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Scottish Enlightenment Philosophy as a Theoretical Framework of Wine Rhetoric

by

Bailey McAlister

Certified Sommelier.
Georgia State University, USA

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SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT PHILOSOPHY AS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF WINE RHETORIC

Bailey McAlister

Certified Sommelier, Court of Master Sommeliers
English PhD Candidate,
Georgia State University, USA
mcalisterbai@gmail.com

Abstract. Modern wine rhetoric embodies all of the persuasive communication skills developed by wine professionals as they navigate their field by learning new wine trends and experiencing different restaurant environments. The rhetorical skills they develop are reflective of Scottish Enlightenment theories on Taste and beauty. Though these fields do not usually intersect in formal education, exploring wine rhetoric through the lens of Scottish Enlightenment reveals the purposeful methodology behind their practice of persuasive communication. This article situates Enlightenment rhetoric in the current conversation of wine by illuminating today's wine rhetorical practice as indebted to Enlightenment rhetorical theory and strategy.

Keywords: rhetoric, Scottish Enlightenment, taste, wine, wine discourse, beauty

INTRODUCTION

Wine rhetoric encompasses the unique discourse, vocabulary, and tastes of sommeliers, restaurateurs, and other wine professionals. While today's wine rhetoric is developed through wine professionals' knowledge of the latest trends and individual experiences in the industry, wine rhetorical strategies are directly reflective of Scottish Enlightenment theories on *Taste* and *Beauty*. In fact, Enlightenment rhetorical theory - especially when it comes to a *Standard of Taste* - seems to have laid the foundation for wine rhetoric to exist as a legitimate form of persuasive communication.

However, one obvious disconnect is the fact that most wine professionals are likely not scholars of rhetoric and therefore do not

consciously base their rhetorical strategies on Enlightenment theories. But, though wine rhetoric might not be individually developed with Enlightenment theory in mind, there is a definite need to explore wine rhetoric through the lens of Scottish Enlightenment to show that the archival, communal, and cultural practice of wine discourse is not merely a random fusion of wine professionals' opinions and industry jargon - but instead a purposeful, classic form of persuasive communication. To display - and academically explain - the nature of wine rhetoric, a theoretical framework of Scottish Enlightenment rhetoric is vital. This article situates Enlightenment rhetoric in the current conversation of wine by illuminating today's wine rhetorical practice as indebted to Enlightenment rhetorical theory and strategy.

THE STANDARD OF TASTE

In some ways, the concept of Taste is simple. Hugh Blair defines Taste as "The power of receiving pleasure from the beauties of nature and of art" (1783, 955). Surrounded by beauty, we are constantly subjected to the possibility of pleasure by merely existing in a world that provides it. But Blair and other Enlightenment rhetoricians complicate the concept of beauty by attaching it to a Standard of Taste, a universal sense of beauty born from community culture and upheld by self-proclaimed Taste authorities. These authorities, according to Blair, use "natural sensibility to beauty" and apply educated reasoning to uphold (and, oftentimes, to establish) a Standard of Taste for their communities to measure beauty against (1783, 957). By applying "reason and good sense" to our natural inclinations towards beauty, we can develop a "power" fueled by beauty and "improved understanding" (Blair 1783, 957).

Other eighteenth-century rhetoricians seem to agree the drive to hold this power is what sets Taste authorities apart. David Hume asserts that elements of Taste are universal and establishes that the ability to acknowledge the standards of Taste and measure beauty

against these standards is common for everyone. However, Hume also believed “few are qualified to give judgement on any work of art, or establish their own sentiment as the standard of beauty” (1757, 837). Like Blair, Hume argues that, though the principles we use to measure Taste are innate, our ability to effectively critique pleasure comes from a separate, special authority developed from sophisticated, practical experiences and specialized education. In the Enlightenment period, this authority - especially in the field of rhetoric - was the key to establishing oneself as an effective persuader. By his definition, it would seem that Hugh believes a universal Standard of Taste to measure beauty against can only be developed by the experts.

However, Hume also argues that Taste, as a general disposition, is “too obvious not to have fallen under every one’s observation” (1757, 830). In this sense, Taste encompasses a natural ability to distinguish between good and bad, high quality and low quality. Especially in contexts of a shared community, we understand a common idea about what social conventions dictate good and bad. Hume evidences this argument by pointing out our reactions when situations that “depart widely” from our standard of Taste occur (1757, 830). For example, in wine culture, these situations would involve tasting off-putting wine - spoiled wine, faulty wine, wine that is too hot or too cold, cheap wine that is tasteless or too sweet, etc. One does not have to be an expert in the field to have a basic standard of Taste for what counts as bad wine. Therefore, as evidenced by Hume, there must be some natural inclination towards a standard of Taste because, when we experience violations of Taste, we are merciless.

BEAUTY AND POWER

These seemingly contradictory arguments complicate the idea of beauty even more. Are we naturally drawn towards beauty because of our innate sense of Taste, or are we only able to truly see beauty

if we are guided towards it by a self-proclaimed authority? This question resounds in the conversations of modern wine consumers - some who swear by the expertise of wine professionals and others who are curious if wine rhetoric is merely a ploy to market expensive wine. Hume would argue that delicacy - “the source of all the finest and most innocent enjoyments” - is the distinctive element separating the layperson’s sense of taste and the learned authority’s Standard of Taste (1757, 835)¹. But Blair might agree with both sides of the argument, asserting that, while a universal taste might be built on everyone’s subjective opinions, upholding the Standard of Taste allows certain people a position of power.

Blair echoes Hume’s argument that experts on Taste are distinguished by their sense of delicacy, but he also clearly associates their authority with power over the Standard of Taste itself - power sustained by a passion for Taste. In other words, Taste experts do not work towards a single achievement, but instead continuously feed their passion in order to maintain their power, “as the goodness of the palate is not tried by strong flavors, but by a mixture of ingredients where (...) we remain sensible of each” (Blair 1783, 958). Blair’s arguments certainly do not debunk Hume’s; it is clear that sophistication, education, and perhaps even natural talent all contribute to a sense of delicacy that allows one to develop an expertise on Taste. But the power derived from an authority over the Standard of Taste is not solely indebted to natural ability nor extensive practice, just as beauty does not exist because of the beholder but instead exists on its own and merely relies on the beholder for affirmation. But even beauty - despite our attempts to conventionalize, standardize, and define it - holds its own rhetorical power. And if a Standard of Taste is our way of quantifying beauty, then the Scottish rhetors of the eighteenth century and the wine professionals of today are in need of a system of methods to prolong their power and drive their audiences towards the sublime².

CAMPBELL'S METHODS

Generally, a rhetor's purpose is to effectively convince her audience of an argument through persuasive communication. Each individual purpose varies depending on the audience, the subject, and the argument itself - which is true for both Enlightenment rhetors and modern wine professionals. While each situation varies, a wine professional's typical goal is to enhance an audience's pleasure from wine through persuasive tactics. A perfect methodology to serve as a framework for these tactics is reflected in Book I of George Campbell's *Philosophy of Rhetoric*. In Chapter V, Campbell describes four tribes of evidence: experience, analogy, testimony, and calculation of chances. These four elements, according to Campbell, form the "foundation" of all persuasive communication (1776, 923).

Experience is listed first perhaps because it is often the first type of evidence an audience considers. Plus, if executed effectively, it can be the easiest rhetorical tactic to employ. Campbell defines experience as "the tendency of the mind to associate ideas under the notion of causes, effects, or adjuncts" (1776, 916). Experience is made up of multiple examples of situations, giving it credibility in the eyes of individuals who have an abundance of it. Employing this tribe allows the audience to draw from their own memories in order to "discover resemblances" in new situations (Campbell 1776, 916). Furthermore, Campbell points out that "by experience we not only decide concerning the future from the past, but concerning things uncommon from things familiar which resemble them" (1776, 917). This makes audience experience an incredibly useful tool for rhetors with new ideas, such as wine professionals who discuss new wines with their audience.

Its usefulness is what makes experience one of the most common tribes of evidence used by wine professionals, as it is often used as a jumping-off point in their arguments. Aaron Meskin and Jon Robson discuss this phenomenon in "Taste and Acquaintance." They argue that experience is the simplest method of achieving persuasion involving Taste, as "we would not know what

[something] tastes like without tasting it” (Meskin and Robson 2015, 128). Unlike some other subjects of beauty, the act of tasting cannot be truly achieved by persuasion alone. Knowledge of elements such as color and sound do not require “first-hand perceptual experience” the way Taste does (Meskin and Robson 2015, 128). By having an audience experience (or by having an audience who has already experienced) an aspect of Taste, the rhetorician can use the audience’s experience to convince them of her argument. In wine rhetorical practice, convincing an audience to receive pleasure from a wine they have already received pleasure from would require little convincing altogether. For this reason, Campbell defines experience as the “foundation” of all reasoning (1776, 918).

Analogy, Campbell’s second tribe, is “hinted” at in his discussion on experience and is “founded on some remote similitude” because, in cases where the audience has not experienced taste, the rhetorician relies on analogy to convince them of an argument (1776, 918). Campbell calls this “indirect experience,” and Meskin and Robson call it “sensory substitution” (1776, 918; 2015, 130). Campbell says that “like effects sometimes proceed from objects which faintly resemble, but not near so frequently as from objects which have been a more perfect likeness” (1776, 918). This persuasive tactic, while not as simple as persuasion through experience, would require the rhetor to articulate comparisons based on her audience’s experiences.

Not only is analogy part of an ideal framework for wine rhetoric, but it is also one of the leading skills formally taught in wine education. Within wine are countless flavors and aromas, and wine professionals learn a plethora of terms to describe them. These descriptive terms - adjectives like *tropical*, *floral*, *herbal*, and *earthy* - are generally not associated with elements chemically present in the wine, but with elements resembling the wine’s character (Puckette and Hammack 2015, 16). In the Deductive Tasting Method for wine professionals, analogy of key terms with wine characteristics founds two of the most important steps, smelling and tasting (Court of Master Sommeliers 2020). These analogies allow wine professionals

to concisely explain their methodology to their audience. Though the audience has not experienced a specific wine first-hand, the analogy of the wine to something they have tasted - comparing Albariño with light, citrus flavors, for example - allows them the indirect experience of the wine.

Testimony is the tribe that truly tests a rhetor's persuasion skill. While based on experience, testimony as a successful rhetorical strategy relies on the *eunoia* of the relationship between the rhetor and the audience. Without this bond, the rhetor will have no credibility, for "on testimony in concurrence with memory is founded the much more extensive experience which is not originally one's own, but derived from others" (Campbell 1776, 919). The rhetor's credibility - or, more blatantly, the audience's perception of the rhetor's credibility - determines the persuasive hold over the audience. Only when an audience has no reason to doubt the rhetor's credibility can testimony be an effective rhetorical strategy.

Campbell, Meskin, and Robson all agree that testimony is a rhetorical tactic based on lack of doubt in the credibility of the rhetor. Meskin and Robson admit that testimony, or "taste-imony" in regards to matters of Taste, does not always lead to knowledge, but

"Still, if we accept the assumption that taste-imony in these instances typically carries some epistemic value, it is difficult to see on what basis we could deny the further claim that, given the right circumstances, such testimony can serve as a source of gustatory knowledge" (2015, 132).

Testimony is based on credibility. Experience is based on memory - persuading an audience through experience depends on the quality of their memory of the experience. But testimony depends entirely on the *ethos* of the rhetor and how well she displays this credibility. Since many wine professionals seek careers that are "predicated on the assumption that their testimony about taste is of epistemic value," developing rhetorical skills related to this tribe of evidence is imperative for success (Meskin and Robson 2015, 132).

Calculation of chances, Campbell's last subdivision of reasoning, reflects the importance of the rhetor's confidence in herself. This subdivision, when combined with one or more of the others, can enhance the effectiveness of an argument. But on its own, calculation of chances involves a last-resort situation in which neither experience, analogy, nor testimony have much persuasive value. Campbell's explanation of chance is unique because of its almost negative connotations. While he believes that conducting a calculation of chances shows smart rhetorical thinking and planning, he notes that chance is not a skill that can be altered by individuals. Chance is not based on trial as the other tribes are; it is, instead, merely a necessary assessment of one's possible successful outcomes in order to prepare accordingly for surprising outcomes.

In these situations, wine professionals rely on their knowledge of wine to make the best argument at the opportune moment. Some might categorize this as situational while others might categorize it as kairotic. Adrienne and Keith Lehrer assert that knowledge of the appropriate language surrounding wine is especially important in situations like these. When someone can use the best fitting language to describe wine, then the chances of persuading an audience - regardless of the audience's level of experience with the wine - increase. When it comes to asserting authority on a standard of Taste, Lehrer and Lehrer say, "*De gustibus non est disputandum*" (2016, 763). The audience's subjective opinion of wine makes the ultimate final decision of persuasive success. When conducting a calculation of chances, rhetors must have the self-confidence to know that they have the best knowledge and skills necessary to please their audiences.

MODERN TASTE

Currently, wine rhetoric is still modeled after Enlightenment rhetoric's methodology and definition of a Standard of Taste. While wine professionals likely do not formally study the art of rhetoric,

their methodology for developing and using rhetoric must employ Enlightenment theories of Taste in order for them to maintain authority as wine experts. The answer to gaining authority lies in the belief of Taste as a faculty of human nature - more specifically, an improvable faculty. Blair insinuates that authorities gain their expertise through improving their Taste. He argues that Taste, though an “internal” sense, is “capable of being guided and enlightened by reason” (Blair 1783, 960). Wine professionals, like everyone, begin with a natural sense of Taste, but their personal desire to improve this faculty leads them towards an acquired sense of Taste which could eventually allow them to be authorities on the standards of Taste in their field. Simply put: scholars who nurture their internal sense of Taste gain the ability to develop themselves as authorities on the standards of Taste.

Blair’s ultimate conclusion is that one’s development from innate sense of good taste to authoritative sense of acquired Taste intertwines with their personal journey towards self-understanding:

“To apply the principles of good sense to composition and discourse; to examine what is beautiful, and why it is so; to employ ourselves in distinguishing accurately between the specious and the solid, between affected and natural ornament, must certainly improve us not a little in the most valuable part of all philosophy, the philosophy of human nature. For such disquisitions are very intimately connected with the knowledge of ourselves” (1783, 953).

Blair argues that the learning we do when acquiring the taste of our subjects involves a self-exploration of our imaginations. This exploration results in deeper learning about ourselves through our education of our subject. Furthermore, Blair insinuates that self-understanding is not merely a side effect of Taste acquisition, but instead an intimate connection that occurs naturally and, possibly, purposefully rather than as the result of. Perhaps self-exploration happens automatically when one begins to extensively study wine; but perhaps the aspiring professional’s innate desire for self-exploration fuels a passion for wine study.

Overall, wine rhetoric finds itself, like Taste, at the intersection of multiple binaries. The language we use to describe wine is both authentic and artificial at the same time. The skills we use are both innate and acquired. The exigency of our argument is strong because of the power that rhetoric has over an audience's sense of Taste and arbitrary because of the objectivity of this subject. The ultimate goal of the wine rhetor is to enhance the audience's pleasure derived from wine, yet the pleasurable outcome lies solely in the relationship between the drink and the audience. Furthermore, the wine professional's purpose and the rhetor's purpose are exactly the same: to guide their audience towards the "sublime," as Campbell puts it (1776, 903). If rhetoric can "ravish the soul" of the audience through the precise, strategic power of the rhetor, then wine can also affect the drinker this way (Campbell 1776, 903). In fact, wine professionals and wine lovers alike might argue that wine has already been "ravishing the soul" of its audience for centuries.

Many scholars believe that Taste and rhetoric are synonymous - especially in eighteenth-century contexts. Both concepts involve creating truths based on extensive learning of language, context, and audience. Moreover, both entities seek to establish a standard by which we measure pleasure against. The similarities between rhetoricians and wine professionals are endless, and both of their passions are derived in pursuit of the sublime. For wine professionals, Enlightenment theory illuminates their paths to success. As for those of us in the audience, we should consider ourselves fortunate that Taste - and wine - reflect the most important intersection: curiosity and pleasure. Our subject allows us to delve into our curiosity while falling back on the inevitable pleasure we gain not from Taste but from simply tasting.

NOTES

1. Hume argues: "When the critic has no delicacy, he judges without any distinction and is only affected by the grosser and more palpable qualities of the object. The finer touches pass unnoticed and disregarded" (1757, 837).

2. *Sublimity* in rhetoric is defined as: “A kind of eminence or excellence of discourse (...) the source of distinction of the very greatest [rhetors] and the means by which they have given eternal life to their own fame” (Longinus 1554, 347).

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THE PERFORMANCE OF *CUECA* DANCE:
ABOUT BELONGING AND RESISTANCE DURING THE 2019-2020
PROTESTS IN CHILE

Ioana Brezeanu

Cultural Manager and Researcher, London, UK
Research Master in Social and Cultural Anthropology,
University Lumière Lyon 2, France
io.brezeanu@gmail.com

Abstract. Over the past several decades, the neoliberal paradigm has dominated global economics and has marked a period of privatization, the supremacy of finance capital and the centrality of unaccountable global financial organizations. Since 2011, the world witnessed an increase in protests across the globe, as citizens have expressed their discontent with the political structures and policies that led to inequalities and the erosion of democratic institutions. Together with millions of people from Ecuador, Colombia, Lebanon, Brazil, Hong Kong or France, different groups of civilians also participated to mass-gatherings in Chile since October 2019 to nowadays. In this paper, I will try to elaborate on how protesters are answering to global challenges through local cultural resistance in order to build counter-identity. By tracing the history of Cueca, a traditional Chilean dance, this article aims to understand how the performance of these cultural practices had been submitted to various levels of re-constructions and re-appropriations of meanings, becoming both an instrument of politicization and a form of activism. Transversally, this analysis will examine how new political actions are shaping the dynamics of protests by different actors and instruments of propagation, specific to post neo-liberal societies: the dominant role of youth, the absence of political parties as main organizers and the widespread use of social media as means of political action.

Keywords: Chile, protests, cultural resistance, neoliberalism, social media

INTRODUCTION

In March 2020, the first cases of Coronavirus have been confirmed in Chile, while mass protests were taking place on the streets of Santiago. The president Sebastián Piñera announced then a public

ban for events of more than 500 people, followed by a total lockdown of many districts of the capital¹.

For many civilians, the beginning of the quarantine represented an extension of the period of “social isolation” initiated five months prior. In fact, since October 2019, thousands of demonstrators gathered on the streets for expressing their anger against the structural inequality in Chilean society: rate increases for public electric and transportation services, but also for education, healthcare, housing and bare necessities². What started as a strike against the raise of 3% of subway fares transformed, gradually, into massive protests.

Although different civil groups (including worker unions, high school student federations, university student associations, feminist organizations and cultural figures) have joined peaceful marches, some protests have also turned into riots. Destroyed properties, barricades and confrontations with the military, led to imposed curfews and the deployment of tanks and troops that use brutal force against the militants.

Nonetheless, those violent acts of protesting, intended to create confusion among the population, instigated the population to raise their voice against repression. In reality, the frustration and precarious existence, due to the inequality policies of the right-wing government, goes back to a neoliberal model that had been in place even before the last civic-military dictatorship of Pinochet, in 1974.

Due to the preservation of the old constitution and the perpetuation of painful memories regarding human rights violations, revoked by the military’s acts of repressions, many protesters mobilized with their own resources: slogans, utensils, pots and pans, music and chants. Many artists and activists joined the protests and used cultural practices as a mean to draw attention on their vision of justice.

At the beginning of the demonstrations, I was also following the events remotely. Among other news, I visualized a video where a group of people were dancing *Cueca*³, in Plaza Italia (historical

epicentre of protests in the capital of Chile, and symbol of rebellion).

Since I am myself passionate about national belonging and identity processes, I became very interested in understanding better the performance of this dance within this particular context. Initially, I found it very curious of how this dance, charged of meaning for its participants had a powerful visual impact and it had been transmitted virtually to millions of people in the world. While I was just a spectator to the scene, I couldn't help but empathize with their claims. I knew very little about Cueca, apart from being Chile's national dance, and the reproduction of it during demonstrations seemed to me an act of solidarity towards the current social struggle of protesters.

