric, theories of expertise, and managing climate science denialism. (2) Introduce particular boundary drawing norms that I view as promising in potentially persuading publics to support mitigation responses to climate change. (3) Review work by Jylhä and by MacWilliams on the politics and demographics of climate science denialists. (4) Argue that recent work by Kenner provides a model for effectively engaging local communities in climate science epistemology, which could be fruitfully extended using social science work reviewed in this paper. (5) Conclude that there is plausibly fruitful political negotiation to be done by engaging conservative people to envision desired futures and compare those visions with the emerging climate.

**Keywords:** climate change, denial, politics, epistemic, community, engagement, post-truth

## 1. ON POST-TRUTH AND EXPERTISE

This section reviews some recent prominent views about how STS should approach climate science denialism. This paper follows Lewandowsky et al. (2015) in the view that there is broad scientific consensus on climate change, which Lewandowsky defines as “the agreement that (a) the Earth is warming and (b) most of that warming has been due to human greenhouse gas emissions”

(Lewandowsky 2015, 1). Opponents of these views, which I'll refer to as climate science denialists, have frequently emphasized scientific uncertainty in order to argue against regulations designed to mitigate climate change. The topic of scientific certainty, and uncertainty, is thus central to the analysis of climate science denialism. This section considers the production of public doxastic attitudes of certainty (or ignorance) through the employment of post-truth rhetoric, which eschews empirical contestation in favour of emotional appeals to authority.

The relation between post-truth rhetoric and climate science denialists has gained increasing attention from STS scholars. Collins, Evans & Weinel (2017) have argued, roughly, that the social constructivist turn in STS work, which emphasized continuities between science and politics, has “opened up the cognitive terrain to those concerned to enhance the impact of democratic politics on science but, in so doing, it opened that terrain for all forms of politics, including populism and that of the radical right-wing” (Collins 2017, 581). They have advocated that STS should respond to climate science denialism by emphasizing conditions of legitimate expertise, of scientific experts, in evaluating claims about climate science. STS, they aver, is expert in expertise. On this view, by limiting the people who are assessed to be experts in accordance with some norms of science, STS can make a uniquely valuable contribution to work on climate science (and other post-truth related topics).

By contrast, Jasanoff & Simmet (2017) have argued against establishing privileged epistemologies of expertise. They contend that the debates around climate change science, such as carbon taxes, have failed to adequately engage with everyday concerns of non-experts, such as “the experience of hardscrabble working lives with legitimate worries, grievances and desires divergent from those of a state perceived as unduly intrusive or an educated, expert elite” (Jasanoff 2017, 765ff). Crucially, Jasanoff & Simmet contend that topics which are taken up by post-truth rhetorics, such as climate science and related regulations, are actually stand-ins for

disagreements about the fundamental values of our society. In Jasanoff & Simmet's words,

Americans' ignorance of each other across economic and class divides has created a world of blanket accusations about being on the 'wrong side of history'. This leads to a climate in which fundamental disagreements over values are treated as if they can be simply overridden and destroyed by facts rather than listened to and reasoned with to create a knowledge base that feels truly shared. Yet, what calls for attention in our present crisis – a crisis of democracy as well as a 'climate crisis' – is precisely this lack of shared imaginations about the future of American, and indeed global, society. (Jasanoff 2017, 765)

That is to say, per Jasanoff & Simmet, contests regarding climate science have failed to make adequate progress in changing legal structures precisely because the participants of the contest have failed to conduct sufficient political negotiations about what values to pursue as a body politic. Climate change activists, including those in STS, should aim to create 'shared imaginations' about the future which 'feels truly shared' to the participants. Appeals to an epistemic privilege of expertise would fail because the contest is political, not factual.

Jasanoff & Simmet is in broad conformity with a Foucault's (1972) account of scientific knowledge production as a ritual which encodes value and power. Consider the following quotation from Foucault on the topic of the production of knowledge.

The history of ideas, then, is the discipline of beginnings and ends, the description of obscure continuities and returns, the reconstitution of developments in the linear form of history...it shows how scientific knowledge is diffused, gives rise to philosophical concepts...it shows how problems, notions, themes may emigrate from the philosophical field where they were formulated to scientific or political discourses. (Foucault 1972, 137)

That is to say, per Foucault, the history of ideas illustrates how notions and problems can migrate between domains of science and political discourses; science is political. Jasanoff & Simmet extend that Foucauldian analytical framework by emphasizing how the

rhetoric relating to climate science lies at the intersection of the scientific factual claim and fundamental questions of political value.

## 2. PROMISING FRAMEWORKS FOR BOUNDARY DRAWING

Jasanoff & Simmet note that the problem of identifying knowledge is ancient, and that the epistemology of science has gained renewed urgency in the face of harms associated with climate change and public contestation regarding what counts as legitimate climate science. This section reviews the rhetorics of climate science and discusses related STS theories of expertise. To give one example of the rhetoric of climate science denialism, consider a view articulated by Scott Pruitt, the Environmental Protection Agency Administrator, who said, “I think that measuring with precision human activity on the climate is something very challenging to do and there’s tremendous disagreement about the degree of impact (...). So no, I would not agree that it’s a primary contributor to the global warming that we see” (Chiacu & Volcovici 2017). That is to say, per Pruitt, disagreement amongst experts about human impacts on climate change are sufficient to warrant his conclusion that humans are not a “primary contributor to (...) global warming”, and therefore governments should refrain from taking steps to limit greenhouse gases (*e.g.* a carbon tax).

