Modal Semantics of Thought Experiments: TE Matrix and PWS
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Abstract
In this paper, we discuss a couple of nonclassical logics and their application in the analysis and interpretation of thought experiments (TE, e.g. Tamar Gendler, Roy Sorensen, Ronald Laymon), particularly modal logic. After discussing pros and cons (e.g. W. Van O. Quine) of modal logic, we opt for Saul Kripke’s frame semantics, possibly described as possible world semantics (PWS), involving a set of (possible) worlds, considered as abstract entities (e.g. Kit Fine 2017), as pictured by search engines like Google and Baidu, an accessibility relation, and a satisfiability relation. On retaining principle of bivalence, we provide for underpinnings of the methodology of TE Matrix, whereby the possible worlds (PW) of TE arguments (premises and conclusions) pick out accessible PW (as from axioms to principles) unto the argument is both formally and informally logically validated (i.e. logical inference is valid, premises and conclusions are true—so, argument is sound) and we don’t need to prescribe any forcing formal validation function (Descriptive Semantics View).
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