The fact is that contemporary movements are subjected to viral diffusions, and the phenomenon can be observed and engaged instantly thanks to social media. The activists are not only shaping the physical space, but also a “networked public”⁴, where the observers can manifest solidarity with their expression of identity. This leads not only to the creation of a larger way of representation of symbols and practices, but also to the “ideoscape”⁵ of those elements, subjected then to reinterpretations; this makes the dynamicity of social movements, as form of producing identity, even more complex and interesting to observe.

In view of these reflections, I found myself questioning: how did “Cueca” become a symbol of Chilean resistance in this particular context?

I will try to answer to this question below, by tracing the history of this practice and understanding better the uses that various actors made of this dance, how it evolved and how its meaning changed according to the context.

PERFORMING CUECA – BUILDING NATIONAL IDENTITY

“La Cueca” represents a dynamic and hybrid dance, which meaning and representations changed in time, different actors being engaged

in the process of instrumentalization of it. As we will see below, defining the “national dance” occurred in specific, politicized contexts.

Cueca is known in Chile since 1824, and it is largely performed in squares, events and gatherings all around the country. Already considered “a crucial element of local culture and identity” in the 19th century, being later adopted as a “national dance”⁶, the origins of the Chilean dance are not well established. It is believed that the practice has an arabic-andalucian background that assumes various social, musical, poetic and choreographic forms in the different southern Andean areas of South America (Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia).

It is also considered that “cueca” comes from the word “clueca”, meaning a hen that is about to lay eggs. In fact, the dance represents symbolically the mating ritual between a rooster and a hen. A man in traditional clothing, or “huaso”, approaches his female counterpart, or “china”, and as she takes his arm, they walk around the dance floor. Facing one another, they start their movements in circles around one another, waving white handkerchiefs in the air. During the dance, it’s important that partners maintain strong eye contact throughout the different steps⁷.

The main characteristic of Cueca consists in its popularity among people. The performance had been transmitted orally through generations, making it available to everyone, regardless the status, gender or age. Its music can be applied to any lyrics and poetry, which made it achieve an important festive role within a community.

Pablo Garrido, in his book dedicated to this folkloric practice, considers Cueca a hybrid form of movements, a syncretism of influences, but with only one “identity”:

In its forge there is the influence of common features of colonial popular songbook (Western modal system, strophic forms detached from peninsular patterns), enriched by indigenous Amerindians and Afro-Asian factors, in the manner of innumerable cultural properties that are common heritage in the New World. But the identity of Cueca is one: Chilean. There were no cuecas

or zamacuecas in Africa or in Spain, therefore it did not come from outside. It is therefore the purest symbol of our identity⁸.

It is interesting to observe how the author acknowledges this dance to be “the purest symbol of Chilean identity” in 1943, only one century after its birth. Around that time, there were however multiple versions of Cueca, the most representatives being the Urban-style Cueca (or Cueca Brava) and the Peasant-style one, rooted on traditional repertory sung by female folk musicians.

From the 30s to the 90s, the two versions of this dance developed in parallel, and the uses of these practices transformed within the political and social context. During the first decades, the Peasant-like Cueca became widespread, hybridized, and mass produced, while the Urban Cueca became an invisible musical practice developed in several popular venues and places of Santiago and Valparaíso⁹.

This process had been strictly connected to the development of the agrarian and forestry industry, highly important in the export of products such as wheat, wine or salmon. In fact, already during the 60s, neoliberal theories had been imported from the Chicago School, making space to the raise of an economic liberal market, way before becoming an authoritarian liberalism form of governance¹⁰. The growth of industrialization in the country led to a sort of mixed economy, with the establishment of many public enterprises, and public funds as primary source of productive investment¹¹. Since rural territories were already hegemonized by haciendas (farms), oriented principally to the exports of wheat -to Lima and California, the 1960's agrarian reform attempted to modernize agriculture and to create an economically independent peasant class (with the expropriation of lands and transformation of farmers in direct producers)¹².

In addition, at the time of Salvador Allende's election in September 1970, the neoliberal theses had become known to the public domain. They were known, debated and appeared as one of the economic alternatives among others. The “Chilean path to

socialism” taken by the new president caused a strong political polarization and a hyper-mobilization of Chilean society, that was afraid of becoming “another Cuba”¹³.

When Augusto Pinochet came to power in 1973, he would eventually take up the neoliberal model already in place, not only as economic policy, but as a whole new concept of society. In this internal power struggle, in order to legitimate his authoritarian regime, the dictator started to put less emphasis on having “rescued” the nation from communism, and more on having overseen its “modernization”.

The installation of the new regime came therefore with the implementation of new economic reforms and restrictions on a political level, notably the establishment of a neoliberal agro-exporting model in Chile, based on the unequal redistribution of the land, weakening the political and economic position of peasant groups¹⁴.

Within this context, the re-appropriation of “folklore” plays an important role in building ¹⁵identity, as the policies of producing fast and foreign flows generated many anti-farms discourses that had to re-adapt to new social practices. Hence, cultural references are employed as a vestige that would materialize, in practice, to the “duty of being Chilean”. When Chile’s most famous folklorist, Victor Jara, was executed and tortured in Chile Stadium, the ruler established new societal and cultural rules. Cueca had been taken from the people and had been incorporated into his military parades, becoming a symbol of dictatorial power and oppression¹⁶.

It is in a period of crisis, that “the return to the past meets a legitimate need of identity, but the approach is not without risk”¹⁷. The need of searching for roots is important because the past also represents a guarantee for the present. The concepts of “true”, “authentic” and “traditions” are manipulated and delivered by the regime in the attempt to generate a sense of national pride among the country’s citizens.

It is in these particular circumstances that Augusto Pinochet declared Cueca as being the National Dance of Chile on September

18, 1979, period when “the traditional music” would become the favorite music of the new government that comes to the rescue of such “tradition” and giving it the “right place”¹⁸.

The institutionalization of this status had been supported by the production of satellite publications, with the intention of searching and providing “historical evidences to the origins of Cueca, from immemorial-temporal unknown to irrefutable roots”¹⁹. This phenomenon is very common in nationalist narratives that defend eternal value and seek for timeless aspirations towards a continuous reinvention of tradition²⁰. In this sense, we can relate to Hobsbawm notion of “invention of tradition”²¹, in claiming that a cultural and social practice is old and locally authentic, with the aim of promoting national unity.

The re-appropriation of a custom is an important factor in the creation of a collective memory, since it makes reference to “all memories, conscious or not, of a lived experience and/or mythologized by a living community, where its identity is related to the sense of the past. It is carried by living groups, open to all transformations, vulnerable to manipulation and unconscious of its successive deformations”²². In this context, the process of re-writing the history, engages also the creation of a feeling of diffidence and distrust against the “socialists”, considered to be alienated and not to represent the needs of the population.

However, the importance of the Peasant-style Cueca changed at the end of the authoritarian regime, when a gradual process of revitalization of traditional and urban culture started, prompting a revival of the Urban Cueca²³. During the 1990s, folk music repertoires slowly started to change their focus, abandoning the conservative cultural policies that survived from the dictatorship, and gradually embracing different musical experiences and the use of new instruments: electric guitar and bass, drums or double bass, the fusion with different genres, the use of technology, or the creation of new types of lyrics. We can understand this style as a city-based genre, oral-focused, and performed in a shouting vocal

style, developed in Santiago de Chile, also known as Cueca Chilenera or Cueca Brava.

This phenomenon joins the revitalization of urban and pop culture, in a postdictatorial context. The liberation from the constraints of the dictatorship came with the idea of revitalizing marginal popular representations, especially by a middle-class young generation that found new ways of connecting the past and the present²⁴. During the bicentennial celebrations in September 2000, the dance returned to the public attention, appropriated by new generations as an expression of nationalism, reframing what was once a vernacular practice.

After 2010, Urban Cueca transforms in a “Civilian Cueca” and continued to be an important cultural practice for the construction of the new Chilean identity.

We can conclude by observing that the performance of nowadays Cueca subscribes to a long heritage of conflict between various political expressions; its claims still refer to the manipulation meaning in the process of building identity, where the Peasant-style dance is associated with the repression, while the urban one with the idea of freedom.

CUECA SOLA AND URBAN CUECA AS CULTURAL RESISTANCE

The recent history of Cueca shows that the appropriation of a cultural practice, in the process of building “national identity”, is rather complex and dynamic. Although it had been declared national dance under the Pinochet’s regime, this folkloric dance, of various forms and variations, remains nowadays a tool of expressing a “Chilean identity”. In order to understand better the place that this practice has within the current protests, we will see in the following lines how it became also a powerful symbol of opposition to the dictatorship.

In fact, when the General came to power in 1973, after a “coup d’état”, his politics of suppression had seen thousands of left-wing

politicians, activists, intellectuals, and artists killed, kidnapped, or exiled by the army. During those times, it is estimated that more than 3,000 Chileans were “disappeared”, while their fates were kept secret during his years in power.

Shut out of politics and commerce, based on a neoliberal model, many women whose husbands and sons were missing found in the cultural customs and folk dances a space for expressing their struggle. After gathering in committees, the performance of music and the arpillera²⁵ workshops, allowed them to produce tapestries that would not only provide an income for their families, but would have also become acts of subversion, for drawing attention to the human rights violations in their country. In finding new means of voicing protest and staging collective action through the making of political “crafts”, the women of Chile also often utilized scraps of clothing left over from their disappeared loved ones.

Very soon, dancing Cueca took also the form of political protest. During gatherings and public celebrations, mothers, wives, and other relatives of kidnapped and disappeared Chileans, started to dance it alone, with a handkerchief in their hand. In fact, without their partners, their dance was illustrating the loss of their loved one, drawing attention to the repressions that occurred in their families²⁶. Since the audience was very familiar with Cueca, it became collectively appreciated the irony of the act: the dance was supposed to represent the same nation that has deprived the performers of their children or spouse²⁷. Moreover, the women who danced “*Cueca Sola*” (literally meaning “*alone*”) were often carrying photographs of their missing partners, in order to revoke their presence in the ritual.

These acts had a powerful visual effect on the audience and it created meaning around their “silent” protest, also because it engaged the use of the body to tell their stories. In fact, the aesthetics and visual aspects of this transmission produced emotional response that goes beyond the linguistic frontiers and contributed to building support communities and solidarity²⁸. Furthermore, being associated with a form of “tradition”, both in its vernacular form or commercial culture, the dance has a much better chance of reaching

a wider public as it speaks in a language that people already understand.

On 8 March 1978, for the International Women's Day, *Cueca Sola* was performed for the first time in public by the *Group of Detained Disappearees*. Within this occasion, a large group of women played and sang alone their interpretation of the new most popular vernacular version of the music²⁹. Since many Chileans identified with the situation of the “desaparecidos”, what began in a safe space of familiar exchange soon became a widely recognized symbol of courage and protests.

The impact of this style crossed borders and, in 1987, the British singer Sting paid tribute to this dance through the song “They Dance Alone”:

Why is there this sadness in their eyes?
Why are the soldiers here
Their faces fixed like stone?
I can't see what it is that they despise
They're dancing with the missing
They're dancing with the dead
They dance with the invisible ones
Their anguish is unsaid
They're dancing with their fathers
They're dancing with their sons
They're dancing with their husbands
They dance alone, They dance alone

During his concert in 1990 “From Chile... an embrace of hope”, more than twenty women performed along with the photo of their missing relatives. Few years later, the rock band U2's lead singer, Bono, also performed together with the mothers looking for their disappeared children on stage, during a memorable concert at the National Soccer Stadium in 1998.

Nowadays, remembering *Cueca Sola*, the rearticulation and recontextualization of this practice is performed mainly in curatorial projects and ethnographic writings; however, the translation of

experience is complicated by the actions of multiple subjectivities and political constraints, typical for the reconstructions of memories.

At the end of the dictatorship, the revitalization of Urban Cueca, that resisted as vernacular reality in the past years started to spread. Its lyrics create an imaginary of utopia for the Chilean society transforming the sadness of the lost community into a desire for “belonging to,” and for “being with”. It is the sense of loss that transforms into a new “geography of sociability,” a new sense of locality, and engaged the need of reconstructing the city, of “our places”³⁰.

While in the past years, this developed as a marginal cultural and social practice, the various performances contributed to the development of an urban memory. Through the process of music mapping, the redefinition of memory is elaborated both by preserving old lyrics and by imagining simultaneously a “new world”, where real and fictional places of the city connect local urban memories with an integrative idea of “locality”. This idea aims to redefine the public space and to create a “claimed community” that develops everyday life networks, where past and present mix. The music becomes a pathway of rebuilding urban landscapes and new rituals for the civic living, by cultivating socially recognized symbolic and material relationships developed within a delimited space³¹.

In a moment of criticism of progress and globalization in Chile, Urban Cuecas produce local meanings that are geographically, socially and historically meaningful for audiences, and create also a city shaped by a sense of locality and community.

We can see how, once again, dancing Cueca represents an important tool for creating a “Chilean identity”. Far from being just the perpetuation of a “traditional dance”, its performance, its re-appropriation and re-transformation of meaning denote an instrument of politicization that perpetuated in time and adopted different expressions. While it suffers different levels of reconstructions by various organs of governance, vernacular groups or civic society, it also demonstrates how relying on art could

become a form of activism that denounces social and political constraints.

THE ART OF PROTESTING AND THE CIVILIAN CUECA

As I claimed in the introduction of this article, my interest in studying the history of this dance began with the visualization of a video taken during the latest protests, in November 2019.

In that video, the National Folkloric Ballet performed in front of the Theatre of the University of Chile, in Plaza Italia, for the “right of living in peace”, engaging with the audience and inviting them to dance Cueca to celebrate that “they are Chileans”³². I immediately started to question: to what extent protesters identify themselves as belonging to a national identity and how dancing Cueca represents part of this process? In fact, who are the Chileans within this context, and who are they opposing during the latest protests?

We could see above, within the evolution of Cueca Sola as political performance, that what used to be an art system organized around state institutions, has managed to find a new site of legitimacy: remembrance of desaparecidos and activism. On the other hand, Urban Cueca represented a restoration of social interaction within a delimited space that becomes then “a simultaneously real and imaginary place, present and virtual, a structured agency and individual and collective experience”³³. Cueca, together with other forms of arts, evolved and perpetuated in the collective consciousness, as belonging to the people, and during the latest protests, Cueca dance is coming back to people, finding in the streets of Santiago the new space for giving voice to their claims.

The performance of the National Folkloric Ballet in Plaza Italia delineates the “specialization” of the dance within a public space that materializes the memory of the social conviviality of popular places, but also of a historical location for protesting. This pacific protest that invites the public to participate through music

reproduces the model of a “Civilian Cueca”, a derived-style from the Urban Cueca that became popular after the years 2000s, among youth generation. The world that the protesters propose, is an imagined world where the population has the right “of living in peace” and to celebrate their belonging to a “Chilean identity”. In this context, the engaging performance aims to conceptualize the transition from the “lost community” to the “claimed community”, constructing this way a new form of collective memory and rebuilding a counter discourse that criticizes the notion of progress or what could be named the “Chilean way to global capitalism”.

However, recreating a feeling of belonging to a national identity, if such would be possible, would imply a complex process, based on more than one collective experience; therefore, the question to ask is not how the actors tried to create a sense of adhesion to the practice, but rather how do various, fragmented symbols, practices and actions take part to the creation of “collectiveness” that fight for common claims? Who it legitimated to take part to this process?

In general, mass social mobilizations aim to be sustainable collectively, and to engage actively a large number of supporters, where a common framework of identification plays an important role. As a result, for identifying themselves with a specific socio-political cause, performing Civilian Cueca facilitates mutual trust and they are more incline to engage in fights for freedom and rights. As all collective actions that develop during social movements are based on “otherness”, it is essential to remember that the key element is the differentiation between “we” vs. “them”. Those concepts are, however, to be approached as a dynamic pattern, where its concrete form depends on the set of relations at a given moment³⁴.

The term of “vernacular music” had been used here to indicate a cultural practice which survived to other forms of representation, implemented within an “official frame”. In fact, we can see in all mentioned cases that the “we” represents the “people”, that develop cultural actions as activism against “them”, the “political class”, although the actors, the space and claims are different, and they

depend on the historical context. Nowadays intent of the actors to liberalize the practice from its dictatorial political meaning, aims to redefine it as a symbol of resistance against Piñera's neoliberal government. This folkloric practice is shaped again by a new intent of creating national identity, deprived of past political constraints.

Sebastian Piñera's political agenda followed the economic path of the former regime. Although the neoliberal model brought high levels of economic growth, technology adoption and low level of corruption, disparities in terms of income and other factors remain important elements in nowadays Chile. The process of economic modernization made also inequality less acceptable in the face of public opinion. For example, in 1990, only 16% of Chileans completely agreed with the statement: "Incomes should be made more equal", and by the year 2000, that proportion grew to 33.5%. Moreover, younger citizens militate for a better quality of education, protection of the environment and social integration of minorities³⁵.

In addition to keeping government policy within the general "free market" framework imposed by the dictatorship, other political, social and cultural limits impacted Chile's "democratic" transition. The privatization of pension system, the cheap labor and the restriction of the social welfare benefits to the very poor (often stigmatized), together with the preservation of the dictatorship's 1980 constitution, that guarantees military independence from the government, contributed to the feeling of austerity perpetuated during the transition and after the restoration of civilian rule.

When in 2010, the newly elected and ultra-conservative president Sebastian Piñera re-inaugurated the bicentennial celebrations by performing the still official Peasant-style Cueca, it resurrected also the nationalist meaning that Pinochet associated with this practice.

The politicized appropriation of the "National Cueca" that makes reference to a past connected to dictatorship instigates the development of counter cultural movements such as the Civilian Cueca.

It is clear that the continuance of cultural activism through music and dance, in front of global and national policies that civilians

cannot change, represents a way of redefinition of a “Chilean identity” that represents better their desire of belonging to a community. However, we can ask ourselves how within the last protests this renegotiation takes place? What ruptures and continuities can we identify compared to the past claims? Who are the new actors and what instruments are nowadays adopted in this process?

Nowadays manifestations have been preceded by past protests, mostly the ones in 2011 which were massively supported by the student movement, in proportion of 79%. In fact, high school and college students have been the most vocal, channeling on the streets and online the public’s discontent over the free-market policies of Chile, educational policies and the environment³⁶.

Since protesting and reshaping identity engages always the reconstruction of historical memory, the instruments and claims that are adopted in the new context are shaped by the new actors involved. Young students belong to the so-called “Fearless Generation” and are inspired by a shared post-memory of stories heard about the fight against injustice to Chile during the dictatorship and about the historical left prior to Pinochet. Moreover, they are collectively willing to mobilize in social movements due to their lack of lived experience of the repressive regime³⁷.

While the issues linked to neoliberalism have led to street protests in the past, latest manifestations represented a new phenomenon, both for their success and their use of social media.³⁸ Chile is one of the countries in the region where digital technologies have been taken advantage of more intensely usage among the population. Having grown up with digital media, young people may be especially drawn to different collective experiences and means of expression, approaching therefore differently, the new forms of citizenship they entail³⁹.

In addition to that, social media can also promote the construction of an individual and collective identity, which represents an important element in building political behavior. By

allowing multiple channels for interpersonal feedback and/or reinforcement of social norms, the various sites operate as information hubs, where different communities and networks intersect their set of expectations, beliefs and values (*Idem*). The displacement of opinion expression from the physical space to the virtual space facilitates in fact the both the exchange of knowledge but also interpretive frameworks that help to process the information. According to several researchers, a “networked public” that is engaged in political talks or public affairs, are more likely to mobilize in political activities, and therefore to develop a protest behavior⁴⁰.

Social media represents also a platform that provide mobilization information and real-time news that are not available in other channels of communication, facilitating this way the coordination of demonstrations, the creation of possibilities to exchange opinions or to join different social and political causes. The diffusion of post materialist values that promote self-expression and elite-challenging behavior promotes also the production of ideological discourses exercised by members of particular communities, which are organized in a variety of cultural institutions or associations⁴¹.

It is within this particular context that cultural resistance and the performance of *Cueca* founds new ways of claiming rights and reshaping a “Chilean identity”.

During the latest protests, different civil groups, including worker unions, high school student federations, university student associations, feminist organizations and cultural figures have initially joined peaceful gatherings and demonstrations.