By contrast, Oreskes & Conway (2010a) support a view that there is an overwhelming consensus among scientific experts that anthropogenic factors are a key contributing factor in climate change. They write that the scientific consensus on anthropocentric climate change is “unequivocal” (Oreskes 2010a, 169). Oreskes & Conway emphasize the crucial role of a group of scientists, including Bill Nierenberg and Fred Singer, allied with conservative think tanks, in generating scientific controversy regarding climate science. They cite a 1979 report on climate science by Nierenberg, Schilling & Nordhaus, produced for the US National Academy of Sciences under the Carter Administration. That report is, per Oreskes &

Conway, unusually disjointed in that, unlike past reports, the Nierenberg report was not signed, in total, by all authors. It has individually signed chapters, a point which they contend indicates the internal incoherence of the views of the authors. The executive summary, they report, “sided with the economists” who counselled against taking measures to limit CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, not the natural scientists who counselled in favour of proactive policies to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (Oreskes 2010a, 177). Oreskes & Conway present documents indicating that powerful interests, such as the energy lobby and “oil-rich states”, actively sought to deceive public perceptions of climate science by paying for research that conformed with their profit interests. Summing up a troubling picture, they conclude, “[the] divergence between the state of the science and how it was presented in the major media helped make it easy for our government to do nothing about global warming...Scientifically, global warming was an established fact. Politically, global warming was dead” (*Ibidem*, 215).

### 3. THE POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGY OF CLIMATE SCIENCE DENIALISM

Jasanoff & Simmet’s call for STS work to engage politically with climate science denialists intersects with fascinating empirical research which shows that those who engage in climate science denial are typically white males with conservative political views, termed the ‘conservative male effect’, a topic of recent research. For instance, one empirical study of climate science denialism by Jylhä et al. found that “[the conservative male effect] can be explained by the endorsement of group-based social hierarchies as indexed by social dominance orientation” (Jylhä 2016, 184). That is to say, the prevalence of climate science denialism amongst conservative males is partly explained by their predisposition to endorse group-based social hierarchies. Such social science findings can help activists and theorists to better understand their audiences as they work to engage climate science denialists. As noted by Wibeck (2014), climate

change activists should be mindful that the public is not uniform, it is heterogeneous, and distinct target groups may respond differentially to various “interpretative frames” regarding climate change (Wibeck 2014, 401).

The relation between authoritarian politics and climate science denialists can be illuminated by Merton’s (1942/73) seminal sociology of science. This paper extends Merton’s account to illuminate contemporary debates about the boundaries between science, pseudoscience, and science denialism. Merton proposed that science has a socially constructed “ethos”; thus, Merton aims to describe, and prescribe, norms of scientific inquiry. Merton’s warning about the dangers of fascist epistemologies of science intersects with the political challenges of our present post-truth era, with implications for theories of climate science denialism. Commentators have for years noted a global lurch to the political right which is demonstrated by Brexit and the election of Trump, whose platform included authoritarian policies which are discriminatory toward perceived outgroup members, such as political refugees and asylum seekers (Taub 2016). According to an analysis of voter demographics in the 2016 election by MacWilliams (2016), “Trump’s rise is in part the result of authoritarian voters’ response to his unvarnished, us-versus-them rhetoric” (MacWilliams 2016, 716). This section reviews research linking conservative voter’s response to Trump’s authoritarian rhetoric and policies with his administration’s forceful climate science denialism and his initiatives favourable to the fossil fuel industry.

Groundbreaking reporting by Banerjee et al. (2016) describing a campaign by the oil company Exxon over a period of 40 years to discredit climate science. In conformity with the aims of that 40-year long campaign, there has been a proliferation of climate science denialists. These denialists are overwhelmingly allied with right-wing, and business-friendly, political positions. The profit motive of the fossil fuel industry is the most elegant and plausible explanation for that lengthy campaign. In this sense, ignorance about climate change was produced by the social structure of capitalism and greed,

transferred through popular media, itself subject to the influence of capitalism. Trump has nurtured connections with the fossil fuel industry, especially coal, and his administration has doubted that climate change is substantially anthropogenic, while the Environmental Protection Agency has sought to loosen regulations of climate change causing fossil fuel emissions and standards.

Oreskes et al. (2018) have extensively described the ways that fossil fuel companies designed and contributed to public controversy regarding climate science. A constellation of corporations and libertarian think-tanks worked together to construct ignorance through the publication of works by scientists which contradicted previous research on climate science. In their words, “during the early 1980s, anti-environmentalism had (...) taken root in a network of conservative and libertarian think-tanks in Washington (...) the CATO Institute (...) the Heritage Foundation (...) the Marshall Institute - variously promoted business interests and ‘free market’ economic policies, and the rollback of environmental, health, safety, and labor protections (...). Much of the funding (...) came from the fossil fuel industry [including] Exxon Mobil” (Oreskes 2018, 160). This paper follows Jasanoff & Simmet in viewing Oreskes’ work as squarely in favour of establishing privileged epistemologies of expertise. We can see privileging of certain epistemologies in the key conclusion defended by Oreskes, namely that the scientists who have been prominent in contesting anthropogenic climate change have engaged in illegitimate knowledge production; they are illegitimate experts. Oreskes & Conway (2010b) sum up: “One reason that the public is confused is that people have been trying to confuse them, in large part by intentionally waging campaigns of doubt against climate science...It works because if people think the science is contentious, they are unlikely to support public policies that rely on that science” (Oreskes 2010b, 686) The work of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate knowledge production has received voluminous attention; in the following section, I review some of that work which I find to be promising. My aim here is not to side with Collins, Evans

& Weinel in favour of expertise boundary drawing, and against Jasanoff & Simmet’s injunction to dispense with such boundary drawing in favour of political negotiation. Rather, my aim is to note what I take to be promising suggestions for boundary drawing that could persuade anthropogenic climate change sceptics to reconsider both their politics and their beliefs about climate change.

