Thirty-Three Moments of the Soviet Position on the German Question: A Microhistory
by
Abstract
This article presents the microhistory of the Soviet position on the German question from 1985 to 1990, drawing on Russian-language archival materials, mainly Gorbachev’s correspondence published by the Gorbachev Foundation. In addition to offering this microhistory, it aims to illuminate the long-debated “not one inch eastward” assurance by analysing its context. This research demonstrates that, during 1989-1990, Western oral pledges to the Soviet leadership regarding NATO’s non-enlargement sometimes specifically referred to the territory of the (former)1 GDR, at other times to the Eastern Bloc beyond the (former) GDR, and in some instances resembled a general promise of NATO’s future non-enlargement to the east. Furthermore, the article highlights that during the negotiations on Germany, the Soviets had concerns about pro-NATO aspirations in the Eastern Bloc (beyond the GDR) and the risks of future NATO enlargement eastward, beyond the (former) GDR. Ultimately, the article proposes a theoretical framework to explain why the Soviets accepted a status quo that risked NATO’s eastward expansion, despite their awareness of the associated risks and the absence of any legal guarantees against enlargement.