In contrast, some transgressive actions became “disruptive” and “violent”. Civil disobedience, labor or student strikes, taking over or occupying buildings and blocking routes, lighting fire and destroying vehicles, properties or buildings, barricades and confrontations with the military, led to imposed curfews and the deployment of tanks and troops that use brutal force against the militants. In claimed in the introduction, the military’s acts of repressions revoked painful memories from the dictatorship times, regarding human rights

violations. Due to the fear of living again under political constraints, civilians reacted promptly, by using different domestic and artistic instruments: slogans, utensils, pots and pans, music and chants. Many artists and activists joined the protests and used cultural practices as a mean to draw attention on their vision of justice. According to Sierralta, cultural strategies “reflect an evident intention to symbolize or represent some element of the collective cause through artistic or graphic media, or through a more sophisticated coordination of actions of those present than the habitual” (Sierralta 2016, 163).

Since the collective identity during social movements emerge from shared concepts, convictions and emotions of people actively engaged, the implementation of social and political changes passes through the collective interpretation of the traits, life experiences and social relations in which they take part (della Porta 2009, 102). The performance of Civilian Cueva during the nowadays manifestations represents not only a continuity of resistance and opposition to a regime that does not embody the needs of the people, but also a claim for freedom.

Thus, must have been aware that cultural meanings are always being actualized in the course of culturally contextualized acts of encoding and decoding. Cultural manifestations derive from the interpretation and ideological explanation that characterizes a particular moment, therefore it was important to “sort out the structures of signification” (Geertz 1973, 20), as Geertz would declare. The uses of cultural practices within political claims can have a powerful effect because they tend to encourage unity, to offer a framework for commitment and self-recognition, to build group identity and to undermine control of authorities.

It is clear that nowadays manifestations in Chile express a neoliberalism crisis. Mass-gatherings exploded in October 2019, and different groups of civilians participated for protesting against inequality, although their political outcome is indeterminate. We could observe a valorization of the revolt without necessarily a political translation, where new challenges are taking over traditional

forms of political and trade union mobilization. These are movements that escape institutional logics and traditional ideological patterns. The answer to the failure of economic implementations represents, as Monod is naming it, “a crisis in recent democracies (Monod 2019). The passage from a political dominance to a democracy increased the gap between liberalism and state, and the vision of the economy relates to a social and ecological degradation. In fact, as we could see also in this analysis, the characteristics of political action in these societies are determined by the dominant role of youth, the absence of political parties as the main organizers and the wide spread use of social media as means of political action.

CONCLUSION

The evolution of Cueca dance as cultural resistance had been strictly linked to the process of building a “Chilean Identity”, in opposition to political and economic constraints of the ruling government. Passing by the Peasant-style Cueca, to the Urban and the Civilian Cueca, and Cueca Sola, the performance had been submitted to various levels of re-constructions and re-appropriations of meaning, becoming both an instrument of politicization and a form of activism.

During latest protests, the persistence of inequalities due to Sebastian Piñera’s political agenda that followed the economic path of the former regime and encouraged the raise of a privileged elite, led to mass-gatherings all over the country.

Within this context, neo-democratic countries⁴², such as Chile, confronts with a crisis of governability, that is translated in political action which are determined by the dominant role of youth, the absence of political parties as the main organizers and the wide spread use of social media as means of political action.

The notion of contestation, along with youth resistance, had been extensively theorized and it is commonly understood as all

forms of protest against ideologies, values and institutions of the dominant culture. The adoption of cultural practices as method of demonstration denotes an intention to symbolize and represent the collective cause, in opposition to a restrictive form of governance, ruled by neoliberal economies and the lack of a tradition in democratic politics. In fact, as we could do in the example above, cultural practices of contestation consist both in the rejection and negation of some aspects of the totality of the dominant ideology on the one hand, and in the affirmation of an oppositional ideology on the other hand.

As we could see, the performance of Cueca dance represents in fact a symbol of resistance and an expression of freedom, with deep rooted historical connections, against the oppression of authoritarian regimes.

NOTES

1. <https://www.gob.cl/coronavirus/plandeaccion/>.
2. Garces, 2019.
3. *Cueca* is considered to be one of the traditional cultural practices in Chile, and also the National dance, as we will see in this article.
4. Mizuko Ito introduces the notion of networked publics to “reference a linked set of social, cultural, and technological developments that have accompanied the growing engagement with digitally networked media” (Ito 2008, 2).
5. *Ideoscape* is a term introduced by Appadurai to represent one of the five contemporary global cultural flows and indicates the circulation of images and ideas within the global cultural flow. By developing his five dimensions: *ethnoscape*, *technoscape*, *financescape*, *mediascape*, and *ideoscape*, he sought to demonstrate how globalization is not homogenous, but rather dynamic and interactive (Appadurai 1996).
6. Spencer 2007.
7. Barrios 1948; Dannemman 2007; Vega 1947.
8. Garrido 1943, 102-103.
9. Spencer 2016.
10. Legroux 2018; Campos 2013.
11. Gavilan 2013.
12. Cid Aguayo 2015.

13. Legroux 2018.
14. Cid Aguayo 2015.
15. Sotoconil 2009.
16. Radio U Chile, transmission of Pilar León about Cueca, from 8th February 2019.
17. Boursier 2010, 12.
18. Sotoconil 2009.
19. Sotoconil 2009.
20. Gingrich, Banks 2006, 2.
21. Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983, 1.
22. Pierre Nora 1978, 398.
23. Spencer 2016.
24. Torres 2010, 119.
25. “Arpilleras” in the Chilean tradition represents an old regional pictorial appliqué technique from Isla Negra on the coast of the country, whereby rags were used to create images and then embroidered on large pieces of cloth (Bacic 2009).
26. <https://theculturetrip.com/south-america/chile/articles/the-complicated-past-of-chiles-national-dance-la-cueca/>.
27. Agosine M, Abzung B 1995.
28. Chodak 2006.
29. Olivares & Gomoll 2016, 162-163.
30. Spencer 2016.
31. *Idem*.
32. Hermosa manifestación junto a la Cueca que se tomó Plaza Baquedano <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bFDBbl8ybfq>.
33. Soja 2008, 40 *in* Espinosa 2016.
34. Melucci 1996, 76.
35. Gil de Zúñiga, Jung & Valenzuela, 2012.
36. Valenzuela 2012.
37. Hirsh 2008.
38. Planas 2011.
39. Gil de Zúñiga, Jung & Valenzuela 2012.
40. Huckfeldt & Sprague 1995; Schmitt-Beck 2008.
41. Gil de Zúñiga, Jung & Valenzuela 2012.
42. Huntington coined the term of “Third Wave Democracy” to defined the transition from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occurred in several regions in the world: in 1974 (Carnation Revolution, Portugal), in Latin America in the 1980s, in Asia Pacific countries (Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan) from 1986 to 1988, Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and sub-Saharan Africa beginning in 1989 (Huntington

1991). I found it, however, more appropriate to use the notion of “new-democracy” for indicating the democratization of countries after the 90s.

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CHRONOTOPES OF TRAUMA IN TONI MORRISON'S *BELOVED*

Abdelkader Ben Rhit

Assistant Professor,
Arab Open University, Oman
benrhit.abdelkader79@gmail.com

Abstract. Trauma, a phenomenon which is too shocking to be fully registered upon its occurrence and which, instead, only manifests belatedly and somewhere else in intrusive images and compulsive re-enactments offers specific challenges to traditional notions of referentiality. This paper seeks to explore how traumatic experiences, such as The Middle Passage, slavery and racism can be represented, read, and perhaps worked through in terms of temporal and spatial references. By reading Toni Morrison's *Beloved*, this paper seeks to demonstrate that trauma is represented, acted out, and possibly worked over, not just through references to time but also to space – geographical, bodily, and textual. Through the analysis of the configuration of space/place in Morrison's *Beloved*, this paper reads trauma using Caruth's theorizations and Bakhtin's notion of chronotope. It offers an innovative reading of *Beloved* and argues that Morrison's novel is a memory-site for remembering and bearing witness to the past traumatic event, a novel that attempts to communicate the spatiotemporally disruptive force of trauma. Finally, this paper aims to contribute to literary trauma studies by reconsidering and expanding the idea of representing trauma by using the concept of chronotope.

Keywords: *Beloved*, trauma, space, African American historical novel, chronotope

INTRODUCTION

Morrison's *Beloved* is a story of both individual and collective pain and triumph resonates typically with the African American experience and human experience in general. My interest on this topic comes from the fact that she doesn't write about normality but rather about the complexity of emotions and behaviour. She dares to speak out the "unspeakable" and "rips the veil" on the hidden realities of sore ordeals. Bound by the paradox of human behaviour

(good people committing horrific acts), Morrison's characters embrace their transgression and then transcend them.

LITERATURE REVIEW

While reviewing the literature on Morrison's *Beloved*, I noticed that researchers have not investigated the temporal and spatial configurations of trauma. Keith Eldon Byerman sees that Morrison's narrative reveals the past by breaking through repression and by reconstituting communities and individual identities based on revelation and witness. (*Beyond Realism* 1990, 72) Angel Otero Blanco claims that "*Beloved* is connected not only with certain individuals but also with a whole society's past which must be socially remembered" ("The African Past in America" 2000, 145). Ashraf H. Rushdy argues that despite the dangers of remembering the past, African American artists have insistently based a large part of their aesthetic ideal on precisely that activity and she gives Morrison as an illustration on her idea for she considers her both a participant and theorist of this black aesthetic of remembering. ("Daughters Signifyin(g) History" 1992, 570). In this paper, I offer an innovative strategy of reading trauma in Morrison's *Beloved* by examining the temporal and spatial configuration of trauma using Caruth's and Bakhtin's theories of trauma and chronotope respectively.

THE TEMPORAL AND SPATIAL CONFIGURATIONS OF TRAUMA

Beloved (1987) underlines that the dramatic historical background of slavery may acquire an empowering role. It's the story of a mother who has killed her daughter to save her from slavery and who suffered the worst for this but ultimately managed to survive and grow up inscribing her new self. *Beloved* devotes its pages to a portrayal of the process of an individual and collective battle against

the effects of slavery, the struggle to be the definer instead of being just the defined. The novel's value lies in the fact that it brings consolation to the broken heartstrings rather than attempts to fossilize the distress of the past. The appearance of the ghost figure, Beloved, is both traumatic and mournful. Sethe articulates herself loudly when she mourns her past loudly. Hence, *Beloved* appears to be a proper illustration of the impulse of trauma and mourning leading to self-regeneration.

Cathy Caruth's understanding of trauma in terms of time and space is a significant starting point to study Morrison's *Beloved*. She temporalises and spatialises traumatic experience when she links the phenomenon of trauma to time and space in her definition. Disruption, displacement, and relocations are temporal and spatial ways of representing trauma. This paper's focus on references to time and space is a contribution to Caruth's (re)quest for a new way of reading, for finding new ways of listening to trauma. In Morrison's *Beloved* The protagonists' physical and mental space is dominated by a historical trauma that changes the way the flow of time and the concepts of space and place are perceived. The configuration of places in Morrison's novel reflects the' traumatized minds of her protagonists as well as their social and political circumstances. The fictional places that Morrison creates mirror the protagonists' traumatised minds and their physical and psychological journey on the path of working through historical trauma. The chronotopes in *Beloved* "are experienced as metonymies of the oppressive and traumatizing social and cultural system that dominates the lives of the protagonists." (Lonien 2009, 12)

Morrison's *Beloved*, the focus of this paper, interrogates national identity and reconstructs social memory. She represents key moments of African American's history starting with slavery and its aftermath, moving on to the Harlem Renaissance and to the time of the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights movement. In rendering these forgotten histories, Morrison imagines as well as repatterns actual and fictional materials to re-enact and re-construct the reality of a historical past that might not otherwise be reached. Morrison, it

could be argued, has turned into a historian of sorts attempting to unearth the forgotten and repressed past of the African Americans. The reconstruction of the African Americans' social memory and their traumatic past reflects the political and therapeutic nature of her trilogy. Her novel is an example of how the chronotope of trauma is imaginatively expressed and configured.

Beloved's traumatic memory and the space where she experienced her traumas and suffering are inextricably linked. In using *Beloved's* deeply spatial and physical memories from inside the slave ship, Morrison takes the reader back to the Middle Passage to witness a buried and silent history. The chronotope of the Middle Passage reflects the spatial parameters of the experience on the slave ship. The vivid details of narrowness, heat and darkness on the slave ship are recollected through *Beloved's* traumatized body. "*Beloved's* repeated assertion that "all of it is now" points to the collapsing of the spaces of past and present in the mind of the traumatized girl and to the impossibility of the Middle Passage to be mourned and then put aside." (Lonien 2009, 72)

A glance at the space-time dimension in *Beloved* can also be understood as a study of its *chronotope*, a concept I will utilize throughout this paper. The spatial configuration of the markers of trauma is both temporal and geographical. They fuse into what Bakhtin has called 'the chronotope' or fusion of time and space. Bakhtin defines the chronotope as follows:

We will give the name chronotope (literally, "time space") to the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature. [...] What counts for us is the fact that it expresses the inseparability of space and time (time as the fourth dimension of space). We understand the chronotope as a formally constitutive category of literature; we will not deal with the chronotope in other areas of culture.¹ In the literary artistic chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history. This intersection of axes and fusion of indicators characterizes the artistic chronotope. (*The Dialogic Imagination* 1981, 84-5)

This tension between a compulsive return to and return of historical traumas and a productive engagement with the past is what Morrison captures in her concept of rememory, in which the prefix suggests both repetition and re-vision. Revisiting her past in response to *Beloved's* incessant questions enables Sethe to engage with it in a (re)constructive way, to see some things in a new light and to remember others that she had simply occluded. However painful, being haunted ultimately seems a necessary condition: more than a source of suffering that binds negatively to the past, it can also be a way of poetically and politically re-visioning a traumatic history and reflecting on how it impacts diasporic identity. (Chassot 2018, 27)

The quotation below reflects how time is spatialized in Morrison's *Beloved*:

I was talking about time. It's so hard for me to believe in it. Some things go. Pass on. Some things just stay. I used to think it was my rememory. You know. Some things you forget. Other things you never do. But it's not. Places, places are still there. If a house burns down, it's gone, but the place – the picture of it – stays, and not just in my rememory, but out there, in the world. What I remember is a picture floating around out there outside my head. I mean, even if I don't think it, even if I die, the picture of what I did, or know, or saw is still out there. Right in the place where it happened' (*Beloved* 1988, 35-36).

Through this monologue, Sethe highlights the concept of “rememory”, which reflects in turn the way Morrison approaches the past as a persistent powerful influence in the present. The above quotation demonstrates that Sethe's memories are tangible structures, spaces she can enter like a room: “Places, places are still there. If a house burns down, it's gone, but the place – the picture of it – stays, and not just in my rememory, but out there, in the world.” (*Beloved* 1988, 36)

Morrison's spatializing of time allows her to move the task of remembering trauma from the individual psyche to the public sphere, which in turn underlines the significance of public remembrance for the African American community. Place and

trauma are inextricably connected and Morrison uses this connection to portray her protagonists' traumatic memories, which in turn represent a larger historical trauma. The historical past is presented in *Beloved* as trauma of individual and collective dimensions. Sethe's (his)story stands for the (hi)story of American slaves because as Baby Suggs says: "Not a house in the country ain't packed to its rafters with some dead Negro's grief" (*Beloved* 1988, 5).

The African Americans' trauma originally started with 'The Middle Passage' which marked the beginning of African enslavement in America. This traumatic historical event is at the heart of *Beloved* and the root cause for the protagonists' traumas and suffering. While Sethe's trauma is not only the result of her killing of her daughter but "her lifelong exposure and subjection to slavery, to which her desperate act was a response", (Chassot 2018, 24) the historical trauma of African- Americans is caused by the Middle Passage, which lies hidden in the deepest recesses of communal memory.

In *Beloved*, Morrison opens up spaces to commemorate the silenced history of African American trauma through rememory" which is a hybrid of remember and memory. The fact that the memory of Sethe remains the same over time, it keeps haunting her and her family. This demonstrates that *Beloved* is not merely about remembering trauma but also about the problems of expressing it in words. Cathy Caruth defined trauma as an event that is so unexpected and shocking that cannot be fully assimilated or integrated in the consciousness as it occurs but it returns belatedly through repetitions flashbacks and nightmares. Trauma disrupts the cognitive, linguistic and time structure of the mind. Hence, the failure of the traumatized subject to speak or communicate trauma simply. Sethe's awareness of the past troubles her mind. Although she works "she worked hard to remember as close to nothing as was safe. Unfortunately, her brain was devious." (*Beloved* 6) "But her brain was not interested in the future. Loaded with the past and hungry for more, it left her no room to imagine, let alone plan for, the next day." (*Beloved* 1988, 6/78)

Another significant chronotope in *Beloved* is the South. Liam Kennedy argues that “The South often plays an important role as an imaginary homeplace in African-American literature with a primary Northern urban setting.” (Kennedy 2000, 58) In *Beloved*, the South has both a positive and a negative connotation. Its positive meaning derives from being the home of the protagonists and hence they have a feeling of nostalgia towards it but its negative meaning stems from being the place of their trauma, torture, oppression and racism.

The temporal and spatial aspects of the notion of trauma is a topic which is worthy of pursuing. Starting out from Caruth’s and Freud’s contentions about the dislocation inherent in traumatic experience, this paper proposes that references to time and space image the traumatized mind, and that trauma should be read for disruptions and dislocations in terms of these temporal and spatial references respectively. Trauma has a time of its own, “trauma’s time,” as Aimee Pozorski calls it, the “belatedness of trauma itself” (2006, 71). Traumatic reference indicates a complicated relation to remembering the past, temporalizing representation.

The protagonists undertake a journey of remembrance back to their southern repressed roots. “If the characters in *Beloved* are motherless in the literal sense of the word, they are also motherless metaphorically, cut off from their traumatizing but also identity-forming roots in the South.” (Lonien 2009, 33) The journey back to the Southern roots is painful. Karin Luisa Badt argues “Given the atrocities in Afro-American history, to return to one’s ‘roots’ has the psychic resonance of returning to a subjugated position: Although the mother’s body, as the site of history, is made to signify anew [...] it is also the trace of an unbearable past.” (Badt 1995, 575) However, because the South is the site of black identity formation, remembrance of the Southern past as trauma is essential for the protagonists’ identity.

Nostalgia or “the longing to return to a lost place” is a major theme in *Beloved*. (Su 2005, 3) Both Sethe and Paul D envision Sweet Home as such a lost place, a lost home which they feel connected

to despite the traumas they experienced there. Morrison reflects on the present and attempts to interpret it using the nostalgia for places of the past. Sethe's longings constitute significant parts of her memory and experience. Thus, the house becomes a chronotope in which "Sethe's psychological hypertrophy is personified, while the heaviness of the memory that pursues her obtains a real form." (Velinova 2009, 4) When at the end of the novel Paul D talks to Stamp Paid about the strange young woman who settled in Sethe's house, he says: "She reminds me of something. Of something I know, but I have forgotten." (*Beloved* 1988, 234)

Sweet Home is the place where Sethe and Paul D met. The ambivalence of this chronotope derives from being both a safe haven for the slaves living on it and at the same time a place for the ugly face of slavery. Sweet Home has two contradictory utopian and dystopian dimensions. Sethe is constantly plagued by intrusive memories of her time at the slave plantation, transporting her back to a past place and time. Her recollections of Sweet Home are vivid:

there was Sweet Home rolling, rolling, rolling out before her eyes, and although there was not a leaf on that farm that did not make her want to scream, it rolled itself out before her in shameless beauty. It never looked as terrible as it was and it made her wonder if hell was a pretty place too. Fire and brimstone all right but hidden in lacy groves. Boys hanging from the most beautiful sycamores in the world. It shamed her--remembering the wonderful soughing trees rather than the boys. Try as she might to make it otherwise, the sycamores beat out the children every time and she could not forgive her memory for that. (*Beloved* 1988, 6)

The complex relationship between memory and nostalgia is exemplified through Sethe's memories of Sweet Home as a chronotope of trauma but also of beauty. Sethe remembers the lynchings, which are outweighed by the soothing images of Sweet Home's beautiful trees.

Sweet Home is an essential chronotope for the formation of Sethe's identity. "It serves as the locus of a common past for Sethe, Baby Suggs and Paul D, and therefore is a vital point of reference in

their common journey towards a retrieval of traumatic memory.” (Lonien 2009, 37) Sethe claims Sweet Home as their common ground, the place that they remember as home whether they want to or not: “She’s right, Sethe. It wasn’t sweet and it sure wasn’t home.’ He shook his head. ‘But it’s where we were,’ said Sethe. ‘All together. Comes back whether we want it or not’” (14). Sweet Home is for Sethe a point of reference against which she orients herself in the chaos and traumatic experiences of her life.