Hansson (2017) has helpfully developed a taxonomy of forms of knowledge production which he describes as deviant. His aim is to counter climate science denialism, which contends that “poses a serious threat to human health and the long-term sustainability of human civilization” (Hansson 2017, 39). Following Hansson, this section distinguishes science from science denialism by articulating a theory of “deviant criteria of assent” (*ibidem*). For example, extending Oreskes, Hansson contends that climate science denialists have “fabricated fake controversies”, an epistemically illegitimate activity (*ibidem*). Per Hansson, other deviant criteria of assent include:

- Cherry picking information – failure to evaluate the whole body of evidence.
- Neglect of refuting information – refusing to acknowledge new evidence that is contrary to previously embraced, intuitively appealing ideas.
- Lack of competence – climate science denialists typically lack academic credentials.
- Inability to publish in peer-reviewed media – climate science denialists have not been able to publish widely in peer-reviewed journals and media.
- Use of conspiracy theories – climate science denialists often evoke vaguely defined liberal conspiracies.

The granular epistemic framework that Hansson offers is in broad conformity with the kind of analysis of expertise advocated by Collins, Evans & Weinel. In addition to describing deviant criteria of assent, Hansson also sketches some demographic commonalities among science denialist activists; denialists are overwhelmingly

“male” and they frequently connect their climate science denial activities with “right-wing” political positions (Hansson 2017, 43ff). Following a Foucauldian analysis of power, we can view the alignment of right-wing political positions with climate science denialism as rooted in a complex, ever-shifting arrangement of interests that include political, economic, scientific, cultural, gendered, and racialized. These criteria of deviant can plausibly be used to engage publics in the kind of political negotiation endorsed by Jasanoff, offering publics a framework to refine their own criteria for evaluating knowledge claims. What do the social sciences tell us about the psychological characteristics associated with right-wing authoritarian politics and connections with climate science?

### 3.1. AUDIENCE SEGMENTATION AND RIGHT-WING POLITICS

The psychology of people who favour right-wing authoritarian politics has been researched by Halperin & Bar-Tal (2011) in the context of Jewish interpretation of novel information in connection with the ongoing conflict with Palestinians. The role of openness to novel information is crucially important for people who hold right-wing political views. Briefly, Halperin & Bar-Tal, found that “unwillingness to be exposed to new information that may contradict already held views about the conflict restricts the views of society members and ultimately supports the continuation of the conflict [with Palestinians]. These members tend to use superficial analyses of incoming information and search for information consistent with already-held knowledge (Halperin 2011, 647). On this account, traumatic experiences, *e.g.* loss of human life, is predictive of fearful and defensive postures which are in turn predictive of information processing. Those who experience great pain are more likely to close-minded to new information which contradicts preconceived beliefs.

By way of positive suggestion, Halperin & Bar-Tal suggest one way to “unfreeze” widely held beliefs, namely by introducing novel

instigating beliefs which “show incompatibility between the desired future, on the one hand, and the emerging future and/or the current state and/or the perceived past, on the other hand” (Halperin 2011, 647). Shifting back to the present topic of science denialism, it follows that one way to unfreeze the science denialist claims is to demonstrate that there is a harmful emerging future which is incompatible with the broad values and aims such climate denialists. I here note that such potential to unfreeze the science denialist claims represents a promising avenue for further STS work which would embrace both Jasanoff’s call to really listen to and negotiate with climate science denialists, while also embracing, in part, the call of Collins, Evans & Weinel to retain some place for privileged expertise (in this case, privileged expertise of the findings of Halperin & Bar-Tal, which provides an empirical basis for framing climate change discussions).

The potential for illustrations of harmful emerging futures to bring productive public attention (as opposed to avoidance) to climate change has been supported by a variety of other researchers. For instance, Henly-Shepard, Gray & Cox (2015) have worked with coastal island communities to raise awareness about hazards and risks associated with climate change, explore adaptation strategies, and foster social trust and learning of diverse stakeholders. Specifically, the research conducted “a series of iterative participatory modeling workshops using fuzzy-logic cognitive mapping (...) community committee represented, explored and actively questioned their beliefs about the natural hazards that their community faces (...) the modelling process allowed the committee to represent the communities’ dynamic nature, run tsunami hazard scenarios to quantify potential direct and indirect effects, and explicitly compare trade-offs of competing adaptation strategies” (Henly-Shepard 2015, 109). Such community work to emphasize local risks associated with climate change are a promising opportunity for climate change activists to both leverage local pieces of knowledge about local climate change challenges, while informing the discussion in ways that have been empirically shown

to foster community engagement (as opposed to burnout, apathy, or avoidance).

### 3.2. A MODEL FOR COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

Work by Kenner (2018) of Drexel University's Center for Science, Technology, and Society in Philadelphia has aimed to help people to become aware of localized effects of climate change, such as increased incidence and severity of asthma attacks, and increased risk of heat stroke. Kenner's work illustrates the potential for climate change activists to further involve faith-based organisations and other community groups, as well as technologies such as phone apps in order to mitigate health risks associated with climate change (Kenner, 2016; Fortun et al., 2014). Such local community involvement expands upon Kenner's push for an embodied, transcorporeality approach to climate change and other environmental problems. Kenner has noted that, in her view, a key challenge is that climate science is not authoritative in the minds of many Americans. Her work seeks to highlight how some climate science has unhelpfully emphasized decontextualized phenomena, *i.e.* knowledge abstracted from felt time-space, thereby undermining the work of scientists and policymakers who need to gain public buy-in on the reality of global climate change. Thus, Kenner seeks to 'bring climate change home', joining Jasanoff in seeking to engage the political concerns of everyday folk and practising what Kinchy et al. (2018) have called 'engaged STS work' integrating the lived realities of communities with environmental justice and climate justice work. In this sense, Kenner's work rejects Oreskes & Conway's emphasis on expertise and scientific consensus, instead of focusing on those who have been sidelined by expert discourses of climate science activists.

