Rawls and the Morality of Civil Disobedience

Abstract

Political obligations require citizens to obey states’ laws. In the case of morally objectionable laws, some political philosophers contend that our political obligation can be overridden by higher countervailing obligation through the act of civil disobedience. John Rawls appeals to this view. He contends that citizens can engage in civil disobedience in a nearly just democratic regime only when
there is a sufficient justification that the principles of equal liberty and fair opportunities have been violated. Some commentators think that by viewing civil disobedience as a political act, Rawls seems to limit the justification of civil disobedience to only political principles. This paper offers an interpretation of Rawls’ theory of civil disobedience that highlights his appeal to potential dissents’
moral dispositions. We argue that the Rawlsian non-violence and fidelity to law requirements for civil disobedience create a moral limit for the dissenter. However, dissenters are obligated to resist the state when it attempts to suppress them from correcting injustices in the society forcibly .