The school place in *Beloved* is another chronotope of trauma. It is not a place of shaping and opening up minds, but a place where the black race is brutally dehumanised. The Schoolteacher’s brand of racist pseudoscience is symbolized by his measuring string, used to systematically measure the slaves’ facial angles, head shapes and brain sizes to prove the supremacy of the white race and the inferiority of the black race. Paul D thinks of how he had fantasized about Sethe on Sweet Home and how the actual consummation of that desire has failed to live up to his fantasy. Sethe remembers deciding to marry Halle and asking Mrs. Garner if there would be a wedding for them. Mrs. Garner simply laughed in reply. As Sethe and Paul D separately reconstruct their pasts, Sethe’s unofficial marriage to Halle shows that the Garners did not consider their slaves worthy of actual marriage.

Sethe approaches Mrs. Garner, expecting female solidarity and understanding concerning her love for Halle: “She and Mrs. Garner were the only women there, so she decided to ask her” (*Beloved* 1988, 26). At this moment, historical reality disrupts the utopian female space of friendship in the kitchen and when Sethe asks “Is there a wedding?” (*Beloved* 1988, 26), Mrs. Garner just laughs at the slave woman’s naiveté. Sethe fails to transform the unhomely space of slavery into a home for her. This kitchen scene has a traumatogenic effect. Whereas it is not overtly brutal or violent, it testifies nevertheless to a form of “insidious” racist trauma, happening within the confines of the traditionally female identified domestic space. According to Laura Brown “insidious trauma” refers to the “traumatogenic effects of oppression that are not necessarily overtly

violent or threatening to bodily well-being at the given moment but that do violence to the soul and spirit" ("Not Outside the Range" 1995, 107). These subtle mechanisms of trauma that often take place in the domestic sphere and which consist in verbal rather than physical violence have a tremendous impact on the psychic and emotional integrity and sanity of the protagonists. These mechanisms of trauma turn the domestic space unhomely.

CONCLUSION

In *Beloved*, Morrison temporalizes and spatializes trauma in order to negotiate ways of individual and collective identity formation. Places like Sweet Home and 124 Bluestone are used as metonymies for the protagonists' traumatized minds and their different ways of dealing with trauma. The protagonists' physical and mental space is occupied by historical traumas that prevent them from finding a place in the present without revisiting the places of their traumatic past.

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THE ERASURE OF THE “REAL” BY THE “HYPERREAL” IN
POSTMODERNITY THROUGH JEAN BAUDRILLARD’S *MODE OF*
APPREHENSION

Farhat Ben Amor

Faculty of Arts and Humanities
of Kairouan, Tunisia
farhatbenamorfarhat@gmail.com

Abstract. This article exposes the views of the French philosophical theorist, Jean Baudrillard (1929–2007), in relation to the dramatic shifts wrought to the world after being swamped with infinite forms of mass culture, ranging from mass production and consumerism to the invasion of the virtual cybernetic life to man’s reality across the globe. It is postmodernity as a condition characterized generally by the superabundance of quantitative provision whether of goods or leisure that Baudrillard seeks to study. This paper sets focus on Baudrillard’s conceptualization of the “real” in such a postmodern condition where he deems is kept shrunk, dissipated and eventually erased altogether by the omnipotent might of the “hyperreal.” The latter substitutes the “real” while incorporating in it infinite contrarities of profound alternatives and never-ending options offered to man, on the one hand, countered by the sheer absence of referentiality, representation and even originality, on the other.

Keywords: Baudrillard, erasure, (hyper)real, implosion, (post)modernity, sign, values, simulacra, simulation, subject(ivity)

INTRODUCTION

The Baudrillardian project endeavors to study modernity, namely signs and indices evincing its end as a phase of history that marks a considerable part of the twentieth century. To ascertain the end of modernity presupposes a skeptic attitude towards the pillars that constitute its structure as a whole. It is to question what Richard G. Smith calls “the values of modernity, bound up with the Enlightenment dream of the progressive emancipation of humanity

through the application of reason” (Smith 2010, 169). Smith detects this urge from the fact that “Baudrillard rarely uses the term ‘postmodern/ism/ity’ in his body of writing, precisely because all his works are concerned with modernity, or rather the ‘end of modernity’ [...] The multiplicity of ends scattered throughout Baudrillard’s writings are a part of modernity coming to an end, not a new postmodern beginning” (Smith 2010, 217). Implicitly, then, the prefix ‘post’ attached to ‘modernity’ is indicative of a state of exhaustion in which no longer is it possible to tap any resource from the ‘values of modernity’ that keep witnessing a process of ending.

In reality, the question of whether postmodernity is a rupture with or continuation of modernity soon gives way to deeper investigations of such a postmodern condition from within. Certainly, this is because the postmodern condition becomes an undeniable phenomenon possessing its unique features whose subtleties of operation ought to constitute the actual field of study, rather than the mere pondering over the conjectural rupture or continuation it makes with modernity. The latter (modernity) would be mostly evoked only if there were an aim of highlighting the changing nature of man’s preoccupations in postmodernity. As Brian Nicol states, “theorists have tended to portray modernity (that is, from early to mid-twentieth century) as increasingly industrialized, mechanized, urban and bureaucratic, while postmodernity as the era of the space age, of consumerism, late capitalism, and most recently, the dominance of the virtual and the digital” (Nicol 2009, 2).

Baudrillard’s study of the end of modernity is anchored in his attempt to envisage it as a parenthesis that is closed once for all. Meanwhile, postmodernity presents itself as another parenthesis that is open, yet its contours are puzzling enough to lead him to embark on deciphering them. It comes as no surprise, then, to find Baudrillard’s works veer towards studying postmodernity as a condition, rather than ruminating on the demise of modernity. Indeed, such postmodern proper concepts as ‘hyperreality,’ ‘simulation’ and ‘simulacrum,’ along with ideas related to

fragmented subjectivities and the loss of control of the subject over the object do, all, furnish the grounds of his writings. All these concepts and ideas are closely interrelated with each other, in the sense of functioning as tools through which Baudrillard problematizes the existence of something called the “real” in postmodernity. Rather, it is the “hyperreal” that is holding sway over the “real” and, therefore, gains prominence in Baudrillard’s works. My aim in this article is to elicit the Baudrillardian conceptualization of the “real” and the “hyperreal” and the process that leads him to derive the superseding authority of the latter over the former in postmodernity.

1. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE “REAL” IN POSTMODERNITY

It is quite pertinent, at first, to expose the constituents of the postmodern condition itself as a mode of life that has its own peculiarities. This is certainly conducive afterwards to gather illuminating insights into the disruptive nature of that condition to the seamy order of the “real” and the subsequent ascendancy of the “hyperreal” instead. Besides, a scientific analysis of a given condition, such as that of postmodernity, requires an overall strategy that takes into account both materialistic aspects (like the goods being produced and sold, socio-economic choices, political machinery etc) and immaterial ones (embracing generally thoughts and culture). In either case, man remains the locus on whose territory the specificities of the condition being studied could be unraveled and sound conclusions would be generated. This means that the study of postmodernity must include within its canon the response of man to the diverse forms of (im)material life, no matter how passive that response may be. Indeed, the incorporation of man’s passivity in the study of postmodernity is revealed through the use of the term “subject” which “serves as a substitute for the older terms *person*, *individual*, and *self* to designate a fractured, decentered, language-shaped creature” (Quinn 1999, 312).

Dealing with man on the basis of being a “subject” implies destabilizing the position of man in the universe so that s/he is no longer viewed as an agent of action. The paradigm of “subject / object” within a postmodern context comes to signify an ever-rising competent and even warring atmosphere wherein the “object,” whose sources never cease multiplying and possessing almost inexplicable and undetectable subtleties, functions often anathematically to the “subject.” Actually, while expounding on postmodernity, Baudrillard tries to pinpoint the causes that incur the “subject” in a decentered state vis-à-vis the “object” and the serious effects produced out of that degenerating process. All the while, he stresses the paradoxical fact that it is out of the proliferation of what Douglass Kellner calls “hi-tech inventions” (Kellner 2006, 22), meant originally to facilitate life and speed the rhythm of service and information, that the decentralization of the “subject” by the “object” is slyly implemented. In his book *The Intelligence of Evil*, Baudrillard points to the mesmerising aspect of these very hi-techs: “you enter the screen and the visual image unimpeded. You enter life itself as though walking on to a screen. You slip your own life like a data suit” (Baudrillard 2005,75).

What takes place is an underlying context of fusion and even inseparability between man and the “screen,” bringing about a different sort of human being. For Baudrillard, the postmodern condition makes out of the screen “a partner in a general negotiation on lifestyles; or something (or someone, since at this stage there is no more difference) to which you are wired” (Baudrillard 1988, 13). This close bond established between man and the screen pertains, in reality, to the deluge of digital networks of communication and information characterizing postmodernity. Expatiating on the Baudrillardian conceptualization of such a “screen-wired” human being, Richard. G. Smith underscores “the emergence of a new modality of the human. The human gives way to the *post-human* when the virtual replaces the actual as the primary mode by which we conceptualize and experience reality” (Smith 2010, 16). Constituting an indivisible entity with the “virtual” while losing

touch with the “actual,” this “post-human” man in postmodernity ends up forsaking the “real” altogether. As Smith continues to argue, “humans have become virtualized – immersed within digital circuits of instant and excessive information technologies – to the point we can no longer maintain a critical difference from the cyberspaces that surround us” (Smith 2010, 16).

When the “virtual” and the “real” become inextricably mixed, the latter is rendered an elusive concept, sharing the same insubstantiality as the former. Hence, Baudrillard notices “the ‘real’ has disappeared, and that is the mystery: why is there nothing rather than something” (Baudrillard 1996, 2)? Baudrillard’s wonder is certainly ascribed to the sheer difference between the aims of such a digital revolution in postmodernity (revolving, in their congregate, around the achievement of speed of service and information) and the shortcoming of its findings, consisted chiefly in banishing man from the “real” while ensnaring man in a “virtualized” mode of being. So, rather than adding “something” to the reality of man, this all-encompassing digital circuit invading the world puts its virtual weight on man as to cause the “real” to be crashed and turn into “nothing.” Brian Nicol adeptly expresses this paradox in postmodernity: “we have become alienated from those aspects of life we might consider authentic or real [...] Existence has become more virtual than real” (Nicol 2009, 4).

1.A. CODIFICATION OF THE “REAL” THROUGH SIGN-VALUES

Inauthenticity of the “real” in the postmodern condition becomes the watchword for Baudrillard. Revisiting the Saussurean one-to-one correspondence between the signifier and the signified, Baudrillard posits a new semiology based on liberating the signified from the stranglehold of the signifier. In his book *Symbolic Exchange and Death*, Baudrillard maintains that “the arbitrariness of the sign begins when the signifier starts to refer to a disenchanted universe of the signified, the common denominator of the real world,

towards which no one any longer has the least obligation” (Baudrillard 1993, 50). Clearly, Baudrillard adopts a wider reading of “arbitrariness” than Saussure who used it as signifying the absence of any relational logic in nature that binds the signifier to the signified. Baudrillard reads it, too, in conjunction with the representational urge of the sign, namely the inescapable inaptitude of the signifier to bear any tie to “the real world” which, by its elusive nature, remains “nothing” and therefore, “no one has the least obligation” to in such a postmodern condition. Hence, the essence of liberating the flow of the signifier in the Baudrillardian semiological enterprise is meant essentially to stress its being cast into “the metaphysics of indeterminacy and code” (Baudrillard 1993, 57).

What is most important, here, is not mainly the irrepresentationability of the signifier to the “real” due to the context of “indeterminacy” surrounding its journey of reference. This is just a parcel of a well-known fact typifying post-structuralist studies at large which have come to oust the Saussurean structuralism wherein for each signifier there is a signified that is fixed and well-determined. So, Baudrillard’s “metaphysics of indeterminacy” is there to enhance the post-structuralist breakthrough of destabilizing fixity and determinacy from within the system of signification as to highlight the capacity of the signifier to have multiple signifieds. It is, rather, the “metaphysics of code” which Baudrillard propounds, too, that deserves to catch much attention, especially that the Baudrillardian conceptualization of the “code” entertains the same disruptive potential to the signifying process as does the indeterminate signified in relation to the signifier in a post-structuralist framework.

Baudrillard does not content himself with elaborating just a post-structuralist reading of the “code,” but inscribes it in a postmodern condition where “the subject becomes a node in the network and an absorbent screen” (Smith 2010, 201). Within the Baudrillardian usage of the term, the “code” does actually reveal much anchorage in such a virtualized digital world characterizing postmodernity. As

he affirms, “a code is a question of substituting the signs of the real for the real” (Baudrillard 1981, 2). Baudrillard is talking about the codification of the “real” which culminates eventually in causing it to evaporate and be “substituted” by mere “signs” iconizing it. It is as though the “real” in postmodernity had undergone a symbolic death after which to be subjected to a monumentalizing process through icons seeking to construct thereby a substitutable existence which, though possesses materiality, remains lifeless. It is exactly like a dead body being embalmed to preserve it from decay. The reduction of the “real” to a set of “codes” ends up, then, giving worth to “signs” rather than what they refer to so that, as Kellner observes, “sign-values predominate over use values and exchange values [...] Signs take precedence over the ‘real’ and reconstruct human life. The subject of praxis is fractured and objects come to rule human beings” (Kellner 2006, 15).

With the overthrow of the “real” by the “signs of the real,” crucial implications take place, all of which flow to the same container: the erasure of the “real.” As Baudrillard maintains, “the question of the signs and their rational destinations, their ‘real’ and their ‘imaginary,’ their repression, reversal, the illusions they form of what they silence or of their parallel signification, is *completely effaced*” (Baudrillard *Simulacra and Simulation* 1994, 42, my emphasis). As the “real” completes its effacement under the thick layers of its own “signs,” there comes to the forefront whether the set of codes replacing it are able to carry on doing the mission they are supposed to do at the referential level. The question concerns the viability of the code to refer to the objective world of reality when the “real” loses any ground of existence. This is certainly what leads Baudrillard to metaphysicize the code. While the aforementioned “metaphysics of indeterminacy” is related to the sign-system in which open-endedness of reference is stressed, the “metaphysics of code” pertains to the coreless outcome of “sign-values” where referentiality itself is effaced following the substitution of the “real” by mere “signs of the real.” Baudrillard presents the latter’s metaphysics as follows: “the code does not claim to prove itself, to

verify itself” (Baudrillard 2003, 91).

1.B. THE IMPLOSION OF THE “REAL” IN ITS OWN SIGNS

The non-referential aspect of the “sign of the real” to the “real” begets serious implications in the study of postmodernity. Even the scale of differentiation whereby to establish parameters of variations between daily practices is made a vain endeavor that cannot be other than void of purport in such a codified sort of reality governed by mere “signs.” For example, there occurs “the breaking down of the distinction between high art and low or mass culture” (Capezio 2012, 2-3). This means that the non-referentiality of the “sign” to the “real” soon yields an inescapable unoriginality in which all that man produces in life remains a mere construct that is caught under the umbrella of sign-values. Therefore, whatever is done and how skilful a product is manufactured are but forms of a larger “code” which is, by its metaphysical nature, always elevated to man’s empirical reality inasmuch as the “code” can do without “proving” and/or “verifying” its presence there. By analogy, the “code” follows the same itinerary of slippage from the “real” as the signifier does in relation to the set of signifieds in the poststructuralist sign-system.

Accordingly, the shrinkage of the liminality separating the “sign-values” that the “code” may possess from their mere systemic essence as unstable constructs results in the eventual loss of values attached to them. Hence, rather than talking about the so-called elevation of the “code” to the laws of reality where “proving” and “verifying” processes are demanded, Baudrillard detects its elusive and even duplicitous nature in man’s life in postmodernity: “it is reality itself that disappears in the game of reality” (Baudrillard 1983, 146). So, if the “code” were to produce “signs of the real” not the “real” itself, all that it does would be a mere “game” of signification, sharing thus not just the same elusiveness of reference, but also the artificiality of reference itself of the signifier in the poststructuralist

sign-system. In the words of Martin Golab, “having lost connection with reality and substituting it for operational value, all differentiation in such a sign-system is achieved artificially and all meaning can be manipulated at will” (Golab 2016, 29). The context of “artificiality” and “manipulation” is certainly indicative of a tricky situation where there is no room for “values.”

As the “real” is played with by the very “signs” of its own representation, it witnesses an explosion from within, known as “implosion”: “strictly speaking, this is what implosion signifies: the absorption of one pole into another, the short-circuit between poles of every differential systems of meaning, the effacement of terms and of distinct oppositions, and thus of the medium and the real” (Baudrillard 1983, 102). Being so, the implosion of the “real” in its own “signs” means, in the final analysis, its generation of its own “effacement” through its mutual act of absorbing and being absorbed in its own compositional “medium” which is, given its anchorage in codality, remains prone to “artificiality” and “manipulation.” Hence, Baudrillard moves a step further in gathering the impossibility of gaining any identifiable and well-grounded meaning from the “real” in the aftermath of its implosion into its own “signs.” As he said maintains, “by the very play of appearances, things are becoming further and further removed from their meaning, and resisting the violence of interpretation” (Baudrillard 2001, 19).

What is being articulated, then, is an imploded state in which the difference between the “real” and “signs of the real” is completely blurred, causing the former to be implicated in the same characteristics as the latter. By extension, no longer is it possible for Baudrillard to talk about a “real” that is untarnished by the “artificial” and “manipulative” aspects of its own “signs” which function always as the “medium” through which that “real” is communicated. Thus, Baudrillard differentiates between the “Real” as a hypothetical concept that has no bearing to the postmodern condition and the actual “real” of postmodernity that is witnessing implosion from within culminating in its erasure. He said, “the Real

implies an origin, an end, a past and a future, a chain of causes and effects, a continuity and a rationality [...] And its disappearance is the dislocation of this whole constellation” (Baudrillard 2000, 63). The ultimate result of the implosion of the “real” in its own “signs” is the total erasure of the common parameters wherewith man can conceptualize the world, whether tempo-spatially (a past and a future) or logically (a rationality), or even metaphysically (an origin and an end).

2. THE “HYPERREAL” AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE “REAL”

Baudrillard posits that the erasure of the “real” in postmodernity has brought about a new mode of reality called the “hyperreal.” He delineates the condition of “hyperreality” as that in which “images are no longer the mirror of reality. They have invested the heart of reality and transformed it into hyperreality where, from screen to screen, the only aim of the image is the image” (Baudrillard 2005, 43). It is the cult of the image for its own sake that typifies the “hyperreal,” creating, thus, “a metastatic mode of self-reproduction” (Genius 2002, 226). This metastasis affecting the “image” engenders a paradox revealed through taking “the heart of reality” as raw materials while doing a simultaneous “transformational” exercise whereby the “hyperreal” acts out its substitution of the “real” through the compositional structure of the “image” itself. The immediate effect of that metastatic situation where the “aim of the image is image,” light is shed on the process of construction, not on the image itself. Hence, “focus is shifted from what is being represented in the image towards how the image is represented and produced” (Capezio 2012, 4).

We are, then, in front of a form of implosion whereby the “image” acts at once as possessing a content that needs to be deciphered and as a constructed production whose structure triggers off the viewer’s interest. This duality begets “the immanent logic of the image as the center of Baudrillard’s analysis” (Saulius 2002, 94).

The sense of amplitude that “immanence” is suggestive of does not exceed, however, the space of the already-imploded postmodern subject in relation to the object being represented by the “image.” Implosion, which is there to endorse “dedifferentiation” (Kellner 2006, 12), narrows down and even eliminates the gap separating the subject from the object so that neither of them grows distinguishable from each other. This indistinguishability does typify the tie binding the subject and the “image” where the idea of “immanence” indicates an endless absorption of the former in the latter, rather than a distanced elaboration of contact. Actually, Baudrillard evokes in his book *Simulations* “implosion as an absorption of the radiating model of causality, of the differential model of determination, of meaning” (1983, 57).