#### 4. CONCLUSION

In summary, this paper has discussed how research on climate science denialism can be informed by social theories of knowledge production and social influence, including those of Merton, Foucault, and Harding. I have sought to balance the calls of Jasanoff & Simmet to engage in political negotiation with the calls of Collins, Evans & Weinel to retain some notion of epistemically privileged knowledge production. Recent work by Kenner strikes that balance by engaging communities to generate awareness of localized effects of climate change and enable the kind of political negotiation that Jasanoff & Simmet advocate while integrating the practice of critically evaluating knowledge claims. I suggest that community engagement work like Kenner's could be fruitfully extended by integrating lessons from Halperin & Bar-Tal showing that widely held beliefs can be unfrozen by showing how some desired future is incompatible with an emerging future. There is plausibly fruitful work to be done engaging conservative white males to envision desired futures and compare with the emerging new climate. The following work by Jylhä and by MacWilliams may be better equipped to make sense of climate science denialism by understanding the fascinating associations between it and conservative political views. Finally, work by Hansson on deviant criteria of assent could be leveraged to help publics to identify deviant knowledge claims, enabling further informed evaluations of climate science denialist claims.

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REVISITING DIASPORA: HISTORY, MIGRATION, AND  
MULTICULTURALISM OF SOUTH ASIANS IN BRITAIN

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**Abstract.** Multicultural Britain – when we refer to this identity of this English land, we denote something deeper and more significant than a mere study of the coexistence of communities with various cultures. The formative process of a country as multicultural consists of history, proliferation, reorientation and transformation of migrants in that country. If we look at the graph of multiculturalism in Britain, we can understand that it entails an exclusive study of diasporisation that includes the history of diasporas in Britain, their arrival, their traumas, their struggle, their rise and transformation. Races from across the world arrived in Britain for various reasons and gave birth to a landscape of multiculturalism. Migrant communities spread all over the country form a platform of multi-cultures where they relentlessly interact with the host culture and thus begin to essay their shift to a new identity. South Asian communities in Britain have undergone these layers of evolution and metamorphosis since their arrival. Some noted writers from these communities have addressed various stages of diasporic experiences in their narratives. This essay briefly discusses this aspect of South Asian diasporic writers in Britain while examining the historical and socio-cultural contexts of diasporisation.

**Keywords:** diasporisation, history, multiculturalism, South Asian diasporas in Britain, narratives

In contemporary cultural studies, diaspora becomes a significant subject of research due to its emergence as a defining tool of cultures, identities and practices in the present global context. Diasporas, though refer to the existence of migrant groups in a host culture, have more to offer in understanding the evolution and metamorphosis of cultures, societies and nationalities. It is through

diasporas the transnational bridge of multiculturalism is constructed in today's world. This essay discusses the definition, history and critical analysis of diasporas with a discursive focus on South Asian diasporas in Britain.

Like its literal Greek meaning – scattering - this term posits an essence of displacement in its configuration. Its historical source is attributed to the exile and migration of the Jewish community to Babylon after the destruction of the Temple in Israel in the sixth century BC. There was a strong political motive rather than a religious impulse behind this destruction. Howard N. Lupovitch finds this context as central to the dispersal of the Jewish community, writing:

In 598, King Jehoyakim joined an alliance of small states against Babylonia. Following the defeat of this alliance, the upper class of Judah was sent into exile, and Zedekiah, a quisling Vassal, was installed as king of Judah. A decade later, unable to quiet the surging nationalist sentiments, Zedekiah joined a revolt against the Babylonian rule. The revolt was defeated in 586, resulting in the destruction of the Temple and the wholesale expulsion of the Israelites population to other parts of the Babylonian Empire. (Lupovitch 2010, 22)<sup>1</sup>

Historically, it is evident that the formation of diaspora, in the case of Jewish people, was caused by enforced political exile and expulsion from Israel. Three facets of this exile have become important to contemporary understandings of the concept of diaspora. First, the members of the Jewish community felt that their best option was to leave Israel. Second, their leaving was, however, not entirely based on freedom of choice and third, exile was accompanied by feelings of homelessness and alienation. The persecution of Jews continued when they lived in non-native locations. John D. Klier, for example, describes pogroms in Tsarist Russia in *The Pogrom Paradigm in Russian History*:

The word “pogrom” is Russian. Its usage became inextricably linked to antisemitic violence after the outbreak of three great waves of anti-Jewish rioting in the Russian Empire in 1881-2, 1903-6 and 1919-21. It was widely charged at the time and since that the Russian government either planned,

welcomed, or at least tolerated pogroms for its own devious purposes. (Klier 2004, 13)

Pogroms and similar waves of persecution led to the dislocation and displacement of Jews across Europe, and they were seen as the quintessential diaspora, political migrants striving to live in a foreign domain. In the middle of the twentieth century, when six million European Jews were massacred by Nazis during the Holocaust, a mass migration of Jewish communities towards America and different countries of Europe took place, forming a new Jewish diaspora. Therefore, “[t]he seemingly endemic nature of Jewish migration gives an image of an overriding sense of Jewish homelessness and rootlessness in the diaspora” (Lupovitch 2010, 02).

