“Post-Truth” Possibility in Popper’s Conjecture and Refutation Pattern

Abstract

Despite appearances to the contrary, we decide to turn ideals to reality, as we cannot perceive reality at the start. This is an endless and inconclusive attempt; but at the same time, it constitutes the rationale to Popper’s conjecture-and-refutation pattern. Once we trace his decision to accept sets of basic statements according to which our search for truth will be realised and identified, we understand the meaning of “post-truths”. “Post-truth” is associated with the working-class people. The right-wing populist rhetoric lures the working class into its trap, which entails nationalism and phobia of immigrants. The above-mentioned set is, indeed, incorroborable: neither falsifiable nor provable. But by accepting it, we accept the dismissal of Popper’s excessive zeal for rationalistic values, which cannot be pursued in abstraction from a well-defined set of circumstances. A “post-truth” can be understood in the process of trial-and-error, as regards, say, the said populist rhetoric. This process shows that we are not free from ignorance, so we cannot absolutely eliminate populism. According to Popper, we ought not make statements irresponsibly or at random, where we have no relevant knowledge, or are not in a position to pronounce, as quite literally we cannot, because part of the essential stage-setting for statement-making, properly so-called, is missing. A “post-truth” fills in that gap, as stressed by Popper’s demarcation line between what we can do and what we cannot do in science and philosophy.