Interestingly, the “hyperreal” emanates from this exhaustive aspect of “absorption” generated by implosion whose magnitude takes on a metaphysical proportion given its implication in the laws of “causality,” “determination” and “meaning.” As G. Smith maintains, “implosion signifies the birth of a new order – that of the hyperreal” (Smith 2010, 76). Ironically, tantalization of the postmodern subject in relation to the “image” as an object characterizes such a “metaphysics” that the “hyperreal” is likely to produce. This is certainly the effect of the amalgamation of the amplitude of “the immanence of logic of the image” with the detainment of the subject in it through the process of implosion whereby the subject’s absorption in the “image” is carried to such an extent that both grow indistinguishable from each other. Hence, rather than possessing the ability to mobilize the “image” from within through such conventional acts as symbolic renderings of it via analysis and interpretation (whether of its content or structural form), the so-called “hyperreal metaphysics” atrophies the subject’s agency in relation to it.

For Baudrillard, the evaporation of the subject’s agency over the “image” yields “glaciation of meaning” (Baudrillard 2001, 181) which affects, too, the notions of “determination” and “causality.” Ultimately, this all-inclusive form of “glaciation” is indicative of the

entanglement of the “hyperreal metaphysics” in a perpetual context of negation and even cancellation of any destination for the “image” outside its space. Accordingly, the confinement of the “image” within its own orbit reverberates, too, the movement of the “sign” in poststructuralism. So, “if the destination of the signs is found in their link to referents, the destiny of signs is to lose their referential function” (Kellner 2006, 97). The same loss of “referentiality” despite the plurality of “referents” characterizes the “hyperreal” journey the “image” undertakes in postmodernity. On the one hand, the “image” suggests a wide array of “referents” thanks to the “immanent logic” it possesses at the level of form. On the other, due to its incessant implosion into a metastatic state of “self-reproduction,” the “image” tends to elude a “real” referential potential, at the level of content. Thus, its meaning is “glaciated” by sinking into a mere “hyperreal” construct” that is just there to simulate reality, not to “represent” it.

2.A. SIMULATION OF THE “REAL” BY THE “HYPERREAL”

While talking about “simulation,” Baudrillard begins with distinguishing it from “dissimulation.” He observes that: “to dissimulate is to pretend not to have what one has. To simulate is to feign to have what one does not have” (Baudrillard *Simulacra and Simulation* 1994, 3). In postmodernity, simulation has to do with the trajectories of both the “real” and the “hyperreal” whereby the latter constitutes a space of “feigning” representationality of and referentiality to the former. The whirl in which the postmodern subject is kept caught pertains, thus, to the perpetual unsettling of the “real” from within by the intruding visitations of the “hyperreal” which does so only to simulate other alternatives of “realness” to the “real.” However, whatever amount of simulation the “hyperreal” produces in relation to the “real” remains a fruitless endeavor since, by its metaphysical nature, the attempt in itself is hinged on falsifying the subject who is kept duped into believing the possibility

of having “what one does not have” actually. This might have led G. Smith to hold that “Baudrillard has always sought to undermine any confidence we have in the possibility of establishing an objective knowledge of the world” (Smith 2010, 4).

This lack of “confidence,” however, does not distance, for Baudrillard, the hapless postmodern subject from the germinating outgrowth of different sources of simulation nourishing the hyperreal sway. In the postmodern condition where reality is bombarded by “signs” and “images” iconizing it in formulaic rules and principles, no room is left to the “real” to be unaffected by the vagaries of simulation. As G. Smith continues to argue, “this hallucinated real – the hyperreal – is more real than the real, with heightened reality effects that the merely existent cannot match” (Smith 2010, 179). Certainly, Baudrillard adopts this hallucinatory aspect of the “hyperreal” through portraying it as a fatal obsession fettering the postmodern subject in its shackles that are made, nonetheless, imperceptible and even appealing by dint of simulation. He highlights the importance of such “heightened reality effects” of the “hyperreal” in diverting the subject’s attention to it, stressing the primacy of the form over the content even at the linguistic level: “the signifier, considered as a form rather than content, produces the effect of the real or referent as mirage, alibi or simulation” (Baudrillard 1990, 197).

Emanating from “the effect of the real,” rather than from the “real” itself, the “hyperreal” finds in simulation a fertile soil to consolidate its own metaphysics of presence in postmodernity. Simulation, which gives the impression of the capacity to transform what is not had into being had, nurtures the “hyperreal” mode of life where the “mirage” of the “real” is endowed with its own “alibi” to defend its appeal to the postmodern subject. Ultimately, what is being feigned to be had, though it is not had, is but a form of anesthetization whereby the “real” is deadened at the expense of dynamizing the “hyperreal,” which requires the subject’s embrace of the falsification of simulation wholeheartedly. As Baudrillard puts it, “to assert that ‘we are in a state of simulation’ becomes meaningless,

because at that moment one enters a death-like state. The moment you believe that you are in a state of simulation, you are no longer there” (Baudrillard 1993, 184). Implicitly, simulation is made like a boon that has its own prerequisite to be obtained, the chief of which is to do without awareness while succumbing into constructing what cannot be had in the “real.”

For Baudrillard, simulation has already achieved its tight hold over the awareness of the postmodern subject whose enchantment to “hyperreal” fabrics reaches its utmost, culminating in a condition where no space is left to the “real” to exist. As Oscar Capezio elaborates it, “the problem Baudrillard sets up is how to speak against this simulation when there is nothing to compare it, when there is nothing outside it. This is his hypothesis of simulation which is not only the loss of true reality, but also its very possibility” (2012, p.8). The main effect of simulation, then, is to cover such a devastation wrought to the “real” in postmodernity while working all the time to convince the postmodern subject that s/he knows the tenure of it. As this state (based on the subject’s mistaken belief in controlling the “real”) lingers, even the “very possibility” of such an act is retarded and cancelled altogether, giving full primacy to the “hyperreal” to keep consolidating its foundations that are based on mere simulations of the “real.” Hence, “simulation is an experience that artfully *mimics* but otherwise has no connection to the reality it presents” (Smith 2010, 199 my emphasis).

2.B. SIMULACRUM AS A MEANS OF HYPERREAL SIMULATIONS

With the intrigues of its “artful mimicry” of a simulated “real,” the “hyperreal” manages to provide the postmodern subject with a much wider space to navigate than what the “real” can do, no matter how elusive that space may be. In fact, Baudrillard stresses the possibility to live out the most extreme form of rapture by the spell of hyperreal simulations. He evokes, for example, “the ecstasy of communication [where] the subject becomes a pure screen, a pure

absorption and re-absorption surface of the influent networks” (Baudrillard 1988, 27). Much emphasis needs to be put, then, on the essence of these “influential networks” that are instrumental in “purifying” and, by extension, purging the postmodern subject from within in the simulatory process of hyperreal beguilements. It is actually from that need that Baudrillard introduces the term “simulacrum” (“simulacra” as the plural form), defining it as follows: “the simulacrum is not that which hides the truth, but that which hides the absence of truth” (Baudrillard 1990, 35).

To consider these “networks” as “simulacra,” then, is to confer on them the ability to blind the postmodern subject from apprehending the erasure of the “real” by the “hyperreal” in postmodernity. Put differently, “simulacrum” serves to veil the simulatory aspect of hyperreal constructions. Unsurprisingly, then, “the realm of the hyperreal (ie. media, simulations of reality, Disneyland and amusement parks, malls and consumer fantasy lands, TV sports and other excursions into ideal worlds) is more real than real, whereby the models, images, and codes of the hyperreal come to control thought and behavior” (Kellner 2006, 12). It is through these variegated forms of “models,” “images” and “codes” that “simulacrum” operates and perpetuates its full seizure of the postmodern subject both from within and without. This leads Baudrillard to talk about “the transaesthetic society of simulacrum as a new dematerialized society of signs, images and codes” (Baudrillard *Simulacra and Simulation* 1994, 39). In this “society of simulacrum,” boundaries are transgressed, causing an exhaustive implosion of contrarities into each other, affecting the whole metaphysics of the “real” and the “hyperreal.” As G. Smith puts it, “the real and the hyperreal are both orders of simulacra, that is, they are generated by images and signs, firstly through representation and then simulations” (Smith 2010, 237).

Under simulacra, no longer does the question of whether “signs, images and codes” represent the “real” or just simulate it through the “hyperreal” matter at all. All is enmeshed in one continuum where the very metaphysics of reference itself is cancelled altogether

so that “no analysis would know how to contain this diffuse, decentered, molecular reality” (Baudrillard 2007, 55). What gears the paralysis of analysis is the irrelevance of the question of relationality with respect to the simulacral mode of life whereby there grows no need of copies, models and constructs at large to have an origin of reference. That is why Baudrillard characterizes postmodernity as a condition dominated by “pure simulacrum” while putting forward Disneyland as a construct that “exists in order to hide that it is the ‘real’ country, all of ‘real’ America. It is no longer a question of a false representation of reality but of concealing the fact that the real is no longer real” (Baudrillard *Simulacra and Simulation* 1994, 12). In other words, it is a mild embrace of the falsifications of hyperreal simulations ingested imperceptively to the postmodern subject after being simulacraly administered as the only locus of the “real” that is longed and striven for.

Under the aegis of simulacral exercises, the hyperreal simulatory constructs keep confounding the representational potential of the “real,” unblocking thus the channels of their mutual communication causing them to transfuse with each other. G. Smith evokes the importance of the prefix ‘trans’ in Baudrillardian philosophical enterprise while maintaining that “‘trans’ means movement between, a confusion of boundaries, of being neither here nor there, a contagion across states” (Smith 2010, 226). Actually, Baudrillard highlights more often than not the way the postmodern subject, on functioning as “a terminal of multiple networks, becomes as much a spectacle as a spectator” (Baudrillard 1988, 16), incorporating in his/her own person such a confusion of movement that the prefix ‘trans’ implies. The Disney-like world of simulacrum gestates too much just to bring forth further forms of erasure, including even separating the subject from the object. As such “everything becomes trans-economic, trans-political and trans-sexual,” resulting, ultimately, in “fractal stage of values” in which the erasure of the subject’s need for referentiality and relationality produces an individual who “no longer differs from himself, and is therefore, undifferent to himself” (Baudrillard *The Illusion of End* 1994, 108),

sustaining what might be deducibly called “the molecular metaphysics of life”.

CONCLUSION

Baudrillard’s study of postmodernity allows him to detect exhaustive aspects that have been changing the nature of life itself, mostly without being felt and/or noticed by man. Generally, the matter concerns the subtle ways through which the “real” has been withdrawing from underneath the feet of the postmodern subject by the “hyperreal.” The latter raises the interest of Baudrillard who works to dissect it from within, despite the delicacy of its operation, in order to be able (and also to allow his readers) to decipher its composition and the way it wields such a power that makes it substitute the “real.” All the while, what seems to baffle Baudrillard most is the vertiginous implosion of opposites into each other, culminating not just in the erasure of the “real” by the simulacry constructs of the “hyperreal,” but more importantly the instigation of further and further dissipations of any entity that is built, regardless of its anchorage in the “real” or the “hyperreal.” It is, rather, the erasure of closure that Baudrillard is announcing in his works. As he puts it succinctly in an interview, “our destiny is the end of the end [...] It would no longer even be possible to live or confront our own end” (Baudrillard 1993, 163), envisaging postmodernity as a condition of ever-suspension.

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AN ESSAY ON FREEDOM.
A SHORT CRITICAL ANALYSIS RANGING FROM ARISTOTLE TO
NOZICK

Alex Phillip Yermolenko

Poet and a writer living in
Bath, United Kingdom
apyermolenko22@gmail.com

Abstract. Space, time and other “*a priori* synthetical cognitions”, through powers of mathematics and physics, these phenomena have been proven to exist. However, Kant asserts that “Freedom of the Will, the Immorality of the Soul and the Existence of God” are still questions that go beyond the possibilities of a *priori* and *posterior* (Muller 1992, 32). What is the role of man in politics? How he manifests himself as a person and as a moral being? How creative is he and whether is capable of being aware of his actions? All these questions are within the debate of spectrum of the philosophical and political anthropology (Haugaard, 2016). The phenomenon of freedom has been debated since the ancient philosophy, and that we are speaking of not only about free will, but also about the individual’s freedom, whether “he is free” from the collective, in being naturally free, or being “free with” the collective, as means social freedom (Haugaard, 2016). Determinism and Indeterminism are two opposite philosophical concepts in which determinists believe in the objective nature of causality and, on the contrary, supporters of indeterminism completely deny objective causality, and causality in general (Ewer, 1907). This essay will illustrate views of political philosophers ranging from Aristotle to modern-day thinkers.

Keywords: essay, political theory, philosophy, politics, social science, freedom, free will

Terrible wars have been fought where millions have died for
one idea – freedom. And it seems that something that
means so much to so many people would be worth having.
Robin Williams

Although Kant states that “freedom is said to be as fundamental in man’s moral life as it is impossible for his understanding” (Perry

1900, 630) he delves into the argument by stating that God and Freedom is still a “product of logical analysis” (1900, 637) or that “transcendental idealism makes it possible” (Saunders 2016, 164). Therefore, freedom as an idea in the *Critic of Practical Reason* is illustrated as “the moral law” and that this “fact of reason” that will derive freedom (Allison 1986, 394). Kant suggests that a ones individual freedom should not interfere with another. For instance, the as a general principle, the unlimited freedom of action of the individual should be narrowed so that it is compatible with everyone’s freedom. This limits the freedom of action of each individual and a positive law is based on this principle. This condition for the peaceful coexistence of people with different views and opposite goals, suggest that through moral law is possible (Gilje and Skirbekk 2001). Consequently, Saunders disagrees with Kant’s approach since his approach to find the “true” meaning behind the unknown trinity only looks at the perspective from the first and second person (2016). This is because, although Kant argues that the phenomena can’t exist without the noumena, he avoids recognising other rational agents (2006). For instance, Saunders supports Grenberg’s (2013) interpretation of freedom that “the moral phenomenology in question is exclusively first personal” and thus the only way to define freedom is through knowledge or how Kant sees it as “transcendental idealism” (Saunders 2016, 165). However, Saunders claims that interpreting freedom through transcendental idealism is shadowing the itself view of the term since without human experience, we cannot see the world as it by which suggests that the interpretation of freedom is incomplete (2016, 170).

The domino effect of German idealism presents us with Hegel’s admiration for Kant’s “speculative” thought and that he was one of the closest to discover the truth to determining what freedom through a glimpse idea of self-determining reality. Whilst this may be true, Hegel’s view on freedom has been more rational (Smith 1973, 438). For instance, Hegel avers that individual’s freedom is cemented to the state and that all of the “spiritual reality” is

possessed through the state. Through this establishment of “traditional interpretation” Hegel uses the “state” as an object of rational freedom that aids the “Idea of Spirit in the external manifestation of human Will and its Freedom” (Goldstein 1962, 65). This way, Hegel attempts to differentiate between the political order and the state by insisting that regardless of the political regime within the state, “the spirit of nation” and “culture” is the “external magnification of human will and freedom” not through obedience but through history that helps us to look at what went right and wrong, in order to find the appropriate equilibrium in the “dialectic” (Goldstein 1962, 69). On the other hand, Marx argues that Hegel’s “civil society” expansion of “population and industry” will cause an inability to express the actual freedom in the stable society, because there wouldn’t be enough jobs meaning that the class sort will be differentiated significantly meaning one’s will have power over the other, suggesting, that the higher class would form the state (Duquette 1989, 223).

Machiavelli’s interpretation of freedom provides additional similarity to Hegel’s idea of the state being cemented to the individual, but also, the rulers that manipulating them is what is equally important (Skinner 2000). For instance, Machiavelli asserts that in order for rulers to have a “free state”, they should observe great examples in history such as from the ancient Rome in which they feared to lose everything to Spartans and collectively went to war to protect the commonwealth (Kahn 1990, 471). Additionally, Machiavelli states that in order for citizens to be free within the state and their ruler, the city must “remain free from all forms of political servitude”. For instance, Machiavelli asserts that the state is “a form of government based on the people” and which will outcome in a “community” that will live in freedom making significant gains to the power of the state since it will avoid the division of class which will outcome in a free state (McCormick 2007). Case in point: In order to make a “free-state”, Machiavelli asserts that through “God” to get out true “human excellence” but keeping it away from the state (Skinner 2000, 59). Conversely, Burns argues that Machiavelli

has substituted the “higher law of humanity and justice” for liberty (1948, 329). In particular, shadowing the rights of individuals and prioritising the all the power to the majority in which history shows from Socrates to modern day banning of books such as *To Kill a Mockingbird*, that injustice leads to the contrary to freedom (Millett 2005). Furthermore, Millett (2005) argues that, avoiding conflict in Machiavelli’s ideology would be seen as “weakness” and prioritised the war as the “health of the state” which really questions if freedom is actually “liberty”?

Nevertheless, Mill’s perception of freedom focuses on many angles including the “harm principle” (Baum 1998). For instance, Mill states that “your liberty to swing your fist ends just where my nose begins” illustrates the importance in this is the not only just for the full freedom of one’s individual, but also everyone’s freedom in order to avoid “conflicting directions” (Baum 1998, 187). For instance, Mill argues that imposing harm of oneself is acceptable since it does not harm other, however, if one’s person freedom harms the other, the government is necessary in order to adequately sustain liberty. Further to this, in order to sustain liberty, within the government, power must lie within the “human beings in the maturity of their faculties” (Mill 2001, 14). To justify, those in need of being taken care of such as children and young adults need guidance to be protected against their actions that more likely to affect others freedom (Hultug 2002). On the other hand, Skinner argues Mill stating that if power is exercised within the state, then freedom will be diminished due to the division of class, in which power lies on the ruler which constrains individuals acting independently (Baum, 1998). This is because, power is considered as oppressive and restrictive in which the “necessary autonomy” serves an individual not for the good but for worst (Baum 1998, 189). Case in point: if injustice occurs within the state and two individuals one with and without power has an option of the prison sentence, it is clear to establish that a sentence is more likely to interfere with “individual liberty” rather than a “small fine” that can be paid without worry from the elite and affecting the rest (Holtug

2002, 366). This way, if this question is raised to the sever level such as life sentence and a significant fine then freedom of one's individual is demolished since the problem of the quantity of welfare restricts will cause a difference in the outcome of the victim's sentence (Turner 2014).

Having lived through second world war and the rise of Pan-Africanism, Rawls has established the veil of ignorance a morality method that illustrates humans as rational and free (Svensson 1989). Case in point: The "thought experiment" in which each individual thought of state of "neutral" not knowing the outcome of their position in life, will need to say what justice is for them (Gilje and Skirbekk 2001, 451). This experiment is important because Rawls notes that welfare as well as poverty is entitled to rapid change in life, where one can gain, win a lottery ticket for instance, and lose significantly in a very short amount of time like in a bank bailout (Gilje and Skirbekk 2001). This way, through the thought of "neutral state" Rawls suggest that people would have freedom since inequality would not be an issue if one's advantage would disadvantage other individuals within the state. On the other hand, Nozick's asserts that freedom lies within a legal way of self-ownership and morality is what grants citizens freedom (DeStigter 2008). For instance, Nozick's entitlement theory asserts that each individual's freedom has property rights and therefore if one works harder than another, the state has no right to seize the property (Francis and Francis 1976). In other words, "self-ownership" should not equate to "property in the person" since for instance an unhealthy person cannot just assume unfairness and seize blood of a healthy person because he has more of it and better, since the unhealthy person did nothing to earn a healthy lifestyle that another has earned (Pateman 2002, 22). Further to this, Nozick presents an example where individuals buying tickets and dropping twenty-five cents in a "special admissions box" in order to see a "home" basketball game with Wilt Chamberlain (1974, 161). Nozick asserts that although, from these small contributions Chamberlain would be gaining two hundred and fifty thousand dollars more than other

players is justified, since he received it though legal obligation contract and of course the demand (1974, 161).

Touching upon the theme of freedom, Aristotle presents a question of “what is good and useful can be brought to light” in the individuals within the state (et al., 1979). Aristotle believes that the most important virtue is justice, and that it is in every individual’s right to receive what they are entitled to according to the state as well as being virtuous which “can be possessed in excess” (Long 1996, 787). By this means, in order for an individual to be free, they shouldn’t focus on “being” free and unlimited liberty but strive in excellence of moral high ground since one can tell someone what to do but cannot tell them how to feel. This way, if liberty is an external good then through virtue eudemonia is possible which will give individual freedom (Long 1996, 787). Nevertheless, Huby (1967) argues that Aristotle at his time of writing didn’t encounter the problem of “freedom versus determinism” since he was a determinist (Hardie 1968). This is because according to Huby (1967) Aristotle “failed” to discover the “freewill problem” because in his arguments he would use restricted determinism in which virtue men are praised and opposed in their inferior actions. Since free will is the product of freedom, this suggests that Aristotle only observed it only using determinism, but not, indeterminism which shows a limitation of defining freedom (Hardie 1968, 274).