The use of the term diaspora to indicate a politically motivated scattering has been extended in relation to other groups that have been subject to European, including British, imperialism. In his research on British imperialism in the nineteenth century India Simon Smith explains that:

In the period between the revocation of the East India Company’s trading monopoly in 1813 and the revolt of 1857-58, Britain intervened ever more intrusively in Indian society. After 1858, despite recognising the folly of seeking to refashion India in her own image, Britain exploited Indian resources as never before. (Smith 1998, 50)

By exploiting the resources of colonies, the imperialist policies not only enriched Britain’s national economy but also jeopardised the political and economic stability of colonised nations, creating numerous rootless, homeless subjects. In another historical survey of British imperialism by Bernard Porter, the “native policy” of British colonisers in the Indian subcontinent is seen as a route to “radical social change” - the total Europeanisation of the subcontinent (Porter 1975, 17-19). The policy was designed to disseminate the values of English culture among the colonised

Indians and thus caused internal chaotic cultural conflicts. This is reflected in William Wilberforce's comment, quoted by Porter:

Let us endeavour to strike our roots into the soil by the gradual introduction and establishment of our own principles and opinions; of our laws, institutions, and manners; above all, as the source of every other improvement, of our religion, and consequently of our morals. (Porter 1975, 19)

The imperialist practices caused a widespread revolution against the colonisers but, at the same time, left the colonised with embedded structures of colonial power. “[A] middle class educated in English”, who eventually became “the agents of cultural dissemination”, managed to create a fascination for English life and culture. (Porter 1975, 21) A large number of colonised people were encouraged to migrate from India to Britain, thus relocating themselves beyond their national boundary in the pursuit of English life.

Historically, the culture of diasporisation was initiated even long before the era of British imperialism. A large number of Africans were enslaved and sold to African Muslim territories. In a historical survey of black diaspora by Ronald Segal, it becomes evident that:

West African societies had slaves: as royal retainers, often in metalworking and other honoured occupations, as agricultural labour, and as porters for the trading caravans. References to the export of black slaves to North Africa only begin appearing in the twelfth century, however, and it was only with the mounting European demand from the sixteenth century onward that the large-scale of trade in slaves from the forest region developed. This trade would become the dominant factor in politics across much of black Africa. (Segal 1995, 09)

The expansion of European imperialism included importing slaves from Africa and other colonial territories and this, for Segal, remained a regular phenomenon on the part of the white British aristocrat class (Segal 1995, 13). A substantial number of black slaves arrived in England in the eighteenth century as part of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Segal points out that “[e]stimates of the number

of blacks in eighteenth-century Britain vary widely. The Gentleman's Magazine in 1764 claimed that there were 20,000 in London alone" (Segal 1995, 265). In addition to trading slaves of African origin, Britain also experienced the influx of South Asians, who arrived as slaves or even as mistresses and wives<sup>2</sup>. This resulted in countless people being scattered forcibly across the country as the metropolis could hardly ensure social and financial stability for most of these new migrants:

London effectively operated a colour bar in employment. Inevitably there were those who were reduced to begging, while women became prostitutes, as a way of surviving and supporting the family, until taken from street to prison for their activities. Others left London for work in the provincial towns or the countryside, the men as artisans or agricultural labourers, the women as laundresses, seamstresses or children's nurses. (Segal 1995, 264)

The displacement of black and Asian slaves in Britain formed multiple locations for diasporic life in the country.

Caroline Adams, in her *Across Seven Seas and Thirteen Rivers*, provides the history of a particular community of South Asians and its arrival in Britain. She tells of the seamen and ship workers from Bengal who absconded from anchored ships at the docks of London, Cardiff and Tilbury to escape the hardship of sea life and have a better life in the country. There was no strict legislation regarding immigration. Adams writes:

For those on the ships, whether before or during the war, the trips ashore when the ship docked at Liverpool, Cardiff or Tilbury, had a special flavour. Calcutta, the port from which they had come, was the Second City of the Empire and London was the first. They were the subjects of the British king, and London was their capital, as much as his (Adams 1987, 39).

Adams explains that ship workers from South Asia used to have little difficulty settling in Britain. They might have jumped ship, but life and work were not necessarily limited by the activities of the immigration authorities. In Adams's words, "[t]he police had no reason to bother them, as they had broken no law in coming ashore,

being citizens of British India” (Adams 1987, 42). A small number of seamen from Bangladesh (specifically, from Sylhet) settled in East London. They became the initial point of contact and source of assistance for the rest of ship workers. Therefore, “[b]y the mid-1930s (...) the lure of London was becoming too strong to resist and the spreading network of contacts led to the growing fashion of ‘jumping ship’ in British ports” (Adams 1987, 40).

In addition, at the end of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth century, a substantial number of middle-class and upper-middle-class Indians arrived in Britain in the pursuit of academic and professional careers. Sukhdev Sandhu’s research reveals that “[t]he lure of culture has also been a magnet throughout the centuries. London offered a passport to sophistication, learning and self-improvement” (Sandhu 2004, 183). The capital of Britain attracted the middle-class gentry and the descendants of aristocratic families in India, who hoped to come and experience the brilliance of British education and culture. Many Indian veterans, especially from the West Bengal, arrived here to educate themselves. Raja Rammohon Roy, Darkanath Tegore, Mohandas Gandhi, Rabindranath Tagore and Mulk Raj Anand were among those who explored Britain as a place of learning and intellectual development. As Gulam Murshid has found:

A number of ship workers (lascars) fled the ship and settled in England; nonetheless, most of the earliest migrant settlers in Britain from Bengal were highly educated and skilled professionals such as doctors, lawyers, and barristers. Coming for education to Britain, they settled permanently in Britain through their matrimony with English women<sup>3</sup>.

At this stage, we can identify three major contexts - political, economic and cultural - that are significant for the formation of a diaspora such as the South Asian one in Britain.

How is diaspora defined in the current cultural analysis? Attributing its formation to the political and economic context following World War II, contemporary critics define diasporas as migrant communities displaced from colonised countries and

relocated in a colonial centre. In a jointly-conceived essay, *Nation, Migration, Globalization: Points of Contention in Diaspora Studies*, Jana Evans Brazeil and Anita Mannur attempt to theorise 'diaspora' in terms of its proliferation since the late 1940s:

The term "diaspora" has been increasingly used by anthropologists, literary theorists, and cultural critics to describe the mass migrations and displacements of the second half of the twentieth century, particularly in reference to independence movements in formerly colonized areas, waves of refugees fleeing war-torn states, and fluxes of economic migrations in the post-World War II era. (Brazeil and Mannur 2003, 03)

Brazeil and Mannur chart the nationalist and economic issues of migration, but also note that diaspora has a human context as well. Diaspora involves the displacement of the cultures and social values of peoples who strive to come to terms with existence in a non-native context. This dispersal of peoples gives rise to myths associated with the experiences of exile, loss and nostalgia and the intensity of feeling for the homelands creates a vision of "home and away". While, in "diasporic understandings", "home" encompasses the reflection of identity, ancestry and national culture, "away" signifies some sort of loss and can be "generalized into a representative typology or definitions of what a diaspora might be" (Kalra, Hutnyk, Kaur 2005, 11). This definition of diaspora presents a twofold understanding of diaspora in which the experience of exile is both geographical and emotional. It is this twofold understanding that has informed the treatment of the South Asian diaspora in this thesis. Defined by geography and expressed in literature, emotional responses to diaspora will be explored.

The physical dislocation is accompanied by the sense of "homelessness", which is psychologically very influential in forming diasporic cultures. Rather than dealing with historical, geopolitical, and socio-economic facets of the South Asian diaspora in England, this essay, following Brazeil and Mannur, studies the psychological implications of exile, alienation and nostalgic consciousness in a way to address the tension between upholding the national values of the

group and assimilating with the host culture. In doing so, this analysis highlights the doubleness of migrant experiences. It exposes diasporic emotions and feelings for home, the recreation of an imaginary home in the face of social discrimination, and the cultural strangeness of a host culture which defines minorities within the framework of otherness. Simultaneously, it underlines the growing crises of identity and the emergence of cultural hybridity due to the fluid nature of cultural practices. In this analysis, South Asian diasporic novels such as Kamala Markandaya's *The Nonesuch Man* (1972), Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses* (1988), Hanif Kureishi's *The Buddha of Suburbia* (1990), Sunetra Gupta's *Moonlight into Marzipan* (1996) and Monica Ali's *Brick Lane* (2003) are seen as negotiating the issues related to South Asian experiences in Britain and, importantly, as also exemplifying the creative expertise of South Asian writers in their intersection with, and restructuring of, western discourses of narrative in terms of content and form<sup>4</sup>.

Why is the narrative used as the basis of analysis? From socio-political and economic perspectives, diaspora refers to the grouping of people from migrated ethnic communities in the culture of majorities. These members have been displaced and dispersed from their native home due to political and economic instabilities in their own country. Political unrest causes severe economic difficulties and thus brings about disintegration at the national level; it compels people from different walks of life - political and social activists, writers and intellectuals - to leave their homeland for an improved, more secure life overseas. The scattering across the world leads to the application of the term "diasporic migration" to describe any movement of people caused by such conditions in a formerly colonised country. For example, the Pakistani socialist writers Tariq Ali and Nadeem Aslam are in exile in Britain, having left Pakistan under the threat of military aggression. Another noted South Asian writer, Salman Rushdie, has been condemned to a life in exile in England following the controversy over *The Satanic Verses* across the Islamic fundamentalist countries and his homeland of India. In the writings of Romesh Gunesekeera, the political unrest of Sri-Lanka is

depicted with such intensity that readers are drawn to the feelings of exile prevailing in the author's personal experiences. Creative art offers insights into the diasporic experience. Writers construct the particular shape of a community's notion of diaspora, endorsing particular experiences of physical alienation, visions of the homeland and the relationships with the host culture. The American political scientist William Safran best explains the structure of a diasporic experience, outlining the characteristics of diasporic peoples as follows:

1) they, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from a specific original "center" to two or more "peripheral", or foreign, regions; 2) they retain a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland—its physical location, history, and achievements; 3) they believe that they are not - and perhaps cannot be - fully accepted by their host society and therefore feel partly alienated and insulated from it; 4) they regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return—when conditions are appropriate. (Safran 1991, 83)

Safran's first point refers to a postcolonial understanding of the relationship between the centre and the margin. While postcolonialism will be discussed in greater depth at the beginning of the next section, here it defines the diaspora's place of origin as the centre from which the migrants are relocated to the metropolis/capital of the host in the present decolonised scenario. His second and third points reveal both the myth of diasporic bonding with "home" and the loss of belongingness. However, the relationship between the centre and the margin is repositioned as the legacy of diaspora becomes cross-cultural due to its convergence and connection with the host culture. Safran's fourth point indicates that the homeland is held up as the ideal destination of return. It comes into debate with the opinion of Brazeil and Mannur, according to whom diasporas are marked by hybridity and heterogeneity - cultural, linguistic, ethnic, national (Brazeil and Mannur 2003, 5). The ambivalence of cultural values caused by the

fluidity of cultures questions the purity of identity and the binary between host and “home”. Safran’s notion of return to the homeland is destabilised by the hybrid “diaspora identities” found in the narratives of the South Asian diaspora in Britain analysed here. Hanif Kureishi’s *The Buddha of Suburbia* (1990) and Meera Syal’s *Anita and Me* (1996), for example, address explicitly this aspect of the diaspora in their narratives, portraying identities as constantly mutating, impure, fragmented, and multicultural.