Hobbes states that “A Free-Man, is he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to do” shows that a man is undetermined and thus has the freewill to decide upon their actions (2017, 171). Just like water in the “banks or vessels” or people that are sick and tied to their bed they maybe not entitled to freedom, but there is “larger space” in which note that freedom is possible but is unreachable at some stages of people’s lives (Hobbes 2017, 171). This way Hobbes illustrates that freedom is possible since individual’s choice is available to them which points out that through availability of liberty, freedom exists (Van Mill 1995). By the same token, determinism can be seen in Hobbes’s interpretation of freedom

since although “no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or inclination”, liberty and necessity are like water and the river, where it is free to exist but has a necessity of flowing by the channel (Hobbes 2017, 172). To illustrate this on human nature, he asserts that a man does what he does because of “their will”, and behind one’s action there is other actions which were originally placed by “God” (Hobbes 2017, 173). Equally important Hobbes draws attention to the state in which he asserts that people has given their freedom (Damrosch 1979) because Aristotle suggests that individuals in democratic states are re-educated freedom in a sense that it is achieved only within their own state, excluding others (2017).

Locke asserts that all individuals are equal, and everyone has free will and compared to Hobbes he looks at individuals not within the state of war but within the state of nature (Stanton 2011). Locke’s indeterminism or volition leads to suggesting that a man can decide which direction he moves and what his mind tells him, enabling him to be a “free man” (Greif 2010). This is because, in his interpretation of the “falling man” he suggests that if a man falls, it is not voluntary since the he does not have a choice at the current situation, however, if a person would to be in a neutral position and able to move, he would have a choice of action granting him freedom (Locke and Greif 2010). On the contrary, principles that Lock has put forward such as “the earth was given by God to all mankind” contradicts his view on freedom since “God” is part of determinism, which suggests that freedom not always is associated with religion in Locke’s perceptive (Kerstetter 1943).

In conclusion, all of the political philosophers regardless of whether they are determinists or indeterminist, their arguments are legitimate since their assumptions are justified through examples of history of the past or at their time their existence. By all means, the “true” meaning in freedom should be observed through first, second and third person (Saunders 2016) and through looking at a broader view of determinism and indeterminism (Huby 1967 in Hardy 1968). Both realist and liberalist had similar views around

freedom and the role of “god” upon people, but it had different meaning when it comes to politics. Thus, “true” freedom still remains unclear since most of its products such as free-will is seen differently from determinists and indeterminists and the middle ground that for instance Hobbes allocates himself in (2017). Finally, what is more important, is the fact that freedom is subjective just like god and immorality, and although we as well as political philosophers can only make assumption, but one day, hopefully, we will all truly understand this extraordinary phenomenon.

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THE “UNHOMED” IN ZORA NEALE HURSTON’S “THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING GOD”

Sana Aribi

The Higher Institute of Human Sciences,
University of Jendouba, Tunisia
sana_aribi@yahoo.com

Abstract. Many critics argue that Zora Neale Hurston overlooks racism in *Their Eyes Were Watching God*. This paper, however, discloses racial discrimination in this novel. Indeed, creating “unhomed” characters, Hurston dramatises African American agony. Dispossessed of her own body, Mrs Turner flounders in a dark skin that she endeavours to shed. Helplessly, Janie vacillates in-between two conflicting affinities. Starks is a prisoner within the confines of whites’ premises. Moreover, racial biases ostracise blacks on the muck. Voices of hostility break the silence of death and ruthlessly uproot the “unboxed” black corpses. From a postcolonial vantage point, this article explores racialism. Mainly, it relies on Homi Bhabha’s concept of homelessness or “cultural estrangement.” Where Bhabha differentiates between “unhomed and homeless”, this study delineates their overlap in *Their Eyes Were Watching God*. Hurston deliberately links cultural alienation with spatial “deprivation” in order to better articulate Blacks’ torments.

Keywords: racism, homelessness, unhomely, unhomed, homeless, alienation

In *Their Eyes Were Watching God*, Zora Neale Hurston depicts the hardships of Janie Crawford’s life. Compelled to marry Logan Killicks, and unable to cope with him, she elopes with Joe Starks (Jody). The latter, promises to “treat her like a lady” “Ah'm uh man wid principles. You ain't never knowed what it was to be treated lak a lady and Ah wants to be de one tuh show yuh” (Hurston 1998, 29). But he would not after their marriage. Despite his material prosperity, the founder of Eatonville, its mayor, the owner of the store, he also illtreats Janie. Because of his jealousy, he obliges her to tie her hair and to veil it. Moreover, he isolates his wife from the

community in which she lives and utterly silences her voice. This self-centered behaviour pervades their conjugal relationship. Thus, the wealthy husband harshly objectifies Janie who merely becomes another possession that he (the owner) acquisitively manipulates. The death of Jody eventually liberates Janie. Hopefully, she finds her true love, Tea Cake, the third husband. However, the latter “is driven mad by rabies after being bitten by a dog during a hurricane, and Janie shoots him in self-defense” (Bloom 2009, 18). Tragic is the end and lamentable becomes Janie’s situation. The black society ruthlessly judges her as a culpable wife and finally the White court acquits her of murder.

Briefly, this novel dramatises Janie Crawford’s vain search for love. Many critics have approached it from a feminist perspective. They argue that Hurston maps Janie’s journey of “self-exploration” as a woman subordinated to gender biases. Two main strands inform these explanations. For instance, Mary Helen Washington in her article “Hurston’s Failure to Create a Genuinely Liberated Female Voice” argues:

And while feminists have been eager to seize upon this text as an expression of female power, I think it is a novel that represents women’s exclusion from power, particularly from the power of oral speech...Janie at least resists her first husband, Logan, but once Jody takes her to Eatonville, he controls her life as well as the narrative. He buys the land, builds the town, makes Janie tie up her hair, and prescribes her relationship with the rest of the town. We know that Hurston means for Janie to free herself from male domination, but Hurston’s language, as much as Jody’s behavior, signifies Janie’s status as an object. (Washington 2009, 33)

Barbara Johnson, equally, observes that Hurston creates a conflictive female character. She asserts: “She had an inside and an outside now and suddenly she knew how not to mix them” (as cited in Washington 2009, 36). A lot of feminists, however, think that Hurston deftly delineates the metamorphosis of Janie from “an object to a subject.” She refuses to be the “field-hand” of Killicks, restores her voice and challenges Jody after many years of surrender

to his authority. Victorious is Janie when she unties her hair and breaks free from the shackles of her second husband after his death. Childless, she challenges her very biological nature and subverts gender stereotypes.

Other critics claim that Hurston chiefly underlines the intra-racial black conflict. For instance, the three marriages of Janie display gender clashes in the same ethnic group. Equally, Mrs. Turner's vehement distrust of blacks, Jody's condescendence in Eatonville, "the coloured town," and his envious neighbours illustrate antagonisms within the same African American community. Furthermore, Zora Neale Hurston was severely criticized for overlooking the tension between Whites and Blacks. Paul Rosenblatt argues: "One novel that says almost nothing about racism is Zora Neale Hurston's *Their Eyes Were Watching God*...In the dialogue of the characters, racism is a minor irritant concern...white people are almost absent from the novel, and racism is scarcely mentioned" (Rosenblatt 2016, 14). He also contends: "When *Their Eyes Were Watching God* was published, some African American reviewers criticized it 'for ignoring the harmful effects of racism'" (Rosenblatt 2016, 14). Besides, Richard King pinpoints to Richard Wright's "hostility to the work of Zora Neale Hurston" (King R. 2004, 233) and explains: "By allegedly imparting to her readers a stage version of black vitality and sensuality, Wright suggested, Hurston was traducing the pain of black life" (King R. 2004, 233).

Janie, the protagonist is a "mulatto" the fruit of her mother's rape by a white teacher. The mother herself was the offspring of Nanny's (Janie's grandmother) violation when she was a slave. Hurston intentionally duplicates and stresses whites' perpetrated assaults. By no means thus does she disregard racial discrimination. Presumably she articulates blacks' agony differently. Based on Homi Bhabha's concept of unhomeliness, "or cultural displacement" this paper deals with racism in *Their Eyes Were Watching God*. Bhabha argues that to be unhomed is not to be homeless (Bhabha 1994, 9). He expounds this idea: "In that displacement, the borders between home and world become confused; and uncannily, the private and

the public become part of each other, forcing upon us a vision that is as divided as it is disorienting” (Bhabha 1994, 9). However, the “unhomed” and the homeless intersect in this study that spatially scrutinises Hurston’s characters, Mrs. Turner, Janie, Joe Starks and blacks on the muck.

Mrs. Turner expresses:

Tain't de poorness, it's de color and de features...Who wants to be mixed up wid uh rusty black man... Don't bring me no nigger doctor tali hang over mah sick-bed. Ah done had six chillun—wuzn't lucky enough tuh raise but dat one—and ain't never had uh nigger tuh even feel mah pulse. White doctors always gits mah money. Ah don't go in no nigger store rah buy nothin' neither. Colored folks don't know nothin' 'bout no business. Deliver me! (Hurston 1998, 141)

Mrs. Turner totally dissociates herself from her ethnic group. Even when she is ill, she refuses to be treated by a black doctor. She links sickness and rustiness, suggestive of decay to blacks but equates whites “the white doctor” with healing. Obviously, the black body diseases Mrs. Turner. In fact, she identifies with the whites and rejects the very corporeal entity that binds her to the black community: “Look at me! Ah ain't got no flat nose and liver lips. Ah'm uh featured woman. Ah got white folks' features in mah face.” (Hurston 1998, 142) She envisions herself in terms of white physical traits. But, she cannot “penetrate” the white race and contests: “Still and all Ah got tuh be lumped in wid all de rest It ain't fair. Even if dey don't take us in wid de whites, dey oughta make us uh class tuh ourselves.” (Hurston 1998, 142). Thus “Mrs. Turner symbolizes racial self-hatred, as she holds great contempt for darker skinned blacks” (Jones 2009, 191). This reaction, undoubtedly, reflects a serious crisis of identity emanating chiefly from the “hybrid” body trapped in between the black race and the white gaze. This experience exemplifies the concept of twoness that W.E.B Du Bois explains as follows:

...the Negro is ...born with a veil...It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of

others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness, — an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body... (as cited in Watson 2013)

Likewise, Mrs. Turner sees herself from the whites' standpoint, and repugnantly rejects her own body, the first threshold that underpins her existence in the world, in space. As a result, she would not belong to any place per se, vacillating between two polarities and reaching neither. Dispossessed of her own body, she is "unhomely." As maintained by Homi Bhabha, unhomeliness "is not a question of being "homeless," Bhabha makes clear, "but a question of being outside of 'home' of being forced to negotiate one's place in the world."

Furthermore, according to John Lowe, Janie Crawford echoes Janus. He argues: "Hurston provides obvious references to Janus throughout *Their Eyes*. Janie repeatedly gets associated with doors, thresholds, gates, and gateposts..." (Lowe 2008, 76). He adds: "And Janie begins her story by deciding 'her conscious life had commenced at Nanny's gate'" (Lowe 2008, 76). Lowe also explains:

She must have seen the intersection of the actual road and the cosmic horizon and related it to her internal dreams. Tea Cake several times tells Janie she has "the keys to the kingdom," reminding us of the black woman's role as gatekeeper (...) (Lowe 2008, 76)

One shall add that this mythological connection discloses also Janie's Janus-faced nature. The latter invokes the imagery of the two opposed faces: White Janie and Black Janie. This experience better materialises with Janie the child who cannot figure out that she is coloured until she is six years old:

So when we looked at de picture and everybody got pointed out there wasn't nobody left except a real dark little girl with longhair standing by Eleanor. Dat's where Ah wuz s'posed to be, but Ah couldn't recognize dat dark chile as me. So Ah ast, 'where is me? Ah don't see me.' (Hurston 1998, 9)

The ambivalent situation Janie confronts seems to be the natural sequel of hybridity thus elucidated by Homi Bhabha:

Homi Bhabha defined hybridity as the condition of identity of persons who live between colonial pasts and postcolonial presents. Bhabha identifies three spaces along which a postcolonial identity may be understood. The first space is identification with the colonizer. The second space is identification with the colonized. The third space is where a postcolonial identity resides because the postcolonial identifies with yet feels outside of first and second space identifications, thereby residing in an in-between or liminal third space. (Jackson and Hogg 2010, 845)

Similarly, Janie cannot disentangle herself from the third space of in-betweenness. Throughout the novel she keeps moving around gates: “went on down to the front gate”, (Hurston 1998, 11), “she began to stand around the gate and expect things,” (Hurston 1998, 25) “Janie hurried out of the front gate” (Hurston 1998, 32). The gate exemplifies the state of indeterminacy being inside/outside at the same time. A mulatto, she bounces between two races, the black and white but cannot identify with a particular ethnic group. Pertinently, the gate relates to the periphery and foregrounds Janie’s marginalisation. Her childhood reminiscence discussed previously better illustrates her plight or crisis of identity. Thus the gate, the liminal space shows Janie’s unhomeliness “feeling that one has no cultural ‘home,’ or sense of cultural belonging.” (Tyson 2006, 427)

In addition, Joe Starks keeps amassing material possessions. He is the prosperous entrepreneur, the establisher of Eatonville, its mayor, and more importantly the owner of the “big house” envied by the black community. Despite his accumulated properties, he remains “culturally bankrupt” and unhomely. Hurston transcribes the dilemma of Jody spatially. The triad of Eatonville, the big house and the bed entangles him and reflects his displacement.

Thus, Starks envisions Eatonville:

But when he heard all about 'em makin' a town all outa colored folks, he knowed dat was de place he wanted to be. He had always wanted to be a big voice, but de white folks had all de sayso where he come from and everywhere

else, exceptin' displace dat colored folks was buildin' theirselves. Dat was right too. De man dat built things oughta boss it. Let colored folks build things too if dey wants to crow over somethin'. He was glad he had his money all saved up. He meant to git dere whilst de town wuz yet a baby. He meant to buy in big. It had always been his Wish and desire to be a big voice and he had to live nearly thirty years to find a chance. (Hurston 1998, 28)

Affectionately, he relates to his town. For him, the “baby town” connotes rebirth. Redolent of parturition, the baby picture evokes maternal ties and departs from patriarchal rigidity. Likewise, Eatonville detaches itself from the patronising white dominion. Homogeneous, it embraces only the black community without the interference of white rules and restraints. Purely black, it totally breaks with the colonial past, its financial control and symbolises emancipation. Equally, it illustrates territorialisation. This black spatial expansion according to Starks is inseparable from the big or loud voice. The new town as a result undoes a history of “silenced” blackness and inaugurates a new era of black liberation. But the freed territory and the autonomous present rapidly fade and Jody remains “unhomely.” Bhabha asserts that “Unhomeliness is when you feel estranged, you do not belong...at home but you are not home.” In fact, the black newly founded “fortification” does not reassure Jody. Destabilised, he keeps looking for White pillars that sustain his edifice. Alienated, he builds a house that loosens the ties with the black present and replicates the White manners.

Zora Neale Hurston depicts the big house of Starks:

Take for instance that new house of his. It had two stories with porches, with bannisters and such things. The rest of the town looked like servants' quarters surrounding the "big house." And different from everybody else in the town he put off moving in until it had been painted, in and out. And look at the way he painted it—a gloaty, sparkly white. The kind of promenading white that the houses of Bishop Whipple, W. B. Jackson and the Vanderpool's wore. It made the village feel funny talking to him— just like he was anybody else. Then there was the matter of the spittoons. No sooner was he all set as the Mayor—post master landlord—storekeeper, than he bought a desk like Mr. Hill or Mr. Galloway over in Maitland with one of those swing-around chairs to it. What with him biting down on cigars and saving his breath on talk and

swinging round in that chair, it weakened people. And then he spit in that gold-looking vase that anybody else would have been glad to put on their front-room table. Said it was a spit toon just like his used-to-be bossman used to have in his bank up there in Atlanta. Didn't have to get up and go to the door every time he had to spit. (Hurston 1998, 47)

A white mould underpins the building, displayed in the white paint coating it. Jody fails to be really the master of house. The latter is haunted by his bosses whose names reverberate in this extract: “Bishop Whipple, W.B Jackson...Mr. Galloway.” Starks cannot cut off from the past and yieldingly reproduces the habits of his white masters: “the cigar, the spittoon, the swing-around chair.” Using postcolonial terms, this demeanour reveals the phenomenon of mimicry which “involves not only the laborious attempt to be accepted by a culture different from the one into which one was born but a simultaneous attempt to rid oneself of everything one has identified as other than that culture.” (Tyson 2006, 440) Suggestively the rocking chair that Jody owns indicates his destabilised position. Rocking back and forth, he oscillates between the colonial past and the black present. This unsteadiness bespeaks the psychological conundrum that he lives: the founder of the colored free town but simultaneously the imitator of the white master and the dweller of the white abode.

Eatonville and Joe's big house epitomise spatial expansion. Deliberately, Hurston entwines the large place with alienation “not belonging.” In this manner, she concretises the idea of unhomeliness. Accentuating the bitterness of this feeling “estrangement,” Hurston associates Joe's death throes with his “unhomed” situation condensed spatially in the image of the “bed.” She writes: “A sort of changing look on his face. Weak-looking but sharp-pointed about the eyes. Through the thin counterpane she could see what was left of his belly huddled before him on the bed like some helpless thing seeking shelter” (Hurston 1998, 85). The weakened state of Joe underlies this passage. The simile “like some helpless thing seeking shelter” shatters the amplified image of the mayor. Hurston yokes the regress of Joe Starks to the thinness of

the counterpane, so much connotative of Jody as a “lightweight.” Moreover, the adjective “huddled” suggests contraction. Joe is shrinking, and this condition starkly opposes the “extending” owner of the “big house.” The transfiguration of Joe seems to be inextricable from the tiny and flattened space. In spatial terms, Hurston depicts the downfall of Joe, lying in bed; the posture itself expresses prostration. She compares him to a “shelterless” thing. Despite, the vastness of his buildings, he is unsheltered, “unhomely.”

Briefly, Starks is trapped in a dilemma. The duality of the black present and the white past cripples his free movement. He founds Eatonville, supposedly initiating a black present and culture. But he behaves as a “white inhabitant” within the premises of the colored town.

This feeling of being caught between cultures, of belonging to neither rather than to both, of finding oneself arrested in a psychological limbo that results not merely from some individual psychological disorder but from the trauma of the cultural displacement within which one lives, is referred to by Homi Bhabha and others as unhomeliness. (Tyson 2006, 421)

Relevantly, John Lowe claims: “Janie and Tea Cake in their scenes on the muck, surrounded by their people and enjoying and creating black folk culture, best express what Alice Walker has called “racial health; a sense of black people as complete...undiminished human beings” (as cited in Lowe 2008, 97). Not only does the muck reflect the healthy communion of blacks but it exposes their displacement as well. This passage from *Their Eyes Were Watching God* is worth noticing:

Day by day now, the hordes of workers poured in. Some came limping in with their shoes and sore feet from walking. It's hard trying to follow your shoe instead of your shoe following you. They came in wagons from way up in Georgia and they came in truck loads from east, west, north and south. Permanent transients with no attachments and tired looking men with their families and dogs in fevers. All night, all day, hurrying in to pick beans. Skilletts, beds, patched up spare inner tubes all hanging and dangling from the ancient

cars on the outside and hopeful humanity, herded and hovered on the inside, chugging on to the muck. People ugly from ignorance and broken from being poor. All night now the jooks clanged and clamored...The rich black earth clinging to bodies and biting the skin like ants....

Finally, no more sleeping places. Men made big fires and fifty or sixty men slept around each fire. But they had to pay the man whose land they slept on.