In contemporary postcolonial studies, the formation and development of diasporas and diasporic cultures are described as involving transnational identity. This is a redefined form of postcolonial identity involving multiple constructions of national identities beyond original national boundaries. Identities are configured by multiple nationalities actively engaged in interactions and encounters with the dominant culture. Migrant identities no longer remain in a state of homogeneity in terms of national culture, as they are confronted, influenced and finally reformed by their host. According to Stuart Hall, diasporic identities “are producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference” (Hall 1994, 402). Hall’s reference to “transformation and difference” indicates the shift from a so-called universal identity (with a national base) to a transnational one. Identifying the “difference” amongst the coexisting diasporas and the host and balancing these differences creates a functional transnational culture. This transformed culture not only involves an interactive network of diasporas but also highlights contestation and resistance in the form of mimicry. This challenge claims to homogenous identity. In *The Black Atlantic*, Paul Gilroy defines this community relationship with the host culture as forming a “politics of transfiguration” which “emphasizes the emergence of qualitatively new desires, social relations, and modes of association within the racial community of interpretation and resistance and between that group and erstwhile oppressors” (Gilroy 1999, 37). It is clear from Gilroy’s analysis that there is a departure from the cultural hegemony of whiteness as the black races in Britain (in which we

can also include the South Asians) contribute to the formation of a new culture consisting of diverse values, perspectives and identities. These formative elements of the new culture encounter resistance on the part of both the host and the diasporic communities as each yearns for pre-existing national values but also strives to address the cultural and political agendas of underprivileged minorities in the host culture. So “[t]he politics of transfiguration strives in pursuit of the sublime, struggling to repeat the unrepeatable, to present the unrepresentable. Its rather different hermeneutic focus pushes towards the mimetic, dramatic and performative” (Gilroy 1999, 38). South Asian diaspora, like many other diasporas, are refigured as transnational cultures which make the “unrepresentable” presentable through the fusion of multicultural values and identities. This is very clearly reflected in the novels of contemporary South Asian writers in England, whose works have revealed a significant exchange of values between the West and the East. The writers address the political currency of identities and the issue of cultural transformation from Asian to “British Asian” in their fictions. For example, Ravinder Randhawa’s first novel *A Wicked Old Woman* (1987) narrates the tale of its protagonist Kulwant Singh’s transformation from a personality shaped by traditional ethnic values to a restructured identity, that of an Asian Briton. Randhawa’s novel is a pioneering attempt to “map out a new territory for the representation of the diversity of Asian British lives” (Nasta 2002, 182).

This cultural heterogeneity has divergent formative elements that estrange diasporas from any sense of “purity”. They shift from the stage of sensitive nationalism to, in the words of Bhabha:

[L]ocalities of culture’ which is more around temporality than about historicity: a form of living that is more complex than “community” (...) less homogeneous than hegemony; less centred than citizen; more collective than “the subject” more psychic than civility; more hybrid in the articulation of cultural differences and identifications that can be represented in hierarchical or binary structuring of social antagonism. (Bhabha 1995, 140)

According to Bhabha, culture is fluid and dynamic rather than static and homogeneous. There are diverse practices, values and aspirations that imbue the different cultures with the essence of particularity while their mutual coexistence combines them within the framework of hybridity. They proliferate and radically question the idea of the location of culture at a universal centre. The decentered existence of cultures forms a multicultural context that destabilises any claim of racial hierarchy. This is how culture becomes temporal and local. Diasporic culture, if examined from this perspective, is also identified as local, fragmented, complex and hybrid departing from the Orientalist idea of presenting it as a culture of “social antagonism”.

Although contemporary theorists are in agreement that the Orientalist conceptions of the diaspora are outdated, these conceptions are important insofar as they influence the way diasporas were (and, in some ways, continue to be) treated, and diaspora writers address these conceptions in their narratives. Orientalism originated in Europe and America, where Western thinkers imagined the Eastern perspective based on limited and prejudiced understanding of people from the East as exotic and socially and intellectually inferior. In Frenchman Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres’ harem paintings of the nineteenth century, for example, the Oriental was depicted with an inference of cultural backwardness. Due to this preconceived notion, South Asian minorities entering Britain as colonial slaves and ship workers were seen as both “other” and inferior, and thus appointed to menial jobs during their early stage of migration. This struggling phase was followed by a phase during which antagonism intensified. Racial attacks by white-skinned British citizens and the use of the slurs “Paki” and “Wog” were a common phenomenon in England even until the second part of the last century.

The scenario of racial conflict begins to change with a growing consciousness regarding human rights among the immigrants, who contested and questioned the practice of racial discrimination. In addition, the dissolution of western political hegemony in the

colonised territories and the stream of migration to the West, especially to Britain, from various decolonised territories, led to a shift in the culture of racial superiority. In the new analysis, the co-existence of different races and their relationship with the host should be interpreted in terms of mutual tolerance, equality and racial fraternity. Britain, therefore, with her new changing landscape, can become a secular and democratic domain of world politics. In spite of persistent racial discrimination, Britain emerges as a platform for the coexistence and fusion of multicultural migrant communities. Diasporas, in this hybrid multicultural context, no longer intend to remain within the margin of “otherness” like their predecessors; instead, there is an openness to accept and adopt the cultural learning and values of British culture. Migrant minorities make their effort to be a part of this culture instead of being secluded or excluded from it.