Thus, Hurston depicts the life of blacks on the muck. Importantly, the verb “hover” reflects their suspended state “dangling, with no attachments.” This very idea crystallises with the oxymoron “Permanent transients” that points out their enduring dislocation. Like nomads they keep wandering from one place to another. Unsheltered, they sleep around fires. Commonly, the fire connotes the warmth of abode but in this excerpt, it betokens the exposure to the outside threats. The bitten skin “biting the skin like ants” accentuates their vulnerability. Hence the transitory way of life alongside with the unroofed and unprotected space underscore mainly the homelessness of blacks. This condition itself associated with the herd, “the mass” implies disorientation and resembles the asylum seekers’ circumstances. Inextricable from poverty and ignorance, it equally symbolises cultural ostracization. Relevantly, Richard Wright contends: “Negroes have never been allowed to catch the full spirit of Western civilization, that they lived somehow in it but not of it ” (as cited in Ellison 2003, 59). Outcasts in their society, blacks are unhomed. According to Homi Bhabha: “To be unhomed is to feel not at home even in your own home because you are not at home in yourself: your cultural identity crisis has made you a psychological refugee, so to speak.” (Tyson 2006, 421)

Discrimination culminates in this scene.

Hey, dere, y'all! Don't dump dem bodies in de hole lak dat! Examine every last one of 'em and find out if they's white or black.

Us got tuh handle 'em slow lak dat? God have mussy! In de condition they's in got tuh examine 'em? Whut difference do it make 'bout de color? Dey all needs buryin' in uh hurry.”

Got orders from headquarters. They makin' coffins fuh all de white folks. 'Tain't nothin' but cheap pine, but dat's better'n nothin'. Don't dump no white folks in de hole jus' so.

"Whut tuh do 'bout de colored folks? Got boxes fuh dem too?"

Nope. They cain't find enough of 'em tuh go 'round. Jus' sprinkle plenty quicklime over 'em and cover 'em up. (Hurston 1998, 170-171)

Blacks are doubly "victimised." The hurricane claims their lives. And their society ruthlessly "dislodges" their corpses. Strikingly, boxes are spared for white bodies only. "The white men have the workers separate the bodies according to color and save the white bodies for burial in a box, whereas the black bodies will be covered in a mass grave." (King S. 2008, 67) Indeed, the box however unsophisticated, made up of cheap pine wood synecdochically relates to funeral rituals and echoes the ceremonies of the civilized human society. On the contrary, the ditch in which corpses are collectively "dumped" figuratively evokes uncultured manners and seems to link blacks with a sense of primitivism. Indeed, the plosive sounds "b" and "p" in the verb "dump" imitate blacks' frenzy and agitation. Metaphorically, the "dumping ground" dissociates blacks from the solemn cemetery and disparages them again. The dichotomy of the barbarous Black and the refined White materialises.

Thus, Homi Bhabha explains this polarity of the enlightened colonizer and the backward colonized immanent to Western thought: "the black presence runs the representative narrative of Western personhood: its past tethered to treacherous stereotypes of primitivism and degeneracy will not produce a history of civil progress, a space for the *Socius*; its present, dismembered and dislocated...the white man's eyes break up the black man's body." (Bhabha 1994, 42) More accurately here, the white guards splinter the black corpse when they segregate it. The quicklime sprinkled over the dead bodies, the white layer, hints at the white discriminatory colonial ideology that grounds cultural and spatial division or separatism. It is worth adding that Homi Bhabha links unhomeliness to colonisation "the unhomely is a paradigmatic

colonial and postcolonial condition” (Bhabha 1994, 9). The coffin in short stands for the impenetrable white area. Unhomely are alienated blacks overdrawn in the “evicted” corpses that are not allowed to encroach upon the white territory. “Homi Bhabha terms those moments where the foreign is recognized as intruding into the domestic as ‘unhomely.’” (Lydon 2020, 101)

To conclude, Mrs. Turner is dispossessed of her own body, the first mediator of spatial experience. Around gates, in between the inside and outside, Janie keeps moving. This positioning reflects the hybrid affinities engulfing her. The white legacy fetters Starks and his edifice “the big house” however expansive flounders. Unroofed, the laborers on the muck suffer from marginalisation. Astoundingly, black corpses are not immune to racial segregation. Heartlessly, the guards “evict” them from the white space. Homeless, divested of the warm abode, Hurston’s characters are equally “unhomed” or unhomely, they face the cruelty of racial discrimination and “cultural alienation.” But eventually, the gloomy mood of racism climaxing in the burial scene seems to change. A watershed in the novel the following excerpt undoes the spatial configuration of unhomeliness, the dispossessed body, liminality, displacement and disorientation. Visionary, it foreshadows a new space for blacks, and restores their undeniable place. Hurston expresses:

She had given away everything in their little house except a package of garden seed that Tea Cake had bought to plant. The planting never got done because he had been waiting for the right time of the moon when his sickness overtook him. The seeds reminded Janie of Tea Cake more than anything else because he was always planting things. She had noticed them on the kitchen shelf when she came home from the funeral and had put them in her breast pocket. Now that she was home, she meant to plant them for remembrance. (Hurston 1998, 191)

This passage exposes the obverse of the burial scene where black victims are dumped into the ground. A new box unfolds, not the coffin reserved for white corpses only, but Tea Cake’s seeds package. The amalgamation “seeds and planting” initiates new

affinities that starkly differ from the biased dichotomy of White and Black. So, the fertilised soil supersedes the dumping ground. Images of hostility and enmity recede. Tea Cake and Janie are not “the unhomed” in a culture that ousts them. They would create an alternative abode. Deeply rooted in the loam, and reincarnated in the blossoming seeds, they would develop new ties with Mother Earth that will never segregate them. Indeed, Janie’s breast pocket evokes the imagery of wet-nursing and symbolises maternal warmth and affection. The shift from “the funeral” to the “breast pocket” is by no means arbitrary. The expression “the sodden and the bloated” associated with Tea Cake’s death and mentioned at the beginning of the novel alters and acquires new meanings within this frame. Inseparable from germination, the watery picture elicits the intrauterine milieu and foregrounds motherly links. Again, this situation is redolent of Tellus. Mother Earth would nourish and embrace Janie and Tea Cake. They sprout from it, belong to it, and nothing would deracinate them.

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A NIGERIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE HEALING OF JAIRUS' DAUGHTER IN LUKE 8:40

Julius Olajide Ademola

Senior Lecturer,
CINDICO - affiliate of Ekiti State University,
Ado-Ekiti, Nigeria
olajideishola5@gmail.com

Abstract. The nature of human existence makes it fundamentally necessary for people to live a healthy life. The need to restore people to full health has been paramount to man since creation. Man has always needed to suppress and reduce in intensity such things as enemies, sickness and diseases, which cause pains and damages to humanity.

The healing could partly mean restoring what is broken between one human being and another, between human beings and the universe as a whole. Healing by Jesus aimed at restoring man to both physical and spiritual health. Man is a being, possessing body, mind and spirit, all inextricably connected; each part affecting the whole and the whole being greater than the part. There is also an interconnectedness between human beings and their environment. This interconnectedness acts as a force on the functioning of each individual as a person. Disease or ill-health often arises as a result of a state of imbalance either from within or from the environment. Jesus did not just heal physically without ensuring that those who were healed physically were also restored spiritually to health. Most of the healing miracles led to the confession of faith in Jesus, either before or after the healing.

This study investigated, therefore, the healing of Jairus' daughter in Luke 8:40 – 42, 49-56 in a Nigerian context, with a view to ascertaining the degree of compliance to Jesus' command. This study adopted hermeneutical and exegetical methods to analyse the text in order to bring out the essential meaning of healing in the Bible in relation to practice in Nigerian society and descriptive methods of the survey were employed. The results of the interview were then analysed. The study concluded that healing is a fundamental aspect of liturgy and practice, which helps in bringing people to salvation. The study then recommended that the authority of the Church should ensure strict compliance with the principles and techniques of healing adopted by Jesus in Luke's Gospel.

Keywords: θεραπεία (therapeia), healing, healing miracle, salvation, repentance, sickness

1. INTRODUCTION

Health is the birth right of everyone; the concept of 'health for all' was developed by the International Conference on Primary health Care held at Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, which was adopted by World Health Organisation. Health for all is a level of health that enables every inhabitant of the world, without distinctions of the country, religion, race or economic status, to live a socially and economically productive life. Holistic health comprises of complete physical, mental, social and spiritual well-being. Disease, on the other hand, is 'some deviation from normal functioning,' which has desirable consequences because it produces personal discomfort or adversely affects individual's health status¹. Rao (2009) opined that a healthy person must be free of all physical (objectively verifiable diseases), social (poverty) and psychological disabilities. Similarly, a person who is free from, disease, illness and sickness should not only be in a state of equilibrium but must also not be known to be suffering from any ailment that brings about personal discomfort. While the concept of health is rich and encompassing, it is still problematic because of the difficulty in reaching a consensus on who enjoys "a complete state of health"².

Furthermore, Rengstorf (2013) described the restoration of health makes man whole or well whether physically, mentally, or spiritually. The Bible indicates that God's highest will for man is for him to be in good health, even as his soul prospers (III John 2). Healing is a prominent topic in the Bible. Sickness is cured by the supernatural intervention of God with or without the use of earthly means, and some of the healings performed by Jesus were characterized by faith.

The vital connection between faith and healing is unmistakable. On the relationship between faith and healing, they operate in close connection with each other, noting that faith being the background and energizing force for healing. Obviously, where faith is present, there is an atmosphere conducive to healing, and vital connection between faith and healing because faith makes possible the healing

of even the most desperate situation. Healing requires faith for its operation. In the New Testament Jesus alone is the healer, and only by faith in Him and in His name can healing be done³.

Health is good and universally desired. It is a necessary condition for obtaining goods of life, indeed, in most western cultures; health has become a virtual and cultural obsession, resulting in steadily growing demands on health care systems and in burgeoning industries in wellness and alternative medicine. Importantly, health and healing are central to the message of salvation throughout the Old and New Testaments, and particularly in the ministry of Jesus. The terms health may be used in various ways, which include healthy body, healthy minds and spirits. Similarly, one can only talk about physical, mental, spiritual, and social health when health is related to salvation for Christians, although it is not likely to be defined that way by a clinician or public institution like the World Health Organization.

Alana (2008) expatiated that in the healing ministry of Jesus Christ, faith was a dominant factor. Normally, faith on the part of the patient was a prerequisite to healing. In ordinary usage, it is applied to be non-medical treatment of disease often spoken of as healing by faith. This usage is based on a fragmented view of the human person in which the doctor looks after the body and the Church looks after the soul. Healing includes the whole person and all means of healing, whether medical or non-medical, physical or spiritual. Healing, whether provided through creation or providence, produces limited powers of self-healing and placed healing agents in our environments⁴.

2. THE TEXT (LUKE 8:40 – 42, 49-56)

40 Now when Jesus returned, the crowd welcomed him, for they were all waiting for him. 41 And there came a man named Jairus, who was a ruler of synagogue; and falling at Jesus' feet he besought him to come to his house, 42 for he had an only daughter, about

twelve years of age, and she was dying. As he went, the people pressed round him 49 While was still speaking, a man from ruler's house came and said, "Your daughter is dead; do not trouble the Teacher anymore," 50 But Jesus on hearing this answered him, "Do not fear; only believe, and she shall be well" 51 And when he came to the house, he permitted no one to enter with him, except Peter and John and James, and the father and the mother of the child. 52 And all were weeping and bewailing her; but he said, "Do not weep; for she is not dead but sleeping." 53 And they laughed at him, knowing that she was dead. 54 But taking her by the hand he called, saying, "Child arise" 55 And her spirit returned, and she got up at once; and he directed that something should be given her to eat. 56 And her parents were amazed; but he charged them to tell no one what had happened. (RSV).

3. THE HEALING OF JAIRUS' DAUGHTER (LUKE 8:40 – 42, 49-56)

The three synoptic gave account of this story. While Mark and Luke mentioned the name of the ruler, Jairus, Matthew did not mention the name. There is some degree of doubt concerning the reading adopted in the Greek text. It is observed that some manuscripts omitted the name in Mark, such as *D*, *ff² Byz*. It is possible that the omission in those manuscripts is a harmonization to Matthew or on the other hand, the inclusion of the name in the Greek text could be a harmonization to Luke⁵. The non-text reading is probably the secondary (Wieland 2002, 65). In some manuscripts, Byzantine 157, in Mark, there is a striking addition to the text – *καὶ θελωῖνα ἐλθων*; this is probably a literary addition intended to complete the otherwise somewhat faulty Greek sentence in the Greek text which reads *ἵνα ἐλθων ἐπιθῇ τὰς χεῖρας αὐτῇ ἵνα σωθῇ καὶ ζήσῃ*, without introduction of any kind⁶. The other explanation would be the omission of that sign of courtesy (*καὶ θελω*) in the Greek text, is possibly a genuine lost reading, excluded in a very early age from the Greek text (Wieland 2005, 37). This is probable because of the

impression that a demand upon the Lord, couched in such imperious language was out of place⁷. Jairus came to Jesus as a concerned father who is of high social standing in the Jewish community to intercede on behalf of his little daughter who was close to death “(...) my little daughter is at the point of death...” Jairus is an excellent example of the responsibility of dominant males to protect and care for the women of their household, in this case a daughter, in the public realm outside the home (Tolbart 1992, 80).

Jesus could have chosen to say a word and declare the child healed from a distance, instead he chose to walk with Jairus and gave him hope – “Do not fear, only believe.” Jesus readiness to travel with a synagogue ruler, Jairus to his house to heal a little girl is a proof of the value he placed on life. And he allowed no one to follow him except Peter, John, and James. He permitted the only three of his disciples - as a competent number to be witnesses of the miracle. The presence of the three disciples at the scene of the miracle indicate that it is partly for their instruction that Jesus performed the miracles (Luke 8:51)⁸. They were given this privilege perhaps in preparation for their leadership role and their commissioning to perform similar acts (Witherington 1990, 99). Luke records that the crowd at Jairus’ house were weeping and wailing greatly at the loss of the little girl, hence when Christ said, “why do you make a tumult and weep? The child is not dead but sleeping they laughed him (κατεγέλων – to deride, ridicule). It is usual in Yoruba land to also find mourners when such an occurrence happens, that is the death of a young person such people come around to empathize with the parent and share their grief⁹. Their scornful laughter shows the absurdity of the view that the girl was only unconscious; they knew death well (Sabin 2005). However, Jesus said “she sleeps” (καθεύδει) In Luke, this verb is used literally to mean literal sleep as in the other passages (Luke 8: 52)¹⁰. It is possible however that Jesus used the word theologically to mean her death is only a sleep. It connotes that death is not the final and irrevocable condition it appears to be, but a sleep from which there

is an awakening – at the call of Jesus. Jesus is saying that the girl had not succumbed to death in any final sense (Carson 1994, 35-40).

Cole (2012) posited that Jesus treats the mother as equally worthy with the father - “but he puts them all outside, and took the child’s father and mother and those who were with him (the three disciples)” (verse 51)¹¹. The Jewish culture just like Yoruba culture would have left out the mother at such a critical times as this, possibly because they would not want her to wear them with much weeping and so disturb them or because she has nothing to do there (orookunrinni – it is men’s matter / impliedly it is a serious matter). Thus the raising up of this girl anticipates the resurrection of Jesus as written in Luke 24:6 ἡγερθη – “He has risen”. Cole (2009) observed that theme is implied in Christ’s first observation to the mourners: “the child is not dead but sleeping” (Luke 8:52). This statement refers to the new view of death that he would bring by his resurrection. Having brought the child back to life and seen her walk about, Jesus told her parent to give her something to eat. Physical care is an important aspect of spiritual concerns; the little girl needed food for strength¹².

Oderinde (2007) opined that through the technique of intercalation, Luke presents the simultaneous unfolding of these two narrative events. Moreover, the interruption of the one story of healing by the other heightens the drama of the first. The little girl is dying; does she need immediate attention? In fact, during the time lapse necessitated by Jesus’ encounter with the sick woman the condition of Jairus’ daughter complexly deteriorates¹³. Consequently, Coogan (1998) noted that in the eye of everyone except Jesus, by the time they have reached her home the possibility of successful intervention has already passed. The thematic and linguistic parallels enumerated above suggest that the appearance of these episodes in this form is not only for the dramatic effect; these textual connections also urge that these accounts be interpreted together. Taken together, they document the sort of faith for which Jesus has been looking. Moreover, the completion of the one incident prepare for the finale of the other. After the abundance of

healing power available in the case of the woman with a haemorrhage, might one not anticipate Jesus ability to raise a dead girl to life?¹⁴

Oderinde (2009) posited that expectation of this nature is even more firmly grounded in the earlier segment of the Lukan narrative. 'This is because Luke's account of the raising of this man's daughter has severe points of contact with the account of the raising of the widow's son in Luke 7:11-17. For example, at the most basic level both are stories of resuscitation, both involve an only child (7:12; 8:42) who is therefore all the more valued, both contain echoes of the analogous Elijah- account (1 kings 17:8-24), and Jesus' word, "Do not weep," are replicated (Luke 7:13;8:52). As such, both are understood as evidence of Jesus' messiahship and the extension of good news to the poor (7:22)¹⁵. A further element characteristic of this narrative unit is the presence of the crowds who are as ubiquitous as there is ambiguous. When they first appear they are portrayed positively, awaiting Jesus return and welcoming his arrival (verse 40). However, Dodd (2012) reiterated that they are described in a way reminiscent of the thorns of the story of the sower, as unwanted foliage growing up alongside sprouting seedlings that will eventually choke the desired vegetation. In the final scene (verses 51-54) unspecified bystanders laugh at Jesus, disbelieving his claims regarding the child, failing to recognize his authority to make such statements (and make his words effective)¹⁶. The crowds are not portrayed as particularly malicious, or are they presented as persons of faith, as person whose faith is manifest in the harvest of perception and obedience. Against this backdrop, the woman with the haemorrhage is revealed as person with the faith that survives the test, and with faith that has human wholeness as its consequence. Similarly, even in the face of those who mock Jesus' claims, Jairus and his wife are able to put aside their fear and to embrace faith in Jesus' capacity to bring restoration.

According to Robbins (2004), Luke returns to the episode with which he had opened this narrative unit, with the initial clause, "while he was still speaking," serving as the seam at the intersection

of these two stories of healing. Because of the heightened drama of the encounter between Jesus and the haemorrhage woman, Jesus' original destination must be brought again into the foreground¹⁷. This accomplished by the introduction of the messenger from the house of the ruler of the synagogue. In the opening of this scene, Baxter (2014) opined that Jairus' daughter has been described as "dying": the delay caused by the exchange with the woman en route to Jairus, house prevents Jesus from arriving in time to heal the daughter. Her situation is beyond hope. "Teacher," the title, by which Jesus is known to the messenger, is generally a term of respect used by those outside the circle of Jesus' disciples. In this co-text, combined with instruction that Jesus' true identity and redemptive power that characterized his ministry. Jesus' response to the message encapsulates the whole of the larger section constituting chapter 8 of the Gospel. Fear must give way to a faith that encompasses a proper recognition of Jesus' identity and concomitant trust in his ability to provide salvation¹⁸.

In verses 51-56, even the disciples of Jesus have been slow to perceive who he is, but they were not the first to have questions. John the Baptist had wondered whether Jesus was the Messiah and in support of this identification. Jesus performs miracles in keeping with the Isaianic vision of eschatological salvation, brings good news to the poor, and raises the dead. By these means, Berkhof (1994) agreed that people will gain insight into the nature of Jesus' person and work (7:18-22). With the disciples as primary witnesses, Jesus has been about the same activities since Luke 8:22, culminating in this episode in which he will raise a young girl from the dead. This explains why he takes only the child's parents and representatives of the twelve with into the room – in order to assist their perception of him, in preparation for Jesus' question in 9:20, "who do you say that I am?"¹⁹

Robbins (2014) posited that Luke's narration is potentially confusing at this juncture. If Jesus takes only these five persons into the house with him, to whom does Jesus address his words, "Do not weep"? Who is weeping and wailing? Who laughs? This

confusion is resolved when it is realised that the narrator has again reorganised his account for dramatic effect, ordering the events outside of chronological time so as to focus separately on two distinct discourses²⁰. Dodd (2016) focused on concentration of Jesus' response to the crowds gathered to mourn the passing of the daughter of Jairus and his wife. As he has promised in the sermon on the plain, those who weep will have cause for laughing (6:21). In the present case, however, laughter is not grounded in the celebration of salvation Jesus had anticipated; instead, it is the laughter of who mock Jesus words. In interpreting the girl's condition as "sleep" rather than "death" he has made an authoritative claim they are unwilling to accept. Of course, in an important sense, the crowds speak the truth; the girl's death has already been reported to Jairus (and thus Luke's audience), and is known by all who have gathered. Capitalising on the word play available to him in the use of term "sleep" as a euphemism for "death," Jesus asserts that her condition is more temporary than the crowds might think. Rejecting his declaration, they also refuse to recognize him as one who might exercise the divine power of giving life²¹.