While accepting the influence of the host culture, diaspora communities are not completely divorced from their national cultures of origin, as they are continually in contact with their families and societies. Therefore, diasporic culture accommodates the practices and cultural codes of communities and cultures of origin as well as, to a considerable extent, British culture. These multiple components, then, bring about the complex forms of diaspora. By reflecting dominant values and accepting incorporation into the host culture, the diaspora reinforces the prevalence of the host culture. Some sociologists and postcolonial critics view this paradox as the loss of “cultural uniqueness”. For William Safran, minority communities fail to preserve the framework of their native culture “if they are surrounded by a numeric strong majority whose culture is attractive and whose economy has a significant cooptive potential” (Safran 2000, 13). Dissipation of native culture can be viewed in both positive and negative terms as the loss of traditional beliefs is offset by the economic benefits of assimilation.

Cultural discrepancies between home and the host culture intensify the emotional longing for “home” among the migrants and the notion of being “away” contributes to feelings of loss and

detachment. Such alienation from “home” breaks the notion of “home” into fragments of imagination. Affirming his diasporic standing, Salman Rushdie describes his view of “home” and “away”:

It's my present that is foreign, and that the past is home, albeit a lost home in a lost city in the mists of lost time (...). It may be that writers in my position, exiles or emigrants or expatriates, are haunted by some sense of loss, some urge to reclaim, to look back, even at the risk of being mutated into pillars of salt. But if we do look back, we must also do so in the knowledge (...) that our physical alienation from India almost inevitably means that we will not be capable of reclaiming precisely the thing that was lost; that we will, in short, create fictions, not actual cities or villages, but invisible ones, imaginary homelands, Indias of the mind. (Rushdie 1991, 09-10)

What Rushdie articulates is the ambivalent relationship diasporic people have with their place of origin, which in their dislocated present becomes an “imaginary homeland” due to their prolonged alienation from it. They desire to reclaim a lost past, but their physical separation from their homeland and their proximity to a new culture reduce the scope for precise reproduction. That is why, though the significance of home inspires the urge to reclaim an original national culture, physical alienation from the homeland makes it problematic for migrants to recreate home in real terms. Instead, an imaginary homeland is created, which is not simply “true” but “imaginatively true” and which, as Rushdie says, is simultaneously “honourable and suspect” as they are “obliged to deal in broken mirrors, some of whose fragments have been irretrievably lost” (Rushdie 1991, 10-11). In addition, diasporas frequently encounter the cultural effects of co-existent diasporas resulting in a hybridity that tends to transcend what Manjitinder Singh calls “the limits of racialised, colonized and national identities” (Singh 2007, 18). The psychological aspects of diasporic studies address the inter-complicity of different ethnic minorities in a world which is not theirs but in which they are striving to relocate themselves.

The confrontations and encounters between multiple migrant communities lead to a radical exchange of cultural practices and the weaving of a multicultural network of diasporas that reveals culture as de-territorialised. It is because “diasporas formate cross national borders, they reveal precisely the fact that cultural practices are not tied to place” (Smith 2004, 256). The notion of purity of national culture begins to wither in the wake of cross-cultural interaction among different nations and races beyond the territory of their homes. This is how a platform of multiculturalism, one that endorses diasporic culture, has come into being at the heart of the metropolis. In this way, in contemporary cultural studies, the diaspora has been included within the discourse of postcolonialism which, along with its anti-colonial and postmodern implications, highlights multicultural reconfigurations.

#### NOTES

1. Specifically, “the Chaldeans, following standard Mesopotamian practice, deported the Jews after they had conquered Jerusalem in 597 BC. The deportations were large but certainly didn’t involve the entire nation. Somewhere around 10,000 people were forced to relocate to the city of Babylon, the capital of the Chaldean empire. In 586 BC, Judah itself ceased to be an independent kingdom, and the earlier deportees found themselves without a homeland, without a state, and without a nation. This period, which actually begins in 597 but is traditionally dated at 586, is called the Exile in Jewish history”. “Exile (597-538 BC).” In *Jewish Virtual Library*. Accessed May 28, 2013. <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourc/History/Exile.html>
2. Gulam Murshid has recorded the history of Bengalis in his book *Kalapanir Hatchhani: Bilete Bangalir Ithibas (The Call of Sea: History of Bengalis in Britain)* written in Bangla and published in Dhaka by Abosar, in February 2008. He has described several stages of migration of Bangla spoken people from the Indian subcontinent. According to Murshid, the English rulers bringing of slaves, mistresses and wives from Indian colonies to Britain was one form of migration. Murshid also writes about Bengali ship workers who settled in Britain as economic migrants and who struggled through financial hardship and who were caught between two cultures.
3. In *The Call of Sea*, Murshid discusses about the arrival of Bengali scholars in

Britain in search of academic excellence. In the second chapter (*Bileti Bidar Shondbane - In Pursuit of British Education*, 58-118) and the fourth chapter (*Bangali Bosbotir Gorapttan - Laying the Foundation of Bengali Settlement*, 164-211) Murshid gives an account of the settlement of Bengali migrants in Britain. Here we see how this migrant community initiated diasporic life in the British landscape. See p.1 64 for the original quotation written in Bangla, translated above [my translation].

4. Dates of first publication of novels by South Asians in Britain are supplied in parenthesis after the first reference to each novel.

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