The other discourse is cantered on the girl and her parents with the three disciples invited only as witnesses. Benz (1994) expatiated that Jesus crosses the boundary between life and death, between purity and impurity, by taking the girl by her hand and commanding her to arise. The effect is immediate. He directed them to give her something to eat both to provide material evidence of her resuscitation and to signify her restoration to kinship, symbolized in the sharing of the food. They, in turn, respond with "astonishment" a typical reaction to the wonderful activities of God²². The growth of the crowds gathered to hear Jesus (8:4) has not been accompany by maturation in the general perception of Jesus; indeed, the crowd seem actually to have served as a potential impediment to the communication of good news in these two episodes. Hence, Best (2007) pointed out the way Jesus direct the child's parents to be silent regarding her restoration to life. A mission of proclamation

and healing is in the kingdom project (9:1-2); what is not needed at present, though is an increase in the number of persons attracted to Jesus on the basis of miraculous events of this nature²³.

4. A NIGERIAN PERSPECTIVE ON 'THE HEALING OF JAIRUS' DAUGHTER

The story of the healing of Jairus daughter in the gospel of Luke 8:40-42 is very relevant to contemporary Nigerian society. Today charismatic healers in Nigeria are making fantastic claims. Programmes on television are usually introduced for years with the same pictures of fantastic claims to the miraculous. Many of them have travelled all over Nigeria and even overseas to seek for magical occultic powers for miracles. Abogunrin (2008) opined that What many displayed on television is nothing but pure magic performed in the name of Jesus. Most of the charismatic healers rarely venture to come out of their church buildings or their radio and television studios. If indeed their claims are genuine why do we seldom hear of the exercise of such gifts in the hospital hall, blind centres, handicapped people, home where people with organic diseases are kept and people suffering from AIDS virus in hospitals? If they genuinely possess the gift why is it that none of them is ever moved or led by God to such places to heal like it happened with Apostle Babalola of CAC in 1930? When hospitals were emptied in search divine healing. Of course, the fact that there are fake healers means that there are genuine ones also who are being used by God today. The gifts of Holy Spirit, including the gift of healing are as valid today as they were in the days of Jesus and of the Apostles and this will remain so until the Lord returns at the consummation of all things²⁴.

In the light of this observation, Omowole (2013) posited that it is proper for Nigeria Christians to minister healing today in line with Jesus techniques and the biblical principles, more so because spiritual and earthly blessings are the concern of Nigerians. However, there is need for warning against being uncritical and

against credulity. An act must be proven and seen by all to be supernatural act of God before you conclude that a miracle has happened. Do not use the idea of miracle, real or unreal, to win cheap popularity for yourself or your congregation. Sermon and teaching should be based on the gospel healing stories, but one must not be narrow minded in our use of the stories. These stories must be used to teach Christian concept and not just that God would give physical healing. These stories must be used to teach the dogmas that the will of God or His perfect will for man is to be in good health whether medically or otherwise²⁵.

5. CONCLUSION

The concept of healing is one of the most fundamental issues in the Gospel. The huge success of Jesus healing miracles in Gospel could be traced to Luke's conception of the person of Jesus Christ as the most significant factor. The way in which Jesus is shown to have conducted his healing miracles and the various interpretation implies a Christology that Jesus is the messiah. In this Christology, the evangelist believes that Jesus is the divine Son of God concealed in human form whose power and authority is manifested in his teachings and healing miracles.

This healing force comes from His divine being. It is empowered and reinforced by the Spirit of God for onward transmission to the sick by a command of words. As the sick person releases his faith to touch the divine seat of the healing power in the being of Jesus, a current of divine health flows in a spiritual manner from Jesus to the being of the sick person. The immediate result is miracle. Thus, the healing power of Jesus is in the nature of His divine person, the action of God and the Holy Spirit in Him. Though healing miracle has been abused and there are a lot of false claims of healing which are not verifiable in the church today, many people who could have sought healing in the hospitals and get healed have lost their lives in the course of seeking healing miracles. However, this does not in

any way discredit the fact that healing miracles are still a reality in the contemporary church. Also when the understanding of Jesus as the healer is well appropriated in the Church, it will reduce the tendency for Pastors to arrogate power to themselves. It will promote the right attitude to healing miracles and develop the faith of the Church members in Christ alone.

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THE IMAGINARY MUSEUM.
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE “MATERIAL WORLD” AND THE
“VIRTUAL WORLD” IN ANDRE MALRAUX’S *MUSEUM WITHOUT
WALLS*

Monica Pinto Mendes

UAb, Lisbon, Portugal
monicapintomendes@outlook.com

Abstract. Since Classical Antiquity, the role of Museums went through a process of metamorphosis. This article begins by scrutinizing the Imaginary Museum - a theme in the work of Andre Malraux, and lead us to embark on an imaginary journey without borders, founded on the interaction between the material world and the virtual world of a *Museum Without Walls* that influences also the *Imaginary Documentary*. It concludes with a sociological reflection on what the Museum can offer today.

Keywords: Andre Malraux, Imaginary Museum, visual arts, art theory, virtual spaces, sociology of art, social politics

INTRODUCTION

Between Classical Antiquity and the 19th century, the museum “Temple of Muses” operated as a leading knowledge centre. In the meantime, museums became *research centres* or *centres of science and arts*. In the 18th century, a new era began with the opening of public museums, highlighting the British Museum (1753) in London, England; the Musée du Louvre¹ (1793) in Paris, France; and the *Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga*² (1884) in Lisbon, Portugal. At the end of that century, the museum became an important element of the enlightened imagination in Europe, expanding the field of meanings and functions. (Brefe 1998, 85).

During the late 20th century, museums lose their strength as main institutions of research to universities, as centres for research and

innovation. However, these institutions continue their important role. In the 1980s and 1990s, museums worked towards giving rise to a new perception of the Western world, offering nowadays researching and teaching activities and contributing to a structured future of the individual.

George Brown Good (1888) observed that what counts is not what a museum owns, but what it can do with what it owns (Mendes 1999 *apud*. Zeiterberg, 64). Man's necessity to collect and preserve different objects for the future gives rise to an institution that completes the general historical process of humanity. Throughout the 19th century, through public museological institutions, the States, particularly the Europeans States, exhibited their power and, simultaneously, ensured the education and well-being of their citizens, based on the theoretical basis of educational philosophy, whose goal was the democratization of education (enlightenment legacy) in a time of renewed nationalism (Mendes 1999). Regardless of the modalities offered to the general public, studies were not carried out based on the experiences of its visitors (Mendes 1999, 674; Hein, 4-5). We will observe soon the care to overcome some of the detected limitations through experience, accompanied by studies and various reflections, the result of the re-alignment of the dynamic part in the functional, technical and financial structure of the museological institution. For example, the MNAA has been given a key role in staff training. This exercised a kind of tutelage over regional museums where, during the 1930s, the "Educational Extension Service" was a pioneering project in Portugal. It aimed to create a link and promote the collaboration between museums and schools (Mendes 1999). The Contemporary Museum is thus understood by a complex system, not limited in what regards collections, exhibitions and conservation of works, nor is it directed to experts but the general public.

As concerns the ideas of massification and reproduction of works of art, and for prophetic ideas that remained until today, I call Walter Benjamin (1892-1940). He argues that works of art could be reproduced with greater or lesser intensity and quality and,

concomitantly, the emergence of photography and cinema enabled to man the reproduction of instant images, reaching, thus, the status of a category as a work of art. Through the democratization of culture, there were positive aspects (advanced civilizations) and negative aspects (mindless, little selective and little interested). The good has ceased to be good to become trivialized indiscriminately, rising, amongst others, problematics such as the fact that the value of works of art is measured today by their ability to generate spectacle, that is, easily predispose mass entertainment (Tota 2010).

Llosa (2010) presents us these problematics and considers that the media influences in the almost complete absence of values from the hierarchy of the importance of cultural facts, a fact caused by the intellectual (avant-garde) movement. The author observes that it is probably in the field of plastic arts that one feels a greater devaluation of the old system of classifying works of art as important, less important and unimportant works (Llosa 2010).

THE NOTION OF “IMAGINARY MUSEUM” IN THE WORK OF ANDRE MALRAUX AND ITS INFLUENCES ON THE MALRUCIAN UNIVERSE

The reflection on the recent dialogical forms of museums has produced deep debates, namely from the *Museums Without Walls* of Malraux³ (1954) to Hetherington (1996), who uses Malraux's metaphor to analyze the Stonehenge case. The museum works as an instrument in transmitting the conservation of power in the culture, as well as a dominant hegemony in arts (Tota 2000, 147).

According to Malraux (1978), the notion of *beauty* is in constant transformation in man, considering as beautiful what surpasses him or that he finds enigmatic, considering the representation of the aesthetic diversity and the different expressions of the artistic creations around the art and the beautiful. For the author, individuals have the possibility of mentally assembling their own *Imaginary Museum* without limitations of borders or time/spaces, unlike the traditional one. In this project – the *Imaginary Museum*,

which began in 1947, Malraux leads us to question the historical past, and artistic legacy, the processes of decontextualization and recontextualization in contemporary culture.

The author assembles a montage of photographs of works of art from all corners of the world and different eras. He analyzes and questions the importance and function of the museum to societies and its interaction with culture, making, thus, the following observation: "The museum is a statement, the Imaginary Museum is a question". A "museum without walls" in the format of an art book which designates as reproductions of works of Arts in an epoch in which printing and photography techniques were improving in the 50s⁴ and 60, thus enabling the perception of art at the level of image quality and printing/publication: "the museum is a confrontation of metamorphoses" (*Ibid.*, 12). "Titian did not reproduce imagined scenes; it was from the night bound forest of Cadore he got his Venus" (Lombardi 2008; Malraux 1978, 56). Many artists claim to have found references in the works of someone else for their own artistic creations. Sometimes we find a connection between painting and photography, in which one is used by the other and vice versa (it is in this meeting of exchange of experiences that the Imaginary Museum is used and where it is enhanced).

The Imaginary Museum is undoubtedly a strong influence on the Imaginary Documentary, as observed the photographer Antoine D'Agata (1961) in one of his publications, namely *Stigma* (2004). He was inspired by the artistic creations of Francis Bacon (1909-1992), in turn "drank" from Muybridge's literature and the idea of the movement of photographic representations, transporting them to his artistic creations, namely to serial painting (Lombardi 2008; Sylvester 1995, 30).

We shall observe, here, the metamorphosis that Malraux talks about when an artistic creation metamorphosis what it was before (Sylvester 1995).

SOCIOLOGICAL REFLECTION ON THE MODALITIES THAT A MUSEUM CAN OFFER

As an institution, the museum gives shape to social practices, paving the way for a succession of approaches on how different societies remember or forget the past, as well as the importance of research work on intervention in the reconstruction of the memory-related to specific historical events. Recalling the past is not limited in remembering historical facts but also depends on the perception of small movements or actions of the human, such as body postures, what kind of materials they used in certain purposes or how certain stimuli make us feel. The museum can offer fragments of everyday life, retracing the culture of a community (Totta 2000; Connerton 1989, p.135).

The role explicitly assigned to museums promotes common values to citizens, raising their cultural and civic levels. This is about the role of museum democratization that leads Zolberg (1992) to compare cultural policies of art museums in France, and the United States of America, in the theme of museums as identity technology. The author questions the modalities in which museums communicate with their public and underlines that although there is an increase in the number of visitors, this is not an indicator of democratization. DiMaggio, Useem and Brown (1978), in a study on this matter, document that although museological institutions can attract a larger number of visitors than theatres, the public mostly under-represents the less favoured classes.

Tota (2000) refers us to Bourdieu and Darbel (1966), who carried out an investigation in which we find out later that there seem to be no changes since then, especially in the Italian Museum. In the 60s and 70s, the authors compared French museums with Greek, Spanish and Dutch ones. In the three ways of enjoying the museums, strictly related to social classes, as a result, the most numerous groups of visitors, to those who knew the names of the artists and their works of art, came from the upper classes, this group sought to avoid guided tours and crowds. They preferred

individual visits or accompanied by someone knowledgeable and thus relying predominantly on their personal culture. In turn, visitors from the middle classes made their group visits, accompanied by a guide, making use of the available catalogue, thus taking the opportunity to absorb all the available information. As the authors emphasize, the middle classes recognize in the erudite culture a value that they aspire to become cultured, they recognize a greater dominance of the upper classes that legitimized themselves as “superior” when compared to other social classes. The working classes did not visit museological institutions for several reasons, namely due to the economic shortage and the inability to decode museum codes, and excluded guided tours for fear of exposing their ignorance.

Tota (2000) affirms that, in Italy, it is still connoted as a classist and that for most, museums are mainly directed to tourists, such thinking about the Italian museum seems to lose its social role as an agent of democratization, of a legitimate arena for recomposing social conflicts. However, based on several analyzes we observe that new experiences have opened up about dialogical museums, that is, about the museological planning policies that will transform the relationship with their visitors in an interactive way. The forms are changing institutionally and the poetics of conservatives (Visitor-Model) are documented in dialogical museums. The cognitive and emotional experience the new dialogic forms can offer corresponds to the profile of the contemporary visitor, familiar with different media and resources for navigation among the numerous museums available online (Tota 2000, 135-148).

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Museum is undoubtedly an irreplaceable place for the perpetuation not solely of Ars Magna exhibited but also to persevere the memories of a nation, its identity, history, myths, cultural influences, artists, trends and the development of techniques in

different fields; teaching; research and conservation of cultural heritage. Culturally rich as history, socio-cultural promotion, source of dissemination and acquisition of new knowledge by the public in general.

The Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, designed by Frank Gehry⁵, reflects upon its deconstructivist style compared to most contemporary museums with influences from the prototypes of the Modern Movement and the 50s, which recover old typological values. However, following the technological developments and the new requirements of an increasingly demanding consumer/visitor, viewing the Museum has an educational role. The Guggenheim Museum, a building in itself a work of art that you feel and breathe whenever you observe it, pays homage to the city of Bilbao and its people. All its structure is majestic, essentially in its complex shapes and curves, due to the shades reflected on its external surface that are different every day, inspiring photographers, painters and causing the metamorphosis that Malraux explained to us.

It is important to highlight the Museum of the History of the Holocaust - Yad Vashem⁶ in Jerusalem, by various memorials, and centre of studies contributes to the enriching of the visitor as an individual. Another similar Museum is the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum⁷, as a centre of studies, does not restricts in providing massive statistical data to its visitors, but handing to each visitor, upon entering the Museum's Permanent Exhibition, an identification card of one of those people who lived during the Holocaust, and where its history appears, showing to visitors that they hold in their hands details of real people of different ages and with existence at different levels of familiarity or friendship. It results in the importance to educate, as well as the responsibility that the museological has for the collective memory. Thanks to the technological evolution and "the plastic arts that invented its press", it is thus possible for us to revisit it online or in book format.

Addressing also the Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga (MNAA), due to the campaign carried out in 2015 as a result of continuous work in directing the attention to the only receiver of the Museum:

man, for doing something unprecedented in Portugal, although this type of initiative is already practised abroad, having started in the United Kingdom in 1906. The MNAA launched a fundraising campaign⁸ to buy the painting “Adoration of the Magi” by the illustrious artist, the Portuguese painter, Domingos António Sequeira⁹ (1768-1837). The fundraising campaign counted with the participation of numerous anonymous contributions from various private entities, such as the EDP Foundation, *Sociedade Portuguesa de Autores*, awards, including the Pritzker Prize (1989), the Prince of Asturias Prize (2014) and the Presidential Medal of Freedom (2016), by Barack Obama. Ana Aeroporto among all, noteworthy, the Aga Khan Foundation, whose donation was the most significant, contributing one-third of the value of the work to the National Museum of Ancient Art.

It should also be noted that traditional visits registered a growth trend in Portugal concerning the number of visitors to museums of 5.2 per cent in 2017¹⁰. However, the trend of the increase in the number of visitors to the museum space and of attendance to cultural attractions events, as well as the offer of the virtual museums as a supplementary modality to visit it, it is not a reliable indicator of democratization, and further studies should be carried out in this field, as well as regarding the transition from real to virtual, where the task would be to bring more concrete results in the countless debates on analytical reflection, some addressed here regarding this thematic and largely documented in many countries. They bring together technologists and sociologists from museological institutions in an offline and online museological experimentation, as referred by Tota in her work (2000, 210 -216). We must, therefore, carefully analyse the situation nowadays, since the visitor loses something, although he acquires many potentialities. He loses his corporeality, restricted only to auditive and visual senses of perception. The individual cannot feel himself in the space, that is, the virtual visit cannot transmit the real environment of the exhibition room(s), although thanks to multimedia technologies and consumption practices, the artistic

productions, contemporary art and visitors benefit from this encounter resulting in an immeasurable diversity concerning both the past and the present. Virtual museums are more receptive and more diffusion to what Benjamin (1955) emphasizes, how the work of art would be structurally transformed when referred to technical reproducibility.

Virtual museums offer a supplementary modality compared to the face-to-face visit. Mnemonic functions tend towards a path to numerous experiences such as freedom. They multiply the potentiality of knowledge and, although this is of great importance, it produces an imperfect approach compared to a face-to-face visit. In short, museological institutions are known as geared institutions service providers, which must provide an experience, based on a singular or differentiated narrative. It is, therefore, crucial to improve the quality of museums' relationship with their audiences and users, and quality assessment tools should be applied for an observational and proper understanding of the studies and to determine their effectiveness, as they are key spaces of education, innovation, inspiration and dialogue.

At a time when governments and the world population face COVID-19, with this unprecedented situation, most museums have made their social media pages more active since they closed their doors to the public by following the recommendations of governmental and health institutions. Others made virtual tours and mobile applications available to continue the support they are providing to society. The pandemic situation, and the current social distancing rule, moving out of lockdown might put the public at further risk of infection. Cultural institutions in general must find creative ways to serve billions of people around the world. Museums, when closed to the public are vulnerable, don't generate revenue and face more challenges with staff and security, as the preservation of collections must continue. UNESCO, the International Council of Museums (IOM), trade unions and supporters are doing all efforts to support the museological institutions with all types of reopening plans as they are experiencing

a new metamorphose, needing to be reimagined with new tools to continue to inspire, educate and produce a dialogue between societies, whether locally or globally, whether virtually or face-to-face. Experts, museums supporters, staff must all engage in a deep constructive reflection in bringing such creative solutions.

NOTES

1. The British Museum had 5000 visitors during the 18th Century. Nowadays, it has 6 million visitors.
2. *Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga* (National Museum of Ancient Art - MNAA), has registered 212.669 visitors, occupies the 2nd place in the national ranking in Portugal, behind the Museu Nacional do Coche (National Coach Museum) registered 350.254 visitors. Although the MNAA has 21.1% more than the previous year, while the MNC registered 8.5% less than in the previous year (Público, 2018); see more information on the Cultural Heritage portal.
3. André Malraux (11.3.1901 – 11.23.1976), entrepreneurial and visionary spirit, French novelist, art historian, for 10 years he served as Minister of Cultural Relations in France. Author of *Le Musée imaginaire de la sculpture mondiale* (1952-54; *Museum Without Walls*).
4. The period post-World War II, when documentary photography acquired new values.
5. Frank Gehry (1929), a Canadian architect, author of postmodern designs, deconstructivist, who used materials such as corrugated metal and recycled materials. His works can be found at the *Guggenheim Museum*, Bilbao, Spain; *Vita Design Museum*, Germany; *Opus*; *Walt Disney Concert Hall*, Los Angeles, USA.
6. Further information available in the portal Yad Vashem – The World Holocaust Remembrance Centre, Israel.
7. Further information available in the portal United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, United States of America.
8. Fundraising campaign started on October 27, 2015, and finished on April 30, 2016. Total raised: €745.623,40. Further information available on the portal of the Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga – *Let's put the Sequeira in its rightful place*.
9. Further information on the portal *Arqnet*.

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